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The European Banking Union (EBU) has introduced many important features of banking 
governance and contributed to restoration of confidence in European banking. However, two 
institutional pillars of the EBU, the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism, were designed as mandatory for the Member States using the Euro as their 
currency, but optional for all other Member States. The majority of them have chosen to 
decline participation, while a handful have joined. A number of important components of the 
EBU are consequently unavailable or inapplicable to the non-participating States.  
This thesis uncovers the reasons why the majority of non-Euro States are not 
participating, analysing the legal reasons for such choice, as well as national economic and 
banking sector predispositions of potential signatories. Its findings reveal that a significant 
number of States are likely to permanently opt-out of the EBU. Moreover, it argues that in 
the absence of solutions to the problems discouraging participation, the long-term non-
participating States are likely to grow increasingly distant from the institutional components 
of the EBU and the Eurozone, which will deepen the fractures in the EU Single Market. As 
an answer to this conundrum, this thesis seeks to provide potential solutions for bridging the 
gap between the two groups of Member States and two banking supervision and resolution 
systems that have emerged. This thesis is the most detailed and multifaceted interdisciplinary 
study on all non-Eurozone EU Member States to date. It involves qualitative and quantitative 
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Thesis Structure, Themes and Methods Employed 
 
 
A. General presentation of this work   
 
The term ‘European Banking Union’ (EBU) generally refers to the gradual 
harmonisation and centralisation of banking policy, resolution, and supervision, involving a 
gradual transfer of powers from the Member States to the supranational European Union 
level. This thesis discusses the EBU from an unusual perspective – focusing on the EU 
Member States, which have chosen not to participate in it.  
The EBU as we know it today was built around the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM), which is mainly about bank prudential supervision, the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM), which deals with the resolution of banks, the Single Banking Rulebook (‘the 
Rulebook’), a body of legislation governing the banking oversight in the EU, and the final, 
partly established, pillar – the single European Deposit Insurance scheme (EDIS).  
The SSM and the SRM are known as the institutional pillars (or components) of the 
EBU. That is because they each comprise a governing EU level body and a system of 
national authorities, working together under complex arrangements, stipulated by EU 
legislation. Both of them are subject to a complication – they do not cover the entire 
European Union, but rather the Eurozone (Member States which have adopted the Euro as 
their single currency), and the States that voluntarily chose to join via a separate agreement.  
The States choosing to exercise or not exercise that option are the focal group of this 
thesis. The aim is to explore the legal, political, structural and economic reasons why the 
majority of non-Eurozone Member States, remain unwilling to participate in the institutional 
components of the EBU. The thesis also offers insights into how the resulting fragmentation 
in European banking oversight might affect European financial stability and the integrity of 
the EU as a whole.  
This work therefore chooses four angles of focus: 1) the non-Participating States 
(NoPS),1  as the primary research interest 2) law, as the pivotal discipline of research, due to 
                                                 
1 The term originally first used by PJE Schammo, Differentiated Integration and the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism: Which Way Forward for the European Banking Authority?, in P Birkinshaw and A Biondi (eds), 
Britain Alone! The Implications and Consequences of United Kingdom Exit from the EU, (Kluwer 2016). It 
refers to EU Member States which have not joined the institutional components of the European Banking 
Union. At the time of writing there are 6 NoPS: Czechia, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Sweden. In 
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its fundamental role in shaping the pre-conditions for non-participation, as well as the 
conditions for participation 3) the Single Supervisory Mechanism, as this pillar ultimately 
drew a sharp legal distinction between Eurozone and non-Eurozone States, and its primary 
statute governs the terms of optional participation, and 4) interdisciplinary research 
methodology, as a pre-requisite for a novel and comprehensive analysis of this multifaceted 
topic.  
The work employs methodologies including legal analysis, political economy analysis, 
qualitative regulation analysis, and quantitative data analysis, in order to uncover and present 
a detailed and nuanced answer to the research problematic.  
This introductory Chapter firstly seeks to outline the purpose and context of this thesis, 
which is done in section B. Section C provides an overview of the themes and scope of 
individual chapters making up this thesis. Research methodology is summarised in Section D, 
briefly introducing the theoretical and empirical foundations the thesis findings are based on. 
Section E highlights the aspects of the thesis which make an original contribution to the 
scholarly knowledge in the fields of European banking law and political economy.  
 
B. Context and purpose of this research 
 
The first institutional component of the EBU, the SSM, was created by the landmark 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (SSMR), which conferred on the European Central 
Bank a number of important tasks concerning prudential supervision. Due to constitutional 
limitations, which burdened the enactment of this Regulation,2 only members of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU or ‘Eurozone’), are compelled to participate in the SSM. 
The membership of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) mirrors the membership of the 
SSM. Thus, the consequences of the SSM’s geographical limits stretched way beyond the 
SSM, drawing a distinction between the EMU and non-EMU states in relation to not one, but 
two EBU pillars. Moreover, the constitutional limitations and EBU design choices made the 
participation terms available to EMU and non-EMU States drastically different.3  
As a consequence of such development, a sub-group of EU Member States, known as 
the non-participating States or ‘NoPS’, emerged. Due to the significance of such States, 
                                                                                                                                                       
some cases the definition includes former NoPS – the UK (now non-EU) and Lithuania (now Eurozone and 
EBU), and most recent EBU members – Bulgaria and Croatia. 
2 See Chapter 2 of this thesis 
3 See Chapter 3 
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which originally also included the UK and Lithuania, a number of legal adjustments needed 
to be made, ranging from special cooperation agreements and memoranda of understanding 
as part of the SSM framework, to significant adjustments in the voting mechanics in the 
European Banking Authority (EBA). These states are far from a monolithic bloc, as this 
thesis uncovers. Moreover, as if to make matters more complex, over the course of less than a 
decade, a number of States changed their relationship to the Union. That included leaving the 
EU altogether (UK), joining the Eurozone (Lithuania), joining the SSM and SRM (Croatia, 
Bulgaria), strictly opting-out (Sweden, Czechia), constantly revising the position (Denmark, 





The decisions and positions of the States were drastically different, while the legal 
framework offered to them was the same. The research leading up to this thesis revealed that 
political and economic considerations eventually tilted the balance.  
What is more, the findings in this thesis indicate that the EBU has amplified some 
integration and disintegration processes, which collide, pull at one another, and result in 
outcomes which are often operationally sub-optimal, costly, and inefficient. Ultimately, the 
political economy of the EBU has shaped many aspects of legal development, but the 
outcomes of these legal developments subsequently shaped the politics and the economics in 
their own right. The need to reflect and assess these processes resulted in the interdisciplinary 
methodology employed, seeking to provide answers to key questions, undistorted by the 
limitations and biases of a single discipline.  
The aim of the thesis is to ask and answer two fundamental questions: 1) ‘What factors 
lead to participation or non-participation of the non-EMU Member States?’ and 2) ‘What role 
has the law played in the past and could play in the future, in shaping the division in banking 
oversight between the NoPS and the participating States?’ The answers to these questions can 
serve three functions: inform the EU policy debate, provide broader context for domestic 
considerations in relation to potential participation, and contribute to the debate on the 
theorisation of the consequences of the EBU on the dynamics of European (dis)integration.  
 
C. Chapter overview  
 
This thesis explores the problematic introduced above in six Chapters. The first five 
Chapters are dedicated to exploring the situation of the NoPS from five different 
perspectives, whereas the final Chapter suggests a number of legal changes, which could 
facilitate banking oversight convergence in the EU in ways that would be acceptable to the 
NoPS.  
Chapter 1 explores the positioning of the EBU in the historical and theoretical context 
of European financial integration. That includes the discussion of integration processes that 
preceded the EBU, dire economic circumstances that led to its creation, the differentiated 
integration processes, and the broader theoretical conceptualisations applied to EU regulatory 
reforms. I argue that the EBU has an important and distinct place in all of these narratives, 
and the situation of the NoPS epitomises many struggles that the broader EU integration is 
facing. In particular, I examine the roles that the EMU and the 2007-2009 Great Financial 
Crisis (GFC) played in shaping the EBU. These two influences created the concurrent 
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narratives of continuity and urgency, which placed the Union on an unstable footing. I 
subsequently employ a more theoretical approach and analyse deeper implications of the 
Banking Union on EU’s geopolitical and constitutional development, applying the theories of 
the Financial Stability Trilemma, the Inconsistent Quartet, and the Path Dependency 
Hypothesis. This discussion illustrates how differentiated integration can twist the EBU into a 
differentiation-deepening force, threatening the integrity of the Single Market.  
Chapter 2 outlines the legal and institutional structure of the EBU, highlighting the 
most important features and shortcomings. Particular emphasis is put on the SSM, as the 
pillar which created the sub-group of States that this thesis focuses on. I discuss the factors 
which led to the SSM being forged the way it was and how two different levels – European 
and national - are designed to function together. I also analyse how the institutional 
arrangements of the SSM decision-making, particularly those relating to the ECB as the 
centerpiece, have made the participation terms fundamentally unequal. I argue that this 
inequality has spilled over into the other pillars of the EBU, especially the SRM. 
Furthermore, the increasing centralisation of European banking oversight has raised the 
stakes for the States taking part in these reforms, which makes unequal distribution of powers 
and consequences within the EBU pillars particularly problematic.  
Chapter 3 analyses the mechanics of participation, as well as the alternative backstop 
arrangements meant to ensure a degree of regulatory harmonisation, if participation 
agreement is not reached. Particular attention is paid to the technical details of the Close 
Cooperation Agreements (CCAs) – binding documents through which the NoPS can become 
part of the institutional components of the EBU. I highlight the fundamental shortcomings of 
these agreements, which partly explain their unpopularity among the majority of NoPS. The 
exclusion of the non-EMU States from the Governing Council of the ECB results in an 
inherently disadvantaged position that these States end up in. In order to mitigate this 
problem, the EBU legislation foresees a number of alterations to the decision making 
mechanics in other bodies, as well as a termination clause, which allows the CCA States to 
leave the SSM and the SRM. However, my research reveals that these concessions can in 
effect be a poisoned chalice. The small print of the alleged concessions puts the non-EMU 
States in a position of even greater disadvantage, largely due aggravation of problems linked 
to the distributive consequences of the SRM. The alternative legal and institutional 
arrangements, on the other hand, do not facilitate the degree of regulatory convergence that 
was expected from the EBU.  
Chapter 4 begins to unravel the underlying political economy reasons for different 
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participation choices. I discuss three geographical regions, which encompass all seven non-
participating States and both CCA States, analysing individual circumstances and concerns of 
these Member States. I discuss the South-Eastern States (Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia), 
Visegrad states (Czechia, Hungary and Poland) and the Nordic-Baltic market (including 
Denmark and Sweden).  
The Nordic-Baltic banking market is also chosen as a case study and a microcosmic 
illustration of Europe-wide problems. This market comprises of EEA, EU and Eurozone 
states, with different supervisory arrangements, which collectively form a fully integrated 
regional banking market. Despite it being one of the most financially stable and fiscally 
responsible regions in Europe, differentiated integration still has an effect on harmonious and 
consistent application of rules in this region. This research analyses the effects and influence 
of non-Eurozone and non-EU states, which nevertheless form part of integrated regional 
markets, alongside participating EU Member States. Such States have substantial credit 
sector presence across the EU, significantly influence banking in individual Eurozone states, 
and can (under certain circumstances) have unintentionally destabilising impact. This 
interconnectedness explains why, the pan-European arrangements might need to stretch 
beyond the Eurozone, to achieve their goals. 
In Chapter 5, the thesis turns to answer a crucial question: why some countries agreed 
to sign the Close Cooperation Agreement while others have rejected it, despite both groups 
sharing very similar concerns, regarding the legal structures, loss of regulatory autonomy and 
distributive consequences of the SRM. I seek to fully uncover the remaining elements of the 
reasoning patterns. It becomes clear that many factors influencing the decision originate from 
outside the law. This chapter offers answers by using a mixed methodology, drawing on 
insights from a range of disciplines, including economics, political science and quantitative 
data analysis. I analyse a set of structural characteristics of domestic banking sectors of all 
non-EMU EU States and compare them against their willingness to participate. Such 
characteristics include inter alia banking sector concentration, banking sector 
internationalisation, exposure to certain States, and the level of non-performing loans. I find 
compelling evidence that structural factors can influence the decision at least as much as 
legal and political considerations. It also becomes clear that non-participation has pushed 
some NoPS to develop alternative contingency plans, in order to mitigate the threats that the 
participating States guard themselves against through the EBU. This underappreciated point 
is important, since it fuels the disintegration dynamics and confirms the path-dependency 
hypothesis, one of the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 1.  
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Chapter 6 draws conclusions from the analyses provided in the preceding chapters and 
moves onto concrete suggestions for legal reforms and improvements. It presents various 
solutions for harmonising banking supervision suggested in past publications and policy 
papers and discovered through this research, assesses their viability and offers several novel 
approaches. That includes, inter alia, discussions on Treaty change, enhanced role of 
supervisory colleges, clear stipulation of negotiation process for CCA accessions, further 
expansion of the remit of the institutional components beyond the EU, additional safeguards 
against disproportionate influence of the Governing Council of the ECB, EU-level legislation 
setting the baseline for supervisory practices, and creation of market incentives for further 
increased integration, leading to greater regulatory convergence.  
 
D. Research methods  
 
The set of research methods employed mainly comprises of legal analysis, law in 
context, law and economics, and political economy methodologies. Two methodological 
strands of thinking are developed throughout the thesis. 
The legal analysis strand, which is largely qualitative, focuses on the substance of the 
Banking Union legislation and case law clarifying it, seeking to identify issues which are (or 
could be) of particular concern to non-Eurozone Member States. This analysis is 
supplemented by testing established hypotheses in political science, EU constitutional law, 
financial law, and economic theory, against the reality of the EBU. The methodological 
framework for this aspect of my research is detailed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
The second strand of this research is more quantitative and (in legal research terms) 
empirical, and employs political economy research methods, quantitative data collection, data 
analysis, and qualitative assessment of quantitative data. The methodological framework for 
this aspect of my research is detailed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. The research process is 
generally centered around collection of quantitative data on various banking sector 
characteristics and comparing the unveiled trends against the Member State’s willingness to 
participate.  
My methods could be simplistically divided into two broad categories: 
i) Qualitative legal research methods of normative assessment, and the 
evaluation of the findings against established theories of legal, political and 
economic development; 
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ii) Quantitative methods focused on a particular hypothesis or 
assumption, seeking to empirically assess the validity of that hypothesis and 
ascertain the breadth of its application; 
 
This mixed methodology was necessary in order to provide answers to the questions the 
thesis set out to tackle. While it is (and will undoubtedly remain) unquestionable that legal 
scholars are the most capable of providing adequate analysis of legally complex issues, the 
legal literature on the issues examined in this thesis did not offer necessary analytical tools 
and methods for the assessment of underlying variables affecting the legal development. 
Most importantly, legal analyses failed to comprehensively answer why some Member States 
opted into the legal regime in question, while others opted out.  It is thus necessary to adopt 
varied methodology, in order understand and address practical concerns and implications.  
 
E. Contribution to existing knowledge  
 
This thesis contributes to the existing body of literature in several ways. Firstly, it 
examines the non-participating States (NoPS) as a specific group in the EBU context in 
exceptional detail, going further than any other research on the topic to date. Secondly, it 
provides a blended legal and political economy analysis of the NoPS, exploring the finer 
nuances of the situation of each NoPS, also providing a number of multidisciplinary findings 
on their impact on the European financial (dis)integration processes. Thirdly, the thesis 
contributes to the existing literature by offering multiple normative suggestions as to how the 
concerns of non-participating States can be addressed, encouraging participation, and thus 
allowing for geographical expansion and increased effectiveness of the EBU’s institutional 
pillars.  
The empirical quantitative study of NoPS’ banking sector structural characteristics 
provided in this work is more detailed than other research papers to date. Moreover, this 
research employed observation of changes in statistical indicators over periods of time, 
reflecting the dynamism of economic indicators, and thus avoiding point of observation bias. 
The full potential of such observations has not been fully utilised in existing literature. 
Furthermore, these changes were analysed in the light of legal and political developments, 
which happened during these periods, allowing for an informative qualitative discussion 
backed by quantitative indicators. The findings were assessed against legal, constitutional, 
and economic theories of European integration and disintegration, seeking to determine the 
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real world effects of legal factors and banking sector structural characteristics.  
Consequently, the thesis uncovers fundamental overriding patterns, joining the 
narratives of individual NoPS, which allows for a comprehensive and conjunctive analysis, 
necessary for informed policy decisions and deeper scholarly understanding. Ultimately, this 
thesis produces a detailed answer why some States chose to join the SSM and SRM, while 



































The legal and institutional architecture of the bodies overseeing European banking is a 
complex system, built on several overlapping lines of thinking: ‘ever-closer union’ 
integration ideals, the need to accommodate pre-existing structures, lessons learned from past 
mistakes, uneasy political compromises, and sub-optimal constitutional foundations. Much 
like the Royal Ontario Museum (Fig.1.1), this institutional architecture would not look the 
way it does, if it was built from the ground up; but it is nevertheless a truly impressive blend 
of vastly different components.  
The European Banking Union (EBU) is a major part of this architecture. It is a 
cornerstone of the European banking law, which is one of the branches of the European 
financial law, falling within the broader scholarly field of economic law.4 The importance of 
the EBU notably stretches far beyond law, as its creation marked a major politico-economic 
shift in EU market integration. It was also the biggest reactionary move in the EU’s history. 
The Banking Union was 
established following the 
global financial crisis (GFC) of 
2007-2009 and the resulting 
sovereign debt crisis, which hit 
the Eurozone in late 2009.5 No 
other EU reform of this 
magnitude has been so firmly 
linked to one particular event.  
This chapter begins our journey through the complex world of EU banking regulation, 
discussing the way towards the Banking Union and offering crucial historical, theoretical and 
economic context, within which the technical details of the EBU should be considered. These 
                                                 
4 Ch Gortsos, The Evolution of European (EU) Banking Law under the Influence of (Public) International 
Banking Law: A Comprehensive Overview, 3rd edition, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens 2020, 
p.127 
5 Often referred to jointly as the Great Financial Crisis or the ‘GFC’.   
Fig.1.1 Photo by Javen/Shutterstock 
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discussions reveal the multifaceted nature of the EBU, as well as the complexity of its 
origins. The narratives of the EBU development lead into the discussion of the integration 
and disintegration dynamics. In this chapter I provide the core conceptual frameworks 
employed for the analysis of such dynamics, which will be used to summarise the findings 
presented in other chapters.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section A covers key events of the historical 
development of financial markets integration, regulatory integration, and supervisory 
centralisation. I identify the conditions the EBU was meant to depart from, that is, in other 
words, the modes of thinking and structural approaches that were meant to be left behind. I 
also explain why the EBU can be seen as a continuation of increasing integration of European 
financial services markets, and how it is linked to the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
These historical narratives form part of the neofunctionalist explanation of the EBU. Section 
B discusses the importance of the role of the crises, which altered the pace, depth and 
expediency of EU reforms. It explains how the crisis experience, the need to protect the 
EMU, and the linear progression towards deeper integration have further joined the EBU and 
EMU narratives, thus exposing the reform to the dangers posed by previous differentiated 
integration. Section C employs a more theoretical approach and analyses deeper implications 
of the Banking Union on the EU’s geopolitical and constitutional development, employing 
the theories of the Financial Stability Trilemma, the Inconsistent Quartet and the path 
dependency hypothesis. I also explore the application of neofunctionalist and 
intergovernmentalist theories to the EBU. I argue that neither of these two theories can fully 
explain the integration and disintegration mechanics. Instead, they are reflections of different 
standpoints, adopted by different actors shaping the EBU. The ideational conflicts between 
them partly explain the difficulties in reaching a consensus that would allow the institutional 
pillars of the EBU to cover the entire European Union.  
 
A. Brief history of European financial integration 
 
This section provides the historical context for the Banking Union, highlighting the 
most important aspects of the financial markets integration, gradually moving onto the 
account of regulatory integration and supervisory centralisation. I indicate why the EBU, 
despite its links to the systemic shock of the crisis, is also a natural instalment in the broader 
European financial integration process. With that being said, this account also reveals how, 
despite trying to mirror the increasing integration of the European Single Market, financial 
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regulation lagged a few steps behind market realities. This tendency manifested even when 
integration was meticulously planned and facilitated by political decisions and legislative 
initiatives. This raises the question whether, through shock-induced decisiveness and 
urgency, the EBU managed to change that tendency and finally keep up with the marketplace 
it oversees.  
The section starts by highlighting the complexity of the European banking market, 
resulting from the diversity of the banking systems that permeate it.  It then proceeds to 
overview the historical evolution of European financial integration, as one of the natural 
historical paradigms in the evolution of the Single Market, leading to the EBU. Subsection 3 
briefly summarises the importance of the Financial Services Action Plan and the role of 
banking supervision in this broader EU strategy for financial services. Subsection 4 covers a 
notable pre-crisis attempt to harmonise the EU banking supervision, based on the so-called 
Lamfalussy report, and its fundamental shortcomings. Subsection 5 highlights important 
crisis-time and post crisis developments, which completes the coverage of the banking 
oversight reforms up to the pivotal moment in the narrative of this thesis – the EBU. 
Subsection 6 discusses the links and parallels between the EBU and the EMU and highlights 
their importance for EBU legal development and consequent differentiation in integration.  
 
1. Diversity and regulatory integration 
 The difficulty of integration efforts in the European finance is rooted in the astonishing 
diversity among the States. Banking is the most prominent example, since this industry is old, 
archaic, and deeply rooted in the national societies. The integration-focused reforms, which I 
will discuss in this section, effectively tried to join together individual markets, all of which 
developed separately, following unique narratives and timelines. The EBU is arguably the 
most ambitious installment in this decades-long endeavour.  
 The EU has always (at least formally) celebrated diversity among the Member States,6 
ultimately even carrying this rhetoric into the EBU legislation.7 However, the diversity 
among the States, often allowed – or even facilitated - by EU legislation, also shaped the 
uneven edifice the EBU had to be placed on, making the reform more difficult. Even as 
cross-border banking approached full integration, the national banking markets and the 
underlying structures of credit institutions differed vastly.  
 The differentiation stemmed from uneven distribution of several factors: national 
                                                 
6 E.g. Art 167 TFEU 
7 E.g. SSMR Rec.17, Rec.79 
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preferences, different compliance processes, coordination issues, autonomy costs, power of 
supranational actors, extent of ideational consensus, degree of international interdependences, 
etc.8 Historically speaking, the EU Member States did not have a shared philosophy of 
banking and finance. For example, the UK, Ireland and many of the Eastern EU States 
adopted the so-called Washington consensus policies – hyper liberal, market-driven financial 
infrastructure models. This contrasts with the more cautions Scandinavian banking, or the 
complex, intricate, and unique German and Italian systems.9 As I will explore throughout this 
thesis, a further problem for the EBU development is that financial services markets are not 
fragmented along the same lines as the European organisational mamberships. The NoPS and 
the Eurozone States have adapted their banking sectors to this complex maze, created by pre-
existing differences and subsequent differentiated integration, and managed to form fully 
integrated regional banking markets, which operate smoothly despite glaring differences 
between the States, as illustrated in Chapter 4.  
 The national regulatory structures overseeing this landscape also differ vastly. 
According to Stubb such differentiation “can be categorised according to […] temporal, 
territorial or sectorial scope.”10 In the banking context, Elliot saw three fundamental ways in 
which regulatory structures differ across Europe: different choices about the particular 
institutions acting as supervisors, different degrees of centralisation, and different divisions of 
authority between supervisory discretion and legal procedures.11 Europe never achieved full 
intellectual consensus regarding the optimal supervisory structure, and arguably – central 
banking as such. The ECB was modelled largely on the Bundesbank12 and there are countries 
in Europe that intentionally chose a different approach to central banking. Some of them are  
NoPS. Not all of the central banks of the Member States are the main supervisors of credit 
institutions. In a quarter of the States central banks have no supervisory responsibilities. 
Some of these are NoPS. Historically, central banks mainly existed as public entities 
responsible for specific designated functions, highly independent, and not involved in 
application of law, which makes them somewhat unusual actors in international law.13 Even 
                                                 
8 See D Leuffen, B Rittberger, F Schimmelfennig, Differentiated integration: Explaining variation in the 
European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013 
9 See N Veron, Banking Regulation in the Euro Area: Germany is Different, Peterson Institute, May 11, 2020 
10 ACG Stubb, A Categorization of Differentiated Integration, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.34:2, 
1996, p.283 
11 DJ Elliot, Key Issues on European Banking Union; Trade-offs and some recommendations, Global Economy 
and Development, Brookings, 2012, p.22 
12 DW Arner, MA Panton, P Lejot, Central Banks and Central Bank Cooperation in the Global Financial 
System, 23 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J.1 2010-2011, p.11 
13 Ibid. p.2 
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in the States with central banks acting as supervisors, other bodies have various supervisory 
functions, and some of these bodies do not have direct equivalents in other States. Therefore, 
finding a single form of oversight for vastly different elements is a very difficult task. As 
Elliott expressed it, “supervisory choices that are right for Germany might be wrong for 
Greece, and vice versa.”14  
 
2. Early Stages of Financial Integration  
A popular view in the literature is that the EBU was a response to the 2007-2009 
(banking) and 2010 (sovereign debt) crises.15 While, the impact of the crises is undeniable, 
the EBU can also be seen more broadly, as an extension of continuous financial markets 
integration process, predating and outlasting the EBU reforms.  
Financial markets integration is part and parcel of the EU’s ambition to build a fully 
integrated internal market. While its ideological premises can be traced all the way to the 
very origins of the European Communities, the intensity and ambition of reforms gradually 
increased with time. In its early stages, the integration process was primarily based on long-
term economic policy considerations. Such considerations became evident with 1966 Segré 
Report16 and reached their aspirational apex with Jean Claude Juncker’s initiative for the 
Capital Markets Union.17 As Segré report put it “market mechanisms contribute best to 
economic growth and to the equilibrium of the economy when they operate within the 
framework of policies reflecting the long-term goals set for the economic and social 
systems.”18 The EC/EU spent many years building such environment. It is important to note, 
however, that the early considerations preceding the GFC, were very economic-benefit-
oriented and neither foresaw potential crises or periods of stagnation of the kind witnessed in 
2007-2010, nor detailed far-reaching regulatory or supervisory reforms. A good example of 
that is the Cecchini Report in 1988 advocating a fully integrated single market in financial 
services, but paying almost no attention to the oversight of such market.19 By the late 90s and 
early 2000s the tensions had started growing, with increasing emphasis being placed on 
regulation and supervision. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID) 
                                                 
14 Elliot 2012, p.22 
15 See section B below.  
16 C Segré, Report by a Group of experts appointed by the EEC Commission, The development of a European 
capital market, EU Commission 1966  
17  For overview see E Mourlon-Druol, A Capital Markets Union for Europe, from Claudio Segré to Jean-
Claude Juncker, blog 2014 
18 Ibid.  
19 Unspecified, Europe 1992: The Overall Challenge, Summary of the Cecchini Report, SEC (88) 524 final, 
13/04/1988 
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is a good example of the ensuing legislation, largely built with a purpose of shaping the 
market landscape.20 These changes were legislation-focused and did not seek major 
institutional European-level centralisation. The following passage from a 2007 ECB report 
(also describing the early signs of the banking crisis as ‘recent market turbulence’), aptly 
illustrates pre-crisis thinking: 
 
“EU framework for prudential supervision should support the efficient 
functioning of cross-border banks. Cross-border banks are important drivers of 
banking integration, helping to address the relatively high degree of fragmentation of 
European retail banking markets. […] the supervisory framework should support the 
efficient functioning of cross-border banking as a channel for further financial 
integration, in view of its benefits for economic growth and competitiveness. […] 
differences in supervisory requirements and approaches and overlapping policy 
measures should be greatly reduced and eventually eliminated”.21  
 
The agenda was primarily to create a level playing field, not avert a systemic shock. 
The market participants themselves were also expected to play an integration-deepening role, 
by establishing increased cross-border presence and developing systems of market self-
regulation. Also, as the retail banking market was considered too fragmented, some level of 
prudential oversight fragmentation seemed somewhat proportionate.  
 
3. The Financial Services Action Plan  
a) Brief overview of FSAP 
The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) neatly illustrates the integration strategy 
after the EMU. It consisted of a set of measures intended to fill gaps and remove the 
remaining barriers to the Single Market in financial services.22 Market integration (notably 
neglecting regulatory harmonisation), was at the core of its agenda.23  Integration was 
expected to “act as a catalyst for economic growth across all sectors of the economy, boost 
                                                 
20 G Ferrarini, N Moloney, Reshaping Order Execution in the EU and the Role of Interest Groups: From MiFID 
I to MiFID II, European Business Organization Law Review, volume 13, 2012, p.581  
21 ECB, Review of the Lamfalussy framework, 2007, p.6 
22 European Commission, The Financial Services Action Plan, Cardiff, 06/1998, p.1 
23 HM Treasury, the Financial Services Authority, and the Bank of England, The EU Financial Services Action 
Plan: a guide, 2003, p.352  
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productivity and provide lower cost and better quality financial products for consumers, and 
enterprises, in particular - SMEs”.24 
The FSAP foresaw further harmonisation in many areas, many of which are beyond the 
scope of this work, including securities, insurance, accounts, corporate restructuring, various 
funds, retail payments, money laundering, etc.25 Some measures with more obvious links to 
the topicality of this thesis concerned financial supervision, corporate insolvency, electronic 
money institutions, and cross-border savings. This reform, like its predecessors and early 
successors, was rules-focused and did not involve drastic institutional changes in areas 
directly concerning credit institutions. The adoption of the FSAP followed the standard EU 
legislative procedures and thus the ECB and financial markets regulators only served as 
consultants. 
 
b) Place of banking in the FSAP 
Although banking was considered a part of the Single Market for financial services 
programme, it was often put on the ‘back burner’, partly due to prevalent belief in sector 
resilience.26 With that being said, the FSAP reforms had some banking-related features. 
Discussion of the majority of these aspects is beyond the scope of this thesis, but some of 
them serve as good illustration of a (slowly) growing focus on spill-over effects and banking 
operations in general. For example, the Bank Winding-up Directive in 200127 sought to 
ensure that credit institutions can be wound up and restructured in the EU as a single legal 
entity, which, had many cross-border banks not become too-big-to-fail by 2007, could be 
considered an important development. This Directive marked the first significant step 
towards consolidation and resolution harmonisation.   
 Another change with some relevance for this thesis was the Taxation of Savings 
Income Directive, designed to prevent cross-border tax evasion by individuals.28 This is an 
illustrative attempt to harmonise oversight (albeit in one, individual respect) beyond the EU 
borders, touching upon Switzerland, something that I will return to in this thesis.29  
These developments effectively demonstrate a pre-existing impetus towards rule 
                                                 
24 Ibid, citing the conclusion of a discussion among Economy and Finance Ministers, the ECB President and 
Governors of National Central Banks, at informal ECOFIN meeting in Brussels in April 2002, discussing a 
report on Financial Integration, drawn up by a Working Group of the Economic and Financial Committee. 
25 European Commission, The Financial Services Action Plan, 1998, p.21-27 
26 For more detailed account of the state of affairs pre-2007 see RM Lastra, Legal foundations of international 
monetary stability, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp.324-328 
27 Directive 2001/24/EC  
28 Directive 2003/48/EC  
29 Chapters 4 and 6 
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harmonisation, predating the GFC. Such impetus was even more evident in the subsequent 
Lamfalussy report, discussed below.  
 
c) Soft banking supervision measures  
The limited attention paid to banking in the FSAP reforms is partly attributable to the 
existence of soft law measures and various enquiries, which created the illusion of 
‘something being done.’ For example, following the Brouwer Report (gently indicating that 
the existing regulatory and supervisory structures in the EU might not be sufficient to 
safeguard financial stability),30 a memorandum of understanding was agreed between the 
banking supervisors and central banks of the EU to that specific end - help ensure financial 
stability.31 It included principles and procedures for cross-border cooperation between 
authorities in the event of a crisis of systemic proportions, affecting multiple States. These 
arrangements were further detailed by a 2005 memorandum to the same effect, also signed by 
the finance ministries of EU countries.32 The memoranda concerned the identification of the 
authorities responsible for crisis management and cross-border information exchange. They 
also provided a framework for cross-border supervision infrastructure. Unfortunately, as the 
illusion of sincere and efficient cooperation was still prevalent, the political will to set up this 
(minimal) infrastructure was lacking. Moreover, even these soft law measures did not 
adequately address systemic risk assessment and management on pan-European level.  
 
4. Lamfalussy Process 
a) Goals and Accomplishments  
 A notable attempt to, inter alia, harmonise European financial supervision by 
increasing the coverage and quality of hard law instruments was the Lamfalussy process,33 
proposing a four level reform. At levels 1 and 2, the Lamfalussy process was based on the 
idea of differentiation between framework legislation and technical implementing measures, 
seeking to make the regulatory and supervisory framework more efficient, effective and 
                                                 
30 H Brouwer, Working Group of the Economic and Financial Committee, Report on financial stability, 
European Economy, Economic Papers 143, May 2000. Brussels, p.32 
31 Memorandum of Understanding on high-level principles of co-operation between the banking supervisors and 
central banks of the European Union in crisis management situations 01/03/2003 
32 Memorandum of understanding on co-operation in financial crisis situations, 14/05/2005 
33 A Lamfalussy et al, Regulation of European Securities Markets, Final Report 15/2/2001; more information on 
the Lamfalussy process see EC website and D Alford, The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank Regulation: 
Another Step on the road to Pan-European Regulation?, Annual Review of Banking and Financial Law, 
Vol.25:1, 2006, p.389 
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sufficiently flexible for market conditions of increasing integration.34 In some (remote) sense 
this distribution has been adopted by the two-level SSM and SRM structures, discussed in 
Chapter 2. The particular focus on supervision at levels 3 and 4 of the Lamfalussy process 
was a significant novelty, attempting to mend the gaps left by the FSAP. Thus, the 
Lamfalussy reforms are said to have “laid the foundations for a network-based institutional 
governance system for the supervision of the EU financial system.”35 The purpose of such 
network was to ensure consistent transposition and application of legislation. Specifically, 
under the Lamfalussy process, representatives of national authorities, were brought together 
in EU-level committees: the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors and, importantly, 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS).36  
 
b) Systemic Shortcomings  
In a somewhat prophetic paper called “Four Predictions about the Future of EU 
Securities Regulation”, Hertig and Lee argued that the Lamfalussy process would not work, 
because of its failure to address two fundamental issues: national protectionism and 
bureaucratic inertia.37 The later could also be described as ‘bureaucratic sloth’, as this 
passage from the preamble of Directive 2005/1/EC illustrates:  
 
“The success of the Lamfalussy process depends more on the political will of the 
institutional partners […] than on an acceleration... In addition, an overemphasis on 
the speed […] could create significant problems with regard to the quality...”38 
 
Hertig and Lee also criticised the Lamfalussy process for effectively dealing with 
symptoms rather than causes and thereby creating preconditions for failure. That resulting 
failure was predicted to make increased harmonisation and some centralisation of supervision 
inevitable.39 However, Hertig and Lee’s paper received a mixed response. For example, 
Michael McKee, Executive Director, British Bankers’ Association, presented opposing 
                                                 
34 ECB, Review of the Lamfalussy framework, 2007, p.1 
35 N Moloney, European Banking Union: assessing its risks and resilience, Common Market Law Review, 
Vol.51:6, 2014, p.5  
36 On the committees see Ch Visscher, O Maisocq, F Varone, The Lamfalussy reform in the EU securities 
markets: Fiduciary relationships, policy effectiveness, and the balance of power, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 
28:1, 2008, p.19 
37 G Hertig, R Lee, Four Predictions about the future of EU Securities Regulation, 2003, pp.7-8  
38 Directive 2005/1/EC, Rec.12 
39 Hertig and Lee, 2003, p.7 
 31 
conclusions.40 The suspicion of a possible failure was present, but consensus on the 
magnitude, timing and likelihood was absent.  
With hindsight, most Lamfalussy measures were moves in the right direction. However, 
they lacked firepower and operational stability, due to over-reliance on effective and sincere 
cooperation, reliability, and expertise of the national authorities (NCAs). The magnitude of 
the banking and sovereign debt crises exposed the shortcomings.41 As Moloney observed, the 
“primary focus of Lamfalussy committees was regulatory and on supporting the 
Commission-led delegated rule-making process.”42 Moreover, while the Lamfalussy 
committees were designed to support supervisory co-ordination across the internal market, 
“they were hampered by their status as soft law actors”, since they could not be empowered 
to adopt measures with binding effect.43 Most importantly, the CEBS and the supervisory 
cooperation frameworks stemming from the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) - the 
main piece of EU legislation in the banking sector at the time - were often not as effective in 
terms of enabling and supporting sincere cooperation and information sharing as believed. 
According to Avgouleas:  
 
“Even regulators from (neighbouring) EU member states, who had also had 
established, via [CEBS], a good understanding with their counterparts, chose 
nevertheless, to follow a national approach when it came to dealing with distressed 
cross-border financial institutions, as in the Icelandic banks’ and Fortis’ cases”.44  
 
Furthermore, as the example of Swedish bank rescue in the Baltics (discussed in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis) illustrates, even when the national authorities cooperated as intended 
and worked towards joint crises resolution, their cooperation framework had little to do with 
CEBS. In essence, banking - the financial sector with arguably greatest influence on the real 
                                                 
40 M McKee, The unpredictable future of European securities regulation, A response to Four Predictions about 
the Future of EU Securities Regulation by Gerard Hertig & Ruben Lee, April 2003  
41 On which see E Ferran, VSG Babis, The European Single Supervisory Mechanism, University of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law Research Paper No.10, 2013; RM Lastra, Banking union and Single Market: Conflict or 
companionship?, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 36, Issue 5, 2013, N Moloney, European 
Banking Union: assessing its risks and resilience, Common Market Law Review, Vol.51, Issue 6, 2014 
42 Ibid. Moloney, p.5, on the role and limits of soft law institutional structures see K Alexander, E Ferran, Can 
soft law bodies be effective? The special case of the European systemic risk board, University of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law Research Paper No.36 2011 
43 Ibid. 
44 E Avgouleas, Governance of global financial markets: The law, the economics, the politics, Cambridge 
University Press, 2012, p.264 
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economy - was not adequately covered by the reform, in terms of enforcement harmonisation 
and effective micro and macro prudential supervision.  
Such situation stands in stark contrast with securities markets, where rules were more 
developed, and CESR played a bigger role in legislative development than CEBS did in 
banking legislation. Generally, the EU banking legislation was largely underdeveloped with 
only the CRD being in place, with the rest of the ‘rulebook’ still in its early stages. The ECB 
expressed concerns that CEBS was not sufficiently involved, due to unimplemented 
distinction between level 1 (principles) and 2 (technicalities) legislation.45 The CRD 
acknowledged this differentiation only implicitly. As a result, the CEBS involvement in the 
drafting of most technical details was limited.46 This is a striking issue, as it was not just the 
national central banks and NCAs, but also the ECB, arguably an institution with the greatest 
expertise in international banking in Europe, that was not meaningfully involved in the rule-
making process. Reflecting on the state of affairs in 2006 Lastra wrote:  
 
“decentralisation (national competence) is the principle that applies to financial 
supervision in Europe. The existence of a multiplicity of committees[…] cannot hide 
the fact that the locus of decision-making remains at the national level.”47  
 
 A contextually interesting (and sometimes forgotten) fact is that Lamfalussy process 
was not necessarily intended as a fixed and entirely permanent solution. Lamfalussy himself, 
as well as the other co-authors of the report understood the system’s reliance on national 
competence and political will. The Committee recommended that its proposed regulatory 
structure should be reviewed, if sufficient progress was not achieved.48 Also, if its approach 
‘did not have any prospect of success’, a Treaty change, including ‘the creation of a single 
EU regulatory authority for financial services was considered.48 Following that thinking, 
EUROFI49 published a report in 2002 suggesting that, to strengthen the Lamfalussy process, a 
European Regulatory and Supervisory System could be established.50 It suggested that this 
system could use a common decision-making mechanism.51 However, it also emphasised that 
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“the  markets  themselves  should  be  given  the  freedom to develop and implement 
solutions.”52  
 
c) Lack of consensus  
 However, as subsequent documentation indicates, the process was assumed to be 
going well and meeting the targets. Just as the Lamfalussy Committee recommended, the EU 
institutions set up an Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group, consisting of representatives of 
the Council, Commission and the Parliament, to monitor the process.53 This group – 
somewhat expectedly - did not include the ECB. The historically peculiar aspect is that the 
first Group’s interim report on the operation of the Lamfalussy process drew largely positive 
conclusions.54  Similar views were also prevalent in local settings and among market 
participants. Consistent with Lamfalussy, the Wicks Report recommended a market-risk-
oriented approach, based on better implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, 
transparent consultations, less new legislation, and reports prepared by the market 
participants themselves, assessing the progress and the health of the Single Market.55 This is 
a perfect example of the (then) prevalent belief in market self-regulation and industrial 
competence.  
Lack of progress in the regulatory (especially supervisory) domain, can also be 
attributed to a notable lack of consensus on how the supervisory integration should look like. 
Lastra, for example, distinguished four different routes for European financial services 
centralisation that were considered: centralisation according to the model of a ‘single 
supervisor’, centralisation according to the model of ‘multiple supervisors’, centralisation of 
some supervisory functions, centralisation in one sector of the financial sector.56 In many 
ways, the structures similar to the EBU or even one authority for the entire financial services 
sector was considered from the start, but only alongside other options. Generally, many 
opposed the creation of one, single European authority at the EU level on the grounds of 
excessive concentration of power and potential lack of accountability and transparency” and 
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said that it required “Treaty amendment and an in-depth discussion of the extent of its 
mandate.”57  
The Lamfalussy process was plagued by many problems, all of which have been 
analysed and assessed in multiple sources.58 Many of such problems have been rectified by 
subsequent reforms. It remains uncertain, however, whether the lessons have truly been 
learned, as many of Lamfalussy era solutions re-emerge at the junctions where a consensus 
cannot be reached, and soft law measures and consultative bodies are employed as 
substitutes.  
 
5. De Larosière report and creation of ESFS 
The 2007-2010 financial crises painfully revealed important shortcomings in financial 
(most prominently – banking) supervision, on both: microprudential and macroprudential 
levels. The integrated and interconnected reality of European financial markets turned out to 
be significantly more sophisticated than the inter-institutional oversight arrangements 
overseeing that system. The crises exposed shortcomings in the areas of cooperation, 
coordination, consistent application of legislation, and trust between (and in) national 
supervisors. Consequently, the European Parliament instructed the Commission to 
fundamentally reform the supervisory structure of the Lamfalussy Committees including 
CEBS.59 The Commission tasked a high-level group chaired by Jacques de Larosière to make 
recommendations on how to strengthen European supervisory arrangements and rebuild 
confidence in the financial system. In early 2009, the resulting ‘de Larosière Report’ on 
financial supervision in the EU set out a framework for a new regulatory agenda, 
strengthened coordinated supervision and crisis management procedures, laying the 
fundaments of the future EBU. The report concluded that the supervisory framework of the 
financial sector within the EU needed to be strengthened to reduce the risk and severity of 
future financial crises and highlighted the main problems that became evident.60 The 
problems could be summarised as follows: 
x Regulation was too micro-prudential and did not sufficiently address broader 
macro-prudential risks; 
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x The requirements set by prudential regulation were largely insufficient to 
ensure resilience; 
x Lack of a systemic risk oversight body; 
x Home-host supervision remained inadequate and lagged behind increasingly 
integrated market; 
x The absence of common rules for resolving cross-border banks. 
 
This report, notably, recommended against setting up supranational supervisory 
authorities at European level.61 Instead, it prescribed ‘far-reaching’ reforms to the supervisory 
structure. Following these recommendation, the three European Supervisory Agencies 
(ESAs) were created. The European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) thus formed the basis of the European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS), alongside the NCAs and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).  
This new architecture could be seen as a move away from Lamfalussy approach. 
Avgouleas comments that with this new architecture the EU effectively abolished “the last 
remnants of the principles of minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition in EU financial 
services regulation”.62 The ESAs also started playing a significant role in standard setting, 
which included drafting the regulatory standards. The EBA was entrusted with what came to 
be known as the ‘Single Banking Rulebook’. Initially it was also the watchdog of consistent 
application of harmonised rules at the national level, but that was partly changed by the 
subsequent Banking Union reform.  
  Avgouleas argues that already at this stage “certain aspects of the supervision 
of cross-border groups have (implicitly) shifted from home country control to transnational 
supervisory structures comprising […] supervisory colleges and the new ESAs.”63 The 
reforms notably left out the resolution regime and institutional set-up at national level, while 
awaiting political, constitutional, fiscal and institutional prerequisites. Interestingly, the EBU 
had to smash through these obstacles, as most of these developments did not happen.  
In summary, the de Larosière report could be seen as a hybrid process, the market-
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driven, playing-field-levelling approach coexisting with the early reaction to the shock of the 
crises. It could be seen as the start of the European Banking Union.  
 
6. The impact of the EMU on the EBU  
Even in the absence of the crises (and despite the mentioned resistance to the idea in the 
previous reforms) it would not be difficult to imagine an EBU-like structure, perhaps in a 
lighter form, eventually appearing as a natural outcome of legal, political and economic 
integration. Ideas for bodies that could spearhead greater cohesion in financial supervision 
were sprawling across Europe, with the most notable being the proposal for European 
Organisation for Financial Supervision, notably including a significance assessment, and 
elevation of the supervision of the most significant entities to European level.64 
Arguably, the creation of the EMU put the EU on track to end up with a banking 
oversight consolidation reform, which further embedded the EBU in the broader narrative of 
EU financial integration. As Merino explained,  
 
“it is the monetary relevance of the Banking Union that provides an immediate 
explanation to its creation. […] The implementation of monetary policy, that relies on 
the objective of price stability […] presupposes an economic policy founded on the 
obligation of budgetary stability as well as progressive convergence between the 
economies of Member States.” 65  
 
The ECB itself also saw the EBU as complementary to the EMU.66 Barrett pointed out 
that the original draft plans for the EMU would have given to the ECB some regulatory and 
supervisory powers, and created the possibility of European-level bail-outs.67 While this did 
not materialise immediately (or fully), multiple works written from both intergovernmentalist 
and neofunctionalist perspectives recognise the congruence between the EBU and the 
EMU.68  
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This congruence is also evidenced by current participation levels, with only the States 
planning EMU accession in the near future joining the EBU. Moreover, parallels are evident 
in the intergovernmental power struggles between what Howarth and Quaglia described as 
‘follower countries’ and the more influential States.69  During the negotiations of both 
Unions, almost identical struggles occurred between French-led coalition of southern states, 
at the time facing a greater degree of instability, against the interests of German-led States 
facing lesser degree of instability.70    
Most importantly, Eurozone membership results in a number of differences between the 
SSM and SRM participation terms available to the EMU and non-EMU States. Among those 
differences, explored in great detail in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, we can find 
fundamental differentiation in terms of decision-making mechanics, voting, and withdrawal 
arrangements. As these terms are unfavourable to long-term EMU opt-outs, the dividing line 
between States participating and not participating in the EBU is essentially current or planned 
EMU membership. While, as I will explain in Chapter 5, it is not the only causal factor, EMU 
is nevertheless the most important legal factor. Thus, the EMU differentiation has de facto 
created much of the EBU differentiation. Schimmelfenning  and Winzen attributed this 
situation to path-dependency – a boarder theory that “once the EU embarks on differentiation 
as a strategy to overcome heterogeneity-induced integration deadlocks, [differentiated 
integration] will not only harden into permanent divides among the member states, but also 
gain momentum.”71 In support of this conclusion Schimmelfenning analyses a number of 
features of the EMU and the EBU, convincingly arguing that the EBU was essentially built 
by the Eurozone, for the Eurozone, and the schism between participating EMU and non-EMU 
States has been etched into the very fabric of the legal texts. 72  A unique (and dangerous) 
aspect of the EBU is that in this instance the EU was unable to contain differentiated 
integration73 within one policy area, which it had generally managed to achieve up to 2013. 
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Therefore, a spillover has occurred from the differentiated EMU into (previously) 
undifferentiated financial market regulation.74 Merino observed that “the monetary policy 
was designed as an exclusive competence of the Union, whereas the economic policy was 
designed as a mere policy of coordination between Member States.” 75 Thus, the EBU joined 
two policy areas built on very different fundamental structures and allowed policy effects to 
diffuse freely across this (former) boundary. 
It can therefore be argued that of all historical EU developments, the EMU had the 
biggest impact on the EBU. As I will explain in Chapters 2, 3 and 5, this is a major problem 
for the those seeking to optimise EU banking oversight.  
 
B.  How the crisis shaped the EBU 
 
It is evident that the EBU can be seen, politically and historically speaking, as an 
extension of ongoing reforms broadly meant to strengthen the single market in financial 
services. However, the unprecedented speed, exceeding that of the previous reforms, 
determination to work around constitutional obstacles, alongside the fact that the EBU took a 
few steps further in most respects than any proposal before the crises, indicates a causal link 
to a trigger event; a significant and explosive one. According to Moloney the EBU was 
“forged in the crucible of the euro-area sovereign debt crisis.”76 Merino observed that “it was 
[…] the sense of emergency that prompted the (r)evolution towards banking union”, 
stemming from the Spanish crisis and insolvency of Bankia.77 Gortsos similarly stated that 
the EU framework for financial regulation, supervision and oversight is a ‘child of the 
crisis’ or rather the child of two crises: the international financial crisis (2007-2009), and 
the fiscal crisis in the Eurozone (2010).78 
This section firstly discusses the relationship between the EBU (including its character 
and goals) and the crises. Secondly, it addresses the vicious cycle between the sovereigns and 
banks that turned the financial crisis into the sovereign debt crisis, and was arguably the core 
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problem the EBU sought to remedy. It further explains why this cycle has not been - fully - 
broken. Subsection 3 explains how the crises deepened the interdependence between the 
monetary policy and supervision, deepening the connection between the EMU and the EBU, 
shaping the later accordingly.  
 
1. Impact of the crises on the character and goals of the EBU  
As Aarma and Dubauskas observed, from the macroeconomic perspective, the decade 
preceding the financial crisis was an exceptionally favourable period, due to steady economic 
growth and low, non-volatile, inflation.79 They further argue that “long­running successful 
macroeconomic situation promoted undue satisfaction with the existing trends and led to 
underestimation of the arising imbalances and implied risks.”80 According to Avgouleas and 
Arner, the build up to such combustible state started even earlier: for about fifty years 
industrial integration processes continued in an increasingly de-regulated market, but the 
regulatory standards and supervisory principles were not adjusted to such developments.81 
De-regulation in a variety of markets, lenient supervision, excessive risk-taking and over-
leveraging affected banking institutions’ balance sheet health.82 That led to eventual decline 
in trust. The GFC, consequently, “resulted in partial disintegration of the internal market and 
[…] caused splits along national lines of some segments of the single EU market for capital 
and financial services.”83 This was not only costly – it became symbolic, politically 
significant, and direction-defining.  
The sudden shift in macroeconomic conditions during the crisis altered the (arguably 
ongoing) reforms’ processes and spirit. While the impetus towards harmonisation and 
integration was by no means new, the particular shape and speed of the EBU were a result of 
the banking and sovereign debt crises. This is evident from four fundamental aspects of EBU 
origin. Firstly, the focus of the reform was on banking – the financial Trojan horse of the late 
2000’s. Secondly, as Moloney described it, the EBU was “a reshaping of the EU’s traditional 
harmonization-driven liberalization-focused, and rules-based approach to financial system 
governance” as “an executive and institutional reform.“84 According to Tridimas, this “shift 
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from a rules-based approach towards executive and institutional reforms disrupts the normal 
direction of power flows” in the EU.85 Given the previous unwillingness to make drastic 
changes, evidenced by the Lamfalussy reforms, such shift was only politically possible due to 
dire and far-reaching consequences of the crises. Thirdly and consequently, EBU represented 
a fundamental shift in terms of the Financial Stability Trilemma priorities;86 which is only 
possible at major historical junctions. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the EBU could 
be seen as a reform furthering market integration by restriction and protection, not 
liberalisation and playing-field levelling. It is a reform built on the narrative of a cautionary 
tale, atypical for the EU, which usually tries to build its ever closer union with forward-
looking enthusiasm. As Moloney observed, for the “first time […] internal market 
construction and support have not been, at least directly, the dominant objectives of a major 
reform to EU financial system governance”.87 In that respect, for the first time in modern EU 
history, a major EU integration event adopted hindsight, not future-orientation, as the 
dominant perspective.  
This is evident from the declared goals of the EBU. According to Baglioni, these goals 
can be put into three broad groups:88    
9 Achieving supervisory and resolution convergence among the 
European countries. 
9 Breaking the vicious circle between bank and sovereign risks;  
9 Reducing the fiscal cost of crises by establishing the requisite 
institutional framework; 
 
The goals reflect the perceived causes of the banking crisis and the sovereign debt crisis 
respectively. Notably, the crises can also be seen as a junction point allowing the EU 
institutions pursue their agenda, by forcing through changes that were previously perceived 
as too grand, costly or politically contentious.  Epstein and Rhodes took neofunctionalist 
view and concluded that “Europe’s supranational institutions have taken advantage of the 
crisis to push through reforms that fundamentally contradict the perceived interests of many 
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member states.” 89 They specifically highlight the fact that the Commission and the ECB have 
managed to limit the impact of German national interests, securing assent to controversial 
measures.90 It could be argued that technocratic neofunctionalist agenda needed more 
political firepower borrowed from the intergovernmental level, which was only possible since 
the governments themselves felt threatened by the sovereign debt crisis.91 Such reasoning 
reflects the complexity of the dual nature of the Banking Union: simultaneously flowing from 
historical tendencies of further integration and also ground-breaking, in its swiftness and 
magnitude. This coexistence of intergovernmental retrospectivity and neofunctionalist future 
orientation created conflicting tensions, to which I will return in section C of this Chapter.  
 
2. De-linking sovereigns and banks  
The national governments felt the urgency to act since the crises showed “Europe’s 
banks and national governments to be locked in a vicious cycle with weak banks dragging 
down governments, while weak governments [were] dragging down their nations’ banks.”92 
As was stated by the House of Lords European Union Committee, the “fundamental problem 
[…] was the systemic link between struggling banks and an indebted sovereign state.”93 
Merino further highlights “a clear 
connection between the triad of 
banking, public budget and monetary 
policy. […] Member States are 
vulnerable to their banks; banks are 
vulnerable to their Member States.” 94 
Therefore, according to Grundmann, 
the foremost aim of creating a 
European Banking Union was to break 
the link between state budgets (funds) 
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and bank funds […] which proved to be a vicious spiral in the financial and then the Euro 
crisis.”95 
The liquidity shortage, decline in trust and resulting risk aversion during the GFC 
naturally increased credit institution funding costs. That increased the borrowing costs for the 
States, within which these credit institutions operate. That increased the cost of sovereign and 
interbank lending, as investors lost confidence and government bonds started shedding value. 
That caused a sovereign debt crisis in multiple Member States and (in some sense) the 
Eurozone as a whole. The banking crisis and the sovereign debt crisis effectively aggravated 
each other. Under such conditions any attempts to restore fiscal sustainability felt 
increasingly futile. This in turn undermined trust even further, and increased fragmentation in 
the EU banking market, even along the borders of Eurozone States.  
Moreover, some actions that the banks and States resorted to in the run up to the crisis 
and during its outbreak made matters worse. Merino pointed out situations where banks were 
“exposed to the creditworthiness of their governments, on account of substantial amount of 
public debt of their own country that they hold.”96 Such relationship magnifies the effects of 
the downward spiral: the more troubled the state, the more likely it is to have to pressure and 
incentivise its banks to purchase its debt. The banks do not have the luxury to resist such 
pressures, since during a systemic crisis reliable debt instruments are scarce. That aggravates 
the two factors that are harming both parties: the states become increasingly dependent on 
domestic bank funding and the banks become increasingly exposed to their troubled states. 
At the peak of the sovereign debt crisis, around 70% of all EU government bonds were held 
by domestic banks, with the numbers reaching staggering 99% in Greece and more than 90% 
in many other troubled economies.97 The creditworthiness problems of these States 
effectively caused divergence in bank funding and lending conditions at national levels. 
Moreover, the panic in government bond markets broke the monetary policy transmission 
channels. It created a self-fulfilling crisis, in which countries whose debt outlook in other 
circumstances was perfectly sustainable were threatened.98 It is clearly evident from the 
language and the agenda of all post-crisis EU banking legislation that the EBU was built with 
these threats in mind.99 
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In 2012 the ECB suggested that the SSM should contribute to restoring confidence in 
the banking sector and to reviving interbank lending and cross-border credit flows through 
independent, integrated supervision.100 This was carried into the EBU legislative proposals. 
The objective101 was to restore “confidence in the financial markets as confidence […was] 
badly affected after the crisis that in a first stage caused huge losses in the banking sector 
[…and] in a second stage [undermined] confidence in sovereign debtors, creating a negative 
loopback to the banking sector.”102 From the supervisory perspective, a single supervisor was 
expected (not unduly, as it turned out) to rebuild depositor and investor confidence, as it was 
less likely to be suspected of national bias and supervisory forbearance.103 Pre-GFC 
supervisors were often lenient towards the so called ‘national champions’, largest domestic 
institutions with lots of influence, as the supervisors were often constrained by their mandates 
or by other national pressures.104 Moreover, the banking crisis revealed a degree of cynicism 
(mixed with national interests) of the national regulators, which manifested in actions like 
siding with troubled banks in hiding information from the public, delaying loss recognition, 
postponing corrective action and consequently magnifying losses.105 As Grundman observed, 
the resulting “negative external effects on the (common) currency caused by supervisory 
failure were so disastrous that […] any other solution than centralisation seemed 
unconceivable.”106 Centralising supervision was expected to minimise supervisory 
forbearance and counter the causes of market fragmentation. It was also promised that a 
European supervisor would not insist on national asset and liability matching, which can 
increase fragmentation.107 Effective supranational resolution regime, in turn, allows for 
timely and effective bank resolutions, uninhibited by national interests. Thus, SRM also had a 
role to play in breaking the doom loop: it limited rising funding costs and thus the risk of 
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bank bail-outs by national governments, as it became more common to resolve banks rather 
than save them.108  
Generally, one of the major achievements of the EBU is that sovereign influence has 
been limited, at least in the Eurozone. However, it has not been eliminated. It is important to 
note that the SSM and SRM, are equipped with tools to prevent a banking crisis spiralling out 
of control, but not necessarily prevent the crisis as such. Purfield and Rosenberg observed 
that some of the key drivers in the pre-crisis bubble were (historically speaking) bank lending 
and a corresponding acceleration of domestic demand. 109 Prudential regulation, in itself does 
not guarantee responsible lending, nor do counter-cyclical buffers safeguard against 
macroeconomic bubbles, which, on a side note, makes post-GFC and Covid-19 monetary, 
credit, and fiscal policy very concerning.  
Moreover, there are limits to what supervision and resolution can do in a politically 
charged, structurally difficult landscape shaped by differentiated integration, as well as 
national and commercial interests. Problems stemming from limited institutional and 
geographical scope are aggravated by incomplete structures and missing components.  
The absence of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), which would join all 
national deposit schemes together, and which was originally included in the EBU plans, 
arguably limits what the SSM and SRM can achieve in terms of breaking the vicious cycle in 
crisis situations. Huertas sees the (not-yet-built) EDIS and the (already built) SSM/SRM as 
two distinct, separate and equally important, parts of the equation. The SSM is supposed to 
reduce the probability that banks will fail and the SRM is meant to reduce the bail-out 
likelihood.110 However, he argues that the mentioned dependence of banks on governments 
has not been sufficiently reduced.111 In addition to the mentioned government debt that the 
banks hold, banks are disproportionately exposed to governments, in terms of credit and 
‘climate’.112  Neither the SSM nor the SRM can solve the problems caused by the fact that 
national governments shape the legal and economic environment. 
Sovereign risk thus remains a factor. As the Greek Bailout Referendum demonstrated, 
there is a risk that the government of a Eurozone State would change the currency in which 
the depositors’ accounts is denominated. Huertas argued that in such cases EDIS could 
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ensure that a Euro deposit in one Member State is as good as a Euro deposit in any other 
Member State.113 Obviously, such goal could also be partially achieved through fiscal 
harmonisation, but that is not on the cards. Even the fiscal backstop for resolution has not 
been agreed upon.114  
Guaranteeing against sovereign risk, or at least mitigating it, is even more difficult with 
States outside of the Eurozone, joining via Close Cooperation, discussed in Chapter 3. On the 
other hand, non-participation of the NoPS increases other risks, including those of systemic 
proportions.115 Such risks partly stem from the fact that with the SSM and SRM being absent 
in the NoPS, the effects of legislation and arrangements seeking to delink the sovereigns and 
banks are weaker.  
 
3. Differentiation, the Crisis, and the EMU 
As discussed in section A, it is clear that a historical and jurisdictional link exists 
between the EMU and the EBU. It could also be seen as a triangular relationship between the 
crises, the EBU and the EMU. Tridimas observed that “the origins of the Banking Union lie 
[in] the Eurozone crisis which undermined financial stability in the Eurozone and posed an 
existentialist threat to EMU.”116 Merino thus concluded that even the very existence of the 
EMU was threatened by both: the budgetary distress of States and evident instability of the 
banking system, which serves “as conduit of monetary policy to the real economy”.117  
The EBU’s relationship with the EMU is thus twofold. On the one hand, the 
interconnectedness between the two Unions exposed the EBU to differentiated integration – 
largely a by-product of the EMU. On the other hand, the experience of the crises that 
threatened the EMU, provided the narrative the EBU was shaped by, and chained that 
narrative to the goal of protecting the EMU. Quite possibly, the EBU and its supervisory and 
resolution bodies would have been shaped differently, under different circumstances.  
The need to protect the EMU inevitably resulted in the EBU being primarily for the 
EMU. Micklitz argued that the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions program, primarily 
designed to save the Eurozone, required political legitimisation in the form of the EBU.118  
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Reportedly, the States approved such an extensive bond purchase programme precisely 
because the Single Resolution Fund and the Single Supervisor were put in place to ensure 
that future bail-outs and recapitalisations of the banking sector could be avoided.119 
 As a consequence, the EBU was simultaneously built on a fragmented footing and 
placed in a position of a ‘wedge’, where it could easily deepen that fragmentation. Merino 
sees the EBU as a construct of dual nature, “a two-sided construction, with a foot in the 
internal market and another one in the monetary union.” 120 The internal market foot 
continues to follow the path of pre-crisis reforms, albeit at significantly greater pace and with 
a more distant destination. The EMU foot, however, was given a new function – to preserve 
and safeguard the EMU. Unfortunately, placing two feet on two distinct uneven surfaces, 
moving at different speeds, is not a comfortable way to stand, be it move forward. As will 
become evident throughout this thesis, the elements aimed at the Single Market can be 
threatened or stifled by differentiation, while the elements aimed at the Eurozone are 
deepening differentiation, which, at its extreme, can result in fragmentation. It is therefore in 
the deep interest of the EU, the Eurozone and the Single Market to ensure that banking 
supervision and resolution differentiation is curbed before it reaches the level of irreversible 
fragmentation. That interest is not necessarily shared by the NoPS.  
 
C. Theoretical conceptualisations and (ir)reversible choices of the EBU 
 
The differences in EBU participation levels and conditions are, of course, not a result of 
an intellectual consensus to deliberately opt for such differences. They rest upon a long 
history of differentiated integration and national differences between the Member States. This 
has resulted in the so called graded membership, which, according to Schimmelfennig and 
Winzen, “emerges from a sequence of decisions on the deepening and widening of an 
organization.” 121 Typically, differentiation and graded membership is not what is intended by 
the proposal for deeper integration -  it comes up as a (sub-optimal) option during the 
negotiations or after their failure.122 In EU integration processes, this outcome is often linked 
to one of the two things: 1) fundamental ideational disagreement between parties, driven by 
their own self-interest, agendas, and philosophies or 2) lack of agreement on the potential 
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sacrifices, when the need to make such sacrifices emerges due to the traditional conflict 
between centralising reforms and national autonomy.  
This section thus discusses the main conceptualisations of such schisms and the 
constitutional and economic law theories trying to explain them. Subsection 1 discusses the 
classic philosophies of EU integration analysis, and lays the foundations for assessing the 
EBU in their context later in this work. Subsection 2 discusses the theories analysing the 
relationships between mutually exclusive factors, framing the choices the EU States have to 
make in terms of the EBU. Subsection 3 provides the core considerations for assessing the 
significance of the EBU and its ability to affect future EU legal, economic, constitutional and 
political development.  
 
1. Theories of EU integration  
Much like most EU reforms pursuing deeper integration, the EBU can be seen through 
the lenses of two main integration theories: neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. 
With different actors pursuing their agendas, driven by different philosophies, the resulting 
tensions deepen fragmentation in the EU, as differentiation spills over from the legal and 
economic domains, into geopolitics and EU constitutionalism.  
 
a) Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism,123 generally holds that political and economic integration in Europe 
tends to deepen over time, driven by Union institutions seeking to simultaneously achieve the 
best possible outcomes for the EU as a whole and to consolidate their own power. In the 
banking context, this theory tends to highlight a struggle between the EU and national 
interests, in which the former typically prevails.124 When it only  prevails in some States, but 
not others, centripetal, fragmentation-deepening, effects can be generated, contributing to 
differentiated integration, graded membership, and path-dependency. At its very dawn, Ernst 
B. Hass’s theory anticipated a gradual decline of the national element of the EU in favour of 
greater integration at the supranational level.125 He expected policy spill-overs between areas 
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(particularly in economy), gradual transfer of domestic allegiances, and technocratic 
automaticity to propel this process forward with increasing intensity.126 
At least two out of these three processes, namely technocratic automaticity (and the 
general rise of technocracy), and the spill-overs can be identified in the EBU developments. 
They are blatantly obvious in a variety of aspects ranging from the rationale for the EBU and 
market integration in general, to the very mechanics of the functioning of the institutional 
EBU pillars.  
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet posited that “in policy areas where the number and value of 
cross-border transactions rose, so did the supply of EU-level rules.”127  This was the case 
with the EU banking markets integration leading up to the EBU, as is evidenced by the events 
described in Section A. According to the neofunctionalist theory, these legal developments 
are preceded by a broader consensus that separate national legal regimes hinder effective 
cross-border financial interactions.128 Again, this tendency is reflected in the rhetoric of the 
legislation shaping the EBU.  
Following the neofunctionalist line of reasoning further, upon embarking on the 
reforms to facilitate cross-border trade (and also to oversee it), the EU and the Member States 
generally need to introduce some level of autonomous supranational control.129 As a 
consequence, some level of control, previously held by the States, needs to be surrendered to 
these supranational bodies. The more operational efficiency is desired, the more autonomous 
the supranational institutions need to become. In that respect neofunctionalism “accounts for 
the migration of rule-making authority from national governments to the European Union.”130 
This theorisation basically describes the elevation of decision-making (SSM, SRM) and even 
rule-making capacity (ECB, EBA), to the European level, mostly facilitated by the EBU. I 
will provide further evidence of this in Chapter 2.  
When the EU bodies exercise their autonomy, their agenda can diverge from the 
perceived best interests of at least some States. In fact, as a matter of neofunctionalist theory, 
supranational governance routinely produces outcomes that conflict with the preferences of 
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the most powerful states.131  Epstein and Rhodes argued this to be the case in the specific 
case of the EBU.132  A number of unintentional factors can contribute to this divergence, 
including overload and spill-over resulting from high issue density and complexity, or 
systemic crises, requiring a swift action.133 In the EBU context such factors were ‘supplied’ 
by the crises, thus allowing neofunctionalist agenda to take hold.  
Under this theory, resulting consolidation of powers tends to be accompanied by a spill-
over, when EU actors realise that the objectives of supranational policies can be better 
achieved by extending supranational policy-making to additional, functionally related 
domains.134 These spill-overs can be economic and/or political and happen from previous 
stage of integration into a new one, or from one policy area into another.135 As mentioned, 
this phenomenon has been observed in the EBU, as a spill-over from monetary policy into 
financial market regulation.136 This could be attributed to the symbiosis between the EMU 
and the EBU, but such symbiosis in its own right is argued to be a sign of path dependency 
and thus a part of the neofunctionalist narrative.  
The neofunctionalist theory would indicate that the European courts then tend to uphold 
this adjusted power balance, which favours supranationalism. As I will illustrate in Chapter 2, 
this has particularly been the case in the SSM context, but also in EU financial regulation in 
general. National courts, notably, do not necessarily share the same sentiment.  
This is linked to possible push back on behalf of Member States. Under such 
circumstances “institutional reversal – an unwinding of supranational rules – is possible but 
difficult.”137  In principle, States’ governments could correct the divergences, as the high 
contracting parties of the Treaties. Such correction would, however, require consensus, as 
Treaty changes require unanimity. Even standard legislative reforms generally need 
substantial qualitative majorities. Moreover, as Schimmelfenning noted,  “by the time the 
member state governments consider policy reversal, the integrated policy may already have 
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created endogenous interdependence as well as sunk costs and exit costs.” 138 Such costs are 
explored in more detail in Chapter 3. Furthermore, by that point the supranational structure is, 
in all likelihood, already shaping interest groups among the Member States. That usually 
happens by deepening the interdependences of the actors participating in the integrated 
policy, and resulting (sometimes unintentional) solidarity emerging among those not 
participating in the integrated policy.  
Rosamond argued that as a consequence of such interdependencies in core economic 
policy areas  and their spill-overs, deeper political integration might become inevitable.139 
The problem with the EBU and EMU is, that they constitute an additional interdependency 
between the participating States, but not one that would cover the entire single market. Hence 
the danger of further differentiation along the lines of participation, which would be in line 
with the path dependency hypothesis, discussed hereinafter.  In such case the EMU and EBU 
differentiation would continue to spill over into the political domain.  
Of course, neofunctionalism does not explain all the aspects of the EBU, while the 
EBU events do not necessarily reflect all the elements of this theory. For example, 
neofunctionalism predicts that interest groups and market participants would transfer their 
allegiances away from national institutions, towards the supranational European institutions. 
While some institutions intentionally moved to participating States (e.g. Nordea), many other 
banks (e.g. L-Bank) fight tooth and nail to stay with the national authorities, which is 
reported to be the main tendency.140 Moreover, the States forming part of the EBU often try 
to resist the Commission’s and the ECB’s (perceived) neofunctionalist agenda on the legal 
and political levels. 
 
b) Intergovernmentalism   
It is therefore reasonable to look for some explanations in the theory of 
intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalism rests on the idea that integration necessitated by 
cross-border activity is primarily shaped by national governments, which create European 
rules.141 The key feature of this principle “is the focus on national interests and the decision-
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making power of national governments negotiating.”142 In furtherance of this theory 
Moravcsik argued that EU integration should be understood as a series of choices made by 
national leaders, and that these choices are inter alia driven by economic interests and 
asymmetrical interdependence.143  
Where Member States fail to negotiate a consensus, or where national interests are too 
different, rifts can occur. That forms the crux of the intergovernmentalist explanation for 
differentiated integration and consequent graded membership. According to this theory, in the 
banking context States are also expected to pursue policies that benefit their domestic 
financial sector.144 Partly for assessing the validity of this hypothesis, a banking-sector-
structural-characteristics-based research has emerged in the scholarly field of political 
economy. It is particularly attractive due to quantitative simplicity of relevant indicators. 
Chapter 5 of this thesis provides an analysis based on this methodology. My research, in this 
field confirms that the States have not abandoned their national positions, which continue to 
play a part in decision-making process. There are even signs of a pushback against perceived 
power creep of the SSM and ECB in particular, in the form of seeking to exclude certain 
entities from its domain, through political pressure and legislative acts. Moreover, Howarth 
and Quaglia provide an account, partly based on intergovernmentalist theorisation, of how 
both the EMU and the EBU were shaped by outright power struggles between groups of 
States with conflicting economic interests.145  
With many aspects of the EBU fitting within this theory there are also many that do 
not. Firstly, the intergovernmentalist explanation has been criticised for failing to account for 
the events following the reform in question.146 Particularly, intergovernmentalists are 
sceptical about many neofunctionalist paradigms, including the spill-over argument, which, 
while its magnitude and importance can be debated, is (at least in the EBU context) basically 
a historical fact. Moreover, they disagree with the fundamental idea that EU bodies, in their 
own right, can have political influence exceeding that of individual States. As my analysis of 
the ECB in Chapters 2 and 3 indicates, that does not withstand empirical scrutiny.  
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c) Standpoints, not explanations 
Neither neofunctionalism, nor intergovernmentalism can fully explain the EBU. 
Alternative theories seem to have even less of an explanatory value, at least within the 
confines of this chapter. Two additional theories – constructivism and federalism – can also 
be discussed in this context. Constructivism  is rooted in the “explanatory power assigned to 
ideas or ‘policy paradigms’, defined as a set of causal beliefs concerning a certain policy 
area, rather than material (mostly economic) interests.”147 Due to its largely unempirical and 
‘uneconomic’ character, constructivism is notably not the best theory for the analysis of the 
EBU, within the framework of this thesis. Its further exploration would, notably, be an 
interesting strand for further qualitative research on the subject. By contrast, the theories of 
European federalism and federalisation148 are sometimes applied to the EBU.149 However, 
they are more useful in explaining the power dynamics within the institutional components of 
the EBU, than the choices made in the EBU’s creation or subsequent accession decisions 
made by the NoPS. I will return to these theories in Section E of Chapter 2. 
It appears that while integration theories do not present an explanation for the EBU in 
its entirety, they do explain the ideational positions the States and the EU proceed from. Such 
positions create conflicts, where different philosophies render different conclusions on the 
optimal course of action or desired limits to the powers of supranational institutions. 
Tridimas lists a number of constitutional tensions appearing in the EBU, with two of them 
being of particular importance here. Namely, ones between  “technocracy and politicisation” 
and between “Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the internal market.”150  
These tensions suggest a narrative in which neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism are not explaining the EBU integration, but rather shaping it. The EU 
institutions can be argued to pursue neofunctionalist agenda, seeking to amass power 
necessary (or thought to be necessary) to achieve the goals of the EBU, as well as broader 
market integration. However, due to their inability to eliminate fragmentation and national 
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autonomy, they cannot control the wild card – national interests. In the absence of a 
mechanism that would compel or push the NoPS to participate, their politico-economic 
interests take hold. Such interests can diverge from the EU’s interests. The NoPS therefore 
behave in an entirely intergovernmentalist fashion towards the EBU and the EMU, basing 
their decisions on primarily national interests.  
This interplay has given rise to the so called realist philosophy, blending the elements 
of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. It is argued that despite the neofunctionalist 
push from EU institutions,  the magnitude of the change brought by the EBU was reduced by 
national interests.151 Donnelly recounts that many member states like Germany, Finland, and 
the Netherlands insisted on institutionally reinforcing national autonomy and other States 
“accepted these demands as the price for modest increases in emergency loans that stave off 
collapse.”152 He argues that “stronger countries will successfully upload their preferences at 
the expense of other national preferences, and that the obligation on national governments to 
implement those standards remains weakly institutionalized in deference to the principle of 
national sovereignty.”153 In contrast to Donnelly, the findings of Epstein and Rhodes can be 
presented, who argued that, firstly, there was no internal ‘German consensus’ on the EBU 
and, secondly, that despite some notable attempts, Germany was unable to dictate the terms 
of a ‘consensus’ to other Eurozone countries or EU institutions, and only achieved some of 
the changes it advocated.154 The same could be said for some NoPS, like Poland and 
Denmark, who could not get what they wanted in the EBU negotiations, and thus opted out.  
It could then be argued that neofunctionalist agenda becomes dominant, as it is shared 
not just by EU institutions, but also a number of States. That effectively weakens the position 
of predominantly intergovernmentalist States, which are more cautious about the EBU and 
particularly the ECB’s powers within it. From the perspective of the Single Market, this is 
dangerous. It creates a plethora of internal tensions. That effectively ‘sharpens’ the edges of 
the participation decision for the NoPS, and forces them into clearly defined, distinct choices, 
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2. The financial stability trilemma and path-dependency  
A detailed picture of the consequences of such sharp and distinct choices can be 
revealed by adopting a dynamic framework, which reflects the continuous attempts to 
balance conflicting pressures and priorities. I thus explore several frameworks particularly 
fitting for (or previously applied to) international banking.  
 
a) The Financial Stability Trilemma 
The first conceptualisation employed for my analysis is the Financial Stability 
Trilemma (FST). Dirk Schoenmaker’s hypothesis holds that financial stability, financial 
integration and national financial policies form a trilemma.155 Any two of the three objectives 
can be compatible, but not all three.156 As he further elaborated, “the trilemma boils down to 
the issue of sovereignty. At one extreme, policy makers can hand over part of their 
sovereignty to foster global banking and global financial stability. At the other extreme, 
policy-makers can choose to impose restrictions on cross-border banking to preserve their 






Schoenmaker subsequently applied the trilemma to international banking, from the 
global macroeconomic perspective:158  
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Howarth and Quaglia adjusted the trilemma for the analysis of national perspectives on 
international banking, to include the components of financial stability, international banking, 
and national financial policies.159  
 
 
    
While this theory is attractively simple, an important question needs to be answered: 
would prioritising international banking and financial stability really mean the sacrifice of 
national financial policies (Howarth and Quaglia) or national authorities (Schoenmaker)? The 
question boils down to whether the country joining the SSM and SRM would actually suffer 
a major loss of autonomy in bank supervision, resolution, and banking policies in general. 
There seems to be a degree of consensus that it would.  Epstein and Rhodes argued that the 
creation of common SSM amounts to a significant loss of national control over credit 
institutions.160  De Rynck observed that “centralizing supervision and harmonizing standards 
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are a rupture with the past”, which introduces a novel policy model. 161 Moloney concluded 
that the NCAs operate within a legal infrastructure which privileges the position of the ECB 
and thus “the loss of control by the Member States […] is real.”162 Binder and Gortsos 
therefore described the EBU as the most significant step towards financial integration in 
Europe since the creation of the Monetary Union”.163 Merino argued that by joining the SSM 
and the SRM participating States transfer responsibilities and powers to the European bodies 
to the extent comparable to the EMU, not just complementing it.164  In depth analysis of the 
technical aspects of the SSM, SRM and the mechanics of opting-in, which I will conduct 
throughout this thesis, confirms these conclusions. If participation constitutes a significant 
transfer of power, it also constitutes a clear choice within the confines of the Trilemma. The 
choice of financial stability and financial integration over national policies.  
For the NoPS the SSM/SRM constitute a choice rather than a necessity, and that is 
because of their non-participation in the EMU. By contrast, as Howarth and Quaglia argued, 
the Eurozone States faced the ‘financial inconsistent quartet’ (Fig.1.6), struggling to 
simultaneously manage financial stability, financial integration, national financial policies, 




Simplistically, for an EMU State, sacrificing financial integration is not an option, since 
it uses the Single Currency, which exposes it to the broader financial health of the Eurozone. 
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Trying to ‘disconnect’ their banking system would thus be painful and possibly futile. Since 
sacrificing financial stability is not an appealing prospect, national financial policies meet the 
sacrificial knife. Howarth and Quaglia reasoned that the NoPS do not face the inconsistent 
quartet and thus all that they are wrestling with is the Trilemma, which leaves them the 
(limited) flexibility to make any choice within its confines.  
 
b) The Path Dependency Hypothesis 
Since the NoPS retain their ability to choose, it is important to understand where 
different choices can take them, and how that affects the EU as a whole.  For that purpose I 
adopted Schimmelfenning’s  path-dependency hypothesis. 166 Simplistically, the hypothesis 
holds that previous integration choices dictate future choices in interconnected policy areas. 
Therefore, it is believed that differentiation adopted as a strategy to overcome heterogeneity-
induced integration deadlocks, hardens into permanent divides among the Member States, 
which in turn condition future differentiation.167  Schimmelfenning argued that the EBU “was 
designed to meet the deficits” of the Eurozone and thus “its institutional setup reinforced the 
original reasons why Non-Eurozone states decided to abstain from the euro area.” 168   As a 
result, the Banking Union “not only reaffirms the original differentiation” but also “widens 
the institutional gap between the euro area and the rest of the EU”. 169 The crisis event can 
thus be seen as an acceleration or an amplification of the path-dependent differentiation 
outside of the EMU and path-dependent (albeit sometimes reluctant) integration within it. 
Fabbrini and Guidi observed that while the “crisis opened a critical juncture where it was 
possible to redefine the institutional and policy features of the EU, its dramatic and 
accelerated impact has ended up reinforcing the path-dependent logic generated by the 
previous constitutional settlement.”170  
 
Schimmelfennig and Winzen listed the following reasons why these processes are 
likely to continue:171 
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¾ Removal of the most Eurosceptic states from the most advanced 
integration schemes and consequent circumvention of their veto on future integration 
decisions; 
¾ Support for normative legitimacy of future differentiation; 
¾ Weakened supranational actors tasked with uniform integration (e.g. 
the EBA) and strengthening of supranational actors created by the insider group (e.g. 
SRB, ECB Governing Council); 
¾ Reinforced endogenous interdependence among the most integrated 
states, 
¾ Facilitation of future agreement on more integration among the 
insiders, thereby widening the gap between insiders and outsiders and making it 
increasingly difficult to catch up.  
 
They conclude that the increasing distance between the EU’s ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ is 
evident from recent treaties and legislation. 172  As my political economy research in Chapter 
5 reveals, this phenomenon is further evidenced by the arrangements made by the most 
reluctant NoPS, to mitigate the dangers and difficulties presented by non-participation.  
If this hypothesis is correct, the NoPS with no plans to join the EMU will naturally 
diverge further away from it, as well as the EBU. Those States which intend to eventually 
adopt the Single Currency, should then opt to join the EBU, seeking to avoid further 
divergence. To illustrate this theorisation, I merged the path dependency hypothesis and the 
financial stability trilemma into a single illustration in Fig.1.7.  
 
                                                 
172 Ibid. p.121 
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It is highly likely that the choices made in terms of the FST could harden into 
permanent positions. Such hardening would be in line established scholarship on integration 
and disintegration mechanics. There is a rich body of knowledge on the causal relationships 
between integration and differentiation, particularly on whether differentiated arrangements 
have centripetal or centrifugal effects on undecided states.173 If the path dependency is 
correct, differentiation at this junction would create a centripetal effect for those states that 
wish to join the EMU and centrifugal effect for those that do not. As Ferran observed, this 
can lead to three possible outcomes: dynamic of integration, dynamic of disintegration, or 
lasting divisions within the Union.174 The next four chapters of this thesis will discuss how 





The aim of this Chapter was to chart the way towards the Banking Union and offer a 
contextual framework for more technical legal and politico-economic discussions.  Sections 
A and B took a historical perspective and showed that the Banking Union could be viewed 
from two perspectives: on the one hand, as a logical continuation of political and 
macroeconomic agenda of creating a fully integrated market for financial services, on the 
other - a reaction to the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the 2010 sovereign debt crisis. Both 
origin stories ultimately intersect at their linkages to the European Monetary Union. That 
creates a number of concerns relating to the States which do not participate in the EBU and 
therefore might have different national interests. Section C introduced a set of conceptual 
frameworks reflecting integration and disintegration dynamics, and broad-stroked the basis 
for underlying legal, political and economic challenges and concerns that stem from the 
Financial Stability Trilemma and path dependency. In particular, it highlighted the danger 
that many of the non-participating States could potentially drift further away from the 
Eurozone and the EBU, which could in turn threaten to further fracture the single market and 
undermine the broader goals of systemic stability. 
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The Legal Structure of the European Banking Union and the Defining Role 




This Chapter discusses the core legal structures that collectively make up the European 
Banking Union and the constitutional origins of the schism that appeared between the 
participating and non-participating States, which is the main topic of this thesis.  
The EBU as we know it today was built around the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the Single Banking Rulebook (‘the 
Rulebook’). Through this reform the ECB became the sole supervisor for significant credit 
institutions and groups of such institutions in the participating States, while the SRM, and the 
Single Resolution Board (SRB) as its governing organ, took charge of resolution. The 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme – the intended third pillar of the EBU –  has not been 
completed on the institutional level. However, this area was still touched upon by legislative 
reforms. 
The SSM was the first institutional pillar of the Banking Union, based on Council 
Regulation 1024/2013 (‘SSMR’) which transferred bank prudential supervision tasks to the 
ECB and governs its interactions with the other main ‘constituency’ in the SSM: the National 
Competent Authorities (NCAs). This pillar is also the most significant for the discussion in 
this thesis, as it drew a fundamental distinction between three groups of EU Member States: 
the Eurozone States which have to participate in the SSM, the States in close cooperation, 
which voluntarily opt into participation, subject to (problematic) limitations,175 and the non-
participating States (NoPS). The participation in the SSM also determines the participation in 
the SRM, as the two mechanisms have identical membership – one cannot be joined without 
joining the other. Therefore, the SSM will be discussed in greater detail than other 
components of the EBU. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to discuss and analyse the most important features of the 
EBU legal and institutional architecture, highlighting the main legal, constitutional, and 
political tensions and implications. It will be argued that the centralisation of decision-
                                                 
175 See Chapter 3, Section B 
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making and standard setting powers, have sharpened the edges of the choice that the NoPS 
have to make in terms of the Financial Stability Trilemma.176 as the power balance within the 
EBU’s instructional pillars, especially the SSM, is strongly tilted towards supranationalism 
and neofunctionalism.  
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section A briefly summarises the legal 
architecture of the EBU. Section B introduces the set of legislation underpinning the EBU – 
the Single Rulebook. Section C provides a detailed discussion on the pillar that created the 
distinction between the NoPS and the participating States – the SSM. Section D discusses the 
second institutional component of the EBU – the SRM. Section E discusses the tensions 
between the EBU and national levels, which lays groundwork for deeper discussion of the 
reasons for non-participation in the remaining chapters of this thesis. The final section 
concludes.  
 
A. Brief overview of the EBU legal structure 
 
The European Banking Union legal structure is considered to consist of two layers: 1) 
the set of common rules under which banks operate and the EU, and 2) intergovernmental 
agreements and EU legislation conferring a set of powers to control banking activities in the 
participating States upon EU bodies, assisted by national competent authorities (NCAs).177 
The first layer of EU legislation can also be described as the ‘non-institutional 
components’ of the EBU. The core element of this layer, binding the entire EBU legal 
structure together, is the Single Rulebook, which is often considered a pillar of the EBU in its 
own right. Unlike the institutional pillars, the Single Rulebook does not have a single 
constitutional basis, nor does it form a single document, as illustrated in table 2.1 below. 
Instead, each of the core pieces of legislation forming the Rulebook have their own 







                                                 
176 See Chapter 1, section C 
177 A Merino, European Banking Union, FIDE Congress Proceedings, 2016, p.103  
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Table.2.1 Key Legal Provisions and Constitutional Basis of EBU Components 

































The second layer of EBU legal structure created the institutional components of the 
EBU. The two existing institutional components of the EBU are based on the SSM 
Regulation178 (SSMR) and the SRM Regulation (SRMR).179 The SSMR was complemented 
by the SSM Framework Regulation (SSMFR). The core SRM legal architecture was 
completed by an Intergovernmental Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of 
contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF).180 The Intergovernmental Agreement has 
the status of an international Treaty and was signed by all EU Member States except Sweden 
and the UK. This legislation was further refined through delegated acts, decisions and other 
legal instruments.  
The EDIS has not been completed on the institutional level, but some work has been 
done in this field through legislative harmonisation, particularly via the Deposit Guarantee 
Directive 2014/49/EU (DGD). Some light on how the EDIS could look like was shed in late 
2015, when the Commission proposed the framework for the scheme.181 The proposal was, 
however, met with resistance and not implemented. There have been a few attempts to push it 
                                                 
178 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
179 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and 
a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a 
Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund 
180 Intergovernmental Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution 
Fund, 2014 
181 Final Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The ECB, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on completing the Banking Union, COM (2017) 592 
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forward. In 2017 the central bank governors and vice governors of Finland, Spain, Lithuania 
and France urged other EU governments to create EDIS. The effort failed largely due to 
German opposition. However, in her Commission presidency candidate speech,  Ursula Von 
Der Leyen emphasised the need to complete the Banking Union, including pushing ahead 
with EDIS, as well as completing a common backstop to the SRF, and strengthening the bank 
resolution and insolvency frameworks.182  
The differences between State positions can be explained adopting an 
intergovernmentalist line of reasoning, which in turn indicates that the (dis)integration 
drivers, discussed in Chapter 1, continue to play a role in the EBU development. Spain, 
Lithuania and France had significant problems during the GFC and deposit coverage came to 
the forefront. The German banks are, however, cautious about financing banks in troubled 
economies, as they hold large amounts of liquid assets. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, the 
prospect of EDIS is also unnerving for some NoPSs sharing structural characteristics with 
Germany, which are concerned about becoming primary contributors (e.g. Denmark, Sweden, 
Hungary).  Such differences also reflect the difficulty with which all of the existing pillars of 
the EBU were built, and the delicate balancing of consensuses and concessions that was 
required.  
 
B. The Single Rulebook 
 
The Single Rulebook could be considered the first pillar of the EBU, since the CRD IV 
preceded the SSMR (June and October 2013 respectively). 183 Babis called the Single 
Rulebook “the most important body of legislation, as far as supervision and prudential 
regulation is concerned.”184 This section seeks to define the Rulebook for the purposes of this 
thesis and to highlight its relevance for the institutional components of the EBU. Subsection 1 
clarifies the definition of the Single Rulebook for the purposes of this thesis. Subsection 2 
highlights the biggest improvements brought by the Rulebook. Subsection 3 indicates some 
of the remaining dangers posed by lack of harmonisation in interpretation and enforcement, 
                                                 
182 U von der Leyen, A Union that strives for more: My agenda for Europe, political guidelines for the next 
European Commission 2019-2024, p.9  
183 The BRRD and SRM were confirmed and voted on alongside the SSM in April 2014. On the significance of 
these timings see H Micklitz, The Internal Market and the Banking Union, in S Grundmann and H Micklitz 
(Eds.) The European Banking Union and Constitution: Beacon for Advanced Integration or Death-Knell for 
Democracy? Hart Publishing 2019, p.278 
184 V Babis, Single rulebook for prudential regulation of banks: Mission accomplished?, University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No.37 2014, p.1 
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as well as those created by flexibility allowed by the Rulebook provisions. Subsection 4 
discusses the role of the EBA in trying to ensure pan-European harmonisation in the 
application of the Rulebook. Subsection 5 covers the problems presented by plurality of 
sources of hard and soft law coexisting with the Single Rulebook.  
 
1. Definition and contours of the Single Rulebook 
The term ‘single banking rule-book’ has a number of similar yet not identical 
definitions and purpose statements. According to Moloney, the term generally refers to “the 
array of binding legislative and non-legislative rules which govern the banking market.” 185 It  
became a formal EU legal and political term in 2009 and reflects the “aim of a unified 
regulatory framework for the EU financial sector that would complete the single market in 
financial services.” 186 According to the Commission,  the Rulebook has two primary goals – 
consistent application of EU banking legislation through removal of transposition risks, and 
construction of a harmonised set of core standards.187 According to the EBA, the rulebook is 
meant to ensure uniform application of Basel III accords in all Member States, close 
regulatory loopholes and thus contribute to a more effective functioning of the Single 
Market.188 Fundamentally, all EU legislation enacted to the effect of fulfilment of these goals 
could be considered to be a part of the Rulebook. For the purposes of this thesis, I adopt 
Moloney’s more technical definition as “rules governing the prudential regulation of deposit-
taking institutions in support of the EBU. […] [B]inding legislative and non-legislative 
(delegated (Art.290 TFEU) and implementing (Art.291 TFEU)) harmonised rules which 
govern the EU financial system.”189 The focus of this section is, however, narrower – the 
CRR/ CRDIV package,190 which, according to Babis is the core of the Rulebook.184 This 
legislation will also be addressed as part of broader discussion of the EBU’s resolution 




                                                 
185 N Moloney, European Banking Union: assessing its risks and resilience, Common Market Law Review, 
Vol.51, Issue 6, 2014, p.1610, n.4 
186 EBA website 
187 European Commission, European supervisory authorities proposals impact assessment, SEC/2009/1234, p.8 
188 EBA website  
189 Moloney 2014, p.1610 
190 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, and 
Directive 2013/36/EU on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms 
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2. Achievements  
The CRD IV and the CRR which deal with bank capital requirements in the EU, 
facilitated significant improvements. The Rulebook managed to (generally) ensure that the 
same definitions of legal concepts and tests are applied throughout the EU. In relation to 
prudential regulation that meant harmonisation of methodologies for capital ratio calculation, 
liquidity level assessment, exposures, cross-border presence, etc. Moreover, the Rulebook 
achieved a considerable degree of harmonisation in authorisation and right of establishment 
in the Single Market procedures, micro-prudential supervision, and micro and macro 
prudential regulation, which was a significant novelty in the EU legal order. Furthermore, the 
BRRD191 was the first major EU legislation in the field of recovery and resolution.  
The BRRD, the CRR, and CRD IV are not limited to banks and can apply to investment 
firms, which avoids artificial separation between entities engaging in the same activities. As I 
will illustrate in section C, that is not the case with the institutional components of the EBU. 
Most importantly, many important rules were laid out in the CRR – an EU Regulation - 
which is directly applicable, less prone to interpretations and thus provides a sturdy basis for 
the CRD.192 This is an important improvement, compared to the pre-Rulebook framework, 
discussed below, which was directives-based and thus more vulnerable to differentiation. 
Generally, the Single Rulebook, alongside the supervisory handbook, which I will discuss 
hereinafter, have been described as “cross-cutting all [the] areas [and] aimed at achieving a 
truly uniform supervisory and administrative practice with regard to credit institutions.”193  
 
3. Lack of harmonised enforcement and interpretation  
An important shortcoming of pre-EBU banking legislation was that it was based on 
loosely harmonised rules, with the application of these rules overseen by the NCAs, at the 
national level. Harmonisation efforts often took the form of Directives and, where political 
will and consensus were lacking, occasionally defaulted to recommendations. Moreover, as 
Howarth and Quaglia observed, such Directives, notably including the CRD and the four 
‘Lamfalussy directives’, were “often based on a minimum common denominator, resulting 
from convoluted compromises and trade-offs during the negotiation process.”194 Following 
                                                 
191 Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 2014/59/EU 
192 See e.g.CRR Art.147 
193 S Grundmann, The European Banking Union and Integration 2019 in Stefan Grundmann and Hans-W 
Micklitz (eds.) The European Banking Union and Constitution Beacon for Advanced Integration or Death-Knell 
for Democracy? Hart Publishing 2019, p.91   
194 D Howarth, L Quaglia, The political economy of European Banking Union, Oxford University Press 2016, 
p.27  
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their enactment such Directives needed to be transposed by the States into their respective 
legal systems, subject to national formulation, interpretation, and linguistics of different 
languages.195 The ‘common’ meaning of terms was only ever really ascertained when legal 
disputes arose, due to EU law’s preference for the Preliminary Reference procedure over 
other forms of challenging EU legislation. This led to a considerable diversity among the 
States.196 Such diversity often created room regulatory arbitrage, but also – on rare yet 
significant instances -  had a major impact on the banking businesses operating in different 
countries. The second banking Directive,197 exemplified how a European banking rule 
enacted at the EU level can result in very different outcomes within the States. The German 
way of implementing this Directive allowed the State to retain its three-layer banking system, 
whereas most Italian mutual banks were demutualised, partly as a consequence of the 
legislation implementing the Directive. As mentioned, the Single Rulebook has gone quite far 
in curbing this diversity, but only to an extent.  
The CRR,198 important as it, is the only Regulation in the main Single Rulebook 
ensemble. The BRRD and the CRD are both Directives. Although the Rulebook is built 
around a set of legal instruments with EEA relevance and pan-EU application, divergences 
are possible as long as fragmentation along the Eurozone, SSM/SRM and EU borders 
remains.  
While some divergences might appear due to the type of legislation employed, others 
stem from the flexibility allowed by the provisions themselves.   Babis provides a detailed 
account on how the Rulebook can leave room for national divergences even within the 
SSM/SRM area.199 The flexibility allowed under the CRR/CRD IV could open opportunities 
for arbitrage and regulatory competition among the States, thus undermining the goals and 
purposes of the Rulebook.200  The list of exposures which NCAs can exempt from the large 
exposures limit is particularly problematic.201 This list includes asset items constituting 
claims on governments, central banks, public sector entities, and intra-group exposures.202 
This makes a big difference, as otherwise credit institutions are prohibited from creating 
exposures exceeding 25% of their capital to a single counterparty or a group of 
                                                 
195 No EU language has automatic precedence, see Markus Geltl v Daimler AG CJEU, 28/6/2012, C-19/11 
196 See ECB, Financial Integration in Europe, 2012  
197 Directive 89/646/EEC 
198 Capital Requirements Regulation (EU) No.575/2013 (CRR) 
199 V Babis, Single rulebook for prudential regulation of banks: Mission accomplished?, University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No.37 2014, pp.9-15 
200 Ibid.p.9 
201 Ibid.p.10 
202 Art.400(1) CRR 
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counterparties.203 While to be exempted such exposures need to be 0% risk weighted, the 
effectiveness of the risk profiling is questionable, since it is based on internal ratings, which 
means it is not immune to national and market pressures, as well as not fully harmonised.204 
Such flexibility can obstruct the efforts to break the viscous circle between the States and the 
banks, while also distorting competition. This is particularly dangerous in relation to smaller 
banks and institutions located in the NoPS, which avoid direct ECB oversight. 25% is a 
massive exposure, and it is questionable whether any such exposure can be justified. 
Moreover, in the absence of such exemptions, banks would be forced to look into 
government-backed claims in other Member States, which would deepen market integration 
and create common interest between the States.  
These flexible exposure provisions should be considered in conjunction with the fact 
that the ECB can also grant approvals, permissions, derogations, or exemptions to the rules 
relating to capital, liquidity, leverage and other requirements, which might make the playing 
field even ‘bumpier’.205 
Concerns regarding uneven playing field are not limited to the requirements 
themselves. The devil might be in the interpretation of requirements. A particularly 
problematic issue is the principle of recognition of prudential requirements between home 
and host authorities. Member States can recognise the macroprudential measures in another 
State with regard to a bank’s exposures there.206As Babis rightly observed, the calculation of 
a credit institution’s total Counter-Cyclical Capital Buffer includes the buffers set by all 
Member States where the institution in question has exposures.207 
 
She points to the risk that 
the recognising (home) State and the setting (host) State may apply these measures in 
different ways.208 For example, this would be the case if the recognising State applies 
different definitions of eligible capital or different methodologies for the calculation of 
prudential requirements.209  
The Single Rulebook generally leaves the States the flexibility to impose stricter 
requirements, but market pressures might result in a race to the ‘Rulebook bottom’, which 
could at particular points be lower in the NoPS, as they seek to gain competitive advantage in 
attracting business. It is therefore crucial for the attainment of the goals of the EBU to ensure 
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that the baseline requirements are sufficiently robust, as well as strictly enforced.  
 
4.  Further harmonisation and the role of the EBA 
In an attempt to reinforce this baseline, the EBA – a pre-existing ESA - was entrusted 
with the duty to be the primary ‘guardian’ of the Rulebook; as opposed to, for example, the 
ECB.210 This decision might seem somewhat questionable in terms of legal capacity, since 
the ECB is a more powerful EU institution listed in Art.13 TEU. As an ESA, the EBA does 
not have legislative powers and is limited to drafting binding technical standards (acts 
specifying particular aspects of a Directive or Regulation forming part of the rulebook), 
which are subsequently adopted by the Commission in the form of regulations or 
decisions.211 Despite such limitations, the EBA was preferable to the ECB, due to the 
restrictions of the ECB’s reach, which I will discuss in Section C. The choice of a less 
powerful pan-European body over a more powerful Eurozone body reflects long term 
impetus towards expansion and convergence beyond the Eurozone. Arguably, the 
involvement of the Commission also helps the Rulebook development retain broader Single 
Market focus.212 
EBA was also subsequently given the task to develop the European Supervisory 
Handbook.213
 
This handbook is meant to harmonise methodologies for identifying and 
measuring credit institutions’ risks, defining corrective action, provide a framework within 
which supervisors exercise their judgment, and ensure consistency of outcomes.214 Thus, the 
Handbook “sets out supervisory best practices for methodologies and processes” for all EU 
NCAs, the ECB and the EBA itself.215  
 
5. Distortion introduced by the ECB  
The launch of the SSM has somewhat complicated this system. The ECB within the 
SSM is subject to the EBA-developed technical standards, EBA’s guidelines and 
recommendations, and the Supervisory Handbook; all while monitoring compliance with the 
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single rulebook itself.216 At the same time, the ECB is in charge of the so-called ‘supervisory 
manual’ – a non-binding document covering various aspects of the SSM functioning, not 
otherwise stipulated in the SSMR or SMMFR.217 A large proportion of this text is based on 
the EBA’s Supervisory Handbook, which could be considered an unnecessary duplication. 
Some aspects differ, and thus can create divergences. Although the provisions of the manual 
are not binding and even the ECB itself is free to deviate from them, this is yet another 
‘rulebook’ and it does not apply to the NoPS, while the EBA’s books do, which could, in 
some limited instances, result in differentiation. In the early stages of the EBU there was also 
some confusion in the SSM countries as to which handbook will be valid in which 
situation.218 This has been solved by giving the ECB’s manual non-binding status, but that 
effectively raises questions about its necessity on the one hand, and effectiveness on the 
other. If the Supervisory Handbook and the ECB’s manual remain similar – what is the 
purpose of such duality? On the other hand - if they diverge – the schism between the SSM 
states and the NoPS deepens. Such situation is sub-optimal. As Avgouleas and Arner 
observed,  
 
“Different supervisory handbooks and supervisory approaches between the 
Member States participating in the [SSM] and the other Member States pose a risk of 
fragmentation of the single market, as banks could exploit the differences to pursue 
regulatory arbitrage.”219 
 
It is evident that in the absence of unifying institutional structures, more room for 
divergences would exist between the NoPS and the SSM/SRM, as well as among the NoPS. 
One of the reasons why divergences remain is lack of clarity in terms of rule-making capacity 
and hierarchy of institutions involved in that process. Arguably, even in the absence of 
conflict between the rule-makers themselves, dangers on the practical level remain, where 
credit institutions can find opportunities for regulatory arbitrage or deliberately search for 
alleged conflicts in overlapping provisions. 
Harmonisation through the ECB’s deeper involvement in rule making could partly 
solve this problem, but would also introduce a plethora of new ones.  As will become 
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increasingly clear throughout this thesis, the more involved the ECB is in an EBU pillar, the 
more concerns that raises, due to its institutional architecture, discussed below. The ECB can 
already influence the content of the Rulebook provisions, which allows for further spill-overs 
of the power dynamics from the SSM into the Rulebook, much to the dissatisfaction of non-
EMU Member States.220  If such influence increases, that might make participation even 
more undesirable.  
 
C. The SSM 
 
The aim of this section is to analyse the first institutional component of the EBU, the 
European Single Supervisory Mechanism, which is the most important pillar for the purposes 
of this thesis. As Merino pointed out, the political agreement on the transfer of prudential 
competences from the States to the EU marked the moment of birth of the Banking Union.221 
The SSM’s particular relevance is also rooted in its constitutional foundations, which 
effectively created the division between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone States on two levels. 
Firstly, the non-Eurozone States could not be compelled to participate in SSM. Secondly, the 
membership conditions for those that chose to participate voluntarily were fundamentally 
different.  
This section thus highlights the most important constitutional peculiarities of the SSM, 
and their consequences. That is done in subsections 2-5, following a brief discussion of the 
goals, purposes and institutional structure of the SSM in Subsection 1. Subsection 6 
concentrates on the role of the ECB as the centrepiece of the SSM and the functions that flow 
from such position. Subsection 7 discusses the role of the National Competent Authorities 
(NCAs) and their responsibilities.  
 
1. The SSM overview  
a) Goals and purpose 
Perhaps the most important goal of the SSM is to eliminate national bias in supervision 
by transferring bank prudential supervisory competence from the national to the EU level. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the attainment of that goal would remove one of the pre-conditions 
for the occurrence of ‘doom loops’ in crisis situations, while also contributing to the 
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improvement of market conditions under normal circumstances.  
Positioned at the centre of the SSM stands the ECB, joined by the NCAs, which are 
also part of the SSM. The functions and competences of the ECB and the NCAs will be 
examined later in this Chapter. For now, suffices to say that the adoption of the SSMR 
changed the profile of the ECB’s activities significantly, while also subtly altering its goals 
and field of responsibility. Under Art.1 SSMR, the ECB’s prudential supervision tasks were 
conferred upon it, with a view to “contributing to the safety and soundness of credit 
institutions” and the “stability of the financial system”. Previously, the only significant power 
for safeguarding the stability of the banking system that the ECB was entrusted with, was 
last-resort lending to solvent banks facing illiquidity problems.222 In that sense, the conferral 
of SSM powers marked a fundamental ideational and functional shift. As one would expect, 
the ECB was vested, in its new role as bank prudential supervisor within the Banking Union 
space, with a new legislative mandate.  
 
b) Institutional set-up   
The supervisory decisions in the SSM are made by various organs of the ECB, as well 
as by the NCAs. This institutional architecture is supported by review and mediation 
mechanisms.  All of these organs will be discussed at some length throughout this thesis. This 
subsection thus only serves as a brief introduction.  
The majority of day-to-day supervisory decisions in relation to the less-significant 
banks are made by the NCAs. The majority of supervisory decisions regarding significant 
credit institutions are made by the Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board of the SSM 
comprises of its Chair, Vice Chair, four representatives of the ECB, and one representative 
from the NCA of each participating State.223 Eurozone and participating non-Eurozone States 
are represented on more or less equal terms. Notably, the Board members have to  “act 
independently and objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole and […] neither seek 
nor take instructions from the institutions or bodies of the Union [or] from any government of 
a Member State...”224 That principle, at least in theory, applies to the State representatives.  
While most of the supervisory decisions are taken by the Supervisory Board, the 
highest ranking organ is nevertheless the Governing Council of the ECB. Non-EMU States 
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are excluded from it, due to constitutional limits discussed in Subsection 3.225 The Governing 
Council retains the ultimate responsibility for all actions of the ECB and has a number of 
veto powers over other organs, and serves as an appellate body. Notably, the Governing 
Council representativeness was already a sensitive topic, even within the EMU. For example, 
Lithuania’s EMU accession triggered a system under which national central bank governors 
take turns holding voting rights on the Governing Council, meaning that not all States are 
always represented.226 This problem will be aggravated by subsequent accessions of Croatia, 
Bulgaria, and other future users of the Euro.  
A lot of ECB’s decisions, including those relating to regulatory activities, are made by 
the Executive Board, comprising of six permanent members.227 That is also a concern for the 
non-EMU States, as Art.139(2)(h) TFEU, excludes them from  the appointment of the 
Executive Board.  
In order to mitigate these imbalances, the ECB has established and Mediation Panel, 
which resolves differences of views expressed by the NCAs of all participating States 
concerned regarding a disagreement between the Supervisory Board, where the non-EMU 
participating States are represented and the Governing Council, where non-EMU 
participating States are not represented.228  
Another important organ is the Administrative Board of Review, entrusted with 
reviewing the decisions taken by the ECB in the exercise of SSM powers.229 The 
Administrative Board of Review is “composed of five individuals of high repute, from 
Member States.” Current employees of the ECB and NCAs are barred from holding positions 
on the Board, which is also expected to act independently.230 I will return to the discussion of 
the appellate organs in Chapter 3.  
 
2. Choosing the (best?) banking supervisor 
Choosing the central institution for the SSM was essentially an elimination process, 
with the ECB not being everyone’s preference. However, given the need to have a solid legal 
basis and the ability to act swiftly under difficult circumstances, the ECB was better 
positioned to undertake such functions than any of the alternatives.  
The EU legal system is largely based on the principle of conferred powers. Under this 
                                                 
225 Art.129 TFEU 
226 On which see ECB website  
227 the President, the Vice-President and four other members 
228 Art.25(5), Rec.73 SSMR 
229 Art.24(1), (2) SSMR 
230 Ibid.  
 73 
principle, the EU can only act if the Treaties provide a legal basis for its actions.231 Such 
basis needed to be found for the central institution of the SSM. Among possible legal bases 
that were initially contemplated was Art.114 TFEU, an internal market Treaty basis, on 
which EU agencies, such as EBA, can be founded. However, Art.114 was rejected,232 and so 
was the choice in favour of establishing an EU agency at the heart of the SSM, which would 
have faced additional complications because of the Meroni doctrine, setting limitations on the 
powers that can be delegated to an agency.233 Thus, at the time it was believed that entrusting 
the EBA with direct micro-prudential supervision would amount to improper delegation. To 
be sure, subsequent case law – the short-selling decision234 in particular – has made this 
assumption somewhat questionable. Even if the EBA could have undertaken some of the 
functions the ECB was subsequently given, it would face many of the limitations the SRB is 
now facing, as well as cumbersome decision-making procedures, discussed in section D, 
below.  Theoretically, the nuclear option of Art.352 TFEU was also available as a possible 
constitutional basis, but the use of it would have been too problematic politically. The 
ambiguity of this article would have made the constitutional limits of the powers of the new 
European banking supervisor unclear; a position which would doubtlessly be considered 
unacceptable by a number of EU States, including most NoPS. Ultimately, the body that 
could most easily act as a banking supervisor was the ECB, since it is allowed to exercise 
prudential competences under Art.127(6), which provided a ‘constitutionally secure’ 
option.235   
The justifying logic is that the supervisory functions are being conferred on the ECB as 
“pre-requisites for ensuring price stability and effective performance of other monetary 
functions.”236 Wymeerch used this logic to justify many features of the SSM, highlighting the 
position of Art.127(6) under the broader heading of monetary policy, which points to the 
symbiosis between the EBU and the EMU, discussed in Chapter 1, section A(5).237 This 
reasoning appears equally justified from the operational and empirical standpoint. Micklitz 
argued that the “integration of financial markets represents an essential goal of the EBU and 
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at the same time, a pre-requisite for the monetary policy of the ECB.” 238 Peek et al. presented 
empirical evidence that supervisory knowledge can increase the ability to forecast variables 
informing monetary policy.239 Lastra also emphasises the ECBs ‘money printing’ capacity, 
which is a useful perk for a lender of last resort, especially one which is also the 
supervisor.240 Since these functions complement each other, from the operational 
effectiveness standpoint, it is somewhat unfortunate that the two capacities of the ECB 
needed to be separated, thus limiting the potential benefits. I will return to this issue later in 
this Chapter.  
Importantly, the ECB itself was far from neutral in this process and actively sought to 
expand its powers into the supervisory domain. This can be traced to the pledge of the (then) 
ECB president Mario Draghi “to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro.”241 That, notably, 
makes the EBU even more targeted at the Eurozone. Furthermore, Micklitz argued the SSM, 
with the ECB at the centre, to be a “direct reversal of the Internal Market programme […] 
built around the supervisory authority – the Single Supervisory Board – rather than 
substantive provisions.”242 He further stressed the importance of the fact that the ECB is an 
EU institution, effectively entrusted with centralised decision-making powers, which has 
significant  political and constitutional implications, discussed in section E.243  
 
3. Problems with Article 127(6) TFEU 
Obviously, being the only feasible option and having some advantages does not make 
Art.127(6) an ideal legal basis. There are several suggested interpretations that make this 
provision seem like an inherently problematic source of legitimacy. While such 
interpretations have largely been brushed aside in order to swiftly facilitate the reform, it is 
important to highlight the most important ones, as they illustrate the imperfections of the 
SSM’s constitutional basis. Most importantly, Art.127 drew a fundamental distinction 
between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone States in the EBU framework, creating numerous 
complications. The problematic aspects of the SSM’s constitutional basis can be divided into 
two broad groups: uncertainties and differentiation catalysts.  
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a) Uncertainties and ambiguities  
Art.127(6) permits the conferral on the ECB of specific tasks concerning prudential 
supervision. The reference to ‘specific’ has been interpreted in different ways. Tridimas  
points to the allegations of inadequacy of Art.127(6) as the constitutional basis of the SSM 
based on the word ‘specific’, and a (notably unsuccessful) challenge in front of the German 
Constitutional Court,244  where it was argued that Art.127(6) only allows the conferral of 
‘specific’ powers to the ECB and cannot be the basis for making the ECB the single 
supervisor.245  
Some commentators have also claimed that pursuant to Art.127(6) the ECB can 
develop activities relating to policies, but not actual supervision. In other words, that its reach 
should not be much greater than that of the EBA. Gortsos for example points out that when 
the TFEU was enacted:  
“[c]ontrary to what was established with regard to the definition and 
implementation of the single monetary […] policy, which became supranational, the 
ECB did not shift into a supranational supervisory authority for the financial system 
[…], given that relevant competencies remained at national level.246  
 
In this context, reference is also made to Art.127(5),247 which stipulates that the ESCB, 
not the ECB separately, is responsible for “supervision of credit institutions and the stability 
of the financial system”. Allegedly, the relevant competence which lies with the ECB is only 
to submit opinions, in accordance with Art.127(4) TFEU, within the limits set out in Decision 
98/415/EC of the Council.248 
Meanwhile, the reference to ‘prudential supervision’ raises questions about the limits of 
the concept of such supervision, as well as the very meaning of it. Ferran and Babis suggest 
that the answers to these questions should be determined by reference to the capital 
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requirements legislation of the Single Rulebook.249 Unfortunately, neither CRR nor CRDIV 
include a precise definition of prudential supervision. They can, however, inform the overall 
view of what supervision entails. Art.4(1)(47) of the CRR seems to imply that prudential 
supervision is ensuring compliance with the Rulebook and using all necessary powers 
conferred in the legislation. A more detailed and precise definition would be desirable for 
future development, specifically in drawing a clear line between supervision and regulation. 
On the other hand, unnecessarily strict definition could draw artificial and unhelpful 
distinctions between supervision, early intervention and resolution, making the processes 
more difficult and lengthier, as the legitimacy of actions of different authorities could be 
constantly challenged as encroaching upon the domain of another body and thus illegitimate.  
 
        b)   Differentiation between Member States 
These ambiguities, problematic as they may be, seem unlikely to materially affect the 
stability of the SSM in the long run. By contrast, the significance of unnecessary 
differentiation between Member States cannot be overstated. Such differentiation is linked to 
constitutional complications in relation to the participation of the non-EMU States. At the 
dawn of the SSM this issue raised a variety of questions.  
Initially there was some speculation that Art.127(6) could not apply to non-Eurozone 
States.250 According to Wymeersch, this argument found support among market 
participants.251 The current set up of the SSM presumes that Art.127(6) can apply to all EU 
States, but that requires a separate close cooperation agreement for each individual non-
Eurozone State. Other Treaty provisions justify this interpretation. Art.139(2)(c) TFEU lists 
the objectives and tasks of the ESCB under Art.127, which do not apply to States ‘in 
derogation’ (i.e. non-Eurozone),252 but clearly emits para.6 from that list. Protocol 15, point 4 
relating specifically to the UK excluded paragraphs 1-5, but not 6. While Brexit made this 
provision redundant, it is still an important indication of legislative intent. However, as is 
evident from a number of Treaty provisions, including Art.139(2)(e) TFEU, for the SSM to 
extend beyond the Eurozone automatically, without a separate agreement, an alternative to 
the ECB would need to be found to serve as the main institution, which, as mentioned, would 
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have been very difficult.  
The biggest problem is that even when the non-Eurozone States participate in the SSM 
and SRM on voluntary basis, constitutional restrictions prevent that participation from being 
truly equal. In essence, under Art.129 TFEU the Governing Council of the ECB is the 
ultimate decision-maker of the ECB and consequently bares the ultimate responsibility for 
the ECB’s actions.253 That, in principle, has not been changed by the creation of the 
Supervisory Board of the SSM. Non-Eurozone states are not – and cannot be - represented in 
the Governing Council and cannot participate in the decision-making of this organ. This 
problem stands as a major stumbling block for new SSM/SRM accessions. It has far-reaching 
consequences, affecting numerous aspects of the SSM and even seeping into the SRM. This 
problem is partly the legacy of the legislative framework designed for the ECB with only the 
monetary capacity. For that reason, Art.139(2)(h) also excludes non-EMU States from 
participating in the appointment of the ECB’s Executive Board which is, inter alia, in charge 
of day-to-day business of the ECB, implementation of monetary policy and includes some of 
the highest-ranking ECB officials, including the President.  
 
4. The ‘mechanism’ status 
a) The delegation issue and the dominance of the Governing Council  
The biggest difference between the SSM and alternative ideas and proposals for 
European supervisory centralisation is that it is a mechanism, not an institution. The reasons 
for such choice are of particular relevance for this thesis. Once it became clear that the ECB, 
as the single supervisor, could not realistically become the only supervisor, at least not within 
the timeframe required, the involvement of the NCAs became a necessity. As we will see 
later, the ECB even relies on the NCAs for the exercise of its tasks under the SSMR.  As each 
NCA was given a seat at the Supervisory Board and entrusted with important tasks in day-to-
day supervision (even for significant banks), the legality of such arrangement was 
questioned. Wymeersch’s research reveals that the legal service of the Council, in an 
unpublished document, concluded that the TFEU does not allow direct delegation to any 
other institution, including NCAs or other institutions ‘subordinate’ to the ECB.254 In this 
context Ferran and Babis255 explore the thorny issue of delegation of discretionary powers 
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under EU law, which the critics of the SSM might point to. They point to Tralli v ECB256, 
where, considering the application of Meroni v High Authority to the ECB, the Court held 
that an EU body is entitled to lay down measures of organisational nature, delegating powers 
to its own internal decision-making organs.257 
The way around this obstacle was found by naming the SSM a mechanism, not an 
institution. With the SSM being a mechanism, rather than an institution, the issue of 
delegation does not arise, as the arrangement effectively makes NCAs the ECB’s 
‘executive’,258 as the case is in relation to the implementation of the monetary policy.259 As 
far as internal organisation goes, the EU institutions have a considerable amount of 
discretion, and distribution of tasks within those confines does not constitute delegation.260   
The problem with this reasoning is that the SSM does not actually merge the NCAs into 
the ECB, even if they sit on the Supervisory Board. They are, de facto and de jure, separate 
bodies and those challenging the SSM legitimacy could argue that leaving the NCAs 
decision-making powers involves external delegation rather than internal organisation.261 The 
mentioned opinion of the legal service of the Council therefore insisted that the only way to 
make it ‘internal’ was to put the ultimate responsibility for the SSM’s decisions on the 
Governing Council.262 This is also in line with the established reading of Art.129(1) TFEU. 
Therefore, in a bid to comply with Art.129, as well as avoid improper delegation allegations, 
the SSM had to have the Governing Council placed at the top of its organisational hierarchy. 
Making the NCAs part of the Supervisory Board, which is technically a part of the ECB, 
notably also gave the ECB the ability to influence the status and role given of the NCAs, thus 
indirectly making the Governing Council even more dominant. 263  
 
b) The resulting coordination problems  
While the status of a mechanism as opposed to an institution largely solved the 
delegation problem, it has come at considerable practical and operational costs. The primary 
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problem is said to be reliance on coordination between central and national elements.264 
Moloney points to the fact that the ESAs have faced many difficulties in the past, especially 
when directing the NCAs, in relation to inter alia binding mediation between NCAs or 
compliance with ESA guidelines.265 It did not take long for this problem to manifest in the 
SSM context. The ESAs, the ECB and the Italian government did not coordinate well in 
relation the problems of Monte dei Paschi di Siena and failed to trigger early intervention and 
resolution processes, partly due to its status as the country’s ‘national champion’ and 
impeding Italy’s constitutional referendum in late 2016.266 The story of this banking failure is 
eerily similar to the one of Lehman Brothers at the wake of the GFC, with various attempts at 
private and public sector solutions taking an entire year, and the final request for a private 
sector solution eventually rejected by the ECB. The speed and efficiency promised by the 
EBU had not turned into reality. Generally, the SSM has been described as ‘vulnerable’ due 
to the split of competence between centralised and decentralised elements, ‘as co-ordination 
risks arise from the mechanism-based operating model’.267 Moreover, it could be argued that 
the delegation issue has not been solved but rather neutralised and the fine line of the Meroni, 
Tralli and Short Selling rulings always needs to be kept in mind, which effectively burdens 
decision-making.  
 
5. Business type limitations  
Art.127(6) confers the mentioned “specific tasks” upon the ECB “relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception 
of insurance undertakings.” (emphasis added) This wording effectively limited the scope of 
the SSMR to banks, which is arguably sub-optimal.268 The GFC showed that non-bank 
financial institutions can also be systemically dangerous.269 The companies that needed 
support included juggernauts like AIG and AEGON. Moloney thus argued that a wider scope 
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could have “supported the holistic, cross-sectoral, functional approach to supervision which 
the crisis exposed as being necessary.”270  
Due to the constitutional restrictions and subsequent political compromises, discussed 
in subsection 7 below, the SSM regime does not apply to large market segments, including 
many institutions performing maturity transformations. Such limitations might be leaving 
room for regulatory arbitrage and creating uneven playing field. Moreover, if seen from a 
comparative perspective, these restrictions limit the SSM structure to the extent not found in 
most interconnected jurisdictions. The US Financial Stability Oversight Council can 
designate systemically important (roughly equivalent to what is known in the SSM jargon as 
‘significant entities’ – see below) non-bank financial entities and financial market utilities to 
be supervised by the Federal Reserve, which automatically triggers application of enhanced 
prudential requirements.271 Similarly, in the UK the PRA can designate investment firms for 
its supervision.272  
That said, the scope of ECB supervision is still an improvement over the original SSM 
proposals. The coverage was expanded moving from the initial proposals onto the final 
SMMR text; which acknowledges that “risks for the safety and soundness of a credit 
institution” can arise “both at the level of an individual credit institution and at the level of a 
banking group or of a financial conglomerate”.273 Thus, in addition to supervision of 
individual credit institutions, the ECB’s tasks include supervision at the consolidated level, 
supplementary supervision, supervision of financial holding companies and supervision of 
mixed financial holding companies.274 These were meaningful additions to the ECB’s 
competences compared to the initial proposals, which were assumed not to include financial 
holding companies and conglomerates.275  
 
6. Competencies of the ECB 
Even with some exemptions and exceptions, the list of ECB competencies is obviously 
vast. Following the establishment of the SSM, the central banking and supervisory 
competencies of the ECB could be simplistically listed as follows: 
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x setting and implementing the monetary policy;276 
x issuance of euro banknotes and coins;277 
x macro-prudential oversight as part of the ESRB; 278 
x micro-prudential supervision as part of the SSM. 
 
The competency at the centre of this thesis – micro-prudential supervision - includes 
organisation of supervision, development of administrative bodies and structures and even a 
limited degree of rule-making.279 The ECB is made exclusively competent (although not 
expected) to prudentially supervise (directly or indirectly, permanently or optionally) all 
credit institutions established in the participating States.280 
In this subsection I will discuss the division of tasks between the NCAs and the ECB, 
and overview the responsibilities of both levels of the SSM. First, however, I will begin by 
highlighting a key change in how the ECB as an institution operates -  that is, the principle of 
a separation between banking supervision and monetary policy.  
 
a) Separation between the EMU and the EBU  
The supervisory competencies of the ECB are operationally and, to an extent, 
institutionally, separated from its monetary ones. This is done “in order to avoid conflicts of 
interests and to ensure that each function is exercised in accordance with the applicable 
objectives.”281  An example of such conflict of interest could be a situation where a decision 
to increase interest rates - a monetary policy decision - hurts financial intermediaries, 
performing maturity transformations.282 Baglioni argued that a central bank, responsible for 
both monetary policy and prudential supervision, would have an incentive to delay the 
interest rate decision, wary of the side effects on the stability of the banking system. 283  
The ECB thus has to ensure that the Governing Council operates in a differentiated 
manner regarding monetary and supervisory functions, including strictly separated meetings 
and agendas.284 According to Alexander, this arrangement was insisted on by Germany.285 
                                                 
276 Arts.127(1) and (2) TFEU 
277 Art.128 TFEU 
278  Pursuant to Council Regulation 1096/2010, also based on Art.127(6) TFEU 
279  Listed in Art.4 SSMR 
280 On the discussion of the ECB’s discretion to make choice of institutions to be supervised by it see section E 
below.  
281 SSMR Rec.65, Art.25  
282 Baglioni, supra, p.35 
283 Ibid.  
284 SSMR Rec.65, Art.25 
 82 
From the operational perspective, there seems to be a lack of consensus on whether such 
separation, sometimes called a ‘Chinese Wall’, is optimal. Prior to the GFC, the ECB itself 
suggested that arguments for rigid separation between prudential supervision and central 
banking were losing strength in the Eurozone.286 At an even earlier stage of EU financial 
integration, when the conceptual framework of the ECB was being developed, Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker argued that separation between the two responsibilities is sub-optimal and the 
risk of conflict of interest can be dealt with internally, without any ‘Chinese wall’ building.287 
They argued that the ECB, as the lender of last resort, has to deal with immediate 
consequences of systemic failures and thus should be able to unapologetically engage in 
supervision.  Moreover, as the same authors stated in a different publication, even in normal 
times “the integrity and reliability of a payment system is essentially dependent on the quality 
of the participants, the specific clearing and settlement arrangements, and the possible 
backing by a Central Bank”, so artificially separating such agendas might be an overkill.288 
Such thinking is not unwarranted. The stated mission of the ECB includes ensuring the 
safety and soundness of credit institutions, stability of the financial systems of the EU and 
individual States, the unity and integrity of the internal market, protection of depositors and 
improving the functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the Single Rulebook.289 
The breadth of this mission might effectively mean that only an institution with both – central 
banking and supervisory – capacities could be up to the task, and the ‘wall’ between the two 
– if actually existent and functioning – needs to be repeatedly climbed over. Baglioni has 
further criticised separation, stating that it ‘does not rely on solid economic arguments’.290 He 
mentions examples when the monetary and supervisory duties might need to be coordinated, 
like for mitigating pro-cyclical effects of capital requirement adjustments.291  
It would seem that eventual demolition of the wall might be desirable. However, in the 
absence of a Treaty change that remains unlikely, as long as the current system for close 
cooperation with the NoPS remains in place.292 One of the reasons for the erection of the 
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‘Chinese wall’ was that non-Eurozone States obviously do not participate in the monetary 
policy considerations and thus would find themselves at an inherent disadvantage, when the 
monetary and supervisory interests of the ECB need to be balanced, even when they do not 
conflict.  
b) Directly supervised institutions  
Supervision is based on a distinction between significant and less significant 
institutions. Generally, the ECB is in charge of the biggest or particularly systemically or 
domestically important entities, which effectively amounts to roughly 120 banks, whereas the 
NCAs are in charge of the rest of the market.  
 
i) Rules for determining the supervisor 
One of the most fundamental changes introduced by the EBU is that, via the SSM, the 
ECB directly supervises institutions, which are “significant on a consolidated basis.”293 
Pursuant to Art.6(4) SSMR, an institution is considered significant and therefore falls within 
the ECB’s direct supervisory domain under at least one of the following circumstances:  
x the total value of its assets exceeds 30 billion euros;294 
x the ratio of its total assets over the GDP of the participating State exceeds 
20%, unless the total value of its assets is below 5 billion;295 
x upon a notification296 by the NCA that it considers such institution 
significant  to the domestic economy and a resulting ECB’s comprehensive 
assessment;297 
x ECB decision where the institution has established subsidiaries in more than 
one participating State and its cross-border assets or liabilities represent a significant 
part of its portfolio; 
x it is one of the three most significant credit institutions in a participating 
State;298 
x any institution that directly receives or requests ESM assistance.299 
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 It is apparent that the interpretation of some of these criteria allows for more 
discretion than for others. A distinction can be drawn between the ‘hard’ (30 bln, GDP ratio, 
top 3 in the State) and ‘soft’ (NCA notification, subsidiaries in a NoPS) criteria. For example, 
for the third criterion (NCA notification) the ECB is expected to take into account all relevant 
circumstances, including level-playing field considerations, the weighting of which leaves a 
margin of discretion.300  
 Credit institutions that do not meet one of the above criteria – so-called ‘less 
significant’ entities – generally continue to be supervised by NCAs. This distinction between 
significant entities which are directly supervised by the ECB, and less significant entities, 
which continue to be supervised by NCAs, is a key feature of the SSM and, as I will illustrate 
hereinafter has become a point of legal contention, when ‘borderline’ entities seek to be 
classified in a particular way.  
 
ii) The particular circumstances clause and its judicial interpretation 
Besides setting out the above criteria, Art.6(4) includes an important discretion for the 
ECB. It foresees that in case of ‘particular circumstances’, the ECB can ‘reclassify’ a 
significant credit institution as less significant. This possibility is further fleshed out in the 
SSM Framework Regulation (SSMFR).301 Pursuant to Art.70(1) of the SSMFR, particular 
circumstances exist where:  
 
‘there are specific and factual circumstances that make the classification of a 
supervised entity as significant inappropriate, taking into account the objectives and 
principles of the SSM Regulation and, in particular, the need to ensure the consistent 
application of high supervisory standards’.302 
 
If the ECB decides to make use of this provision, the reclassified credit institution will 
be supervised by NCAs. However, generally, the use of the ‘particular circumstances’ clause 
appears to be limited. The SSMFR states that the term must be interpreted strictly.303 
Moreover, the ‘particular circumstances’ that would allow classifying an otherwise 
significant entity as less significant are to be determined on a case-by-case basis and 
“specifically for the supervised entity or supervised group concerned, but not for categories 
                                                 
300 SSMR Rec.41 
301 Art.6(4) sub-para.2 SSMR; Arts.70-71 SSMFR 
302 Art.70 SSMFR 
303 Art.70(2) SSMFR 
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of supervised entities.”304 As the case law suggests, the onus of proof seems to be on the 
institution (possibly also the NCA) to prove that the SSMR objectives can be better attained 
by putting a significant institution under the direct supervision of the NCA.305  
These provisions on ‘particular circumstances’ came under scrutiny in the L-Bank 
case.306 In this case Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg – Förderbank (L-Bank), a 
German bank wholly owned by the Land  of Baden-Württemberg, received a notification 
from the ECB that “on account of its size it was subject solely to its supervision rather than 
shared supervision under the [SSM].”307 L-Bank disagreed, invoking the ‘particular 
circumstances’ clause of Art.6(4) SSMR and Arts.70-71 SSMFR.308 The Administrative 
Board of Review of the ECB – a body which, as mentioned in section C(1), carries out 
internal administrative reviews of the ECB’s supervisory decisions – found the ECB’s 
decision lawful. The final verdict was that “the applicant’s classification as a significant 
entity was not in contradiction with the objectives of the [SSMR]”.309  
L-Bank challenged the decision of the ECB, including the ECB’s interpretation of the 
term ‘particular circumstances’, before the General Court (EGC). However, the EGC agreed 
with the ECB. Referring to Art.70(1) SSMFR, which fleshes out the meaning of ‘particular 
circumstances’, it held that it had to be understood as: 
 
“referring solely to specific factual circumstances entailing that direct 
prudential supervision by the national authorities is better able to attain the 
objectives and the principles of the [SSM Regulation], in particular the need to 
guarantee consistent application of high prudential supervisory standards.”310 
 
It went on to confirm that the ECB was right when deciding in essence that a 
reclassification of L-Bank was only justified “if it was demonstrated that direct prudential 
supervision by the German authorities would be better able to ensure attainment of the 
                                                 
304 Art.71(1) SSMFR 
305 C-450/17 P, para.59 and T-122/15 para.75 
306 Landesbank Baden-Württemberg is a parent company controlling three commercial banks and the 
Landesbank for some Federal States of Germany; Germany's biggest state-backed landesbank lender. 
307 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v. ECB Case T-122/15 Para.2  
308 Under Art.70 SSMFR “Particular circumstances […] make the classification of a supervised entity as 
significant inappropriate, taking into account the objectives and principles of the SSM Regulation and, in 
particular, the need to ensure the consistent application of high supervisory standards.” Under Art. 71 such 
determination is to be made on case by case basis.  
309 ECB/SSM/15/1, para.2 
310 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v. ECB Case T-122/15 Para.80 
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objectives of the [SSMR] than supervision by the ECB.”311  EGC also ruled that under 
Art.6(4) “the ECB has exclusive competence for determining the ‘particular circumstances’ 
in which direct supervision of an entity which should fall solely under its supervision might 
instead be under the supervision of a national authority.”312 L-Bank appealed the decision of 
the EGC, but on appeal, the Court of Justice (CJEU) confirmed the decision.313 
The CJEU notably did not close the door to such challenges completely, remarking that 
in principle there was nothing in either regulation, which “would make it impossible for the 
Landeskreditbank to argue that there are ‘particular circumstances’ within the meaning of 
those provisions, and to adduce proof of their existence,” 314 and that a stronger argument 
presented in claiming ‘particular circumstances’ could be more fruitful.315 Notably, the ECB 
has exercised its discretion not to supervise with respect to several banks, on grounds 
including preservation of national supervisory system, and the bank being otherwise too 
small.316 However, this is still an instance of the ECB exercising its discretion, and seeing an 
exercise of discretion as a limitation to discretion would be erroneous. 
This case also set precedent as to how the principle of proportionality is to be 
interpreted in the SSM (potentially EBU as a whole) jurisprudence. The CJEU stated that 
“the principle of proportionality was taken into consideration by the EU legislature, and that 
the ECB is not required […] to determine case-by-case whether, despite the application of the 
criteria set out in the second subparagraph of Article 6(4) […], a significant institution should 
come under the direct supervision of the national authorities on the ground that they are better 
able to attain the objectives of that regulation.317 The justifying logic seems to be that as long 
as the credit institution satisfies one of the ‘hard’ criteria of classification (i.e. top 3 in the 
country, 30 billion, etc.,) the proportionality  test is automatically considered to be satisfied, 
as that is how the system was envisaged by the legislature. It is not unforeseeable that, should 
the institution be classified as significant based on more discretionary criteria, the approach 
could be more lenient, but that is not confirmed. 
 
 
                                                 
311 Ibid. para.81 
312  Ibid. para.54 
313 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v. ECB, Case C-450/17 P 
314 C-450/17 P, para.63 
315 Ibid. para.71 
316 N Moloney, European Banking Union: assessing its risks and resilience, Common Market Law Review, 
Vol.51, Issue 6, 2014, p.1646, with reference to Third 2014 SSM Quarterly Report, p.6 
317 Case T-122/15 para.59, also para.75 of Case C-450/17 P 
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iii) Consequences of differentiation by significance 
The arrangement based on significance assessment, while effectively utilising an 
existing infrastructural base, also has some drawbacks. Firstly, such arrangement still 
necessitates the existence of the NCAs in their full pre-EBU capacity, corresponding budgets 
and payrolls. Secondly, small institutions can also turn out to have systemic implications 
within (and as a result of) their particular operating environments.318 The well-known 
problems of ‘cajas de ahorro’ in Spain are illustrative of this problem. Thirdly, the credit 
institutions themselves clearly do not see the two regimes as being equivalent, and are willing 
to ‘shop’ for the one that suits them better, which has multiple negative effects.  
In the light of such concerns, the Commission initially proposed that all banks in 
participating States should be supervised by the ECB. However, this proposal crashed against 
a wall of national interests. Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland prominently argued that 
smaller institutions with no major cross-border activities should continue to be supervised by 
the NCAs.319 Two pragmatic factors also came together in shaping this system: the ECB itself 
was being reformed and facing constitutional limitations; the NCAs were already in place to 
do the job.  
This represents a broader theme of the EBU reforms where old and new architecture 
had to be modified and merged together, as discussed in Chapter 1. This is not, in and of 
itself, a problem. Concerns appear where, as Moloney expressed it “the proxies can be shaped 
by political interests rather than disinterested assessments of optimal scope.”320 As I will 
illustrate,321 the numerous EBU/SSM limitations, divisions, exemptions, discretions, and 
exclusions have been shaped by many distinct and sometimes conflicting interests. It 
becomes hard to find their underlying logic. In order to effectively function in this 
environment, the ECB was given the discretion in interpreting the significance criteria, but 
that resulted in a whole new set of political and constitutional problems, discussed in section 
E.  
 
c) Functions and powers of the ECB within the SSM 
Following prolonged wrestling with constitutional limitations, legal challenges and 
political pressures, the ECB nevertheless ended up with a list of significant supervisory tasks. 
                                                 
318 N Moloney, European Banking Union: assessing its risks and resilience, Common Market Law Review, 
Vol.51, Issue 6, 2014, p.1645, see SSMR Rec.16 
319 Ibid.  
320 Ibid.  
321 Subsection 7, below. 
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In this subsection I will touch upon the most important aspects, including some of the more 
contentious ones.  
i) authorising and withdrawing the authorisation of all credit institutions established 
in a participating State irrespective of their significance.322 The SSMR justifies this 
consolidation of authority by emphasising the need to ensure that only “an organisation 
capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and 
suitable directors carry out those activities.”323 NCAs nevertheless participate in the 
authorisation process, since it is up to them to propose to the ECB to grant authorisation.324 
As Moloney summarised, NCAs are “responsible for data collection and assessment of 
compliance; […] the ECB in effect endorses the NCA decision but is the de jure authorizing 
actor, albeit with limited operational control.” 325 NCAs can outright reject an application for 
authorisation, if the requirements for authorisation under national law are not met.326 They 
can also propose to withdraw the authorisation of a credit institution pursuant to EU or 
national law.327 Thus, the ECB has to carry out its tasks with regard to withdrawal of 
authorisations in cases of non-compliance with national law.328 In such cases the ECB, a pan-
European, non-judicial body, effectively enforces national law of participating States and 
shows deference to their requirements and procedures.  
 
ii) To conduct or participate in cross border supervision, when at least one State 
involved participates in the SSM.329 That includes carrying out the tasks of the home State 
NCA in case of a credit institution established in a participating State, which wants to 
establish a branch or provide cross-border services in a NoPS,330 supervision of credit 
institutions’ parents established in a participating State,331 and participation in supervision on 
a consolidated basis in relation to parents not established in one of the participating States.332  
The ECB acts as either the home or the host authority where the credit institution is 
established across the SSM borders. This essentially happens in accordance with the old 
                                                 
322 Arts.4(1)(a) and 14 SSMR 
323 Rec.20 SSMR 
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home-host principle, discussed in Chapter 3(A)(1) of this thesis, but with the ECB stepping 
into the shoes of the relevant NCA. The ECB has, pursuant to Art.9 SSMR, all the powers 
that competent authorities have under EU law (e.g. the CRD), unless otherwise provided.333 
Importantly, the ECB can also require NCAs to make use of their powers stemming from 
national law, where the SSMR does not confer such powers on the ECB.334 As discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3, with regard to credit institutions established in non-Eurozone 
participating States, the ECB exercises its powers via Close Cooperation agreements.335 By 
virtue of such agreements the States partly surrender their NCAs and national legal banking 
supervision powers to the ECB. This modified SSM arrangement seeks to ensure that the 
supervision of the ECB does not allow any spill-overs from the Eurozone and delivers on the 
promise to act in the interest of the EU as a whole. It follows a broader pattern of the EBU 
whereby the more cross-border the business is, the more supranational oversight it attracts. 
 
iii) The ECB assesses acquisitions and disposals of qualifying holdings in credit 
institutions, except resolutions.336 The SSMR states that “an assessment of the suitability of 
any new owner […] is an indispensable tool for ensuring the continuous suitability and 
financial soundness of credit institutions’ owners.” 337 Merger and acquisition issues came to 
the forefront during and shortly before the GFC. From the failed attempts to organise the last 
hope takeover of Lehman Brothers, to the story of RBS, which brought ABN AMRO’s 
subprime mortgages onto their books just before the crash - these events had dire 
consequences.  
Banking mergers often have strong political undertones, which does not always result 
in the best outcomes. Political pressures and obstacles, particularly in crisis situations, can 
result in unnecessary delays, which can prevent a timely acquisition and result in outright 
failure of the troubled bank.338 On the other hand, unchecked business interest of systemically 
important entities can result in destabilising mergers. With the SSM system in place, harmful 
mergers are more likely to be prevented, thanks to the ECB’s greater expertise and more 
resources for assessment, while locally less favoured (but necessary on the European scale) 
mergers are easier to force through.  
                                                 
333 SSMR Rec.45 
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336 Art.15 SSMR 
337 Rec.22 
338 for specific examples see S Deo, C Franz, C Gandrud, M Hallerberg, Preventing German Banks Failures: 
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While under Art.15 SSMR the initial assessors of acquisition applications are the 
NCAs, the ECB can essentially veto such acquisition on the basis of EU law. According to 
Gortsos, with mergers and acquisitions of businesses in the banking sector being subject to 
approval by the ECB, the European banking landscape will be shaped at supranational level 
for decades.339 There is little doubt that the ECB as an EU institution, is well placed to carry 
out such an assessment, arguably without imposing undue restrictions on the internal 
market,340 but this also raises questions as to where prudential supervision ends and direct 
market regulation begins.  
 
iv) The line between supervision and regulation is also blurred in relation to the 
assessment of suitability of directors, which is obviously is a huge power, as a matter of 
principle and practice.341  Even in federal states like the USA, Switzerland or Russia such 
powers can only exercised by the federal authority under limited circumstances, and the ECB 
does not (sensu stricto) wear the mantle of the sovereign in the EU. Art.93(2) SSMFR gives 
the ECB all powers the relevant NCA has for such matters. Additional related provisions 
expand it beyond, including the removal provisions of Art.16(2)(m) SSMR, which includes 
removals on the basis of EU and national law transposing Directives.342 Grundmann sees this 
as a fundamental change with consequences stretching far beyond banking law.343 He argues 
that the organisational requirements of banking supervision, including acquisition and  
disposal of holdings and suitability of directors, will at some point inevitably clash with the 
goal of increasing the shareholder value, which could alter the private law equilibrium, 
especially in company law, “with the ensuing need for a detailed readjustment of rules on 
duties of directors (their ultimate goal no longer being shareholder or also stakeholder 
welfare).”344   
 
v)The main function of the ECB in the SSM is of course to ensure compliance with 
relevant prudential requirements and governance requirements.345 In ensuring 
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compliance, the ECB applies Union law (e.g. the CRR), but not only. Indeed, the SSMR also 
tasks the ECB with applying national law where the relevant Union requirements are set out 
in an EU directive (e.g. the CRD). Directives require implementation into national law and 
accordingly the ECB must apply the law that transposes the Union law into national law. To 
be sure, EU regulations are different. They do not require implementation into national law 
and the ECB can apply them directly. Nonetheless, these regulations can still include 
‘options’ for Member States. Accordingly, the SSMR also requires the ECB, when exercising 
its tasks, to apply relevant national laws which exercise these options.  
Clearly this arrangement, where the ECB – as an EU institution – is required to apply 
national law is a constitutional peculiarity and one that was hotly debated during the 
negotiations of the SSMR. Such arrangement has broader implications which will be 
discussed in section E. For now suffices to say that this arrangement is an unusual deviation 
from the general EU line of reasoning, where national implementing measures and national 
laws applying options are out of an EU body’s reach. In general, any kind of direct law 
application of EU bodies is unusual. Previously,  similar centralised decision-making 
procedure combined with law application only existed in competition law.346 Based on 
Art.103 TFEU, the Commission was entrusted with the competence to enforce EU law via 
Regulation 17/1962.347  
Arguably, such arrangement was necessary and in line with the broader SSM logic. 
Given that much EU legislation is still adopted in the form of directives, it was a necessary 
arrangement. This is all the more so, since directives lack horizontal direct effect and 
accordingly, the ECB would not (generally) be able to rely on Directives against credit 
institutions (which are private parties).  
 
vi) The ECB performs supervisory reviews and stress tests in order to determine 
whether the arrangements of credit institutions and the own funds held by them ensure a 
sound management and coverage of risks.348 On the basis of supervisory reviews, the ECB 
can impose specific additional funds, publication and liquidity requirements, as well as take 
other measures.349  The ECB monitors whether the banks hold certain levels of capital against 
risks inherent to the business, limit the size of their exposures to individual counterparties in 
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accordance to the (notably rather flexible) Single Rulebook provisions, and disclose 
information on their financial situation, as well as dispose of sufficient liquid assets to 
withstand situations of market stress, and limit their leverage.350 
 
vii) The ECB participates in supplementary supervision of a financial 
conglomerate in relation to the credit institutions included in it, and assumes the tasks of a 
coordinator, where  appointed.351 As discussed, supervision of conglomerates, as well as 
inclusion of financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies are 
significant improvements, which expanded the ECB’s remit significantly. On the other hand, 
their inclusion makes the exclusions of other ‘bank-like’ entities and their groups even harder 
to justify, as I will discuss in subsection 7 below.  
 
viii) A particularly contentious aspect of the SSM arrangement is that the ECB 
performs supervisory tasks relating to recovery plans and early intervention where a 
credit institution or a group does not meet or is likely to breach the prudential requirements. 
That includes a number of powers relating to fundamental aspects of business operations. As 
Donnelly observed, these powers “are controversial enough within a country, but are un-
precedented within the EU. All of these measures require strong regulatory authority to 
intervene in the property rights of companies, shareholders and creditors.”352 The ECB can 
also implement structural changes required to prevent financial stress or failure. Such powers 
notably do not (or at least should not) amount to outright resolution. The resolution plans are 
also mainly the responsibility of the Single Resolution Board, discussed in Section D, 
although the dividing line is not clear. According to Baglioni, the SSM lacks a clear 
distinction between early intervention measures, resolution powers, and day-to-day 
supervision.353 That has further reaching consequences of particular relevance for the 
problematic assessed in this thesis, as the involvement of the ECB in the activities forming 
part of other pillars of the EBU brings the representation issues of the SSM into these other 
pillars.  
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ix) Another instance where the ECB operates on the border of the competence of 
another EU body is contribution to the development of draft regulatory technical 
standards or implementing technical standards.354 The adoption of those standards is 
within the purview of the EBA and not part of the tasks of the ECB. The role of the ECB is to 
contribute in a ‘participating role’ to their development, or to draw the attention of EBA to 
the need for such standards. Moreover, the ECB itself is subject to the regulatory and 
implementing technical standards drafted by EBA in accordance with Arts.10-15 and 16 of 
Regulation 1093/2010, and to the provisions of the European supervisory handbook, also 
developed by EBA.355 The intricacy of these relationships is discussed in section B of this 
Chapter.  
 
x) The ECB’s involvement in rule making also extends to adopting regulations for 
the arrangement of SSM tasks.356 Before adopting a regulation, the ECB conducts public 
consultations unless that is disproportionate or the matter is urgent.357 Moloney observes that 
the ECB has considerable rule-making powers, not just under Art.4(3) SSMR, but also 
Art.132 TFEU, which, inter alia, allowed for the ECB’s investigatory and enforcement 
powers and its operational framework, to be partly governed through ECB-made rules.358  
 
xi) The range of the ECB’s investigatory powers is vast. That includes institution 
investigations and on-site inspections.359 To that end the ECB exercises all the investigatory 
powers the NCAs would have under EU law and can request the NCAs to use their power 
existing solely under national law.360 Moreover, the ECB can ask national courts to have its 
orders enforced in case of a refusal of an on-site inspection,361 and has the power to request 
the assistance of the relevant NCA.362 
 
xii) The ECB also has far reaching direct and indirect sanctioning powers, including 
fines and penalties for failure to comply with obligations under its regulations and decisions, 
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rooted in the mentioned Art.132(3) TFEU.363 Inter alia, that includes pecuniary penalties up 
to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach.364 NCAs 
are able to apply penalties in case of failure to comply with obligations stemming from 
national law, including such law enacted in transposition of Directives. Importantly, under 
Art.18(5) the ECB can direct NCAs to open proceedings imposing penalties for breaches of 
both, EU acts and national legislation, including national legislation conferring powers, 
which are not stipulated by EU law. In this respect the ECB’s sanctioning powers stretch 
even beyond the powers of courts.  
 
xiii) Besides its micro-prudential tasks, the ECB also has certain tasks in the macro-
prudential area. Macro-prudential supervision concerns systemic risks to the banking 
system as a whole. The toolkit of macro-prudential supervisors includes, inter alia, the ability 
to adjust capital buffers, exposure limits, etc. Specifically, under Art.5 SSMR, the ECB can 
apply higher requirements for capital buffers and ‘more stringent measures aimed at 
addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks’ than those that are applied by macro-
prudential actors of participating States.365 The fact that ECB can only apply higher 
requirements or more stringent measures underscores that the ECB’s role in the macro-
prudential field is only secondary. Schammo rightly observes in this context that the SSMR 
“does not vest exclusive macro-prudential competence in the ECB. The ECB’s power under 
Art.5(2) is an intervention power. National actors continue to be the primary holders of 
macro-prudential competence.”366 Nevertheless, he also points out that – the ECB’s 
secondary role notwithstanding - the ECB takes the view that it can exercise its macro-
prudential powers ‘even if no measures have been applied at the national level.’367 He refers 
to Art.102 SSMFR, according to which the failure of a national authority to set a buffer rate 
‘does not prevent the ECB from setting a buffer requirement.’ However, actual macro-
prudential powers, albeit limited, are somewhat unusual among the SSM’s mostly micro-
prudential provisions. Many NoPS consider this overreaching and it is one of the many issues 
that concern them. 
 
xiv) This list featured several mentions of the ECB applying national law. That is a 
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part of a broader arrangement whereby the ECB can utilise national legal systems in pursuit 
of the declared goals of the SSM. It could be considered part of the effort to combat inaction 
bias, giving national legislation additional enforcement capacity.368 On the other hand, by 
engaging in application of national law, the ECB arguably bypasses the NCAs, taking part of 
their mandate stemming from national democracies.  
If national law confers on the NCAs powers which are not required by EU law, 
including certain early intervention and precautionary powers, the ECB can require NCAs in 
the participating States to use those powers.369 Notably, as a general rule, the ECB can only 
issue such instructions where the SSMR does not confer equivalent powers on the ECB, but 
this is not a significant limitation in this context.370 This raises two broader concerns. On the 
one hand, the ECB takes over many powers that were entrusted to the NCAs by their 
sovereigns, through delicate and politically contentious processes. On the other hand, even 
though the ECB (by working through NCAs and applying national law) shows some 
deference to subsidiarity, long term such system can create bumps in the playing field. As 
Mills put it, “diversity of state laws” can lead to “an anachronistic fracturing of regulation, 
facilitating forum shopping.”371 For example, the aforementioned application of local 
sanctioning powers brings up harmonisation issues, meaning that the playing field concerns, 
conflicts of interest and unequal application of precedent might occur. Moreover, Tridimas 
discussed a number of complications, which could arise through the ECB applying national 
law and noted that the ECB would have to interpret national law in order to apply it. 372 The 
question is whether the ECB would be bound by the interpretation of the national courts, or, 
alternatively, if it would be obliged to disregard such interpretation if it conflicts with EU 
law.373 Micklitz questions the ability of the ECB, as an enforcement authority, to hold the 
vast body of EU and national rules together, to reach the national public officials in charge, 
and to do so more efficiently than the NCAs (or courts) do in the NoPS.374 Furthermore, 
there is little practical guidance on how the ECB is to apply the rules of precedent or 
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even whether it is bound by precedent in the first place.  
 
7. Competences of the NCAs 
Despite the central position of the ECB, the NCAs are a major integral part of the 
SSM.375 Schammo described the SSM model as “based on an ‘uploading’ and ‘unloading’ of 
supervisory tasks: ‘uploading’ because the ECB […] directly supervise[s] credit institutions 
as a result of the establishment of the SSM;376 ‘unloading’ because the ECB in its role as 
prudential supervisor [relies] on the expertise and work of national authorities.”377 In short, 
the SSM recognises the expertise of the NCAs within their jurisdictional, economic, 
organisational and cultural domains.378 
This subsection briefly examines the main functions of NCAs, some of which were 
already touched upon in the previous subsection. It shows that NCAs play an important role 
within the SSM, but also continue to do so outside the SSM. This section does not provide a 
complete list of the NCAs’ powers, as such powers differ in different States. Therefore, a 
detailed account would be outside of the scope of this research. This subsection merely seeks 
to highlight the most important aspects of the institutionally dual-layered nature of the SSM, 
before analysing the deeper implications of the power balance between the two levels in 
section E.  
 
a) NCAs’ role with respect to significant entities 
While the significant entities are supervised by the ECB, at the operational level, NCAs 
have an important role.  
Firstly, they participate in ‘joint supervisory teams’ (JSTs).379 Each of such teams are 
composed of staff members of the ECB and the NCAs, but presided by a member of ECB 
staff – JST Coordinator.380 Such teams engage in most aspects of day-to-day supervision of a 
significant entity, including supervisory review and evaluation process, the preparation of a 
supervisory examination programme and implementation of such programme.381 Under 
Art.5(1) SSMFR, staff of national central banks, which are not the designated NCAs in their 
                                                 
375 Art.6(1) SSMR 
376 Arts.4-5 SSMR 
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378 SSMR Rec.37 
379 Art.3 SSMFR 
380 Arts.3(1) and 6 SSMFR 
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countries can also join the supervisory team. That arguably deepens the cultural symbiosis 
between central banking and bank supervision across the SSM.  
Secondly, the NCAs assist the ECB with the preparation and implementation of acts 
relating to the tasks referred to in Art.4 SSMR, discussed above.382 That includes the 
preparation and implementation of acts relating to the ECB’s supervisory tasks, including the 
day-to-day assessment, on-site verifications, and assisting the ECB in enforcement of 
decisions.383 Both the ECB and NCAs have an obligation to exchange information.384 The 
NCAs and the ECB also ‘share’ sanctioning, authorisation and assessment of qualifying 
holdings powers discussed in subsection 6, above. Generally, in the areas where the powers 
of the ECB and the NCAs intersect, the general principle is that the NCAs can do more, but 
almost never – less.385 That particularly applies to their powers in the macro-prudential field, 
to which I will return shortly. 
 
b) NCAs’ role with respect to less significant entities 
Pursuant to Art.6(6) SSMR, the NCAs are responsible for the supervision of less 
significant banks and, in the absence of the ECB interference, generally have the same 
competences the ECB does for the significant entities. However, the role of NCAs with 
respect to less significant entities must now be seen in light of the aforementioned L-Bank 
decision. This case established that the NCAs carry out their tasks with respect to NCAs only 
as a result of a decentralised implementation of an ECB exclusive competence.386  
The ECB also benefits from important powers over NCAs under Art.6(5) SSMR. Under 
Art.6(5)(a) the ECB issues regulations, guidelines, and general instructions to NCAs, 
according to which they complete their supervisory tasks. If that does not suffice in ensuring 
“consistent application of high supervisory standards”, the ECB can decide to exercise 
directly all the relevant powers.387 As discussed in section E, this provision is particularly 
contentious. That is linked to the ECBs exercise of oversight over the functioning of 
supervisory system as a whole.388 The ECB can also at any point request information389 and 
seek judicial authorisation for its actions via national institutions, even if that means 
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389 Art.6(5)(d)-(e) 
 98 
bypassing the NCA.390 Moreover, under Art.31(2) SSMR, the ECB can order a supervisory 
team that does not involve the ECB’s staff to include a member of any other participating 
State’s NCA. In summary the NCAs retain a considerable number of tasks and a degree of 
operational autonomy in relation to the non-significant entities, but that autonomy can be 
removed by the ECB.  
 
c) NCAs’ role with respect to entities falling outside of the scope of the SSM 
Outside the scope of the SSM the NCAs have retained their powers and 
responsibilities.391 That includes some functions intertwined with the SSM supervision, but 
not forming part of it, like receiving right of establishment and free provision of services 
notifications, and day-to-day verifications of credit institutions.392 Micro-prudential 
supervision of (technically) non-banking financial businesses also remains the exclusive 
responsibility of the NCAs. The list of such businesses includes, inter alia, all entities 
excluded by Art.1(2) SSMR (to which I will return hereinafter) and insurance and 
reinsurance undertakings excluded by Art.127(6) TFEU. Other notable businesses performing 
bank-like functions which remained with the NCAs include electronic money institutions, 
payment processors (including deposit-taking ones), UCITS, investment firms and funds, etc. 
Importantly, the Member States are free to diverge from the EU law definition of credit 
institutions to some extent, and designate some of these bodies as credit institutions under 
national law and have their NCAs supervise them as such. That would not bring them into 
the ECB’s domain. Importantly, the NCAs also supervise credit institutions from third 
countries establishing a branch or providing cross-border services in the EU.393 NCA’s also 
retained all of their competences in non-prudential supervision.394  
 The underlying logic is that the NCAs retain all competencies that are not necessary 
to for implementation of EU policy in the area of banking supervision.395 Questions, remain, 
however, as to whether all entities excluded from the scope of the SSM would fit under the 
umbrella of such justification.  
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d) Entities excluded from ECB supervision by the SSMR 
As discussed in Chapter 1, it is widely believed that the surrender of national powers, 
particularly the powers of the NCAs, in the SSM area is quite significant. It is therefore 
unsurprising that many States deliberately sought to exclude certain entities not just from the 
SSM remit, but also from the remit of the CRD, and thus many other Single Rulebook 
provisions. As mentioned, all such entities are supervised by the NCAs.  
I have discussed the exclusions resulting from Art.127(6) TFEU in Section C(5). 
Quantitatively, constitutional limits are not the primary source of exclusions from the ECB 
supervision. Further exceptions were made due to political pressures. Some of these excluded 
entities are, simplistically speaking, very similar to banks in terms of business profile, and 
engage in deposit taking and lending. Art.1(2) SSMR explicitly excludes institutions referred 
to in Art.2(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD)396 from the supervisory tasks conferred on the 
ECB. That list is lengthy and includes inter alia investment firms,397 Italian, French and 
Portuguese deposit taking funds, Croatian, Lithuanian and Irish credit unions, and many 
others. Whilst the exclusion of some institutions appears fully reasonable, due to their 
specific character and links to smaller regional economies within their States, the exclusion 
of credit unions and deposit-taking funds is less convincing. Often there is little practical 
difference between these institutions and credit institutions to which the SSM system applies, 
just like there is often little practical difference between similar entities excluded in one State 
but not excluded in another. A further problem is that excluded entities usually have 
particular links to the State or a region within it, which means that the problem of 
interconnectedness between the State and these institutions is particularly deep.  
It is a reflection of a number of uneasy political compromises and the legacy of the 
GFC. Germany (in)famously lobbied for Sparkassen and Landeskreditbanken to be 
excluded.398 That could have potentially given these gigantic entities, which are - by most 
measures - retail banks,  a number of privileges. Germany even managed to get Poland - a 
determined NoPS - to come out in support of German exclusions. Lithuania, still not an EMU 
member at the time, also supported Germany, as well as all credit union exceptions, in order 
to set precedent for the exclusion of its own credit unions, when it joined the EMU shortly 
                                                 
396 Amended to include Croatian and Bulgarian entities and modify the lists of other national exemptions by 
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after. Notably, Germany eventually reluctantly agreed to submit these entities to the SSM 
framework, in exchange for other concessions.  
It is important to note, that the EU chose to use the CRD as a proxy for adjusting the 
exemptions, rather than simply listing them in the SSMR. Using a Directive, rather than a 
regulation for that purpose allowed for easier additions of exclusions, when negotiating 
participation with NoPS.  
However, such flexibility comes at a cost. Due to the exclusions, the SSM regime does 
not apply to significant market segments, including institutions performing maturity 
transformations. Such limitations might be leaving room for regulatory arbitrage and tilting 
the playing field, as liquidity, especially toxic and otherwise suspicious assets, might 
gravitate towards alternative deposit taking institutions, including shadow banking entities, 
partly hiding them from regulatory oversight.  
It can also drive further differentiation.399  As discussed in Chapter 1(A), the national 
banking systems of the EU States are very diverse, due to their separate evolution, flexible - 
directives-based - EU legislation, and different economic philosophies. Veron uses the 
example of Germany, illustrating how the different layers of its banking system have 
effectively created a sub-strata of banks, which “are subject to a different supervisory, state-
aid, and accounting framework [which] raises the possibility of competitive distortions” and a 
possible return of the “bank-sovereign vicious circles.”400 The Art.1(2) SSMR exclusions 
have the potential to aggravate such risks and draw further divisions between regulatory 
systems, not only between the Member States, but also within them.  
Furthermore, Art.2(5) CRD has become a political battle ground, used by the States to 
resist the perceived power creep of the ECB and EU in general.401 As this provision easily 
lends itself to amendments, such power struggle expressed through an almost annually 
amended legal provision inevitably conflicts with the goal of legal certainty.  
 
e) NCA’s role in the macroprudential field 
As pointed out above, NCAs continue to be the primary actors within the macro-
prudential field. Their powers stem from both, EU and national law. 402 However, even 
                                                 
399 Stubb recognised territorial and sectorial scope as types of differentiated integration; ACG Stubb, A 
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tools not provided for in relevant acts of Union law”, see also Rec.28 
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though macroprudential supervision continues in the main to be a national competence, the 
SSMR does impose some obligations on NCAs that wish to make use of certain macro-
prudential tools. Specifically, if an NCA wishes to use one of the macro-prudential tools 
listed in Art.5 SSMR (e.g. impose a counter-cyclical buffer), it has to notify  the ECB of this 
intention. The ECB can object, stating its reasons. The NCA has to ‘duly consider’ the ECB’s 
reasons before proceeding with the decision, but retains the freedom to push ahead. The same 
principle broadly applies in the opposite scenario. The ECB can also apply higher 
requirements at its discretion, has to listen to the opinion of the relevant NCAs, but is capable 
of proceeding despite the possible objection.403  
This is in line with Schammo’s observation that, generally, the relations between the 
NCAs and the ECB are less hierarchical in macro-prudential supervision than in micro-
prudential supervision.404 In some cases, the NCAs can even utilise the firepower of the ECB 
to deal with particular national or regional concerns. For example, under SSMR Art.5(3), an 
NCA can propose to the ECB to raise capital buffers, seeking to address a specific situation 
in its State or regional setting. The language of Art.5(2) and (3) does not necessitate the 
causal factors arising from the financial industry itself. That effectively means that macro-
prudential tools at the ECB’s disposal could be used to address broader country or region 
specific concerns, as long as they do not fall too far from the SSMR’s remit.  
 
D. The Single Resolution Mechanism  
 
A bank resolution is a process by which a failing bank is wound down or restructured, 
when it “cannot go through normal insolvency proceedings without harming public interest 
and causing financial instability.”405 This process allows the resolution authorities to use a 
plethora of intervention powers, reaching as far as suspension of creditor or shareholder 
rights.  
Resolution, albeit preferable to outright insolvency, is obviously still an undesirable 
outcome. Therefore, it is normally preceded by a recovery attempt. That needs to take place 
when the bank still retains its recovery capacity - the capability to restore its financial 
position following a significant deterioration before reaching the point of potential 
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insolvency.406 When that point is reached, the resolution arrangements kick in. In the EBU 
this process is handled by the second institutional pillar – the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM). In this section I will briefly introduce the functions and structure of the SRM and 
proceed to highlight the aspects of it that are of particular relevance for this thesis.  
 
1. Membership and purpose of the SRM  
The Member States participating in the SSM automatically participate in the SRM and 
vice versa.407 As I will explain in detail in Chapter 3, for those States that opt into these 
arrangements and retain the ability to withdraw, withdrawal from one Mechanism would 
automatically expel them from the other one.408 Such clauses do not apply to the EMU States, 
which participate in both mechanisms automatically.  
The SRM primarily seeks to strengthen enforcement of the BRRD – the Bank 
Resolution and Recovery Directive -  provisions in the participating States, by countering 
contagion and other systemic consequences of bank failures, as well as trying to prevent such 
failures in the first place.409  
As discussed in Chapter 1, banking sector contagion effects often resulted from using 
public funds for bail-outs and interconnectedness between the credit institutions and states. 
According to the SRMR, these problems were partly attributable to divergences between 
national resolution rules, practices, and decision-making processes.410 Thus the rectification 
of such issues was necessary to restore and retain confidence and market stability, as well as 
mitigate moral hazard.411 As Moloney observed,  
 
“the financial crisis has starkly illustrated how aggressively banking market 
damage and risk can be transmitted across the internal market. Containment of risk 
in one part of the internal market through the SRM should mitigate the extent to 
which risk spreads in crisis conditions.”412  
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The SRM also seeks to continue the work started by the BRRD in strengthening market 
discipline, even in non-critical times. Before the SRM came into play, the BRRD  bail-in 
mechanism had already placed the burden of bank losses onto shareholders and creditors 
before using the public funds, with a primary purpose of protecting the interests of taxpayers 
and mitigating moral hazard.413 As Avgouleas and Goodhart observed, “turning unsecured 
debt into bail-in-able debt [can in itself] incentivize creditors to resume a monitoring 
function, thereby helping to restore market discipline”.414  
Although the SRM came in as an enforcement mechanism for the BRRD regime, it also 
effectively strengthens the SSM. A good way to ensure adequate prudential behaviour of 
financial institutions is the fear of ultimate failure. On that note Huertas argued that the SRM 
“can create a credible threat that the ECB could put a bank into resolution without cost to the 
taxpayer and without wreaking havoc on the economy at large.”415 Generally speaking, 
delinking the sovereigns from troubled too-big-to-fail banks and producing deterrent effects 
on the banking industry has potential to make the market more disciplined in and of itself. In 
that sense harmonised resolution can strengthen supervision.  
 
2. The Single Resolution Board  
With some exceptions, the SRM institutional infrastructure mirrors the SSM, in the 
sense that there is a division of responsibilities between the European and national levels.416  
The core institutional structure of the SRM is the Single Resolution Board (SRB), an EU 
agency established pursuant to the SRMR. In relation to significant banks, the SRB 
essentially assumes the tasks and powers of the relevant national resolution authorities 
(NRAs), like the ECB does for supervisory purposes.417 That involves preparation of 
resolution plans and making resolution decisions.418  Somewhat contrary to the name, the 
SRB’s function is not just dealing with resolution; the role is proactive, focusing on 
resolution planning and preparation, seeking to avoid banking failures.419 The NRAs of 
participating States retain the authority for smaller institutions and ‘non-bank’ entities, 
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including those specifically excluded by the SSMR/CRD, as discussed in section C, above.420  
The SRB’s mandate stems from Art.114 TFEU (the main legal basis for ESAs and EU 
financial regulation) which has historically been problematic.421 As Moloney observed, 
Art.114 “does not confer a general competence to regulate the internal market, but requires 
that a measure must genuinely improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market”.422 This was one of the reasons why the establishment of the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF), imperative for the SRM’s functioning,  required a separate 
international treaty. I will return to the SRF in Subsection 4, below.  
The SRB is comprised of a Chair, four full-time members, and members delegated by 
each participating State. Unlike in the SSM, no distinction is made between the 
representatives of EMU and non-EMU participating States. The full time members are 
appointed on the basis of merit.423 The permanent members, including the Chair, are to act in 
the interest of the Union and a whole and in most respects are reminded to take into account 
the interests of the NoPS.424 The ECB and the Commission also delegate permanent 
observers.425  
The SRB does not always sit in the same composition. Under Art.43(5) SRMR, the 
composition varies between executive and plenary sessions, both of which have different 
tasks.  The executive session includes the Chair, the four permanent members, and the two 
permanent observers. When the executive session is considering a resolution of a particular 
bank, these members are joined by the SRB members representing all the NRAs involved 
with that entity.426 The membership of the executive session is therefore more restricted than 
that of the plenary session, which involves all members of the SRB. Under Art.53(1) SRMR, 
the SRB, in its executive session, can also, on ad hoc basis, invite additional observers, 
including a representative of EBA and the NRAs of NoPS, when deliberating on a group that 
has presence in them. The wording of the provision seems to suggest that the NoPS 
representatives are to be invited every time such situation emerges and that the SRB does not 
have discretion on the matter.427 Moreover, under Art.83(3) SRMR the NoPS’ NRA 
representatives can participate in joint resolution teams as observers.  
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In most other respects the cooperation between the SRB and the NoPS NRAs is limited 
to  memoranda of understanding, which are non-binding soft law instruments.428 I will return 
to their shortcomings in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the flexible design of the SRB has been 
praised as “more dynamic and variable” than that of the ECB’s Supervisory Board.429  
Despite its smaller composition, the executive session has major powers, including 
preparing all the decisions to be adopted by the plenary session, preparation and approval of 
resolution plans, determining own funds and eligible liabilities requirements and even 
making significant decisions in relation to the SRF (generally those falling bellow 5bln Euro 
threshold).430 The plenary session retains the decision-making superiority on using the SRF 
above the threshold and the investments that the Fund makes.431 It also sets the vast body of 
rules, the executive session and the NRAs have to follow.432 
 
3. Dealing with a troubled bank  
The SRB’s powers include use of a number of powerful resolution tools: the sale of 
business tool, the bridge institution tool, asset separation, the bail-in, etc.433 The NRAs retain 
the same powers for all other banks, if the SRF is not being used. In any situation, the NRAs 
have to inform the SRB of their actions and coordinate with it, submit the resolution plans to 
the SRB and inform the SRB on the progress of a particular resolution.434 Finally, the SRB 
can directly exercise the resolution powers with regard to any Eurozone credit institution, 
thus replacing the relevant NRA.435  
Being more similar to an ESA than a Union institution, in terms of its mandate, the 
SRB has notable advantages and disadvantages compared to the Single Supervisory Board 
and the ECB. The biggest advantage is that the SRB’s mandate, while broadly similar to that 
of the ECB’s, can stretch further. For example, under Art.7(2)(b) SRMR, the SRB is in 
charge of all cross-border groups, regardless of their status in the SSM. It is argued that the 
SRM’s ‘significance test’ design in this sense is more sensitive to cross-border and internal 
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market bank activities than the SSM’s.436 The mentioned institutional flexibility and equal 
representation for all participating States are also considerable advantages.  
However, SRB also has a notable limitation: it needs to rely on the firepower of 
institutional actors to enforce its decisions. Particularly the NRAs are put in charge of the 
implementation of decisions regarding individual banks and use their powers under the 
Single Rulebook and national law to that end.437 Moreover, the doctrines of delegation and 
conferral often require additional competence of an EU institution for implementation and 
enforcement. For that reason the Commission is heavily involved.438 The scenarios involving 
different actors are illustrated in Fig.3.1 below.  
 
Fig.3.1 Resolution Procedure in the EBU 
 
 
A particularly problematic aspect is the ECBs involvement. As mentioned in section C 
above and explored in detail in Chapter 3, the conditions for participation in the SSM are not 
equal between the EMU and non-EMU states, which discourages most NoPS. That is mostly 
rooted in the exclusion of the opt-ins from the Governing Council of the ECB. Therefore, 
heavy involvement of the ECB in resolution processes risks undoing the good done by 
ensuring equal representation for the non-Euro participating States in the SRM. 
Simplistically, the more involved the ECB is in resolution, the more problems it brings over 
from the SSM.  
The ECB is involved in the SRM on multiple levels. As discussed in section C, the 
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early intervention powers are held by the ECB, for significant credit institutions.439 
Intuitively, the early intervention seems more like an activity falling within the resolution 
domain, rather than supervision. However, since the SRB is not equipped with full 
discretionary direct action powers, the involvement of a Union institution – the ECB - was 
necessary to ensure speed and swiftness of intervention. Otherwise the EBU bodies would 
struggle to intervene at a stage that could still be described as early, due to above-mentioned 
complexities of decision-making and enforcement. While the SSMR Art.4(1)(i) explicitly 
excludes resolution powers from the ECB’s domain, other provisions indicate that the 
dividing line is far from obvious. The same provision gives the ECB the ability to instruct 
structural changes to the credit institution and the duty to participate in recovery planning. 
These powers in relation structural changes and requirements are certainly far-reaching, 
including additional funds requirements and restrictions to business operations.440 Moreover, 
Art.12(1) SRMR requires the SRB to consult the ECB on the minimum requirement for own 
funds and eligible liabilities, which the ECB can then enforce pursuant to the aforementioned 
SSM legislation. While these are borderline powers falling somewhere between supervision, 
resolution and regulation, in one respect the ECB’s involvement is particularly significant: 
the ECB can declare a significant bank 
‘failing or likely to fail’, thus setting in 
motion all the resolution processes, as 
illustrated in Fig.2.2 below.  
All in all, it is plain that decision-
making within the SRM is quite 
complicated. The road to the final decision 
to resolve can stretch through the SRB, the 
NRAs, the European Commission, the 
ECB, the EBA and the NCAs, where 
separate from the NRAs.  
 
 
Fig.2.2 Resolution Decision Points in the EBU441 
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Baglioni describes the SRM governance structure and decision making mechanics as 
“by evidence too complex.”442  He points out that all the bodies involved need to “take 
complex decisions and interact with each other under very strict time deadlines.”443 This 
complexity is increased by a large number of consultation, observation and oversight 
procedures.444 A lot of these procedures are put in place to promote convergence, but the 
number of stakeholders and variables is mind-boggling, which is considered a feature of sub-
optimal design by the majority of NoPS.  
 
4. The financing arrangements and the (almost) single resolution fund  
As Tridimas observed, “although, consistently with its legal basis, the SRM Regulation 
stresses its internal market credentials, its centre of gravity lies with the substantive aim of 
pursuing financial stability through the establishment of burden-sharing arrangements.”445 
Such burden sharing would be impossible without adequate funding, which necessitated the 
creation of the SRF. It is an industry-contributions-based fund, meant to ensure that the 
banking industry itself remains primarily responsible for its health and rescue. It is also one 
of the SRM’s most contentious features. 
Just like many other components of the SRM, it mirrors the provisions for national 
resolution funds in the BRRD. Baglioni argued that the SRMR “makes the national resolution 
funds introduced by the BRRD obsolete, since they have been substituted by the SRF.”446 
Although this could be the case for the Eurozone states, the situation for the NoPS, wishing 
to join the SRM is – predictably - more complex. As I will explain in detail in the next 
Chapter, non-Eurozone countries can, unlike their Eurozone counterparts, withdraw from the 
SRM and thus the SRF.447 This would result in a number of sudden an very drastic changes, 
including a recoupment being repaid to them,448 and  reinstatement of the national resolution 
fund (NRF), which would have to satisfy a lengthy list of criteria.449 That would likely force 
some States opting for long-term non-EMU participation to stockpile cash in a separate NRF 
on top of the SRF.  
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The size of the completely mutualised SRF is expected to be at least 1% of the covered 
deposits of all credit institutions in the participating State, same as for the NRFs.450 The 
mutualisation process is regulated by the Intergovernmental Agreement signed by all EU 
States except the UK451 and Sweden. This derogation of the UK and Sweden, two largest 
national banking markets in the EU outside Eurozone, was an important political statement, 
to which I will return in Chapters 4 and 5. Each State has to transfer up to 12.5% of their 
annual ex ante contributions.452 The general idea, as Baglioni explains, is that during the 
mutualisation process “the national compartment of the country where the bank is established 
[…] will be first used”, digging into the mutualised funds as the crisis deepens.453 
 
 
Fig.2.3. SRF mutualisation statistics and prediction. Source: Baglioni 2016454  
 
The SRF Intergovernmental Agreement acknowledges the possibility of situations 
where “the means available in the Fund are not sufficient for a particular resolution action, 
and where the ex post contributions [need to be] raised.”455 The ex post contributions must 
not exceed three times the annual amount of ex ante contributions.456  The possibility of a 
crisis situation similar to the GFC, where both types of SRF funding would not suffice needs 
to be considered. SRMR says that “under no circumstances shall the Union budget or the 
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national budgets be held liable for expenses or losses of the Fund.”457 The recovery plans also 
need to be drafted, avoiding any assumption of extraordinary public financial support.458 That 
leaves two options. The first one is the Harmonised Loan Facility Agreement, signed by each 
SRM State with the SRB. Such agreement effectively provides a national individual credit 
line to the SRB to back its national compartment following resolution cases. Generally, this 
type of agreement means that a lender sets out the terms and conditions on which it is 
prepared to make a loan facility available to a borrower, an example of which is discussed in 
Chapter 4. That can be a time consuming process, not much faster than obtaining ex post 
contributions. The second option is the ESM. This option is also problematic as the ESM is 
limited to 700 billion euros (of which only 500 are available for lending) and operates in 
international law as an international treaty.459 It is limited to the Eurozone, and non-Eurozone 
States, like Bulgaria and Croatia, could not accede to it when joining the EBU. Even for 
EMU States such process is not automatic, as the ESM is not linked to the SSM or SRM, and 
in that sense does not form part of the EBU. Furthermore, the ESM has its own eligibility 
criteria, which first need to be satisfied (which is also time-consuming), and even then the 
entire 500 billion would not be deployed to deal with the crisis in question. That is mostly 
because the ESM holds just 80 billion in capital, with 420 billion being callable. Moreover, it 
is worth noting that the ESM is an instrument of ‘precautionary financial assistance’ and is 
meant to recapitalise troubled banks, not bail out the failed ones, and thus serves a different 
function to that of the SRF.460  
If these options fail and the SRF runs out of money, the responsibility to deal with the 
remainder of the shortfall would fall on the States housing the troubled credit institutions, 
even if that goes against the rhetoric of the SRMR. As Baglioni rightly observed, if this is the 
case, “the purpose of breaking the link between governments and the financial risk of their 
domestic banking sectors, which has been officially placed at the center of the European 
banking union project, seems to be seriously jeopardized.”461 Arguably this jeopardy would 
happen even at the stage of ESM application, as the ESM can purchase bonds of the 
beneficiary Member States and even issue its own, thus locking the ESM and the states in a 
loop.462 
The use of the SRF for problem situations which do not amount to a crisis is also 
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restricted. As Huertas observed, “the BRRD allows the resolution authority to tap the 
resources of the fund to recapitalise a failing bank, provided creditors bear losses equal to at 
least 8% of the bank’s liabilities and the assistance from the resolution fund is consistent with 
state-aid rules. 463“ Effectively that means that there is a de minimis threshold for magnitude 
of banking sector problems. Moreover, the funds available to individual states are even more 
limited.  
Such limits and thresholds make perfect institutional sense, as the SRM is not 
envisaged as the main way of dealing with failing banks. It is expected that for most banks’ 
liquidation can be achieved through the normal insolvency proceedings applicable to any 
company in the market, and only some credit institutions considered too systemically 
important and interconnected would be ‘resolved’.464  
It is largely for this reason that the SRF is often considered incomplete. Consequently, 
the creation of a backstop is being pursued by the Commission. Tridimas summarised the 
proposal as follows: 
 “The […] backstop would be used in combination with other resolution tools, namely, 
bail-in and the availability of the SRF and would include, for example, using common 
funding in combination with the ECB instruments to cover liquidity shortfalls and provide 
more time to look for the best buyer of a bank in a specific situation. “465  
 
Without going into too much detail of this proposal, as it is beyond the scope of this 
work and still incomplete, it is important to note that any deeper involvement of the ECB in 
the resolution process could make participation less appealing to NoPS in de jure or de facto 
permanent EMU derogation, and that needs to be taken into account.  
 
E. Power struggle between the two levels of European banking oversight  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, following the Financial Stability Trilemma, it can be argued 
that opting into the SSM/SRM is effectively a choice of supranationalism over national 
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control. From the theoretical perspective, it could also be considered a choice of 
neofuctionalism over intergovernmentalism. Some have gone as far as to argue that it is in 
fact a choice of technocracy over democracy.466 For that to be the case, however, mere 
legislative harmonisation is not enough. The institutional components of the EBU would need 
to exhibit clear supranational characteristics, as well as evident impetus towards further 
centralisation. It is therefore important to determine where the balance between the EBU 
institutional components and the national authorities has settled in terms of internal dynamics 
within these pillars. The acceptability of this settlement is a key consideration in the NoPS 
decision on participation. For the sake of clarity and brevity, I will mostly focus on the SSM, 
as it draws the sharpest distinction between the two levels, due to its differentiation between 
the EMU and non-EMU states, which is of particular significance for the topicality of this 
thesis. Moreover, with the ECB, an EU institution, as its centerpiece, the SSM is effectively 
the biggest recent leap towards greater direct control of a major policy area by the EU.  
Subsection 1 starts with a brief discussion on the theory of federalism, often invoked in 
the SSM/SRM discussion, due to the two-level structure of these mechanisms. However, 
instead of attempting to answer whether the EBU institutional components fit into this theory, 
I take the theory apart and discuss how the SSM squares against the key balancing concepts 
that are employed in federalist assessment: the principle of conferral (Subsection 2), the 
principle of subsidiarity (3) and the level of centralization (4). Subsection 5 revisits the L-
Bank case, and discusses the approach the European courts take in relation to the 
aforementioned key balancing concepts in the EBU context, as well as the political counter 
moves that the States employ in a bid to avert centralization.  
 
1.  Federalism  
The division of the SSM and SRM into two (European and national) levels invoked the 
notions of federalism.467 Tridimas described the EBU as “a force towards the federalisation 
of financial regulation.”468 Carmassi et al. even called it a ‘federal model’.469 In principle, 
division of power into two often characterises federalisation. To form a federation, as Alexis 
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de Tocqueville expressed it, is “to divide the sovereign authority into two parts.”470 There 
also seems to be a requirement of some sort of separation between two levels of governance, 
evidenced by ‘physical’ constitutional structures, as well as enumeration of (and limits to) the 
powers of the ‘federal’ body. 471  Using this as a yardstick, the SSM notably falls closer to the 
federal narrative than the SRM, due to the ECB’s dominance and its status as an independent 
EU institution.472 
The problem with this thinking is that there is no single definition of federalism in EU 
economic law, and the term has been employed very loosely. The meaning of federalisation 
in EU law, financial or otherwise, is far from uniform and is subject to numerous 
interpretations.473 As Roobol  observed, to the British ‘to federate’ may sound as ‘to 
centralise’, whereas to the Belgians it is more often understood as ‘to decentralise.’474 
Therefore, calling a mechanism federal implies a division of authority into two parts, and 
suggests some conceptualisations concerning the power relationships that characterise 
federalism,475  but does not suggest a sufficiently robust set of criteria for empirical analysis. 
This lack of clarity regarding the meaning of federalism persists in banking law. Grundman, 
discussing federalism in the specific EBU context, said that this theory “emphasises the main 
advantages of decentralised rule-setting, guided by the subsidiarity principle”.476 However, 
Tridimas deviates from this definition in a different chapter of the same book, and seems to 
imply that in this context federalisation means greater centralisation.477   
With that being said, discussions on federalism, especially in the European context, 
almost universally involve the analysis of four variables: subsidiarity, conferral, 
centralisation, and balance of power. It is thus more meaningful to assess the features of the 
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EBU in the context of these variables individually, as they each constitute a separate concern 
for the Member States.  
 
2. Conferral  
In the SSM, much like in the EU as a whole, the division of power is facilitated through 
the principle of conferral. The principle provides that “the Union shall act only within the 
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein,” and “competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties 
remain with the Member States.”478 This is what the SSMR does: it confers specific 
supervisory tasks on the ECB. That is also a major difference between the SSM and the 
SRM. The SRM is not an instance of conferral of powers to an EU institution and thus its 
structure is less constitutionally problematic.  
The significance of the SSM conferral of tasks cannot be overstated. The SSMR is the 
EU’s formal recognition that, in principle, banking supervision is a Union competence, not 
only on the legislative, but also administrative and adjudicative levels. Grundmann argued 
that this is a “huge step taken conceptually – namely in that it is no longer only legislation 
(rule-setting) which is being transferred to the central EU level, but also its 
application/administration in the individual cases.”479 He sees it as a continuation of the 
Lamfalussy process, discussed in Chapter 1, in the form of a “move towards much “deeper 
unity in the application of law down into the single cases,”  but also a leap “towards much 
more intense ‘real’ uniformity in applied law – as compared to mere legislative 
harmonisation or even unification (even if combined with the possibility of preliminary 
reference).” 480 Arguably, the SSMR does not just confer new powers onto the ECB but also 
deepens such powers to an almost unprecedented extent. According to Micklitz, “the message 
is that banking is different from all other regulated markets – from telecom, energy, transport, 
but also from other financial services and insurance” and that special competence rules are 
“necessary for European institution building replacing national banking supervisory 
institutions.”481 To be clear, the ECB does not fully functionally replace the NCAs through 
the SSM/EBU, but it does, to a very large extent replace them in terms of the hierarchy of 
power. Grudmann thus alludes to the possibility that through this reform, the EU –  mainly 
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through the ECB – will become in yet another area an independent supervisor of EU States 
and companies, like the Commission has become in competition law and state aid.482   
 
3. Subsidiarity   
The legitimacy of conferral of tasks in many ways rests upon the principle of 
subsidiarity, which is meant to ensure that powers are not elevated to the EU level 
unnecessarily. According to Carroza, subsidiarity is rooted in the fundamental “human need 
for both belonging and differentiation” and thus “demarcates a conceptual territory in which 
unity and plurality interact, pull at one another, and seek reconciliation.”483 As a legal 
principle, subsidiarity serves an important function – it counterbalances power 
consolidation.484 In the TEU the principle is stated as follows:  
“…the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, […] but can rather, by reason of the 
scale or effects […], be better achieved at Union level.”485  
Mills observed that, in respect to the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, an 
exclusive allocation of competence to the higher level “implicitly involves a determination 
that uniform regulation at that level is strongly necessary and justified” and “an exclusive 
allocation to the states implicitly involves a determination that regulation at the federal level 
is not necessary and cannot be justified.”486 This logic forms the basis of the formal 
justification for the establishment of the SSM, the objectives of which: 
 
 “cannot be sufficiently achieved at the Member State level and can therefore, by 
reason of the pan-Union structure of the banking market and the impact of failures of credit 
institutions on other Member States, be better achieved at the Union level….”487 
 
Specifically, supervision and resolution of significant credit institutions is moved to the 
higher level due to the transnational character of their activities, while NCAs and NRAs 
remain responsible for smaller institutions, due to their particularities and connections to 
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smaller national and regional economies. This logic was also used in justifying the exclusions 
of certain entities from the scope of the EBU, as discussed in Section C(7)(d).  
Historically, subsidiarity always gained importance at the moments of centralisation 
and consolidation of the EU institutions’ powers. The added competencies of the ECB are an 
example of such centralisation. It can be recalled that the formal recognition of subsidiarity as 
a legal principle of EU law followed the expansion of the EU’s powers by the Maastricht 
Treaty, the same Treaty that effectively created the EMU, which, in turn, the EBU was built 
to safeguard, as discussed in Chapter 1. This introduction of subsidiarity as a legal and 
political principle into the constitutional practice is understood in two ways: 1) as a reaction 
by States to the growing centralised power of the European community, 2) a methodology for 
ensuring balance between the EU and the States.488 In reality it falls somewhere in between, 
with the assessment largely dependent on the assessor’s political stance. Horst, for example, 
argued that subsidiarity as a principle is primarily playing a role in reducing the threat posed 
by the ECJ to the States’ cultural diversity.489  Bermann, also highlighted “the connection 
between subsidiarity and the expansion of the Community’s powers,” 490 but also considered 
its use to be a broader mechanism for balancing of power in the EU.491 It is widely 
considered that subsidiarity adds moral and constitutional legitimacy to EU reforms, which is 
a particularly acute concern for the EBU. 
Barber argued that subsidiarity “does not just embody a preference for smaller units 
over large ones: it allocates powers to the states containing the people who will be affected 
by the power.”492 Such interpretation of subsidiarity distils the “the function which the legal 
relationship involved fulfils in the economic […] life of any country.”493 The economic life is 
of course linked to political life, which thus makes subsidiarity politically sensitive. Deo et al. 
research shows that policy-makers’ view of their financial system “varies based on the 
overlap between banks’ activities and who politicians rely on for electoral support.”494 This is 
where the subsidiarity settlement manifests: it determines which officials have the power  to 
influence the financial institutions (e.g. prevent bank failures), as well as which 
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constituencies are important for politicians and officials to retain power.495  
Consequently, the States are often reluctant to surrender such powers to supranational 
bodies, especially to a (more or less) autonomous EU institution, like the ECB. In such cases 
the States and some credit institutions tend to invoke doctrines capable of limiting 
centralisation, like subsidiarity, in order to maintain greater national control. Such 
considerations have particular practical implications, and play a role in the participation 
decisions of the NoPS. If the subsidiarity and centralisation questions are settled in a way that 
maintains a satisfactory balance between the NCAs and the ECB, the task of persuading the 
NoPS to join might become a little easier. However, if such settlement comes at the expense 
of operational stability, some of the practical incentives for joining might be lost. Moreover, 
it is not just the subsidiarity settlement that matters, but also the directions in which power 
flows within the EBU institutional pillars.  
 
4. Centralisation and consolidation of power  
The State contemplating participation in the SSM and SRM needs to factor in not one, 
but two levels of functional centralisation and power consolidation. Firstly, there is the static 
layer of centralisation, created by the EBU legislation itself. In a sense this settlement reflects 
the eventual consensus reached between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism during 
negotiations. Secondly, there is the dynamic layer, shaped by ongoing processes within the 
institutional pillars. Here, the ECB once again comes to the forefront, since being an EU 
institution and arguably the most powerful body in the EBU architecture, it could edge the 
overall construct towards greater centralisation and consolidation of power in its own hands. 
This would be very much in line with neofunctionalist theorisations.  
The importance of the static allocation of power should not be understated. According 
to Carmassi et al. European banking governance centralisation did not necessitate that 
functions are always exercised at the central level for all banks and in all circumstances.496  
However, to achieve the intended goals, the arrangements needed to ensure that “the legal 
powers of supervisory decisions firmly reside at the supranational level.”497 Moloney  wrote 
that the EBU “has re-ordered the balance of power between the Member States and the EU 
with respect to operational banking market governance and in so doing has placed some 
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stress on the foundational Treaty settlement regarding the competence of the EU.”498  While 
it seems that the national regulatory autonomy aspect of the Financial Trilemma, discussed in 
Chapter 1, has been (partly) sacrificed, this might be the inevitable cost of having a banking 
union in the first place. Baglioni states that “on political grounds, the transfer of sovereignty 
related to the oversight over the banking system was a prerequisite to proceed toward the […] 
pillars of the banking union.”499  As discussed in Chapter 1, the imminent need to move away 
from the home-host principle was felt, and with it, the resulting need to partly move away 
from national oversight regimes.  
The length, contentiousness and difficulty of negotiations, as well as the numerous 
compromises and exceptions discussed above, indicate that this transfer of (traditionally) 
sovereign powers, was not easy. Moloney’s research revealed that the NCAs operate within a 
legal infrastructure which “privileges the position of the ECB” and thus “the loss of control 
by the Member States and NRAs/NCAs is real.”500 It is therefore unsurprising that the States 
might feel uneasy about the increases in powers and influence of the ECB - the most 
autonomous of the EBU institutions. This is of even greater concern for the NoPS, especially 
those unwilling to adopt the Euro, as they are, as mentioned, excluded form the ECB 
Governing Council. Any indication that the functioning of the SSM or SRM facilitates 
further consolidation of power in the hands of EU bodies, beyond the original legal 
settlement would be perceived as a major red flag.501  
It appears that the ECB, supported by the Commission and the EU Courts, has been 
taking small incremental steps towards power consolidation, which forms the dynamic 
element of centralisation. Chiti and Recine’s research revealed that while the ECB generally 
acted in a manner which is compatible with the rationale and text of the SSMR, “it has 
consolidated and promoted supranationalism within the SSM.”502  They point to a number of 
processes including, elaboration of the ECB’s supervisory handbook, ideological prevalence 
of supranationalism, and  gradual expansion of the ECB’s powers, strengthening the 
functional prominence of the ECB in the SSM. 503 Crucially, Chiti and Recine consider the 
development of the SSMFR, in which the ECB played and important role, as part of this 
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process. They argue that such activity of the ECB shapes the pattern of interaction between 
the ECB and the NCAs, and the nature of the supervisory powers wielded by the ECB. This 
dynamic is argued to be capable of conditioning future developments in the SSM.504 This 
forms part of a broader narrative in which the decision-making allegedly moves away from 
coordination, towards centralisation.505 According to Micklitz, when such fluctuation is 
possible, the power tends to flow predominantly in one direction - from the States to the 
EU.506  
On a side note, this dynamic internal centralisation, which includes administrative 
centralisation, effectively prevents the SSM structure from being classed as federal. As 
Schütze argued, the powers of the federal body need to remain enumerated.507 While some 
fluctuation is possible and natural, there needs to be a degree of separation, or at the very 
least the power balance needs to move back and forth between the two levels. Thus, the 
process of dynamic, one-directional flow of powers moves the construct from the federal 
‘middle ground’ (between the national and international or between centralisation and 
coordination) into the territory of centralisation.508   
My findings in this thesis confirm that this dynamic also affects the participation 
decisions of the NoPS. Through voluntary participation the NoPS would not only have to 
accept the subsidiarity settlement enshrined at the launch of the EBU, not only accept the 
clarification of this settlement provided by the CJEU, but also the fact that the ECB and - by 
extension - the EU is likely to gradually move (on the basis of policy or inertia) towards 
greater supranationalism, greater neofunctionalism, and thus also increasingly greater ECB 
dominance, within the limits permitted by that settlement. Tridimas expects institutional 
interaction, supervisory coordination, and the need to ensure the attainment of objectives, to 
lead to a high degree of normative harmonisation and supervisory convergence, through 
which ECB will become the dominant player.509 He further reasoned that supervisory 
supremacy of the ECB is likely to lead to regulatory supremacy, due to unsustainability of 
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separation between regulation and supervision, and the institutional weight of the ECB.510 
While there are many factors allowing the power within the SSM (and – by extension – 
the EBU) to consolidate in the hands of the ECB, perhaps the most obvious legal reason is 
that the SSM regime does create hard border between the competences of the ECB and the 
NCAs through Art.6(4) SSMR significance assessment. Furthermore, the congruence 
between the SSM and the SRM, as well as the ECB’s involvement in the Single Rulebook 
rule-making thus allow for spill overs into other pillars of the EBU. Art.5(b) of the SSMR 
explicitly states that “when necessary to ensure consistent application of high supervisory 
standards, the ECB may at any time, on its own initiative […] decide to exercise directly 
itself all the relevant powers for one or more credit institutions [which are not deemed 
significant].” The ECB’s ability to remove the bank form the NCA’s domain, has been 
further enhanced by the formulation of the particular circumstances clauses in the SSMFR, 
the wording of which, as mentioned, has been influenced by the ECB itself. Rec.5 SSMFR 
says that the “NCAs are responsible for directly supervising the entities that are less 
significant, without prejudice to the ECB’s power to decide in specific cases to directly 
supervise such entities where this is necessary for the consistent application of supervisory 
standards.”511 ECB’s liberties extend to use of the NCA staff for supervisory teams at its full 
discretion.512 Moreover, the NCAs do not have to be involved in some procedures like on-site 
inspections, but such involvement can be requested by the ECB.513  
Most importantly, in line with neofunctionalist theories, the European courts have taken 
the ECB’s side. Read in conjunction with the L-Bank judgment discussed in detail below, the 
SSMR and SSMFR provisions remove the ability for an NCA to be exclusively responsible 
for any credit institution in a legally demarcated way, bar specific exclusions via Art.1(2) 
SSMR.  
 
5. The L-Bank case and the stance of the EU courts 
a) Core message of the ruling 
As discussed above, in the L-Bank case, Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg – 
Förderbank, received a notification from the ECB that it will be considered significant on 
account of its size.514 L-Bank disagreed, invoking the aforementioned ‘particular 
                                                 
510 Ibid. 
511 The emphasis is mine  
512 Art.7 SSMFR 
513 SSMR Art.12(4); see also Rec.28 
514 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v. ECB Case T-122/15 Para.2  
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circumstances’ clauses of Art.6(4) SSMR and Arts.70-71 SSMFR. However, both the EGC 
and the CJEU sided with the ECB.515 
Whilst L-Bank is of significance for understanding the concept of ‘particular 
circumstances’, its constitutional significance goes well beyond this. This is because the EGC 
and the CJEU also considered (as part of L-Bank’s appeal) the division of competences 
between NCAs and the ECB under the SSMR, as well as the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity.  
In relation to the division of competences, the courts held that with respect to the 
prudential tasks found in the SSMR, the ECB had exclusive competence, notwithstanding that 
NCAs supervise less significant credit institutions. In a crucial passage of the judgment, the 
EGC held that NCAs were carrying out their tasks with respect to less significant entities as 
part of a ‘decentralised implementation’ of the ECB’s exclusive competence, not their own 
national competence.516 The ruling established “that direct prudential supervision by the 
national authorities under the SSM was envisaged by the Council […] as a mechanism of 
assistance to the ECB rather than the exercise of autonomous competence.”517  
 What is more, the court provided an important clarification regarding the application 
of the principle of subsidiarity. L-Bank submitted that the ECB’s decision breached the 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. The ECB and the Commission – importantly -  
argued that the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity have already been taken into 
account by the legislature when the SSMR was drafted and no further consideration in 
relation to these principles was required during the assessment of significance or any other 
action taken within the remit of the SSMR.518 The EGC agreed with the ECB and the 
Commission. On appeal the CJEU also stated that: 
 “the ECB is not required […] to determine case-by-case whether, despite the 
application of the criteria set out in the second subparagraph of Article 6(4) […], a 
significant institution should come under the direct supervision of the national authorities on 
the ground that they are better able to attain the objectives of that regulation.”519 
 
This judgement, makes the demarcation between the NCA and ECB territories 
discretionary, with the discretion falling firmly into the hands of the ECB. More importantly, 
                                                 
515 Case T-122/15 and Case C-450/17 P 
516 Ibid. para.72 
517 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v. ECB Case T-122/15, para.59 
518 Ibid. para.37 
519 Case T-122/15, para.59, see also Case C-450/17 P, para.75  
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it effectively indicates that the type of subsidiarity settlement applying to the SSM and, by 
extension, the EBU as a whole. It is materially different from the traditional constitutional 
subsidiarity settlement. While the traditional arrangement in the EU is that the decision-
making process is to be elevated to the EU level if it is necessary, in the SSM it is the 
opposite – the decision-making is lowered to the local (state) level if that is necessary.520 
According to the CJEU, “[c]onsequently, direct prudential supervision of a significant entity 
by the national authorities is possible only when there are circumstances indicating that the 
classification of that entity as significant is inappropriate in order to achieve the objectives 
pursued by Regulation No 1024/2013.”521  
This ruling, while seemingly following the literal meaning of the provisions, was (in its 
effect) very favourable to the ECB, and quite unfavourable to the States and their NCAs. The 
ruling sends two fundamental messages: 1) that the subsidiarity settlement has been factored 
in during the legislative enactment and does not need to be revisited during the operation of 
the SSM, as long as the processes comply with the SSMR, and 2) that there is no such thing 
as exclusive NCA competences, based on significance. Consequently, the ruling largely 
disabled the protections against gradual power consolidation subsidiarity normally offers. 
 
b) The context, aftermath, and significance of the case  
The events preceding the succeeding the L-Bank case are as significant as the case 
itself. The early stages of the SSM development revealed how thorny the issues of supremacy 
and NCA autonomy can be. The Commission’s initial proposal was to gradually place all 
credit institutions within the ECB’s supervisory domain.522 Undue centralisation and 
overreaching concerns were raised by many influential States, including Germany, the 
Netherlands and Finland, which fought fiercely to ensure that the micro-prudential 
supervision of smaller institutions, mainly those not engaging in major cross-border activity, 
continued to be supervised by the NCAs.523 Industry pressures also played a role, particularly 
coming from smaller, less internationalised banks. Smaller banks are generally more likely to 
be saved by national and regional decision makers, and therefore often lobby for supervision 
                                                 
520  Case T-122/15, para.81, see also paras.87, 88 for the applicant’s argument see para 48.  
521 Case C-450/17 P, para.47 
522 Art.4 of the Commission Proposal for the SSMR, COM 212(511)  
523 Ch Gortsos, The single supervisory mechanism: a major building-block towards a European Banking Union 
(the full europeanisation of the ‘bank safety net’), ECEFIL 2013, p.21 
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by the ‘lower’ level.524 These pressures resulted in the settlement now embodied in Art.6(4) 
SSMR.  
However, the interpretation of Arts.4 and 6 presented in L-Bank made much of this 
lobbying futile. The ECB was held to have broad powers to remove an entity from the NCAs’ 
domain, essentially at its sole discretion.525 This judgement was not a misnomer and followed 
a broader line of reasoning established in EU economic law. Moloney observes that generally 
“the Court, over time and albeit across a limited jurisprudence, has almost always favoured 
the EU interest in financial market construction over national interests in protecting 
distinctive market features.”526 She draws upon the examples of Commission v. Germany527 
and Alpine Investments528 to support that conclusion. Similarly, in the cases of Pringle529 and 
Gauweiler 530 in determining the distinction between economic and monetary policy, the 
CJEU also effectively expressed preference for wider powers at the EU level. As Tridimas 
observed, while allowing for institutional discretion, the interdependence between economic 
and monetary policy cemented by these decisions works mostly to the advantage of the 
ECB.531 Historically, prior to the EBU, very few major banking measures were challenged, 
they were challenged unsuccessfully, and post EBU jurisprudence does not seem to indicate 
changes in that regard.532 That is not to say that the legislation governing the EBU 
institutional components does not allow legal challenges. CJEU challenges are available by 
virtue of, inter alia, SSMR Arts.13(2), 24(11), Rec.60, SRMR Rec.120, Art.37(2) and 
especially Arts.86-87. However, the likelihood of success in such challenges is generally very 
low. However, the CJEU, whilst generally leaning towards the EU, has also ruled in favour of 
the Member States. In the OPTA case the CJEU rejected the binding nature of 
recommendations issued by the Commission.533 While this case concerned the telecom 
sector, it has been suggested that it could also have an impact on the banking sector.534 The 
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CJEU does not shy away from ruling on the main legal instruments and their applicability. 
What it avoids is interfering with is the internal ‘administrative’ processes within the 
instruments and institutional structures built on them, such as the SSM/SRM. That allows the 
ECB to expand its influence. Moreover, the role that the ECB takes in administrative 
enforcement is argued to marginalise the role and function of law – not only in the making of 
law but also in its application.535 For that reason national law enforcement by the ECB, 
discussed in section C, is not always viewed favourably by the States. 
Such situation was obviously not pleasing to the governments of multiple Member 
States, which effectively created another tension point between EU’s neofunctionalist actions 
and States’ intergovernmentalist reactions. The States – Germany, most prominently - pushed 
back on both – adjudicative and political levels. On the adjudicative side, in a subsequent 
ruling, the German constitutional court issued a judgement that seems to conflict with the 
ECG and CJEU’s reasoning in L-Bank: that Arts.4(1) and 6 support a distribution of 
competences between the ECB and national authorities.536 According to this judgement, the 
NCAs “exercise their powers on the basis of their primary competence, not on the basis of 
powers conferred by the ECB.”537 Schammo rightly observed that the German Constitutional 
Court’s “findings are rooted in a different understanding of the relationship between Article 
4(1) and Article 6, and a different appreciation of what the recitals of the SSM Regulation 
have to say about competence.”538 Moreover, unlike the European Courts in the L-Bank case, 
the German Constitutional Court also accepted subsidiarity as a consideration that does apply 
in such circumstances and can be invoked in the assessment of significance. It notably 
concluded that in this particular case:  
“a manifest violation of the principle of subsidiarity cannot be found, given that the 
SSM Regulation only conferred tasks and powers on the ECB which are indispensable for 
effective supervision, and that national authorities still retain extensive powers.”539  
 
Therefore, the judgement technically did not conflict with the CJEU ruling in terms of 
outcome and did not cause much of a stir. It did, however, indicate that the national courts 
might not be willing to accept the exclusivity of the ECB’s powers and the neofunctionalist 
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stance adopted by the CJEU, which stands in contrast with the positions of many 
participating and non-participating States. Grundmann predicted that the EBU might 
“become the playground for intense judicial assessment of the tension between diversity and 
unity”, and important discrepancies between the EU and national courts might be a sign of 
such tension.540   
The L-Bank decision sent a message that the CJEU is unlikely to come to the aid of a 
credit institution wishing to escape the ECB’s supervision. Moreover, the protections 
introduced by Art.6 proved to be of limited value. Effectively, the only way to ensure that the 
ECB would not supervise a particular entity or group was to exclude them altogether through 
Art.1(2) SSMR, which, as explained, can be done by amending Art.2(5) of the CRD. 
Consequently, the governments scrambled to achieve some exclusions, which manifested in 
the amendments introduced by Directive 2019/878. Particularly the German government 
jumped on the opportunity to exclude some entities, as changes were being made to appease 
Bulgaria and Croatia, before the start of their participation. Perhaps the most interesting 
exclusion is the Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg – Förderbank (L-Bank), now one of 
the excluded German entities. This was a clear pushback, on the intergovernmental level, 
against the growing powers of the ECB and the CJEU support it seemingly enjoys. More 
broadly it could be viewed as a part of a counter-move against four phenomena, which, 
according to Micklitz, characterised the EBU and especially the SSM development: 
streamlining, depoliticisation, bureaucratisation, and centralisation.541    
While it does not alter the validity of the L-Bank judgement, this change to Directive 
2019/878 indicates that the power struggle between the national and the supranational is still 
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F. Conclusions  
 
This Chapter has overviewed the core pillars of the European Banking Union. It 
highlighted the fundamental problem of unequal participation, which can potentially deepen 
fragmentation. The crucial difference is that participating non-EMU States do not enjoy equal 
participation terms in the Governing Council of the ECB, which makes their participation in 
the SSM as a whole fundamentally unequal. That makes the subsidiarity settlement and the 
degree of centralisation objectively more concerning for them, than for their EMU 
counterparts. The differences in participation terms and EBU body memberships are vast, as 
illustrated by table 2.2.  
Table 2.2 Comparison of the position of EMU vs. non-EMU countries in the EBU 
Status  Euro area countries Non-euro countries  
Membership in the banking union  Obligatory  Voluntary  
Participation in the Supervisory Board  Yes  Yes  
Participation in the Governing Council  Yes  No  
Participation in the Single Resolution Board  Yes  Yes  
Access to the ECB liquidity facility  Yes  No  
Access to Single Resolution Fund  Yes  Yes  
Access to the Deposit Insurance Fund  Yes  Yes  
Access to the ESM funds  Yes             No  
Source and arrangement: Belke, Dobrzanska, Gros and Smaga, 2016543 
The resulting concerns are aggravated by the involvement of the ECB in all other 
pillars of the EBU. As Moloney observed, the ECB deals with the entire bank lifecycle: 
authorisation,  supervision,  recovery and resolution planning, early intervention, and even 
the early stages of resolution.544 Consequently, that allows for (arguably unnecessary) spill-
overs of unequal and sub-optimal arrangements into other pillars.  
In this chapter I explained the reasons why the SSM took the form of a mechanism 
rather than an institution. Its character as mechanism rather than a body created fluid power 
relationships, which thus allow for such spill-overs, in line with the path-dependency 
hypothesis. In line with this hypothesis, the EBU is argued to be capable of influencing the 
dynamism of integration beyond its scope, spilling over into rule-setting techniques, 
                                                 
543 A Belke, A Dobrzanska, D Gros, P Smaga, (When) Should a Non-Euro Country Join the Banking Union?, 
Journal of Economic Asymmetries 2016, p.9 
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adjudication in courts, and even affecting the interpretation of constitutional principles.545 
This phenomenon is predicted to continue, and to affect the future capital markets union.546  
These processes are obviously concerning for the NoPS, which are naturally more 
averse to centralisation at the EU level. Consequently, they tend to scrutinise every detail of 
the participation offer in front of them, as well as the details of alternative arrangements, put 
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Existing Instruments for Mending the Supervisory Gaps Between 




The institutional components of the EBU do not currently extend beyond the Eurozone 
and two newly-participating States, both of which will adopt the Single Currency in the near 
future. Although the Single Rulebook applies throughout the EU, the enforcement of its rules 
remains unharmonised among the Non-Participating States (NoPS). As I have discussed in 
Chapter 1, this is problematic, since pre-crisis developments and the financial crisis itself 
delivered a serious blow to the idea of national efficiency, in many ways putting pressure on 
the choices made in terms of the Financial Stability Trilemma. Avgouleas and Arner argued 
that the “premise of home-country control and the principle of minimum harmonization were 
bound to undermine at some point the stability of the EU banking system.”547 This problem 
remains largely unresolved in the NoPS.  That in turn undermines the overall efforts to 
achieve pan-European harmonisation.  
In order to resolve this situation, or at the very least mitigate the dangers presented by 
it, the Banking Union legislation foresaw several arrangements. The Close Cooperation 
Agreements (CCAs) allow the NoPS to opt-into full participation, albeit with a notable (and 
problematic) exception of decision-making mechanics. For those States which choose to stay 
out of the SSM/SRM framework, by not adopting the single currency and not signing the 
CCA, the framework of Memoranda of Understanding was created.548 For countries outside 
of the EU, the combination of memoranda of understanding, agreements with regional 
coverage, and bi-lateral agreements is in place. Institutional and inter-institutional 
arrangements like the EBA and colleges of supervisors are also expected to play a role in this 
complex landscape.549  
The purpose of this Chapter is to review these arrangements, highlighting key features 
and thorniest aspects. This Chapter concludes that the CCA is the only available ‘hard’ 
                                                 
547 E Avgouleas, DW Arner, The Eurozone debt crisis and the European Banking Union: A cautionary tale of 
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arrangement and thus, in order to ensure uniform application of supervisory standards and 
practices, as well as to achieve the goals of the EBU reform, it might be necessary to provide 
incentives for more NoPS to adopt it.  
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section A discusses the current legal mechanics of 
cross-border supervision between the Eurozone and the NoPS. Section B analyses the close 
cooperation agreement, and highlights its legal and functional imperfections. Section C 
discusses the main legal alternative suggested by the SSMR - memoranda of understanding. 
Section D assesses the role colleges of supervisors could play in bridging the gap between the 
two groups of States. Section E briefly discusses the possibility of the EBA serving as the 
unifying institution. The final section concludes.  
 
A. Current system of cross-SMM-border banking supervision 
 
All of Europe’s twenty largest banks do business across Eurozone borders. Be it on the 
basis of establishment of branches, acquisition of subsidiaries or mergers involving new 
members of the banking group - trillions cross the Eurozone borders every day. A non-
Eurozone bank doing business in the Eurozone or a Eurozone bank doing business in a non-
Eurozone State is a common occurrence. Large banking groups operating cross-border, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, are generally seen as a positive thing, which has historically allowed 
the States and their citizens to benefit from better services and cheaper products, thus 
boosting businesses and lifestyles, as well as deepening market integration. Avgouleas neatly 
summarised the need to balance the benefits of their smooth functioning with safeguards that 
need to be installed in order to prevent systemic disruptions: 
 “intra-group financing and transfers of assets from one group entity to another are at 
the heart of modern banking and create significant, even critical, efficiencies in the operation 
of banking groups. However [they] can also be used to weaken the financial position of one 
entity and strengthen another.” 550  
The EBU has facilitated the consolidation of supervision of banking groups operating 
cross-border in the SSM/SRM area. However, fragmentation outside of this area has 
remained. In this section I will discuss the most problematic aspects of such fragmentation.  
 
 
                                                 
550 E Avgouleas, Governance of global financial markets: The law, the economics, the politics, Cambridge 
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1. The new-old home-host 
Due to non-participation of the NoPS, many of the changes introduced by the SSM and 
SRM have limited structural impact in relation to cross-Eurozone-border oversight of 
banking groups, and significant entities established outside of the Eurozone but within the 
Single Market. The allocation of powers and competences between participating States and 
the NoPS continues to be based on an (essentially) unaltered home-host model. 
Simplistically, the home-host model is based on supervisory cooperation between the 
home (domicile) state and the host (branch/subsidiary) state. The home supervisor supervises 
the branches, subsidiaries and the headquarters established in its jurisdiction, whereas the 
host supervisor is only responsible for the branches and subsidiaries in that jurisdiction. In 
practice, it is common for large banks to have multiple host supervisors. This model received 
ferocious criticism following the GFC, as discussed in Chapter 1. The home-host system left 
room for national championship, inaction bias, regulatory arbitrage, and many other 
supervisory and resolution inefficiencies.  
Moreover, even the home and host supervisors and regulators which generally perform 
well, might have incentives to act against each other’s interest in crisis situations. Examples 
of that include the home supervisors delaying the information or downplaying the seriousness 
of the situation, or the host supervisors ring-fencing entities in its jurisdiction.551  Either of 
the actions can make things worse for the other side: sudden ring-fencing can further increase 
stress on the group, deepening the crisis and forcing the other host supervisors to ring-fence 
the entities in their jurisdictions. Delays in information sharing can allow contagion effects to 
spread through the group and across domestic markets. In addition to systemic crises, this can 
spark regional crises, the impact of which I will discuss in Chapter 4(E). In more dramatic 
scenarios, one of the supervisors can trigger reorganisation, recovery, emergency takeover or 
a resolution of a distressed subsidiary, which can negatively affect the group’s position, while 
the other level(s) of  supervisors (e.g. Eurozone NCA, ECB) is still trying to nurse it back to 
health.552 
As discussed in Chapter 1, despite these shortcomings, the home-host system stood as 
the primary system of international banking coordination, all the way until the GFC and the 
end of the Lamfalussy era. As part of the EBU, in the SSM area, these problems have been 
solved (or at least mitigated) by making the ECB the primary supervisor of cross-border 
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banks and banking groups, and effectively abolishing the home-host system. The changes to 
the rest of the EU have been less pronounced, and generally left the home-host system in 
place. This system also remains in place for cross-border banking stretching beyond the EU.  
 
2. EBU changes to the remaining home-host system  
 The SSM framework put in place some arrangements designed to facilitate group 
supervision harmonisation between the SSM area and the NoPS. In relation to the supervision 
of cross-border institutions and groups active both inside and outside the Eurozone the ECB 
has to cooperate closely with the NCAs of the NoPS.553 The arrangements for such 
cooperation include information exchange, and participation in colleges of supervisors. 
However, this participation is limited to the colleges established under the EBA or ECB 
guidance and does not include regional colleges, or other colleges operating outside of the 
EBU framework, discussed in Section D. This cooperation can be further strengthened 
through memoranda of understanding,554 and coordination arrangements for obtainment of 
information, where the ECB’s jurisdictional scope does not stretch far enough.555  
 In principle, such cooperation does not alter the character of the supervision 
mechanics, which is still essentially home-host, when either the host or the ‘guest’ (or both) 
does not participate in the SSM and SRM. Effectively, the ECB can only act as either the host 
of the home authority, when the Eurozone border is crossed. If the ECB acts as a host 
authority, it does not supervise the institution located in the home state and vice versa. When 
a bank operates cross-border between the NoPS and interconnected States (e.g. Danish bank 
in Sweden, Hungarian bank in Poland, etc.), the system is entirely home-host.  
However, despite leaving the home-host system in place for the NoPS, the EBU has 
had an impact on how it functions. The biggest change is that, as Wymeersch expressed it, 
the ECB is the competent authority dealing with the NCAs of the NoPS “on the same basis, 
as was the case with authorities in the pre-SSM setting.” 556  Schammo neatly summarised the 
mechanics:  “the ECB will, when it is competent according to the [SSMR], act in its relations 
with authorities of [NoPS] as either the competent authority of the home Member State or as 
competent authority of the host Member State.557 For groups, it might also act as 
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consolidating supervisor”.558  
The ECB has essentially stepped into the shoes of the relevant NCAs and is empowered 
to participate in consolidated supervision of cross-border groups headed by parents based in 
NoPS, and to take on host State tasks with respect to the branches of banks originating from 
the NoPS, which are located within its domain.559  
 The presence of the ECB in this mix might in itself be an improvement. As Schammo 
observed, “the ECB might prove to be a more effective interlocutor in a home-host setting 
than some national authorities.”560 Moreover, the Single Rulebook is now in place, and it is 
possible that rule harmonisation will help ensure long term financial stability to a greater 
extent. Furthermore, in a Eurozone-to-NoPS scenario, the ECB has a lot of control over the 
credit institution’s parents, even if the subsidiary is supervised by the host NCA. The effects 
of power consolidation in the hands of the ECB are felt particularly strongly in the situations 
where the ECB becomes the consolidating supervisor. For that to be the case, however, the 
part of the banking group in question needs to be significant enough to fall within the ECB’s 
domain. 
 
3. Significance assessment  
In the scenario involving a NoPS-based bank or banking group with activities in the 
Eurozone (via branches and/or subsidiaries) the need for direct supervision by the ECB is 
determined by significance assessment, similar to the one applying within the SSM area. 
However, if a NoPS bank wants to directly provide services in the SSM area, under Art.16 
SSMFR, the ECB will carry out the tasks of the NCA of the host (participating) State 
irrespective of the significance criterion. The significance criteria also apply to groups. If 
supervised entities are part of a supervised group, the significance is determined at the 
highest level of consolidation within participating States and in any of the following 
circumstances: 561 
(a) if the supervised group within the participating Member States fulfils the 
size criterion, the economic importance criterion, or the cross-border activities 
criterion;562 
(b) if one of the supervised entities forming part of the supervised group fulfils 
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the direct public financial assistance criterion;  
(c) if one of the supervised entities forming part of the supervised group is one 
of the three most significant credit institutions in a participating State.  
 
A good example of type (c) situation can be found in the Nordic-Baltic market. 
Swedbank’s Latvian subsidiary is one of the three largest banks in the country.563 Thus, that 
part of the banking group falls under the direct supervision by the ECB. The SSM rules 
would still apply to its smaller presence in Finland, meaning that the ECB could supervise 
this part of the group directly, if the need arose, but currently does not, due to its (relatively) 
smaller size. The parent bank in Sweden avoids the ECB supervision. Importantly, under 
Art.53(2) SSMFR, for the purposes of determining significance on the basis of the size 
criterion, the supervised group of consolidated undertakings includes subsidiaries and 
branches in the NoPS and third countries, meaning that the assessment methodologies 
account for and encompass the full picture of a banking entity or group. Effectively, that also 
means that the consolidating supervisor needs to rely on the NoPS NCA for information. 
Particular branches can also be drawn to SSM supervision. Under CRD IV, Art.51(1) the 
branch can be “made” significant by the NCA of a host State sending a request to the 
consolidating supervisor, where Art.112(1) applies.564 Art.39(2) SSMFR details the 
procedure for a group or an individual entity to start or cease being significant by the means 
of an ECB decision. This can open ways for banking groups to adapt their business models to 
have a choice of a supervisor by, for example, distributing smaller subsidiaries among more 
States. One might argue that this flexibility can also create opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage. However, the ECB stands as the guardian of this provision, since it has to explicitly 
declare the institution no longer significant.  
 
4. Branches, subsidiaries and consolidation  
While the SSMR explicitly declares not to alter the framework regulating the change of 
legal form of subsidiaries or branches and its application, it does introduce unnecessary 
confusion in this respect.565 A problematic outcome of the SSM group supervision 
arrangement, is that it artificially divides fully interlinked groups along SSM boundaries, 
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which does not reflect the business models and distorts the significance assessment. Under 
Art.41(2) SSMFR branches opened in different participating States by an institution 
established in a NoPS are treated individually, as separate supervised entities. Moreover, 
branches established in a NoPS or third countries by an SSM/SRM country bank are 
considered separate supervised entities, even separated from subsidiaries of the same credit 
institution, when determining whether the significance criteria of Art.6(4) SSMR apply.566 
Darvas and Wolf discuss the example of Danske Bank.567 They explained that although 
Denmark stayed outside the SSM, Danske’s subsidiary in Finland is directly supervised by 
the ECB, because it is one of the three biggest banks in Finland. However, apart from two 
small subsidiaries in Luxembourg and Northern Ireland, in other Eurozone States Danske 
operates branches, and these branches would fall under ECB supervision only if Denmark 
joined the SSM.568 Generally speaking, the difference between a branch and a subsidiary is 
that even the business itself sees the branch as a part of the same parent business. Going 
against that logic does not bring any benefits.569   
This has deeper implications not just for classification, but also for the effectiveness of 
group-level (consolidated) prudential requirements.570 Babis sees dangers in discrepancies in 
calculating consolidated requirements, making it difficult to compare between groups located 
in different States or between different layers within the same group, and creating 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.571 Darvas and Wolff notably argued that the Single 
Rulebook, and the EBA’s supervisory rulebook, alongside the Basel III accords and the 
Capital Requirements legislation and the EBA are all put in place to ensure supervisory 
convergence and consistency of outcomes. 572 However, while the Single Rulebook, ensures a 
considerable level of harmonisation, it also leaves a lot of discretion. Particularly, the PRR573 
derogations in Arts.7-8 and 9 leave a lot of flexibility. Consequently, in the absence of further 
harmonisation, a degree of differentiation between the NoPS and the participating States is 
likely, with further differentiation occurring in the EEA states and the UK.  
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These distortions need to be viewed in the broader context of how banks operate.  
Mayes observed that “where banks operate in more than one member state, these operations 
are separate”, and separation leaves room for divergence of practices even within the same 
bank operating across the Eurozone and EU borders.574  This phenomenon is likely to be 
more  pronounced, where the somewhat artificial border at the SSM lines helps ‘isolate’ the 
branch or subsidiary. In the event of stress or failure such separation can delay decision-
making or lead to misguided decisions, thus aggravating the crisis. This is particularly acute 
in insolvencies. As Avgouleas observed, “in cross-border insolvencies, transfers of assets 
from one member of the group to another are often restricted by member state laws, since the 
recovery of these assets is a very difficult process in insolvency due to the doctrine of 
separate legal entity.”575 The fact that the assets can be recovered eventually is a remedy of 
very limited potency, as the shock to the system and the taxpayer can be immediate. 
Avgouleas saw insolvency situations as a gap in the BRRD framework, since the resolution 
framework only covers “conditions under which assets may be transferred between entities of 
a cross-border banking group in stressed situations, but not when the institution has entered 
bank insolvency proceedings.”576 The ability of Eurozone parent groups to use the ESM 
funds for refinancing non-Euro subsidiaries has also been questioned.577   
 
5. Fees as a false incentive  
Fragmentation along the SSM/SRM lines also has the potential to distort competition 
for a very pragmatic reason - fees. The funding for the SSM’s activities is collected in the 
form of fees levied on market participants. Such system was established with a view to 
ensure the ECB’s independence from undue influences of NCAs and market participants, and 
separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks.578  Therefore, the institutions 
established entirely or predominantly in the SSM area pay all of their annual fees to the ECB. 
The calculation of the fees excludes subsidiaries established in the NoPS, but not branches. 
 However, the institutions originating from the NoPS, EEA/EFTA states and third 
countries only pay the ECB a chunk corresponding to the size of their branches. This is 
calculated at the highest level of consolidation in the participating States, based on the 
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importance and risk profile of the credit institution concerned, including its risk weighted 
assets.579 The same, in principle, applies to subsidiaries, different consolidation rules 
notwithstanding.  
While these arrangements are in line with the overall goals and aspirations of the EBU, 
in the presence of fragmentation alongside Eurozone borders, it also presents some dangers. 
As I will discuss in Chapter 4, all NoPS believe their supervision systems to be cheaper than 
that of the ECB/SSM. The only NoPS that approach the costs of the SSM are arguably 
Sweden and Denmark, but even their fees are lower. While this did no discourage Nordea 
from moving to Finland, other entities have not followed. The Visegrad states offer 
significantly cheaper supervision. Effectively, that means that a banking group has an interest 
to keep their operations in the NoPS, in the absence of other competitive disadvantages.  
This inclination, while creating some unevenness in the playing field, will not be a 
fundamentally problematic issue, unless it starts feeding into path-dependency. If lower 
supervision costs are seen as an incentive for the choice of locale, the NoPS would also have 
an incentive to push these costs even lower, which would eventually start affecting 
supervision quality. Consequently, looser application of requirements or less supervisory 
attention would create incentives for riskier banking businesses to move to, remain or expand 
in the NoPS. In this respect, Appelbaum and Nakashima have discussed how the existence of 
incentives for a regulator to bring more institutions into its domain can lead to weaker 
prudential supervision.580 
 
6. One more supervisor  
While there are routes for NoPS-ECB coordination, in the presence of increasingly 
diverging paths the end result could be a multi-layered, overlapping and irreducibly complex 
supervisory system, the complexity of which would leave room for mistakes and regulatory 
arbitrage. As the CEO of UniCredit Federico Ghizzoni expressed it: “it would be a real 
tragedy if instead of one regulator we would have one more regulator.”581 Being interlinked 
with the ESRB, the ESAs, including the EBA, and the NCAs the SSM is already considered 
to be at risk of being tangled in the web of overlapping supervisory responsibilities and 
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duplicative requirements.582 When the need to cooperate with NoPS’ NCAs arises, 
overlapping, dual, or even triple supervision is common. The concept of multi-layered 
supervision has been subject to academic discussion for a long time, and the findings are not 
encouraging.  
The first major effect is supervisory competition. On the one hand, it can discourage 
unnecessarily restrictive practices, thus improving business conditions, which under some 
circumstances could be a positive. However, the entire SSM project is generally meant to 
tighten supervision, not loosen it. Supervisory competition thus naturally works against the 
core premise of the reform. Multi-layered banking supervision has been accused of 
promoting competition in laxity.583 Secondly, as discussed throughout this thesis, there is 
obviously plenty of room for conflict of interest between the NoPS’ NCAs, the ECB, the 
Eurozone NCAs, the SRB, and the EBA. Such conflicts can relate to rule making, national 
discretions, sanctioning, resolutions, etc. Thirdly, in principle, all the concerns relating to 
home-host systems remain acute.  
The problem of multi-level supervision and supervisory competition can be particularly 
acute not just for the NoPS, but also predominantly host participating States like the Baltic 
States, Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria, etc. As was the case in the Nordics-Baltic region during 
the GFC,584  the banking groups based in larger home economies can indulge in excessive 
risk taking through their branches and subsidiaries, in smaller host economies, thus inflating 
bubbles and destabilising weaker host markets. However, if the parent entities themselves are 
sturdy, they can also help stabilise the host economies, which is one of the reasons why their 
presence is not, in itself, undesirable. Ensuring the stability of the parent entity and the group 
as a whole is, to a large extent, a responsibility of the supervisors. In the absence of single 
supervisory framework, and in the presence of multiple cross-border supervisory 
arrangements, with different geopolitical centres and somewhat different agendas, 
supervisory effectiveness becomes hard to gauge.  
Spendzharova and Bayram’s research reveals that SSM/SRM States and NoPS “share 
extensive links in banking supervision and crisis management,” but also that the home State 
(NoPS) regulators can enjoy “significant decision-making power vis-à-vis the host 
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regulators” in the host (SSM/SRM) States.585 As I will further explore in Chapter 4, small 
host States are therefore subjected to (sometimes conflicting) influences originating from the 
ECB and the larger home State NCAs. The reality is that smaller host states often have to try 
to please two masters, increasing supervisory complexity and the associated costs. 
 
7. The widening gap   
That is not to say that supervisors cannot cooperate without a legally binding 
arrangements and institutionalised cooperation mechanisms. Schoenmaker gives the example 
of multiple NCAs reaching a cooperative solution in the bailout of Dexia and the 
continuation of Western bank operations in Central and Eastern Europe.586 The Nordic-Baltic 
arrangements discussed in detail in Chapter 4(D-E) also fall into this category. However, the 
effectiveness of such system is conditional on the existence of shared group or regional 
interest and the willingness of States, not just their NCAs, to cooperate. Moreover, such 
arrangements, are often blind to macro-prudential threats and, to a large extent, 
macroeconomic concerns.  
 In principle, the cross-border supervision mechanics between the NoPS and the SSM 
area are not too dissimilar from the relationship between EU Member States prior to the 
EBU. This appears to be an unfortunate complication resulting from differentiated integration 
and graded membership, rather than ideational consensus. As a consequence, as far as the 
NoPS are concerned, the institutional components of the EBU are largely ineffective in 
combating a number of pre-crises problems including national champions, regulatory 
arbitrage, uneven playing field, the NCAs siding with market participants, undue influence of 
largest credit institutions, etc. Moreover, due to their importance as banking centres (e.g. 
Sweden), size (e.g. Poland) and interconnectedness (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Hungary), many 
NoPS have the capacity to spark new crises. As long as the home-host principle remains, the 
EBU remains fundamentally incomplete.  
The geographical scope of the EBU is therefore an obstacle to its success. Addressing 
this issue, Jean Claude Juncker emphasised the need to expand EBU and EMU membership 
in his 2017 State of the Union speech.587 This was echoed by Ursula Van der Leyen at the 
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beginning  of her presidency.588 Speyer concluded that “the objectives of maintaining 
financial stability in an interlinked financial market and of preserving the single market for 
financial services require that the geographic scope of the SSM to be the entire EU-2[8]589 
and EU 2[8]-x membership will hurt the single market.”590 The Single Rulebook alone is 
widely considered  insufficient for facilitating successful pan-European banking supervision 
harmonisation, or even create the impetus towards gradual centripetal processes. Avgouleas 
and Arner concluded that “[i]n order to avoid any divergence between the Euro Area and the 
rest of the EU, the single rulebook should be underpinned by uniform supervisory 
practices.591 Schoenmaker asserted that “the ultimate goal should be to operate at the EU 
level since the Internal Market for Banking operates EU-wide.”592 As a sort of an extension 
of the path-dependency hypothesis, he warned that the opposite could result in centrifugal 
effects, as “an Alleingang of the euro-area in financial services would force a split in the 
EU’s financial system.“593  
All of this boils down to one fundamental question: are the SSM and SRM necessary in 
order to ensure systemic stability? If the answer is in the affirmative, it would seem that by 
only covering a relatively small percentage of Europe’s banking assets the SSM and SRM 
remain fundamentally incomplete. It is therefore meaningful to explore the avenues for 
SSM/SRM expansion, in terms of their direct remit and cooperative reach.  
 
B. Close cooperation agreements 
 
In order to address the threats posed by fragmentation, the EBU legislation foresees 
several types of agreements and structures, that can be used to increase the EBU’s reach and 
effectiveness, or (failing that) mitigate the risks. The most effective solution is obviously 
getting the NoPS to join the SSM and SRM.  
Joining takes the legal form of a Close Cooperation Agreement (CCA), effectively 
making a non-Eurozone state willing to enter into such agreement with the ECB a part of the 
SSM and SRM. This subsection seeks to introduce and discuss the legal structure of such 
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agreement, including the main legal and organisational reasons for the NoPS’ reluctance to 
join. Before doing so, however, in subsection 1, I will discuss the centripetal factors pulling 
some States to join, which evidently had some sway in the south-eastern states of the EU – 
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. Subsection 2 covers the procedure of entering into the CCA 
and the legal implications of such decision.  Subsection 3 analyses the legal status of the non-
Eurozone participating states. In subsection 4 I move onto the thorny issue of conflict 
resolution, and the termination of the CCA as the (sub-optimal) ultimate solution to 
disagreements between the NCAs and the ECB. Subsection 5 focuses on the changes made to 
the CCA arrangements, in order to make them more appealing to the NoPS.  
 
1) Centripetal factors for participation  
a) Incentives to participate 
In the preceding Chapters I have touched upon several problematic issues which make 
the CCA seem like an inherently unattractive concept. Such issues inter alia include 
representation in the Governing Council, decision-making mechanics, and the costs 
associated with supervision and the SRF.  
On the conceptual and political level, however, there is a degree of consensus that 
participation in the EBU should remain open to non-Eurozone Member States and - most 
importantly – a degree of consensus among the NoPS that participation would be an option, if 
obstacles impinging on their national interests were removed. Such consensus is evidenced 
by the fact that even the countries which never intended to participate in the SSM or the SRM 
and refused to sign the SRF agreement - the UK and Sweden - fought to ensure the full 
inclusion of CCA states in the SSM. Moreover, even the most reluctant NoPS have clearly 
stated concrete reasons for their non-participation, and very few of such reasons are 
ideational or ideological. Basic constructivist consensus is therefore achievable. However, 
neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist incentives and pressures would also need to align.  
There are many compelling arguments why joining the SSM via the CCA might be 
beneficial for the NoPS. These arguments carry different weights in different NoPS, and thus 
should not be perceived as universally applicable, but all the arguments mentioned here have 
been recognised in the domestic EBU debate in more than one State. They range from 
broadly mirroring the general logic of participation in the SSM, to fear of being left behind or 
being left out of otherwise beneficial processes.   
Firstly, opting-in would carry many of the same benefits as the ‘normal’ membership. 
The Vienna Initiative working group stated that opting in would give the NoPS essentially 
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the same benefits as for the Eurozone States with respect to mitigation of home-host 
problems, quality and consistency of supervision, crisis aversion or mitigation, and reversal 
of fragmentation.594  
Secondly, the ECB supervision and SRB’s resolution plans may enhance the opting-in 
State’s reputation as a banking centre by reducing the risk of supervision being tainted by 
national bias.595 Hüttle and Schoenmaker argued that joining could improve the credibility of 
national prudential arrangements.596 It is also argued that banks headquartered in Member 
States outside EBU could be at a competitive disadvantage, if their domestic banking 
supervision was perceived as inferior to the SSM.597 That could effectively result in higher 
funding and operating costs for both – the market participants and the States, as there might 
be a need for the domestic NCAs to outperform the SSM, not just be on par with it.598  
Thirdly, it is argued that since some of the non-Eurozone States are important hosts to 
foreign banks headquartered in the Eurozone, they could gain from “improved management 
of interdependencies within EBU on the practical level.”599 They could expect to be “major 
beneficiaries of a supranational system” of supervision that is “more impartial and more 
conscious of cross-country spill-overs”.600 Hertig et al observe that the ECB has the ability to 
attract high-calibre supervisory staff and can recruit from a much broader pool of talent than 
what is available to most NCAs, thus potentially having the personnel with better 
understanding of international banking interdependencies.601   
Fourthly, some Member States might see the CCA as a prelude to the Eurozone 
membership.602 As I will discuss in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, the States seeking accession to 
the EMU are generally lenient towards the EBU, which is evident from Bulgaria and 
Croatia’s participation.  
Fifthly, for smaller, predominantly host States, the EBU can also provide a way to 
resist the influence of the home States and their institutions. It is well documented that high 
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foreign bank ownership has the tendency to result in the pressure to accept regulatory agenda 
set by the home states.603  This can effectively expose them to Pistor’s ‘host’s dilemma’.604 
The EBU can be argued to present a solution to it.  
Sixthly, the NoPS with limited supervisory budgets and resolution capacities, could 
outsource the tasks (and banks) they have been struggling with to the ECB, thus avoiding 
potential reputation damage. That is particularly important for the states with questionable 
supervisory track record.605 In the worst case scenario, even if the ECB supervision turned 
out to be inferior to domestic arrangements, or the magnitude of a crisis exceeded the 
contingency buffers, participation would still spread the blame for supervisory failure, 
reducing the direct reputational damage to the States.606  
Furthermore, for States with disproportionately large banking sectors, the added 
financial backstop of the SRF could add extra safety.607  The smaller States which are home 
to large multinational banks are aware of the potential struggle they would have to endure, if 
such banks failed. Schoenmaker provides a detailed discussion of such struggles and 
specifically points at the Nordic banking giants, arguably too big for their home states.608  
It is thus unsurprising that Nordic credit institutions themselves often take somewhat 
unexpectedly EBU-friendly stance. Danske Bank, for example, has stated that the EBU “is an 
important step towards a more stable European banking sector and a more closely integrated 
market for capital and financial services.”609 Statements notably count for little in the banking 
world, but actual business decisions are certainly indicative. The biggest EBU-linked 
business decision so far came in 2017, when the Nordic banking giant, Nordea decided to 
move inside the EBU “to find a fiscal backstop large enough to see it through any future 
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crisis.“610 While this was not the only formal reason, and reputation and prestige of the ECB 
were cited as the main factors, the hunt for stronger support footing was evident. The more 
lenient Finish tax system probably also played a role, but the EBU was certainly a major 
factor. Nordea’s (then) CEO Casper von Koskull admitted that  “[t]he main reason is that a 
bank with four domestic markets – Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark – with a balance 
sheet that I believe is two times Sweden’s GDP, is a bank I think should be based within the 
European banking union.”611 
Nordea’s move from Sweden to Finland also indicates that at least some large market 
participants, especially those already compliant with the Single Rulebook, are not shying 
away from ECB supervision. This impression is further strengthened by the directions of 
post-Brexit moves, with credit institutions and financial firms eyeing Paris, Dublin and 
Amsterdam as preferred destinations, often preferring them to non-EBU Stockholm, Oslo, 
Copenhagen or Zurich. This would be in line with Epstein and Rhodes’s assertion that 
European banks are less beholden to their home States and markets than assumed, due to 
significant market consolidation across Europe, and thus less responsive to political 
influence.612 If this assessment is correct, some NoPSs housing large international banks 
might have to adjust their positions, to accommodate the concerns of such institutions. On the 
other hand, it is important to note that Nordea’s move did not affect Sweden’s position.613 
 
b) Pressures to participate  
In some cases, the industry preference for participation can turn into outright pressure, 
especially in smaller markets dominated by Eurozone banks, which do not seek to derive any 
specific advantages from being shielded from the ECB’s supervision. This possibility forms 
part of a mosaic of centripetal pressures. Such pressures are related to the above-mentioned 
incentives, but also distinct from them. The main difference is that the pressures are less 
about the individual interests of the Member States, and more about broader macroeconomic 
and geopolitical processes, which can at times override the national interests.  
The second group of pressures is linked to globalisation and liberalisation of financial 
markets, which inherently conflicts with protectionism. Epstein and Rhodes contended that 
liberalisation of European economies is increasing the economic and political costs of  
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protectionism.614 As I will demonstrate in Chapter 5, protectionist and nationalist policies can 
still work as an alternative to joining the institutional components of the EBU, but this option 
is only available to a limited number of NoPS, and requires a very particular set of national 
banking sector structural characteristics. For such policies foreign bank penetration needs to 
be reduced and the banking sector needs to remain relatively small, compared to the State’s 
GDP. While an option for some States, this would be an unreasonably costly path for others.  
The third pressure is rooted in the growing size and power of the EBU institutional 
components. It is foreseeable that the EBU institutional structures could gradually annex the 
rest of the EU, due to their shear size and the political force they are effectively a 
manifestation of.615  An acute concern for the NoPS is of course that this might happen on 
purely neofunctionalist basis, without due consideration as to whether the EBU presents the 
best possible supervision and resolution outcomes from individual States’ perspectives. That 
would leave the remaining NoPS in a shrinking interest group, with diminishing influence in 
the EBA.616  
The fourth pressure is inherently linked to the aforementioned ones. Epstein and 
Rhodes argued that reduced costs of international economic exchange raise the relative costs 
of the products and services that protectionist states produce, making those states less 
competitive.617 Therefore, for the NoPS with large and highly internationalised banking 
sectors, especially those housing major international banking groups, protectionism would 
not be an option, as the globalisation and liberalisation of financial markets would suck them 
deeper into international arrangements.  
The fifth pressure is linked to vulnerabilities. As discussed in Chapter 1, the GFC has 
revealed the dangers that troubled States and banks can present to each other. Therefore, 
Epstein and Rhodes claim that one of the major reasons why the Eurozone States became 
inclined to participate was the increased financial vulnerability of banks and States.618 Such 
vulnerability, as I will demonstrate further in my analysis in Chapter 4, is partly what drives 
some of the NoPS to develop an interest in participation. Therefore, it is not unforeseeable 
that many NoPS might join following national, global or regional crises, particularly those 
with the potential to put the existing arrangements into question.  
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The fifth pressure is predominantly exerted by EU institutions on the neofunctionalist 
basis. Avgouleas and Arner observed that the EU institutions, especially the Commission, see 
the EBU and the development of the single market as inseparable and mutually reinforcing 
processes.619 Therefore, avoidance of the EBU might become a politically and economically 
costly challenge, as the EU institutions have clear incentives to make the NoPS feel 
somewhat uncomfortable. 
Lastly, the effects of the EBU are not fully avoidable even for the NoPS. That in itself 
constitutes a synergic pressure. As I have illustrated, the SSM/SRM States and the NoPS still 
have to uphold the same Single Rulebook provisions. The ECB also plays a major role in 
cross-border group supervision. Consequently, as Wymeersch observed, the NoPS and third 
countries have to recognise the supervision system with the ECB at the helm, including 
aspects like the division between significant and less significant credit institutions.620 As this 
recognition increasingly results in the need to adapt to, as well as mirror and mimic EBU 
structures, the institutional advantages of differentiation decrease, as the costs increase.   
 
2. Problematic aspects of the joining procedure  
a) Constitutional basis for the inclusion of the NoPS 
For these incentives and pressures to have an effect, the EU obviously needed to 
provide a procedure for joining, which would be acceptable to the NoPS. This task turned out 
to be more legally complicated than expected. When the Council and Commission proposals 
for the SSMR were made public, they gave rise to a debate on the legality of opting-in 
through the CCA. More detailed discussion of the constitutional debate on participation of 
the NoPS can be found in Chapter 2 of this thesis. In essence, the question was whether 
Art.127(6) TFEU can be applied to non-Euro States.621 Carmassi et al. neatly explain the 
situation, pointing to Council Regulation 1096/2010 “conferring specific tasks upon the ECB 
concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board”, which used Art.127(6) as 
the legal basis for appointing the ECB President and Vice-President to the ESRB and 
charging the ECB with the specific tasks of setting up and funding the secretariat of the 
                                                 
619 E Avgouleas, DW Arner, The Eurozone debt crisis and the European Banking Union: A cautionary tale of 
failure and reform, The University of Edinburgh 2013, p.40 
620 E Wymeersch, The Single Supervisory Mechanism or 'SSM', Part one of the Banking Union,  National Bank 
of Belgium Working Paper No.255, 2014, p.22 
621 E Ferran, VSG Babis, The European Single Supervisory Mechanism, University of Cambridge Faculty of 
Law Research Paper No.10, 2013, p.22, and EO Wymeersch, The European Banking Union, a First Analysis, 
Financial Law Institute Working Paper Series 2012, p.8 
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ESRB - a body comprising all EU states.622  By logical extension Art.127(6) should not be 
restricted to the Eurozone, as made explicit by the provisions of Art.139(2c) TFEU, which 
mentions other provisions of Art.127 that do not apply to Member States not using the euro, 
but not paragraph 6. Consequently, via Art.7(1) SSMR, the ECB is empowered to carry out 
the tasks in the areas referred to in Articles 4(1), 4(2) and 5, (the main functions conferred by 
the SSMR),623 in relation to credit institutions established in non-Eurozone States, which 
have signed the Close Cooperation Agreements (CCAs) with the ECB. While this, highly 
technical, justification for the inclusion of the non-Eurozone States provided the 
constitutional basis for subsequent expansion of the institutional components of the EBU, it 
also brought a number of restrictions and complications to the process, discussed below. As 
sub-optimal as Art.127(6) may have been for the SSM and the EBU as a whole, in relation to 
the non-EMU States it arguably stands as the biggest obstacle.  
 
b) The joining procedure  
Art.7(2) of SSMR sets out the procedure for reaching the CCA. Further details, 
stipulating the timing and content of applications, assessment of applications, and admission 
of new members, were fully outlined by Decision ECB/2014/510.624 It is essentially a three 
stage process. Firstly, the NoPS notifies the other States, the Commission, the ECB and EBA 
of its intention to enter into a close cooperation with regard to all credit institutions 
established in it. In this notification, the NoPS undertakes to ensure that its NCA will abide 
by guidelines or requests by the ECB, and provide the required information on all of its credit 
institutions. The NoPS then has to adopt relevant national legislation to ensure that its NCA 
will be obliged to adopt any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the ECB, 
which arguably signifies surrendering part of national regulatory autonomy, in terms of the 
Financial Stability Trilemma.625 Moreover, Under Art.4(3) of Decision ECB/2014/510, this 
national legislation passed to ensure ECB’s supremacy needs to be to the ECB’s satisfaction, 




                                                 
622 J Carmassi, C Di Noia, S Micossi, Banking Union: A Federal Model for the European Union with Prompt 
Corrective Action, CEPS Policy Brief No.282, 2012, p.3 
623 For the discussion of which see Chapter 2 
624  ECB Decision of 31 January 2014: On the close cooperation with the national competent authorities of 
participating Member States whose currency is not the euro (ECB/2014/5) 
625 SSMR Art.7(2)(c), see my discussion on the FST in Chapter 1(C) 
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c) Limited room for negotiation  
Much to the dissatisfaction of the NoPS, the joining provisions do not leave much room 
for negotiation, which was available to the Eurozone States at the launch of the SSM, 
discussed in Chapter 2. While this can be justified on the basis of legal and procedural 
certainty, the NoPS are placed in an underprivileged position, compared to their Eurozone 
counterparts. Notably, the drafters of the SSMR were aware of these concerns and left some 
flexibility in terms of institutional scope. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the exclusions of 
particular types of institutions in Art.1(2) SSMR are not set in stone and can be adjusted by 
modifying Art.2(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD), which has been done on a few 
occasions.626 As discussed, some entities based in the NoPS have been excluded, in order to 
get around political roadblocks in establishing the SSM, and in trying to sweeten the deal for 
the NoPS. Examples of that include the exclusion of Lithuanian credit unions shortly before 
its EMU accession in 2014 and the inclusion of Croatian credit unions, as well as the 
Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development, forming part of the effort to persuade 
Croatia to participate.627 The remaining provisions of the SSMR do not, however, leave much 
room for additional negotiation of material aspects of participation.  
 
d) Problematic nature of the agreement  
The legal nature of the CCA is also somewhat unexpectedly thorny and politically 
problematic. Partly buried in the complexity of the language of the SSMR, lies the fact that 
the CCA is (formally) an ECB decision. This is evident from the first paragraph of Art.7(2) 
SSMR, as well as Art.5 of Decision ECB/2014/510, describing the agreement as a decision of 
the ECB “addressed to the requesting Member State and establishing a close cooperation.” 
This decision is obviously preceded by an application from the NoPS, but the ultimate legal 
decision is made by the ECB, with all the symbolism such arrangement carries. While this 
can be explained by the constitutional and political considerations, it is nevertheless 
somewhat unfortunate. Firstly, the symbolism of the phrasing is widely understood by the 
Member States as that of subordination, especially since the State’s request can be rejected 
by the ECB under Art.5(3). Secondly, a mere ECB decision is an unusual form for an 
agreement of such significance, which can be contrasted with the international treaty signed 
                                                 
626 For full list of amendments to this Directive see https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/banking-prudential-
requirements-directive-2013-36-eu/amending-and-supplementary-acts/amendments_en, Most notably, Directive 
(EU) 2019/878, Art.1  
627 Directive (EU) 2019/878, Art.1 amending CRD Art.2(5)(11) 
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for the SRF, bilateral agreements with Switzerland, or the free trade agreement encompassing 
financial services signed with the United Kingdom.  
 
3. CCA country status in the SSM  
The contentious aspects of the accession procedure are, however, just the tip of the 
iceberg. Historical development of the SSM in particular is marked by constant attempts of 
the NoPS to gain more say in decision-making, as well as to gain the status of actual 
members of the SSM and (consequently) the SRM.  
 
a) Part of the SSM   
The initial Commission’s proposal for the SSM did not give non-Eurozone 
participating States full membership of the SSM and, in all likelihood, other EBU 
institutional components. This was notably changed in the Council’s proposal.628 The SSMR 
eventually explicitly declared that non-Eurozone participating States (the EU States that sign 
the CCA) are a part of the SSM and their NCAs are SSM authorities.629 Such change is a 
result of the objections of a number of NoPS, ironically spearheaded by Sweden and the UK, 
following the publication of the Commission’s proposal. Giving non-Eurozone States lesser 
status in the SSM was argued to be a violation of the fundamental principles of the EU. 
During the meeting of EU finance ministers in September 2012, Sweden’s finance minister 
said that Sweden “could particularly not accept the supervision based on the ECB, where they 
cannot become members without joining the euro.”630 The (then) Swedish PM Fredrik 
Reinfeldt used his gift of foresight: “I don’t think any of the [NoPS] will accept that.”631 As I 
will explain hereinafter, this concern has not been resolved to the satisfaction of most NoPS. 
Upon signing the CCA, the NoPS would not become – de facto and de jure - equal 
participants in terms of ultimate decision making and representation.  
Nevertheless, giving formal membership in the SSM/SRM to the CCA States was 
perceived positively. Shortly after the publication of the Council’s Proposal, Bulgaria and 
Romania expressed interest in participation, Croatia followed a few years later.  
                                                 
628 SSMR proposal (Council text, December 2012) Arts.2(1)-(2)), As Ferran and Babis, 2013, p.9 noted, “This 
interpretation of the Council’s proposal and the final text is confirmed by the deletion of para 3 in art 6 (which 
becomes redundant if non-euro participating Member States are automatically represented in the Supervisory 
[Board])”.  
629 SSMR Art.2(1), Art.2(2) 
630 Financial Times, EU Ministers at Odds over Banking Union, 15/09/2012 
631 Financial Times, Eurozone Outs Fear Banking Union Plan, 01/102012  
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The current definition of a participating State restricts membership to EU Member 
States and thus does not allow for membership of EEA, EFTA states, or the UK.  
 
b) The Governing Council issue 
Prior to the launch of the SSM, Elliot observed that “single supervisory regime for 
Europe would be good, but only if it has the right governance structure, so that all concerned 
can defend their view-points and their interests.”632 This leads us onto the most problematic 
legal issue in the entire EBU debate, on par with some of the most important economic 
concerns.  
A crucial difference between the NoPS and the Eurozone States is the representation in 
the Governing Council. The SSMR Preamble explicitly states that “Member States whose 
currency is not the euro are not present in the Governing Council for as long as they have not 
adopted the euro in accordance with the TFEU” and cannot “fully benefit from other 
mechanisms” provided for the Eurozone States.633 This monumental obstacle is rooted in the 
ECB’s founding statute, limiting membership of the Governing Council to members of the 
Executive Board of the ECB and the governors of the national central banks of the 
Eurozone.634  
The significance of this problem, however, is primarily related to decision-making 
hierarchy, particularly in relation to the most contentious decisions, which are, by their 
nature, exceptional. Darvas and Wolff therefore downplayed the problems stemming from 
lack of representation in the Governing Council. They claimed that this problem is 
counterbalanced by representation in the supervisory board, providing “equal rights for euro-
area and non-euro-area states.”635 Even the more critical commentators agreed that the 
“structure, and other safeguards in the SSM Regulation, appear to go as far as is legally 
possible to place euro and non-euro Member States on an equal footing […] and whilst the 
outcome is not ideal for non-euro participating Member States, it is expedient.”636  
Such reasoning has some merits. The Governing Council primarily sets the agenda and 
                                                 
632 DJ Elliot, Key issues on European banking Union; Trade-offs and some recommendations, Global Economy 
and Development, Brookings, 2012, p.4 
633 SSMR Rec.43 
634 Art.10, Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB annexed to the 
TEC. See also OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p.78. For more on the structure of the governing council see Europa 
website.  
635 Z Darvas, GB Wolff, Should non-Euro area countries join the Single Supervisory Mechanism?, Bruegel 
2013, p.4 
636 E Ferran, European Banking Union and the EU Single Financial Market: More Differentiated 
Integration, or Disintegration?, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No.29 2014, p.16 
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standards, but it does not actively supervise credit institutions. The draft decisions of the 
supervisory board are deemed to be adopted unless the Governing Council objects. While 
indicating the hierarchy of decision-making power, such arrangement also means that most 
decisions are not tinkered with by the Governing Council. Its further involvement is mainly 
through appeals in cases of fundamental disagreement, which are not an everyday 
occurrence. The absolute majority of supervisory decisions are made by other bodies, like the 
Supervisory Board and the NCAs.  
With that being said, as my research in Chapter 4 reveals, the Governing Council 
representation issue is a major factor in the eyes of most NoPS. While not actively involved 
in day-to-day supervision, the Governing Council is, nevertheless, an immensely powerful 
organ, which plays other significant roles in the European supervisory architecture.  
The list of such roles starts with standard-setting and ends with being the ultimate 
arbitrator, meaning that the Governing Council impacts the entire supervision lifecycle. The 
Governing Council establishes the Code of Conduct for the ECB staff involved in 
supervision637 as well as makes the ultimate decision in case of an NCA or credit institution 
disagreeing with the ECB. Importantly, such decisions are essentially administratively 
incontestable by private parties. For example, natural or legal persons can request a review of 
a decision of the ECB under SSMR relating to that person, but a request for a review against 
a decision of the Governing Council is not allowed.638 As I will elaborate in Subsection 4 
below, the only meaningful, non-judicial, recourse in case of a significant disagreement with 
the decision of the Governing Council, which could go beyond (possibly futile) objections 
within the SSM structures is termination of the CCA.639  
Ferran observed, that through such arrangement, despite other forms of representation, 
the non-Eurozone States choosing to participate in the EBU are excluded from “the key 
formal decision-making forum.”640 Non-representation effectively creates what is considered 
second-class membership, in the view of most NoPS.641 Some see it as being placed in the 
position of policy takers rather than policy makers – an issue which partly cooled down even 
                                                 
637 Art.19(3) SSMR 
638 Art.24(5) SSMR 
639 Art.7(8) SSMR  
640 E Ferran, European Banking Union and the EU Single Financial Market: More Differentiated 
Integration, or Disintegration?, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No.29 2014, p.16 
641 A Spendzharova, I Bayram, Banking union through the back door? How European banking union affects 
Sweden and the Baltic States, West European Politics, 39:3 2016, p.565 
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the initial Romanian enthusiasm.642 This problem should be seen in the light of other 
concerns, such as being outvoted in the SSM decision-making framework, including the 
Supervisory Board, by the EMU majority.643  
Moreover, Sweden expressed the opinion - shared by other NoPS, academic 
commentators and discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 above - that the Supervisory Board 
of the SSM is ultimately subordinate to the ECB’s Governing Council and that this sort of 
relationship ultimately makes participation unacceptable.644 On top of that, while the 
presence of the NCAs on the supervisory board is a step forward, this change was reportedly 
diluted by the ECB’s ability to influence the status and role given to the NCAs.645 
The changes made moving from the SSMR Proposals onto the final text indicate 
considerable attempts to soften the problem within existing legal limits and structures. The 
SSMR obliges the Governing Council of the ECB to invite the representatives from non-
EMU  States whenever it is contemplated by the Governing Council to object to a draft 
decision prepared by the Supervisory Board or whenever the concerned NCA formally 
disagrees with a draft decision of the Supervisory Board.646 However, as I have discussed in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis, after the GFC, banking regulators have become wary of any kind of 
advisory roles and view such mode of participation with scepticism.  
 
4. Termination  
The procedure for termination and, most importantly, the variety of events which could 
trigger such procedure, also deeply concern the NoPS. The problems are generally linked to 
involvement of the Governing Council and additional differentiation between the CCA States 
and the EMU States. Under Arts.7(7)-(8) SSMR, the ultimate recourse the CCA State has is 
the termination of the CCA. Moreover, the ECB can also trigger termination. The option to 
terminate the agreement by a CCA State was a major change from the initial proposals, 
which did not explicitly allow it, and was mostly introduced as an attempt to make the CCA 
more palatable to the NoPS. There are four principal ways in which termination can occur.  
Firstly, the CCA signatory State can simply choose to terminate the CCA. Under 
Art.7(6) SSMR the State can request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation at any time 
                                                 
642 OM Georgescu, Romania in the Banking Union: Why the international supervision of cross-border banking 
is necessary, CRPE, 2015, p.6 
643 Spendzharova and Bayram, 2016, p.566 
644 Ibid, p.573 
645 E Chiti, F Recine, The Single Supervisory Mechanism in Action: Institutional Adjustment and the 
Reinforcement of the ECB Position, European Public Law, Volume 24:1 2018, p.124 
646 Arts.6-7, Rec.72 SSMR 
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after three years of participation. The ECB is then obliged to immediately proceed to adopt a 
decision terminating the close cooperation and indicate the date from which it applies, within 
a maximum period of three months. This is in many ways unprecedented, as for the first time 
the in the history of European integration a country can simply quit (at least institutionally) 
one of the European ‘unions’. This can be contrasted with the difficulties of leaving the 
EMU, Schengen or the Single Market. As Speyer observed, while this may make 
participation more palatable to the NoPS, “it sets a dangerous precedent – all the more so in 
an area, viz. financial supervision, where reliable and lasting structures are important for 
building confidence.”647  Legal certainty and security of expectations are the obvious victims, 
as yet another aspect of dynamic differentiated integration is given precedent. Notably, due to 
specific circumstances, the termination safeguards are not meant to be construed as a 
precedent for other areas of Union policy.648 It can be recalled, however, that monetary policy 
differentiation was not meant to be construed as precedent for financial regulation either.  
Secondly, termination is also an option for the States in case of a really strong 
disagreement with the ECB. Under Art.7(8), if a participating State disagrees with a draft 
decision of the Supervisory Board, it informs the Governing Council within five working 
days. The Governing Council, after five working day considerations, responds to the State. 
The State can request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation with immediate effect and 
will not be bound by the ensuing decision.649 That is effectively the only ‘guaranteed’ way to 
avoid the implementation of the contested decision. The SSMR does not provide judicial 
review procedure for such decisions, but a mediation panel, discussed Subsection 6, is 
established in an attempt to heal potential rifts. Making termination the ultimate remedy 
arguably makes the arrangement more tolerable to the potential CCA States, but also 
increases the aforementioned risk of dynamic differentiated integration. Stipulating a direct 
route to judicial review in the SSM legislation could guarantee a greater degree of stability, 
but it also could – admittedly - prolong the procedures where timely decisions are imperative.  
The third situation where the termination of a CCA can occur, detailed by Art.7(7) 
SSMR, arises from an objection of the Governing Council to a draft decision of the 
Supervisory Board. From the NoPSs’ perspective – a situation where the ECB effectively 
disagrees with itself. The Supervisory Board and the State in question can formally disagree 
with the Governing Council’s objection. Where the Governing Council confirms its 
                                                 
647 B Speyer, EU Banking Union: Right idea, poor execution, Deutsche Bank, 2013, p.9 
648 Rec.43 SSMR 
649 On decision making and power balance see Chapter 5 
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objection, the participating State can notify the ECB that it will not be bound by the potential 
decision related to a possible amended draft decision by the Supervisory Board. The ECB 
then can consider the possible suspension or termination of the CCA, taking into account 
considerations like integrity of the SSM, consequences relating to the fiscal responsibilities of 
the State, whether or not it is satisfied that the NCA concerned has adopted measures which 
ensure that the playing field remains level between Member States, and that the national 
regime complies with EU law.  
Fourthly, a non-Eurozone Member State can also be forced out of the institutional 
components of the EBU by the ECB. The most politically problematic (and conceptually 
peculiar) aspect is that the ‘punishment’ for non-compliance on the part of the CCA State or 
its NCA is also termination. Under Art.7(4) SSMR the ECB can “address instructions” to an 
NCA, specifying the relevant timeframe of no less than 48 hours, unless earlier action is 
deemed necessary,650 to take actions relating to SSMR Arts.4-5 tasks. Failure to comply, can 
lead to a warning that the close cooperation will be suspended or terminated in the absence of 
a corrective act. 
In addition to their individual shortcomings, all of these arrangements suffer from a 
couple of overriding flaws. Firstly, the Governing Council is involved in all three situations 
where the CCA is terminated due to disagreement. That effectively highlights all the 
representation issues, discussed in Subsection 3 above. Secondly, there is no termination 
procedure for Eurozone States, and thus no ultimate punishment of this type for non-
compliance. This further deepens the division between the EMU and non-EMU States, 
fulfilling the prophecies of the path-dependency hypothesis, discussed in Chapter 1. 
Moreover, the existence of the (effectively) termination-as-punishment clauses, defeats the 
whole point of introducing this questionable system of flexible membership in the first place 
– namely to encourage the NoPS to participate. The temporary nature of the arrangement and 
the prospect of termination through factors partly beyond the States’ control, coupled with 
the status of the Governing Council as the ultimate decision-maker, are an unappealing 
combination.  
While the reputation damage done by not joining the CCA might exist, it is relatively 
small compared to the damage done by termination. Not to mention the costs of all the 
arrangements for participation, which could turn out to be in vain because of one 
disagreement, relating to (possibly) one individual institution, in a matter of weeks. Although 
                                                 
650 If earlier adoption is indispensable to prevent “irreparable damage” 
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the SSMR leaves the re-joining opportunity, it is clear that virtually no Member State would 
do that. Especially since a State, which has terminated the close cooperation with the ECB is 
barred from entering into a new close cooperation for three years.651 This applies regardless 
of who initiates the termination.  While such limitation appears reasonable from the 
operational standpoint, as a short ‘break’ period would encourage States to quit and re-join in 
order to avoid individual decisions, thus aggravating network instability, it also effectively 
eliminates any practical possibility of the State in question re-joining.  
 
5. Termination and the SRM 
Moreover, further complications and costs come into consideration due to the 
symbiosis between the SSM and the SRM. As a form of a ‘guillotine clause’, withdrawal 
from the SSM also terminates the participation in the SRM and vice versa.652 Such step 
would automatically terminate participation in the SRF. A ‘refund’ sum called recoupment 
would then be repaid to the NoPS in question.653 The SRB and the withdrawing State would 
then need to ensure sufficient sum is retained for national resolution arrangements, taking 
into account a variety of factors including voluntary or non-voluntary termination of the CCA 
and national economic cycles.654 At the time of writing there is no stipulation or guidance as 
to what would happen if the withdrawing state was a Eurozone country leaving the Eurozone 
or the EU altogether via Art. 50 TFEU. It could be assumed that a similar recoupment 
arrangement would apply, subject to broader withdrawal negotiations, similar to Brexit. 
However, the absence for such arrangement for EMU States once again indicates a 
distinction between the EMU and non-EMU States, as well as the fragility of the CCA as an 
instrument.  
In case of the CCA State withdrawing, the national resolution fund would need to be 
reinstated and the relevant institutional structures recreated. This would come on top of the 
added costs of the sudden need to strengthen national resolution authorities, which might 
become weaker (or at least have to alter their mode of operation) during participation. Due to 
increased likelihood of withdrawal the NoPSs might need to retain the existing structures and 
keep smaller additional funds for the situations where the SRF funds are insufficient or 
recoupment delays occur. Under Art.4(3) SRMR, the decision on recoupment can take up to 
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652 The participating non-Eurozone countries can withdraw from the SRM under Art.4 SRMR. 
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three months, with possible further delays. As the last paragraph of Art.4(3) seems to 
indicate, there is no precise deadline and the only stipulation as to the recoupment schedule is 
that it has to be a “limited period commensurate to the duration of the close cooperation.”  
Effectively, the States in close cooperation might have to hold more funds or spend 
more on resolution infrastructure per 1 euro of covered deposits than their Eurozone 
counterparts, if they wish to keep the termination option in Art.7(6) SSMR open. Such added 
costs could be tolerable, since for that cost the CCA State ‘purchases’ the option of 
termination, which is unavailable to EMU States. However, the ability of the ECB to 
terminate the CCA, puts the CCA States in a position of significant net disadvantage. This, in 
and of itself, is not an appealing prospect, especially for those NoPS which do not have plans 
to join the EMU at a later date.  
These problems are further aggravated by the fact that non-EMU States do not 
participate in the ESM, so their financial firewall is weaker. As I have discussed in Chapter 2, 
the SRF might not always be sufficient to halt a systemic crisis, and ESM funding would 
really come in handy in such cases. The SRF was largely designed with additional backstop 
(ESM) in mind, and such thinking did not extend to the non-EMU States. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the use of the SRF for problem situations that do not amount to a crisis is also 
restricted. Moreover, the funds available to individual States are also limited, and some 
NoPS, especially those which are hosts to larger international banking groups, like 
Hungary,655 have expressed concerns about the limits of the maximum help they could 
receive.656  
Most importantly, many NoPS are particularly unhappy with the possibility of using 
their funds to bail-out other countries’ banks, especially those with limited exposure to their 
own. I will return to this in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. Given the increased possibility of 
termination, some non-EMU States might end up in a situation where they bail out other 
States’ banks, but have to leave the SRF before their banks can use it. In summary, the added 
organisational and monetary costs of the withdrawal from the SRF make the CCA even less 
attractive to the NoPS.  
 
6. The safeguards protecting the interests of the CCA States (and their 
flaws) 
                                                 
655 Discussed in detail in Chapter 5  
656 K Kisgergely, A Szombati, Banking union through Hungarian eyes – the MNB’s assessment of a possible 
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It should be noted, that many of the scenarios described in the preceding subsections 
are the worst case scenarios. In all likelihood most disagreements will be solved without 
resorting to extremes. The extreme safeguards, in particular the termination of close 
cooperation, are expected to be used in justified and exceptional cases.657 However, the less 
extreme arrangements also have their fair share of flaws. This subsection highlights the most 
important concessions made in order to appease the NoPS and indicates why they failed to 
alleviate the concerns of all five of the EMU-sceptic NoPS.  
 
a) Representation in the Supervisory and Resolution Boards  
Firstly, as mentioned, the CCA States were given full representation in the ECB 
Supervisory Board. While not a safeguard per se, it is a concession, giving the CCA States 
equal say on the majority of decisions. This was mirrored by the SRM arrangement, by which 
the CCA States will each delegate a member of the SRB under Art.43(1) SRMR.658 While the 
SRB is an EU agency and its membership is (in principle) not restricted,659 adding the CCA 
States to the ECB’s Supervisory Board was an unprecedented move, which should not be 
understated. For the first time, non-Eurozone states were given equal say in a major ECB 
decision-making organ. This change had the promise of a major paradigm shift, as the ECB 
was primarily built for the Eurozone. Unfortunately, even in this structure, we can see the 
legacy of the ‘EMU-first’ orientation. For example, a somewhat unexpected constitutional 
problem arose in relation to the position of the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board. 
Art.139(2)(h) TFEU, excludes non-Eurozone States from participating in the appointment of 
the ECB’s Executive Board. That could effectively reduce their influence in the Supervisory 
Board, as its Vice Chair is chosen exclusively from the members of the Executive Board. 
While this might not be a major issue, any instance where the legal arrangements privilege 
the EMU States over the CCA States confirms the perception of inequality. Notably, partly 
for this reason, the position of the Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board has been kept vacant 
for a number of years and remains vacant at the time of writing. This indicates some 
deference, shown to the current and potential CCA States.  
The most important concern is, as mentioned, that the Governing Council is superior to 
the Supervisory Board. This is evident from a number of provisions.660 Since the Governing 
                                                 
657 SSMR Rec.43  
658 Following the same conditions as appointees of the Eurozone States under Art.56 SRMR 
659 Due to different constitutional basis, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
660 E.g. SSMR Art.7, Art.19(3), Art.24(7), etc.  
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Council retains the ability to override the Supervisory Board decisions, the caution of the 
NoPS is understandable.  
 
b) Mediation Panel  
As part of the attempts to alleviate such concerns, a number of balancing arrangements 
were introduced. One of such arrangements was the creation of the mediation panel. This 
panel resolves differences of views regarding an objection of the Governing Council to a 
draft decision by the Supervisory Board. The panel – importantly - ensures equal 
representation and includes one member per participating State  (including CCA) chosen by 
each State from among the members of the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board.661  
It decides by simple majority voting. While the creation of such panel is a welcome step, 
which reduces the likelihood of termination of CCAs due to the Governing Council 
disagreeing with the Supervisory Board, the limitation of the Panel’s capacity to Supervisory 
Board and Governing Council conflicts in unfortunate. An opportunity for the States 
concerned (or their NCAs) to address their own objections to this panel would be welcomed 
by the NoPS. The downside of such arrangement would obviously be the resulting sacrifices 
in decision-making efficiency. Part of the reason for not extending the use of the Panel for a 
broader spectrum of conflicts was also the existence of the review procedure, available via 
the Administrative Board of Review.  
c) Administrative Board of Review 
Unlike the Mediation Panel, the Administrative Board of Review (ABR) allows 
challenges from a range of interested parties, including natural and legal persons.662 While 
this was generally perceived positively by the NoPS, the ABR is not an optimal organ to give 
voice to the non-Eurozone States or their banks either. Under Art.24(4) SSMR the members 
of the ABR are supposed to act independently of any national interest. In other words, even if 
a citizen of one of the current NoPS is appointed onto the ABR, they would be prohibited 
from advancing the interests of their home State or its credit institutions. Moreover, the ABR 
is not an easy place to bring up concerns with, since a natural or legal person seeking to 
challenge a decision would need to show direct and individual concern, unless they are the 
addressee of that decision.663 The direct and individual concern doctrine has been borrowed 
from the EU procedures for the action of annulment, despite being heavily criticised in that 
                                                 
661 Art.25(5) SSMR 
662 Art.24 SSMR 
663 Art.24(5) SSMR  
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field as an impractically high standard.664 It is hard to find justifications for such choice, 
especially since the acts of the ECB within the SSM are  - by their nature – non-legislative, 
and thus even in the field of annulment actions (post-Lisbon) would only require proof of 
direct concern.665 Even for the NCAs the path to a successful challenge is not easy, as the 
decisions of the Governing Council cannot be challenged in front of the ABR.666 The 
Governing Council is even explicitly granted greater appellate powers.667 
 
d) Safeguards tainted by the Governing Council issue.  
NoPS’ concerns with the Governing Council representativeness were among the 
reasons why the supervisory and monetary capacities of this organ needed to be separated. 
Under Art.25(4) SSMR the Governing Council’s meetings and agendas are different for each 
of the capacities. While this has some potential to alleviate concerns of at least those NoPS 
that will adopt the Euro in the future, such arrangement has notable shortcomings. It presents 
a twofold problem discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 above: on the one hand, such 
separation might not be optimal from the operational standpoint, on the other – it is difficult 
to ensure absolute separation with the same personnel sitting in a similar setting, often in the 
exact same room. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, despite this separation, the NoPS generally 
perceive the Governing Council as a single body, with a resultantly deeper interest in the 
affairs and wellbeing of the Eurozone States than those of the NoPS. Generally, all of the 
arrangements of the supervisory structure, including the ones designed with the CCA in 
mind, are in some way subjected to (arguably disproportionate) influence of the Governing 
Council. The Governing Council can (effectively) initiate termination of the CCA, impact the 
decisions of the Supervisory Board, and even influence the triggering of a bank resolution via 
the SRM.  
                                                 
664 See A Albors-Llorens, Standing of private parties to challenge community measures: Has the European 
court missed the boat, The Cambridge Law Journal, Volume 62 Issue 1, 2003; A Kornezov, Shaping the New 
Architecture of the EU System of Remedies: comment on Inuit, European Law Review 39(2), 2014; R Schütze, 
European Union Law, Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp.355-374 
665 Art.263 TFEU 
666 SSMR Art.24(5) 
667 SSMR Art.24(8) 
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Moreover, it has a privileged 
standing in front of the Administrative 
Board of Review, while its decisions are 
immune from the scrutiny of this body. If 
needed, the Governing Council could also 
completely disregard the Mediation Panel. 
Effectively, all of the safeguards 
introduced to protect the CCA States 
from disproportionate Governing Council influence are designed in a way that the Governing 
Council, or the EMU States represented on it, have disproportionate influence in the 
mechanisms facilitating such safeguards. That has locked the CCA arrangement safeguards in 
a sort of ouroboros situation. This comes in addition to the fact that the CCA States are a 
minority group in the SSM and SRM, so their (already limited) influence in the Supervisory 
Board would be limited even further, especially if we considered EMU and non-EMU States 
as separate interest groups. The NoPS are also aware that the number of CCA States will 
always remain very small, in all likelihood limited to 3-6 States, due to planned EMU 
accessions of Bulgaria and Croatia and (seemingly) permanent EBU derogation of Sweden. 
Unsurprisingly, none of the NoPS have been persuaded by the effectiveness of the 





C. Memoranda of understanding 
 
Given the Treaty restrictions on CCA State participation in the Governing Council, 
infectiveness of the safeguards against the detrimental effects of such situation, and the 
fragility of CCA arrangement, it was foreseeable that at least some Member States would 
refuse to join the SSM and SRM. After the UK and Sweden refused to sign the SRF Treaty, it 
was clear that the largest EU banking centres outside Eurozone – London and Stockholm – 
would remain outside. The (now) largest non-Eurozone Member State – Poland – took a 
similar position. For this reason, the SSMR envisaged the use of memoranda of 
understanding as a tool to mend the gaps in supervision and build some bridges between the 
participating States and the NoPS. In this section I will discuss the origin and legal status of 
Fig. 3.1 Applied and modified, original design by an 
unknown artist  
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the memoranda, circumstances under which the ECB is obliged adopt them, and assess the 
effectiveness of these soft-law instruments.  
 
1. Purposes and types of the memoranda of understanding  
Memoranda of understanding and similar arrangements, in essence, are not a new 
feature in the governance of European banking regulation. For example, in 2005 a 
Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation between the Banking Supervisors, Central 
Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union in Financial Crisis situations was 
entered into, as discussed in Chapter 1. The pre-crisis documents were, notably, very 
different from the ones used in furtherance of the goals of the SSM and SRM. Normally they 
were not public and lacked enforceability in some of the multitude of relevant 
jurisdictions.668 The SSMR style memoranda are - at least - public and open, made available 
to the European Parliament, to the Council and to Member State NCAs.669 While they still 
lack binding power, more political weight has been placed behind them.  
Since the SSM’s launch we have witnessed the memoranda appear in a variety of 
shapes, as their intended purposes mutated. More NoPS were originally expected to 
participate in the SSM by entering into the CCA with the ECB. However, as the CCA proved 
unpopular, the memoranda of understanding, originally envisaged as a temporary transition 
tools, now serve as primary documents stipulating the relationship between the ECB and the 
NCAs. The memoranda, inter alia, clarify the consultation relating to decisions of the ECB 
having effect on subsidiaries or branches established in the NoPS, whose parent undertaking 
is established in a participating State, and the cooperation in emergency situations, including 
early warning mechanisms.670 They are flexible instruments, which can be reviewed on a 
regular basis.671  
The SSMR memoranda have a broader geographical reach than the CCA and thus often 
apply to EEA/EFTA states, like Norway or Switzerland, as well as third countries.672 They 
can also have regional coverage, especially in cases of integrated regional markets, like the 
memorandum of understanding between the ECB and the Nordic states.673 These are 
                                                 
668 As the EBC admitted, Press release 18/05/2005 
669 Art.3(1) SSMR 
670 Rec.14), Art.3(1) SSMR 
671 Ibid.  
672 A third country is defined in Art.2(27) SSMFR as a country which is neither an EU Member State nor an 
EEA State 
673 Memorandum of Understanding Between Finansinspektionen (Sweden), Finanstilsynet (Norway), 
Finanstilsynet (Denmark), Finanssivalvonta (Finland) and The ECB, on prudential supervision of significant 
branches in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland, 2/12/2016 
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primarily used to make arrangements for dealing with the complex banking structures, 
strengthen working relationships, and can take a variety of mixed forms involving the NoPS, 
the ECB674  and third countries’ authorities.675  
As Schuster et al observed, due to the global nature of banking activities, the 
supervision of EU credit institutions increasingly requires a network of cooperation with the 
supervisory authorities of third countries outside the EU.676  Even though the ECB, as a new 
supervisory authority, was originally facing the challenge of not having such a network in 
place,677 or rather not having one that would cover the ‘edges’ of its domain fully, this aspect 
seems to have been handled adequately, partly since the ECB inherited much of the pre-
existing arrangements, as discussed in the next subsection. The international network of 
cooperation that the ECB has established is at the very least on par with those of most EU 
NCAs. The SSMR also expanded ECB’s international relations powers, but only to a limited 
extent. Under Art.8 the ECB can develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements 
with supervisory authorities, international organisations and the administrations of third 
countries, subject to appropriate coordination with EBA. Notably, in most cases the ECB is 
not obliged to do so, and neither are these third-country bodies.  
Memoranda of understanding can also be seen as a clarification tool within the SSM 
area, where the ECB’s SSMR mandate cannot reach. For example, as Moloney observed, the 
inherent network instability in the SSM can be aggravated by the limitation of the ECB’s 
powers, where conduct supervision and prudential supervision intersect with respect to risk 
and stability supervision.678 She sees Art.3(1) SSMR provisions on the ECB’s cooperation 
with NCAs responsible for markets in financial instruments and related memoranda of 
understanding as a partial remedy for such issues.679 In such cases the ECB enters into 
memoranda with NCAs responsible for markets in financial instruments, describing how they 
will cooperate in the performance of their supervisory tasks. Importantly, the EBU 
memoranda often co-exist in parallel with the inter-NCA cooperation and regional 
memoranda, which can involve NCAs from third countries.  
 
                                                 
674 See Rec.14 and Art.3(6) SSMR 
675 Art.8 SSMR 
676 G Schuster, K Lackhoff, M Benzing, DA Bauer, The SSM Framework Regulation Part 2: Administrative 
procedure, legal remedies and transitional provisions, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2014, pp.8-9 
677 Ibid.  
678 N Moloney, European Banking Union: assessing its risks and resilience, Common Market Law Review, 
Vol.51, Issue 6, 2014, p.1647  
679 Ibid. and Rec.33 SSMR 
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2. Obligatory memoranda  
The primary purpose of the memoranda in the SSM context is nevertheless the 
cooperation between the ECB and the NCAs. Such memoranda are expected to describe the 
terms of cooperation between the NCAs and the ECB in performance of their supervisory 
tasks under EU law. The SSMR presents two cases where the ECB is obliged to have 
memoranda-based arrangements in place.  
The first instance is where the SSMR Art.3(6) requires the ECB to conclude a 
memorandum with the competent authority of each NoPS which is home to a ‘global 
systemically important institution.’ This is the only instance where the term ‘systemically 
significant’ is still used in the SSMR, although the word ‘systemic’ was emitted from the rest 
of the SSM Regulation moving from the proposals, despite the presence of this term in CRR 
and CRD IV, where ‘significant’ and ‘systemic’ institutions are defined for the purposes of 
EU law.680  
This has implications for the memoranda. When determining which country to sign the 
memorandum with, the ECB consequently does not have to follow the Art.6(4) SSMR 
significance criteria. Rather, it is only obliged to aim at countries with significant institutions  
under Art.441 CRR681, which are identified as globally significant in accordance with Art.131 
of Directive 2013/36/EU. This identification methodology is different from the criteria used 
to designate an institution as significant under Art.6(4) SSMR. For example, criteria like 
“substitutability of the services or of the financial infra structure provided by the group” or 
“interconnectedness of the group with the financial system” are not present in SSMR, while 
simply being the largest institution in the country does not make an institution systemically 
significant under Directive 2013/36/EU.  
The Directive 2013/36/EU checklist has been followed in all memoranda to date. It is 
somewhat peculiar that in this specific instance the SSMR does not use its own methodology. 
This differentiation, notably, helps avoid exclusions on technical or vestigial basis, creating a 
more straightforward system. This impression is strengthened by the fact that the ECB-NoPS 
memoranda diligently observe the principle of proportionality, with participants agreeing that 
the highest level of cooperation should apply to the largest branches.682  
                                                 
680 The reason why the term ‘significant’ was preferred over ‘systemic’, was that the Council and the 
Commission wanted to make sure that all Eurozone state would have some banks falling under the supervision 
of the ECB, thus minimising the likelihood of domestic or regional crises. It is questionable whether this logic 
needed to be dropped for memoranda requirements, however.  
681 Regulation No 575/2013  
682 See for example Memorandum of Understanding on prudential supervision of significant branches in 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland, 2/12/2016, III (12) 
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The second type of obligatory memoranda are the ones predating the SSM, that the 
ECB ‘inherited’. Pre-existing memoranda of understanding and cooperation arrangements 
with other authorities entered into by an EBU NCA prior to 4 November 2014, that cover 
tasks transferred to the ECB by the SSMR, continue to apply.683 The ECB participates in such 
existing arrangements in place or alongside the home NCA. The ECB, notably, does not 
automatically become a signatory to memoranda established after the launch of the SSM, and 
entered into by the NCAs on non-EBU/EBA basis.   
 
3. Effectiveness of the memoranda  
The main reason for discussing the memoranda in this context is the assessment of their 
capacity to mend the gaps between the SSM/SRM and the NoPS. There are multiple reasons 
why, for all their merits, the memoranda envisaged by the EBU legislation are unlikely to 
meaningfully contribute to the attainment of that goal. 
Firstly, the EBU memoranda often do not do anything that was not previously done (or 
could be done), by the signatories themselves. It is worth contrasting the ECB-Nordics 
memorandum,682 with a separate Nordic-Baltic memorandum, which is not directly based on 
EU legislative provisions.684 Coming into force two weeks after its ECB-signed predecessor, 
the Nordic-Baltic memorandum has significantly broader geographical scope and reflects the 
banking market reality better. The differences between the two documents are significant. 
The ECB memorandum is mostly concerned with information exchange and transparency, 
whereas the Nordic-Baltic memorandum has provisions relating to supervision, resolution 
and recovery. The Nordic-Baltic memorandum discusses actual semi-institutional and inter-
institutional structures employed for the purposes of attaining the memorandum’s goals, and 
despite still being a soft-law instrument, resembles binding agreements. The ECB 
memorandum, by contrast, is very limited and abstract. Notably, the SSM memoranda, like 
the Nordic-ECB one, also recognise the interconnectedness in regional markets, effectively 
recognising that arrangements with individual states in this context might not have the 
intended effect. The Memorandum covers non-EU (EEA) Norway, two EU NoPS - Sweden 
and Denmark – as well as one EMU member - Finland. Such formal recognition of integrated 
banking markets existing across various European memberships is significant. However, it 
left out the Baltic States and Iceland, which needed to be rectified by the States immediately, 
                                                 
683 Art.152 SSMFR 
684 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation regarding Banks with Cross-Border Establishments between 
the Central Banks of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden, 15/12/2016  
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in their own Nordic-Baltic memorandum not involving the ECB.  
Secondly, the memoranda are not (and cannot be) legally binding and do not give rise 
to liability, as stipulated by the SSMR and their own texts.685 This limits the effect of the 
SSM memoranda even further, especially when dealing with third countries. Such 
memoranda, as well as any other arrangements, also cannot create legal obligations in respect 
of the EU and its States.686 Under SSMFR Art.2(27) a third country is any country which is 
neither an EU State nor an EEA State. The list of third countries notably includes 
Switzerland, Russia and the UK, which have significant impact on European finances. 
Although there are no restrictions for legally binding arrangements being created by the third 
countries in favour of the ECB, without reciprocity such arrangements remain unlikely.  
It is reasonable to question whether documents which are not legally binding and 
cannot create obligations have any tangible value. Furthermore, (assuming that they do have 
some value) there is a strong possibility that much of that value would be lost in crisis 
situations. In the context of the fiscal backstop debate, Schoenmaker described non-binging 
memoranda of understanding  as “paying lip service to international cooperation.”687 In the 
light of the ineffectiveness of pre-GFC soft-law measures, memoranda of understanding can 
at best be seen as a placeholder in the absence CCAs and bilateral agreements with third 
parties. At worst – a poorly designed smokescreen, put in place to create the illusion of 
formal arrangements. Even in the presence of political will at the time of signing the 
memoranda, they provide a ‘decoy’ solution to the Financial Stability Trilemma. 
Schoenmaker described this process as “starting […] from the wrong side. [since] it assumes 
that what is needed is to make sure that supervisors can cooperate (by harmonising rules and 
agreeing on protocols), but it does nothing to assure that they will cooperate.”688   
 
D. Colleges of supervisors 
 
One of the ways to create channels for supervisors to cooperate is to create collegiate 
structures dedicated to a particular banking group or geographical region. That makes 
                                                 
685 Memorandum of Understanding on prudential supervision of significant branches in Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark and Finland, 2/12/2016, III (13)  
686 Art.8 SSMR, with additional limitations reading: “Without prejudice to the respective competences of the 
Member States and institutions and bodies of the Union, other than the ECB, including EBA, in relation to the 
tasks conferred on the ECB by the SSMR.” 
687 D Schoenmaker, Banking Supervision and Resolution: The European Dimension, Law and Financial Markets 
Review Vol.6 2012, p.2 
688 Ibid. p.6 
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colleges of supervisors one of the options for mending the gaps in European banking 
supervision, since they can - unlike the ECB, NCAs or even the EBA - transcend 
jurisdictional boundaries. In the presence of strong will and cooperative spirit among the 
participating authorities, the colleges can reduce the opportunities for a particular group to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage, encourage exchange of information, facilitate convergence of 
practices, and increase preparedness for emergency situations. Importantly, supervisory 
colleges exist in parallel (or as the case may be – symbiosis) with resolution colleges. 
Resolution colleges play an important role in bank resolution arrangements and exercise a set 
of binding powers. While supervisory colleges do not have such powers, they can help 
smooth functioning of resolution colleges by encouraging cooperation and information 
exchange, as well as strengthening ties between the NCAs and NRAs from different 
countries.  
In this section I will discuss several types of supervisory colleges, and assess their 
effectiveness in mending the gap between the participating states and the NoPS. Detailed 
discussion of resolution colleges is beyond the scope of this thesis, and they will only be 
discussed here for contextual and comparative purposes. Subsection 1 introduces the 
functions and varied origins of the colleges. Subsection 2 discusses the changes introduced 
by the EBU to their structures. Subsection 3 explains why, despite notable merits and 




1. Shared characteristics and different origins of the colleges  
Generally, colleges of supervisors are inter-institutional international structures, 
through which supervisory or resolution activities are coordinated in the absence of, or in 
supplement to, other arrangements.689  Both supervisory and resolution colleges facilitate 
cooperation between authorities dealing with a particular banking group. Supervisory 
colleges can also operate across an integrated international banking market, on the basis of 
regional cooperation, like the Nordics and Baltics, or Visegrad 4. Most supervisory colleges 
share two at first sight conflicting characteristics: permanence and structural flexibility. Such 
flexibility allows them to transcend jurisdictional boundaries, and encompass non-EU NCAs. 
Colleges mostly facilitate exchange of information, planning and joint or coordinated 
                                                 
689 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Revised good practice principles for supervisory colleges, 
18/04/2014, p.1 
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performance of supervision. That can include all aspects of on-going supervision, including 
the preparation for and the handling of emergency situations.690 
According to Basel Committee, the main objective of colleges is to help the NCAs in 
developing better understanding of the risk profile and vulnerabilities of credit institution 
groups.691 The structure of the colleges based on these arrangements reflects the activities of 
the supervised entity. Some consist of two authorities, whereas others comprise a couple 
dozen authorities from multiple jurisdictions. The frequency and intensity of college 
activities, as well as interconnectedness between participating NCAs, can also differ 
significantly.692  
Historically speaking, colleges of supervisors are not a creation of the EBU and many 
of well established colleges predate it. A good example of a supervisory college which, while 
(like most) created for a particular banking group, grew to play a role in deepening regional 
supervisory integration is the Nordic-Baltic college for Nordea, which was one of the factors 
leading to the Memorandum of Understanding on the management of a financial crisis with 
cross-border establishments signed by the NBR states in 2003. The regional integration 
deepened, and similar colleges were established for other major groups like SEB, Danske, 
and Swedbank. Well-integrated supervisory colleges also played a role in allowing the home 
(primarily Nordic) regulators to gain some decision-making power vis-à-vis host regulators in 
the Baltic states, thus facilitating supervisory convergence.693 Notably, such influence was 
not always welcomed in the Baltic States, which saw EBU membership as a means to 
reducing it. I will return to the intricate network of supervision in this region in the next 
Chapter.  
With that being said, although collegiate structures are not a new development, 
significantly more emphasis has been put on their role after the GFC. In the current era of 
European banking oversight colleges can be created in three main ways: by the EBA, by the 
ECB/SSM, and the NCAs themselves, but the EBU has had an impact on all three types of 
colleges.  
 
2. Colleges created or altered by the EBU  
Currently, regional and institution-specific colleges coexist across the continent. As 
                                                 
690 Ibid.  
691 Ibid. p.4 
692 Ibid.  
693 A Spendzharova, I Bayram, Banking union through the back door? How European banking union affects 
Sweden and the Baltic States, West European Politics, 39:3 2016, p.567 
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Carmassi et al argued, the establishment of the SSM presented the opportunity to turn them 
into effective supranational supervisory structures.694 The need to provide a pan-European 
blueprint for colleges arose since the level of collegiate coverage and intensity differed vastly 
between banking groups and regions. From the broader European viewpoint, effective 
collegiate cooperation was generally lacking. The consolidated basis of supervision with the 
colleges being involved was already envisaged in the Commission proposal for the SSM.695 
Notably, the EBU legislation does not see supervisory or resolution colleges as necessary for 
credit institutions concentrating their activities solely in the Eurozone (since that is the ECB 
and SRB’s domain) and predominantly envisage them as structures meant to manage home 
and host relations and resolution planning between the Eurozone and the NoPS or between 
the NoPS, with possible addition of other European jurisdictions. Under Art.9(2) SSMFR, 
where there is no pre-existing supervisory college, and a significant bank has branches in the 
NoPS that are classed as significant,696 the ECB establishes a college with the NCAs of the 
host States. Establishment of such colleges is an obligation of any EU NCA acting as the 
consolidating supervisor under Art.116(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU. In the cases where there 
is an existing college and the ECB acts as the consolidating supervisor, it chairs the college 
and sits on it as the main supervisor. The EBU NCAs whose responsibilities have been taken 
over by the ECB in such instances, participate in the college as observers.697 This notably 
constitutes a  degree of surrender of influence - or even a relegation for the NCAs - and many 
NoPS are not happy about it.  
Art.10 SSMFR outlines the procedures for the ECB and NCAs as members of a college 
of supervisors to allocate responsibilities if the consolidating supervisor is not in a 
participating State (NoPS NCA). The ECB and NCAs then participate in the college of 
supervisors in accordance with the following rules: 
(a) if the supervised entities in participating States are all significant supervised 
entities, the ECB participates as a member, while the NCAs participate as observers;  
(b) if the supervised entities in participating States are all less significant, the 
NCAs participate in the college as members;  
(c) if the supervised entities in participating States are both less significant and 
significant, the ECB and the NCAs participate in the college of supervisors as 
                                                 
694 J Carmassi, C Di Noia, S Micossi, Banking Union: A Federal Model for the European Union with Prompt 
Corrective Action, CEPS Policy Brief No.282, 2012, p.5 
695 Art.4(1) 
696 According to Art.51(1) Directive 2013/36/EU 
697 Art.9(1) SSMFR 
 168 
members. 
However, the NCAs of the participating States where the significant supervised entities are 
established can only participate in the college of supervisors as observers.  
Art.7 of EBA’s Regulatory and Implementing Technical Standards details the 
participation arrangements.698 Typically, the authority assuming the role of consolidating 
supervisor wields important powers. When deciding which authorities should participate in a 
particular college meeting or activity in accordance with Art.116(7) of Directive 2013/36/EU, 
the consolidating supervisor has to take into account the topics to be discussed and the 
objective of the meeting or activity, in particular with regard to their relevance for each group 
entity, the significance of the group entity in the State where the group entity is authorised or 
established, and its importance for the group. It is important to note that such provisions give 
a lot of power to the consolidating supervisor (which is often the ECB). The consolidating 
supervisor also participates in the selection of delegates participating in the college.699  The 
delegates have the power to commit their NCAs as members of the college to implement 
what the college decides. The consolidating supervisor can also invite the representatives of 
the supervised banking group itself to participate in a college meeting or activity, based on 




3. Why the colleges cannot bridge the gap  
Supervisory colleges clearly have their merits and uses. According to the Basel 
Committee, they facilitate ongoing relationships among supervisors, covering any cracks that 
might open in broader supervision systems.701 To that end colleges can include supervisors in 
non-EU countries, which in that sense makes their reach a lot broader than that of most other 
supervisory structures, including the SSM itself. 
However, the depth of what colleges can achieve is inherently limited for three main 
reasons: 
 a) they lack interest and capacity to act in the interest of the EU or the banking system 
as a whole,  
                                                 
698 EBA final draft regulatory and implementing technical standards on colleges of supervisors, 
EBA/RTS/2014/16  
699 Ibid.  
700 Ibid.  
701 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Revised good practice principles for supervisory colleges, 
18/04/2014, p.4 
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b) they lack uniformity to facilitate deeper convergence, 
c) they do not have sufficient legal capacity to effectively mend structural systemic 
gaps, such as the schism between the EMU States and the NoPS.  
 
a) Lack of broader interest in convergence 
Without direct linkages to macro-prudential structures, colleges typically lack direct 
interest in broader EU or European banking health. Such lack of pan-European interest is not 
surprising, given the nature of the colleges. As Schammo observed “unlike the ESAs, 
colleges are not subject to prescribed normative orientations such as to act in the EU 
interest.”702 Moreover, while colleges of non-EBU origin can have a broader spectrum of 
responsibilities, they have a narrow, group-specific, focus. In principle the colleges are 
designed to focus on a limited market participant group (or region), and instances where a 
college gives impetus to further cooperation, like in the mentioned Nordea’s case, are rare. 
As a consequence, the information available to the college neither reveals the full picture 
necessary to understand and monitor systemic threats, nor does it provide additional direct 
incentives to do so. 
To be sure, the involvement of the ECB can give the colleges greater awareness of 
systemic threats and, with the most influential supervisor having a (notably limited) degree of 
pan-European and single market interest, can tilt them towards greater convergence. The 
SSMR puts an obligation on the ECB to cooperate with the EBA, ESMA, EIOPA, ESRB, and 
other authorities, which form part of the ESFS, which collectively seek to ensure an adequate 
level of regulation and supervision in the EU as a whole.703 Where necessary, the ECB can 
utilise the memoranda of understanding with NCAs or EU bodies to strengthen such 
relationships. 
However, the ECB is just one of several participants in the college. The EBA can also 
play a role, as I will discuss in Section E, but its involvement also has limits. That does not 
alter the fundamental premise of collegiate cooperation. The colleges were created to mend 
individual gaps, not build entire bridges. While enhanced cooperation between supervisory 
authorities both at EU, EEA, and global level is seen as key to strengthening the supervision 
of cross-border banking groups, the colleges themselves are generally envisaged as 
                                                 
702 PJE Schammo, Home country control with consent: a new paradigm for ensuring trust and cooperation in 
the internal market?, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol.15, 2013, p.480 
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additional monitoring mechanisms.704 Colleges, both resolution and supervisory, have a set 
of concrete functions, like reaching joint decisions on the risk-based capital adequacy of 
cross-border groups and their EEA subsidiaries, exchange of information,705 and certainly 
have some level of interest in systemic stability. However, they do not owe a duty of care to 
safeguard the health of the financial system.  
 
b) Lack of uniformity and shared interest 
Most collegiate processes are based on written cooperation and coordination 
arrangements. Such arrangements differ college to college in respect to, for example, the list 
of invited observers and their rights. The blueprints provided by the EBA do not ensure that 
all colleges will behave or operate in the same way, not to mention that different standards 
apply to colleges established for different purposes. That does not seem to contribute to pan-
European harmonisation to an extent that could offset existing fragmentation.  
What is more, the NCAs participating in the colleges also differ among themselves. 
Particularly, they are subjected to the risks presented by divergence of practices between the 
EBU States and the NoPS. According to Baglioni, the divergence of supervisory practices is 
not only a problem for the SSM and the EBA, but also for the Colleges of Supervisors. 706   
 
As he expressed it, the colleges “are composed of members from the [NCAs] of 
countries where an international financial institution is located, and they have to reach an 
agreement about the application of prudential rules to such an institution, possibly with the 
mediation of the EBA. Of course, it is difficult to reach an agreement when the cross-country 
differences in supervisory practices are significant.”707 
 
While differences in supervisory practices and organisational structures are important 
in the times of relative stability, in the times of crisis they dwarf in comparison to another 
problem – national interests. In such situation the collegiate activities can even become 
counterproductive. In some cases, supervisory information sharing facilitated by a college 
and consequent early remedial action can further distress the banking group, for example if 
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the host NCAs chooses to ring-fence the branches and subsidiaries in their domain.708 
The SSM-based colleges tried to remedy that to some extent, but the resulting 
disproportionate amount of power given to the consolidating supervisor became a 
discouraging factor for the participation of some NoPS, the most powerful of which are not 
keen to surrender their college leadership positions to the ECB.  
Combined these factors create network instability, which in itself is a further 
disincentive for potential CCA States. As the SSM and SRM do not see the need for colleges 
overseeing the groups operating solely within their frameworks, the future CCA and/or EMU 
States might lack incentives to participate in the collegiate activities with full vigour, while 
awaiting accession. The remaining NoPS, in turn, might also be further discouraged from 
participating in the SSM/SRM, as they would lose a lot of the influence that they currently 
wield in the colleges. For example, should Denmark and Sweden join the EBU institutional 
components, the entire NBR market would fall within the ECB’s domain, and the influence 
that their NCAs now have in the NBR colleges would be lost.  
 
c) Lack of legal power 
In addition to lacking interest in pan-European regulatory harmonisation, the colleges 
also lack capacity to materially contribute to it. Carmassi et al. stated that prior to EBU, the 
colleges were “weak instruments in the hands of the parent company national supervisors” 
and provided “for limited exchange of information between the home-and host-country 
supervisors of the group.”709 While there were some notable exceptions to this tendency, even 
the well-organised NBR colleges did not prevent reckless lending and the resulting bubble in 
the run-up to the GFC, as I will discuss in Chapter 4.  
It could be argued that post-EBU colleges are stronger, but they still do not have ability 
to fully mend the gaps left open due to NoPS’ non-participation and systemic instability. 
Colleges have no legal personality and hence no legal capacity, like the ability to sue. “[N]or 
are they, for that matter, European bodies such as the ESAs,” as Schammo rightly 
observed.710 Consequently, they do not have any legal powers. A college derives its power 
directly from the participants, and therefore in that sense does not add any additional legal 
firepower to pan-European prudential supervision. This can also be contrasted with resolution 
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colleges, which can adopt binding decisions on a broad range of issues listed in the BRRD, 
including the valuation of solvency, removal of obstacles to an effective resolution, approval 
of resolution plans, and determination of loss-absorption capacity, etc.711 
It could be suggested that supervisory colleges could simply be given binding legal 
powers, a la resolution colleges. Early stages of the EBU featured calls for colleges to have 
“full powers to control and inspect all branches and subsidiaries of cross-border banking 
groups, thus […] making full use of existing supervisory structures.”712 However, without 
going into the specifics of why some of these powers could not be entrusted to the colleges, it 
can still be safely argued that they would not solve the main problems discussed in this thesis 
– differentiated integration and instability presented by non-participation. Giving supervisory 
colleges formal legal powers would fully chain them to the groups they would oversee, 
reducing regional and pan-European convergence opportunities, thus aggravating the 
uniformity and lack of pan-European interest concerns.713 Moreover, that would likely 
exclude non-EU jurisdictions. Even the cooperation with the NoPS would remain shaky and 
problematic, with limited improvements over the status quo.  
While supervisory colleges have their place and uses, and can avoid many of the 
jurisdictional obstacles affecting the SSM, they cannot, in any form allowed by the existing 






E. The European Banking Authority  
 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) has been discussed in a variety of contexts in 
this work already. In Chapter 2 I specifically addressed why it could not be placed at the 
centre of the SSM as the primary supervisor. A logical extension to that discussion is 
examining whether the EBA can help with building the bridges between the SSM and the 
NoPS. In this section, I will examine how the EBA helps bridging the gap between the 
participating and non-participating States, and also why it is not capable of doing that fully. 
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The section starts with a brief discussion of the most important differences between the EBA 
and the ECB, before assessing the EBA’s bridging potential in Subsection 2. Subsection 3 
discusses the voting mechanics and the efforts to give equal weight to the participating and 
non-participating States’ positions. Subsection 4 explores the fundamental legal and 
structural obstacles which prevent the EBA from being able to mend the gap between the 
NoPS and the participating States.  
 
1. EBA v ECB: different agendas and priorities  
As Lastra expressed it, “[t]he existence of two ‘banking authorities:’ EBA and ECB is a 
reflection of the co-existence of the Single Market and the Banking Union.”714 They have 
different jurisdictional domains but some of their needs and goals intersect.715 The crucial 
difference between the EBA and the ECB is that the EBA is angled towards the Single 
Market as a whole to a greater extent. This might not be immediately apparent, as the 
‘integrity of the single market’ rhetoric is also displayed throughout the legislation relating to 
the ECB. In the spirit of the TEU non-discrimination principle, the ECB is cautioned against 
discriminating against any Member State or group of States as venues for the provision of 
banking services, and has to carry out its duties with duty of care for “the unity and integrity 
of the internal market.”716 That is similar to the EBA Regulation stating that EBA must act 
“independently, objectively and in a non-discriminatory manner, in the interests of the Union 
as a whole.”717  
Despite similar rhetoric there is a material difference in how these principles apply. The 
ECB is believed to only be expected to act in the interest of the Single Market in its conduct, 
rather than take proactive steps in furtherance of such market.718  By contrast, the EBA is 
meant to act in the interests of the EU by actively striving to prevent regulatory arbitrage, 
promote equal conditions for competition, and provide a forum for all Member States. 719 The 
difference is evident from the tasks conferred upon the EBA, such as the duty to promote 
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pan-EU convergence of practices, particularly between the ECB and the NoPS NCAs.720  
Moloney attributes these differences between the EBA and the ECB to the ECB’s wider 
mandate, resulting in turn from its legal basis in the primary sources of EU law and 
consequent breadth of its objectives and activities, which can be contrasted with those of the 
EBA under Art.1(1) of the 2010 EBA Regulation, reflecting EBA’s status as an ESA.721 The 
fundamental principles of EBA’s behaviour, as Schammo observed, “reflect more deep-
rooted expectations about the behaviour of agencies.”722  
 
2. EBA’s bridging potential 
In the light of all the fragmentation issues arising due to limited scope of the SSM, the 
EBA could seem like the optimal institution to serve a unifying role. It ensures equal 
representation for the NCAs of all Member States, and in that sense is materially different 
from the ECB. According to Avgouleas and Arner, the EBA thus acts as a “hub and support 
network of EU and member state national bodies, safeguarding the stability of the financial 
system, the transparency of markets and financial products and the protection of depositors 
and investors.”723 Being one of the EU ESAs, it has greater powers than the colleges, while 
also enjoying greater geographical reach than the ECB. There are some compelling reasons to 
believe that the EBA could help bridge the gap between the Eurozone and the NoPS.  
Firstly, it is placed over the ECB, the colleges and the NoPS’s NCAs as the main – 
unifying - standard setter. As Schammo observed, because of the EBU/SSM amendments, the 
ECB is still subject to the authority of EBA.724  The EBA carries out its tasks, like its power 
to settle disagreements, with respect to the ECB “as in relation to the other competent 
authorities.”725  The ECB has to follow the Single Rulebook, as well as the EBA’s guidelines, 
as discussed in Chapter 2.726 So far the ECB has generally respected the EBA’s authority, 
complying with the technical standards and other guidance. Where there is margin for 
interpretation, the ECB reportedly tends to take a temporary position; once the EBA has 
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clarified the issue, the ECB observes such clarification.727   
Therefore, within the current institutional architecture, the EBU is best placed to ensure 
that the NoPS and the participating States remain on the same page rule-wise. Its standard 
setting powers have the ability to unite all supervisory systems, providing a harmonised 
baseline.  
Secondly, the EBA does a lot of work in coordinating supervisory colleges, giving it 
some (limited) power to steer them towards broader European goals. The EBA is responsible 
for drafting the mentioned regulatory and implementing technical standards, which specify 
conditions for the establishment and functioning of colleges, establish procedures for 
interactions between the consolidating supervisor and other competent authorities, and 
stipulate the minimum frequency for college meetings for colleges established under Art.116 
CRD, which normally meet annually.728 The EBA does not just lay down the standards for 
the colleges – it actively promotes and monitors effective and consistent functioning of 
them.729 In addition to setting the standards, this can be done through its own direct 
participation. Under Art.21(1) of Regulation (EU) 1093/2010, the EBA can participate in the 
activities of the colleges of supervisors, including on-site examinations, carried out jointly by 
several NCAs, which can include the ECB. Its leading role is emphasised in Art.21(2) and 
entails stress testing. It also plays a similar role in resolution colleges.  
Thirdly, the EBA’s geographical reach and interest are wider than those of the ECB. 
Despite the fact that the ECB has gained immense powers via the SSM, the EBA remains ‘the 
guardian of the borderlands’ meaning both: coverage of the NoPS and candidate states. For 
example, in 2015 the EBA updated its recommendation on the equivalence of confidentiality 
regimes to include the Bank of Albania, thus reinstating itself as the main authority for the 
‘outer rim’.730 
Fourthly, the EBA is equipped with mediation powers, applying not only to the SSM 
but also the SRM under Art.95 SRMR. Such powers might go part of the way in 
compensating for the lack of effective dispute resolution mechanisms in the SSM and SRM, 
discussed above. Notably, in most respects, EBAs dispute resolution powers are limited to 
mediation and fall short of arbitration.  
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Lastly, as mentioned, the ECB strives to ensure that all NCAs have equal say within its 
structures, which requires a further discussion, provided hereinafter.  
 
3. Ensuring representation 
As mentioned, the most important difference between the ECB and the EBA and is that 
the later ensures equal representation for all EU States in their individual capacities. 
Furthermore, the main decision-makers within EBA are NCAs, which are all voting members 
of EBA’s Board of Supervisors.731  It therefore unsurprising that States and their credit 
institutions sought to protect the EBA’s role during the EBU construction.732 Potential 
marginalisation was a major concern for hardliner NoPS, like the UK, Sweden or Poland, 
which also happened to be the most politically and economically powerful ones, among the 
group.733 This stemmed from a broader concern that with the SSM, SRM and SRF targeted at 
the EMU States, the interests of the NoPS may get overlooked, thus threatening the authority 
of pan-EU bodies like the EBA and SBRB.734  Such concerns were fully reasonable, as 
greater degree of supervisory convergence within the SSM called for different arrangements 
than those applying at EU level.735 Former EBA Chairman Enria consequently warned that 
“repair of the Single Market will proceed with different speeds and will be driven by different 
priorities within and outside the SSM jurisdiction”, that there is a “possibility that a rift opens 
up in the Single Market” between SSM and non-SSM Member States, and that an “attentive 
focus” to the Single Rulebook and common supervisory and resolution practices will be 
required to “contain the risk of a split two-tier system.”736 Such concerns are in line with the 
path-dependency hypothesis, discussed in Chapter 1.  
Schammo sees such concerns as causal factors for the EBU-driven changes to the EBA 
Regulation, many of which were were voting-related.737 A reasonable fear among the NoPS 
was that the members of the SSM could caucus (deliberately or naturally, due differentiated 
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arrangements and interests) and, in the case of conflict of interest between the Eurozone and 
the NoPS,  the EBA would effectively end up doing the ECB’s and participating States’ 
bidding. Moloney described it as “the most significant pressure point.”738 According to her, a 
coalition of participating States’ NCAs and the positioning of the ECB as the ultimate 
supervisor could, in conjunction, pose a threat to the EBA’s effectiveness and even to the 
internal market interest.739  
The EU sought to address such concerns by amending or adding a number of provisions 
in order to protect the interests of the NoPS.740 The most significant (and telling one) was the 
modification of voting mechanics, which now includes procedures designed to protect NoPS 
NCAs from being marginalised, using the double majority voting system; which effectively 
means separate simple majorities within the participating States and the NoPS being needed 
for reaching the required qualified majority for all Board of Supervisors actions constituting 
or relating to rule-making.741  Preamble of the EBA Amending Regulation states that the 
amendments to the decision-making arrangements in the Board of Supervisors were 
necessary in order to “ensure that the interests of all Member States are adequately taken into 
account and to allow for the proper functioning of EBA.”742  
It is also important to note that the ECB representative sits on the EBA’s Board of 
Supervisors on non-voting basis and the SRB representative is a mere observer.743 Therefore, 
while the participating States could still caucus on the political level, the ECB and the SRB 
are neither expected to speak on their behalf on the Board of supervisors, nor do they have a 
vote.  
The double majority procedure also applies to the EBA’s panels for particularly 
important decisions, where the interests of States are likely to conflict, such as breach of EU 
law or mediation processes with binding outcomes.744 The Board of Supervisors must ‘strive 
for consensus’ when deciding on the composition of the panel under Art.44(1), which 
intervenes in the settlement of a disagreement. If such consensus cannot be reached, the 
Board of Supervisors have to take decisions by a majority of three quarters. The ECB cannot 
be included in the panels as they can only be composed of voting members of the Board of 
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Supervisors.745 While such procedures might appear cumbersome, Ferran and Babis reasoned 
that the complications are acceptable in the light of a bigger goal: preventing the States from 
caucusing.746  
 
4. Why the EBA is unlikely to bridge the EBU gaps 
a) National interests  
Unfortunately, with all these changes and advantages, a few major issues still prevent 
the EBA from building a sturdy bridge between the NoPS and the EBU. As Baglioni 
observed, the EBA “is more a consultative body than an authority: its technical standards 
need to be incorporated into regulations issued by the EU Commission (which are directly 
applicable in member countries), and its guidelines are not legally binding.”747   
Moreover, the EBA is constantly wrestling with questions of representativeness and 
national interest. It is simultaneously being accused of being unable to act in unified and 
decisive fashion, due to manifestations of national interests, and being incapable of 
representing such interests. 
As the main decision-makers in the EBA are the NCAs, it is an inter-institutional - not 
an inter-governmental - structure. Moreover, it is meant to be acting in the interest of the EU 
as a whole. The consensus principle is equally problematic, as although the requirement to 
strive for it is meant to be without prejudice “to the effectiveness of the Authority’s decision-
making procedures,”748  for a “body […] whose decisions ought to be argument-or evidence-
based, the merit of the consensus principle is nevertheless questionable – not least because it 
will make it more complicated to impose decisions in the face of differences between 
competent authorities.”749 The EBA thus seems like a sub-optimal forum for defending and 
promoting national, regional, or political interests.  
That is not to say that the national interests are absent from the EBA. Quite the 
contrary, as Schammo’s research reveals, the NCAs often neglect their obligations to act in 
the public interest while making EBA decisions, succumbing to the pressure of varied 
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organisational objectives and country-specific interests.750  He points to the IMF’s conclusion 
that “national interests may still influence decisions” in the EBA.751 The European Parliament 
has also noted that “it has been difficult for national representatives to separate their role of 
head of [an NCA] and European decision-maker, challenging their ability […] to act 
independently and objectively in the sole interest of the Union as a whole.”752 Moloney 
points out that this can hinder the EBA’s ability to develop distinct EU positions, particularly 
in more sensitive areas.753 This problem is further aggravated by the fact that the EBU 
amendments to the EBA legislation lessened the influence of the only full-time independent 
EBA representative - EBA’s Chairperson. 754 
The EBA thus finds itself in an unenviable position where it is the only forum where all 
Member States can defend their positions on equal footing, yet they are doing that through 
their NCAs, which, in turn, are not meant to be doing that in this capacity, and instead 
working towards the betterment of the single market as a whole. If the measures, seemingly 
designed to retain the pan-European supervisory integrity are misunderstood (or misused), 
fragmentation can be deepened by the very instruments, which were meant to stop it. On the 
other hand, the EBA moving into the Eurozone (to Paris) after Brexit, rather then NoPS 
Warsaw or Prague was in itself a symbolic shift, which in turn might distance the NoPSs 
from what was previously their main forum.  
 
b) Voting arrangements and further disintegration  
Paradoxically, even the changes to the voting arrangements introduced to safeguard the 
NoPS interests have been criticised as short sighted,755 deepening the divide between the 
NoPS and the Eurozone756 and not contributing to EU-interest-orientated decision-making.757 
As if to make things more complicated, these decision-making reforms were largely designed 
by the UK and finally agreed, despite the Commission raising concerns about potential 
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fragmentation risks and German opposition.758 This is illustrated by, for example, by 
European Parliament noting that “the changes in the original voting system of EBA [...] were 
a concession to some Member States and made the decision making procedures in the Board 
of Supervisors more onerous and cumbersome.”759 It is worth remembering that the UK and 
other NoPS were also opposed to the EBA maximising its potential by fiscal means. The 
main conflict line was between two NoPS – the  UK and the Czech Republic – (notably 
supported by Spain), rigidly opposed to any transfer of powers with fiscal consequences, 
against Eurozone France, Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands.760 Thus, somewhat 
paradoxically, the NoPS, by attempting to safeguard their interests within the EBA, arguably 
incidentally undermined its overall influence.  
Moreover, the new voting mechanics for the EBA created an additional minor 
disincentive for the NoPS to participate in the SSM and SRM. As a NoPS, Croatia controlled 
1/8 of the ‘separate’ NoPS majority. As a CCA State it holds 1/20 of the participating States’ 
majority.761 Bulgaria effectively traded 1/7 of a separate majority for 1/21. While this loss of 
influence was acceptable to these two States, which will shortly gain a say at the ECB’s 
Governing Council as EMU States, purely from the perspective of the influence in the EBA, 
participation in the SSM/SRM is an objectively bad deal for States in de jure or de facto 
EMU derogation.  
This has the potential to deepen the division between the two groups in the EBA. The 
existing voting patterns and mechanics could already be considered a manifestation of path-
dependency, but the future events are likely to deepen the schisms. Since Bulgaria and 
Croatia signed the CCA in summer 2020, the entire ‘NoPS majority’, is commanded by the 
most Eurosceptic and anti-EBU States, such as the most determined NoPS Sweden and 
Czechia, Eurosceptic Poland and Hungary, and the only remaining State in permanent EMU 
derogation – Denmark. Not only do they have disproportionate influence in the EBA, but 
also, on some issues, their positions might be diametrically opposed to the SSM/SRM States. 
Moreover, if Romania signs the CCA, the three Visegrad States, long-time political allies, 
will have an effective veto on EBA decisions.  
It does seem like the EU legislature itself has also given up on trying to bridge the gap 
between the two groups of States through the EBA. As Schammo observed,  
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“whilst in the past the EU legislature was concerned about putting in place modalities 
for ensuring that the ESAs could make decisions in the face of divisions between their 
members (e.g. simple majority voting, no consensus requirement), the more recent changes 
suggest that the EU legislature now considers that divisions in EBA are an inevitable 
outcome of closer integration among SSM members...”762 
 
c) Lack of firepower  
One of the reasons for the lowered expectations for the EBA as a bridge between the 
NoPS and the participating States is that its powers are inherently limited. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the Meroni doctrine limited the extent to which the ESAs could be empowered to 
take supervisory decisions in the first place. As Baglioni neatly summarises the EBA’s role in 
the European Banking supervision system, which he described as a “two-tier system”: 763    
“[T]he convergence of supervisory practices, […] is mandated to the EBA [whose] 
technical standards need to be incorporated into regulations issued by the [Commission], 
and its guidelines are not legally binding. The application of the EBA regulations and 
guidelines is delegated to the [NCAs]. In the euro area countries, to the contrary, the 
delegation of supervision to […] the ECB should allow a higher level of convergence in 
supervisory practices. “764   
Such arrangement indicates, that the ECB occupies a niche in the Eurozone, which is 
left empty in the NoPS. While, as discussed above, the EBA has convergence and co-
ordination powers – including supervisory guidance, stress-testing, peer review, and 
participation in colleges of supervisors – it has only very limited direct, binding powers of 
intervention over NCAs and banks.765 These powers mostly apply in unusual circumstances, 
like breach of EU law, binding mediation between NCAs, and emergency conditions, and 
essentially only allow the EBA to direct NCAs and banks with a specific purpose of ensuring 
compliance with EU law.766  
Even in such instances the EBA arguably lacks power. The mediation powers, applying 
to the SSM and the SRM are a good example. Under Art.95 SRMR NRAs become subject to 
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EBA’s binding mediation powers. However, this does not apply where NRAs exercise 
discretion or make policy decisions. But with this limitation, Moloney argued, the binding 
mediation power risks becoming a ‘dead letter’ if it cannot be deployed where divergent and 
obstructive differences of opinion emerge between NCAs (and, crucially, between NCAs and 
the ECB).767 She further contends that the “persistence of discretion as a touchstone for 
legitimate EBA action poses a challenge to EBA’s effectiveness.”768 
There is also a notable problem of institutional asymmetry. Although the ECB is a non-
voting member of the Board of Supervisors, the EBA is not a permanent observer at the ECB 
Supervisory Board.  
While the EBA is expected to do its best to protect the integrity of the single market, it 
is evident that it was not envisaged as a body responsible for mending the gaps in supervisory 
effectiveness, opening due to non-participation of the NoPS, or in fact any gaps left (or 
created) by the EBU.  
 
F. Concluding remarks  
 
This Chapter discussed the main forms of cooperation between the EMU and non-EMU 
Member States in European banking supervision. The most straightforward and effective way 
to achieve supervisory and resolution harmonisation is the Close Cooperation Agreement. 
This agreement, in principle, could have several tangible benefits for the newly participating 
States. Unfortunately, the legal foundations of it could be considered sub-optimal. Many 
NoPS have very serious concerns about the (from their perspective) disproportionate 
influence of Governing Council, on which they are not represented, and the SSM decision-
making in general. These concerns exist in parallel with a number of issues relating to the 
SRM, including funding. A variety of issues plague mediation, arbitration, conflict resolution 
and termination arrangements, which effectively make the CCA unattractive to essentially 
every NoPS, which is not willing to join the EMU afterwards.   
A very significant problem for many NoPS is that the ultimate backstop for not being 
bound by an ECB decision is termination of the agreement. Therefore, NoPS naturally 
wonder whether a supervisory cooperation - which takes at least half a year to organise, a few 
months to terminate, but only a few weeks to deteriorate to an irreparable state - is 
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worthwhile.769 Especially given the costly and immediate termination of the SRM 
membership and the resulting need to recreate the national resolution fund, which is an 
inevitable consequence of leaving the SSM. While the option of a legal challenge using the 
court system also exists, the path to it is not straightforward, and its timeframe might not be 
optimal in the fast-paced banking industry.   
As most NoPS, in all likelihood, will not join the SSM/SRM, some alternative 
arrangements discussed in this Chapter can, if used wisely, make some of the gaps between 
the two groups of States a little narrower. The level to which they can be stretched is, 
however, limited.  
As a placeholder for the lack of CCAs, the legislation presents the memoranda of 
understanding. Such instruments, for all their merits, are just that – a placeholder. They are 
useful clarification tools in day-to-day supervision, but their value in crisis situations is likely 
to remain limited. They are not a new instrument, but rather a remnant of the failed 
Lamfalussy era approach. 
Another potential solution is enhanced use of supervisory colleges. They have the 
notable advantage of stretching beyond the SSM area and even the EU, which adds value to 
the overall arrangement. However, the way supervisory colleges are now coordinated seems 
to suggest (once again) that European Banking is being harmonised on two overlapping 
levels, which leaves a questions of how European and how single the European Single 
Supervisory system really is. Colleges of supervisors existed before the GFC and the EBU 
and were helpful structures in day-to-day cross-border group supervision. However, they did 
not have any mitigating effect on the crisis deterioration processes or their aftermath. Useful 
as the colleges are for providing conditions for supervisors to cooperate, they do not in any 
way ensure that they will. Moreover, lack of legal personality or status, makes them mere 
extensions of the NCAs mandates within the home-host system.   
The EBA is the only institutional structure with some powers which can compel the 
NCAs to act in a particular way, albeit within limited circumstances. It would appear that 
with the list of powers and geographical breadth of the mandate that the EBA has, it can 
serve a unifying role, but its effectiveness is being eroded by national interests, recent 
relocation due to Brexit, and the EBU itself. A serious concern is also that the distinction 
between the NoPS and the Eurozone states in the EBA Board of Supervisors and panels is 
deepening the divide between the two groups of States, as well as contributing to decision-
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making complexity.  
Within the existing legal infrastructure, the only instrument that can actually expand the 
SSM/SRMs remit is the CCA, and it is therefore worth examining why it remains so 

































One of the main challenges the EBU is facing is its geographical scope limits. Such 
limits have further-reaching consequences for the differentiation mechanics, which arguably 
strengthen path-dependency. The EBU legislation provides a legal solution to these problems 
via the close cooperation agreements (CCAs).770 However, only a minority of NoPS have 
signed them. Non-participation of the remaining NoPS creates a number of threats and 
complications, due their interconnectedness with the Eurozone, as well as non-EU States and 
credit institutions.  
In addition to the legal characteristics of the CCA itself, there are two additional broad 
groups of factors affecting the (non)participation decision: 1) the political, historical and 
economic circumstances of each NoPS, and 2) the structural characteristics of their banking 
sectors. This chapter focuses on the former, whereas Chapter 5 will examine the later. These 
chapters discuss every non-Eurozone Member State, seeking to find a set of common reasons 
for (lack of) participation. I specifically aim to develop and (to an extent) prove a hypothesis 
explaining why some countries are keen on signing the CCA, while others are strongly 
against it, despite sharing similar concerns relating to the Governing Council, financial 
arrangements, and EBU legislation.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section A summarises the main shared concerns 
among the NoPS. Sections B, C and D discuss all NoPS, divided into three broad groups by 
geographical proximity and banking market integration. Section E analyses the Nordic-Baltic 
Region in greater depth. It is an area of Europe comprising Eurozone, EU and EEA States, 
which together form a fully integrated banking market. The findings on this region can 
inform a broader debate on the EBU, as it has become a microcosm of the most important 





A. Shared concerns of the non-participating States  
 
As I have discussed in Chapter 1, the pre-EBU system of banking supervision and 
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resolution had fundamental flaws. Furthermore, every EU State suffered from the crises, 
which would therefore make it seem natural to take part in a reform that solves at least some 
of the GFC problems. That, as M r  and Piroska observed, raises a number of “intriguing 
political and economic questions” the most important of which is “why do some […] member 
states dissent from an arrangement that promises safer and more stable banking to all?”771 As 
will become evident in sections B, C and D, even the most reluctant NoPS are not (in 
principle) opposed to the EBU, but rather concerned about certain legal arrangements, 
political costs, and economic implications. While the NoPS are not a homogenous group, 
with the differences between such states often outweighing similarities, there is still a 
worrying lengthy list of shared concerns relating to the institutional components of the EBU. 
Namely: 
x Single-Currency-centric rhetoric and agenda 
x Congruence between the EMU and the EBU 
x Exclusion of non-EMU States from the Governing Council of the ECB 
x The ability of the Governing council to overrule the Supervisory Board 
x The ability of the Governing Council to influence the status of the State 
representatives on the Supervisory Board 
x Lack of scope for negotiations in signing the Close Cooperation Agreement 
(CCA) 
x Inflexibility in accommodating national baking sector characteristics  
x The ECB’s ability to terminate the CCA 
x The impact of CCA termination on the contributions to the SRF 
x The influence of the ECB on the Single Rulebook  
x The ECB’s ability to trigger the resolution procedures  
x Lack of exclusive competences for the NCAs and NRAs 
x Liability sharing in the SRM 
x Having to contribute to bailing out other States’ banks 
x Distribution, allocation, and deployment of the SRF 
x Costs associated with (generally more expensive) supervision and resolution 
planning 
x Not being persuaded that the ECB can deliver better outcomes than the NCAs  
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x Consolidation of power at the European level 
x Ongoing administrative centralisation within the institutional pillars of the 
EBU 
x Loss of sovereign autonomy 
x Ideological prevalence of neofunctionalism over intergovernmentalism in the 
EBU 
x The stance of the European Courts, seemingly leaning towards the ECB 
x Political influence of the largest Eurozone States  
 
This long list of concerns is almost certainly non-exhaustive. It is also only a part of the 
equation, which includes further country-specific concerns. Nevertheless, it allows for 
drawing a (somewhat simplistic) narrative, forming the baseline for the NoPS participation 
considerations.  
Having the luxury to engage in a prolonged consideration and give due weight to each 
concern is in itself a fundamental difference, compared to their Eurozone neighbours. Unlike 
the Eurozone States, the NoPS were not put on a strict path of monetary integration. That 
allowed for more flexibility during and after the GFC. As Howarth and Quaglia observed, the 
NoPS do not face the fourth element of the so-called ‘inconsistent quartet’772 - the EMU. 
Consequently, they could “cope better with the instability created by cross-border banking - 
and thus the financial trilemma - because they retain[…] their lender of last resort powers 
[…] through both monetary and fiscal policy.”773 This hypothesis is strengthened by the 
tendency of the countries considering the EMU membership to gravitate towards the EBU. 
As explained in Chapter 5, such tendency requires further nuanced analysis, since the EMU-
leaning States share the same concerns as their more Euro-sceptic counterparts and – 
furthermore - move towards the SSM and SRM at different speeds. Some countries willing to 
join the Eurozone take the full package at once, when EBU membership becomes 
compulsory due to joining the EMU (Lithuania); others do it incrementally (Croatia, 
Bulgaria) or even remain hesitant about the EBU despite the long term goal to adopt the Euro 
(Romania).  
In principle, the NoPS’ concerns reflect the concerns of the Eurozone States during 
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(and after) the EBU negotiations. However, the NoPS are more vocal; their concerns are 
more pronounced, more illustrative, and more indicative. As Howarth and Quaglia expressed 
it, “(Non)membership of euro outsiders is a clearer indicator of preferences than very 
reluctant membership by euro area member states.”774 The group of the initial 2014 NoPS 
split along the same lines as their Eurozone counterparts during the EBU negotiations. 
Describing these negotiations Merino wrote: “[…] two camps represented well identified 
interests: on the one hand, those which advocated for Member States […] sharing 
collectively bank risks, for the sake of […] stability of the euro and the avoidance of 
excessive austerity; [versus] those which could not accept that their taxpayers assume the 
risks of the banking sector of third countries nor accept solutions that would incentivise 
moral hazard in the financial sector.”775  
The same split gradually occurred among the NoPS. What factors push some NoPS to 
participate, while most others decline? Why do schisms appear even between tightly 
politically and economically linked neighbours, otherwise forming fully integrated banking 
markets? In order to answer these questions, it is important to consider every NoPS as an 
individual state, shattering the notion of the NoPS as a homogenous body, putting the 
individual narratives together and trying to weave a coherent thread of tendencies. I will 
therefore discuss all NoPS in the context of their regional settings.   
 
B. Romania and the new EBU states of the South-East  
 
Before delving into the discussion of the States that have chosen to opt out of the EBU, 
it is important to address the only States that opted in. Romania was the first State to express 
an interest in participation. However, it has not started participating yet. Instead, Bulgaria and 
Croatia became the first CCA countries in 2020. This section briefly overviews the main 
reasons why these States were more lenient towards the EBU than other NoPS. Subsection 1 
discusses the relationship between Eurozone membership and participation of the South-
Easter States. Subsection 2 assesses the impact of banking sector instability. Subsection 3 
summarises the reasons for Romania’s (possibly temporary) non-participation. Subsection 4 
summarises the region’s positions. Deeper analysis of structural characteristics will be 
provided in the next Chapter.  
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1. Eurozone waiting chamber 
Howarth and Quaglia observed that in the Southeast, SSM participation was presented 
as the first step to full EMU membership, although near-term participation remained unlikely 
for some of the States.776  For Croatia, and – to a lesser extent – Bulgaria, EMU membership 
is a near term prospect, for Romania that is not the case. The June 2020 EU convergence 
report indicated that Bulgaria and Romania did not meet the inflation target, while Croatia 
managed to achieve that.777 Bulgaria and Croatia, unlike Romania, posted budget surplus in 
2019. Near-term EMU participation not being on offer might have in turn cooled down 
Romania’s initial enthusiasm for the EBU. 
Bulgaria and Croatia’s participation strengthens Howarth and Quaglia’s hypothesis that 
Eurozone membership (or planned membership) correlates with support for the EBU.778 It 
would also be in line with path-dependency hypothesis, suggesting the congruence between 
the EMU and the EBU.779  This correlation (or causal relationship) splits into two distinct, yet 
related, paradigms. Some States might be willing to enter into a CCA for its own merits and 
overlook the shortcomings, like decision making and liquidity provision, since for them they 
are temporary. Other States might consider the SSM and SRM sub-optimal regardless of their 
status, but choose to turn the blind eye to their shortcomings, since the benefits of the EMU 
outweigh the negatives of the EBU. The later was arguably the case with Latvia and 
Lithuania, which joined the EMU and EBU simultaneously, whereas Bulgaria and - to a 
lesser extent – Croatia partly joined the EBU for its own merits.  
The recent impetus towards further integration during the EU’s post-Brexit period is 
also at play here. In the post-Brexit State of the Union speech the president of the European 
Commission Jean Claude Juncker urged further integration including financial and structural 
assistance for Member States seeking to join the euro.780 It is therefore possible that EBU 
membership could serve as an exhibition of solidarity, in turn winning these States some 
favours from the EU, which could be needed for future EMU membership, should meeting 
the Maastricht criteria prove problematic.  
The waiting chamber hypothesis seems to best fit Croatia, which has applied to join the 
EBU in 2020 and the EMU in 2024. However, Croatia is still entering the EBU much earlier 
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than it would otherwise have to as an EMU candidate. This is peculiar, since it previously 
intended to join ‘when the EBU is completed.’781 In 2016 the Croatian National Bank 
Governor Boris Vujcic stated: 782    
“the best option for Croatia is to wait until all three pillars are completed: joint 
monitoring […] (SSM), a joint bank bailout fund, and a joint deposit guarantee (a deposit 
insurance scheme). When that is completed, only then would it be in Croatia's national 
interest to enter the Banking Union.”  
Why has Croatia changed its mind? As discussed in Chapters 1-2 of this thesis, the 
deposit guarantee scheme project is currently limited to national harmonisation, and the fiscal 
backstop for the SRF is not completed. The EBU does not seem to be completed, in the way 
Croatia expected it to be, before joining. Moreover, as Huertas, Schelling, and Goretzky 
emphasised, Croatia needed to undergo a number of significant and costly adjustments in its 
banking governance.783 It would seem counterintuitive to undergo such adjustment sooner 
than necessary. It might thus mean that the progress made so far, combined with EMU 
membership intentions, can encourage a State to overlook certain shortcomings. It is notable 
that the SRF mutualisation is approaching completion, which is favourable to a small, 
predominantly host, banking markets like Croatia or Bulgaria.  
 
2. Banking sector instability as a catalyst  
Banking sector instability and shaky supervision could also be a catalyst. Hüttle and 
Schoenmaker argued that, Bulgaria decided to join following a failure in supervision, which 
resulted in the collapse of its fourth biggest lender.784  This collapse was plagued by 
allegations of fraudulent bankruptcy and seriously damaged Bulgaria’s international banking 
reputation. Howarth and Quaglia also argued that in Bulgaria CCA was a part of the effort to 
stave off a major banking crisis spiralling from this collapse.785 The decision to participate 
could thus mean that the Bulgarian government sought to spread the supervisory blame 
resulting from future failures, which Ferran argued to be an incentive for participation.786  It 
is well known that such considerations were present when Lithuania joined the EMU in 2015. 
                                                 
781 EBL News, Cenbank governor: Croatia should join Banking Union when completed, 18 May 2016  
782 Ibid. 
783 M Huertas, H Schelling, K Goretzky, Croatia’s accession to the European Banking Union – the outlook 
ahead, Dentons, 2019, p.1 
784 P Hüttle, D Schoenmaker, Should the ‘outs’ join the European Banking Union?, Bruegel 2016, p.2 
785 D Howarth and L Quaglia, The Political Economy of the new Single Supervisory Mechanism: Squaring the 
‘Inconsistent Quartet, EUSA 2015, p.18 
786 See also E Ferran, European Banking Union and the EU Single Financial Market: More Differentiated 
Integration, or Disintegration?, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No.29 2014, p.11 
 191 
The otherwise serious concerns with EBU’s financing and decision-making were largely 
already brushed aside by the bigger goal of joining the Eurozone, but the shadow of 
scandalous failures of Snoras and Ukio Bankas also made the decision easier. Notably, since 
solid fiscal policy allowed Lithuania to join the EMU and the EBU on the same date, the 
Governing Council issue did not arise. That is something the South-eastern States have not 
been able to achieve.  
Banking sector internationalisation also played a role. According to Howarth and 
Quaglia, with their banking systems dominated by foreign (largely Eurozone) banks the 
South-Eastern States had an incentive to join EBU because they were are not in a position to 
fully safeguard financial stability domestically.787 These subsidiaries are of systemic 
importance for the host country […] but not for the for the home countries (Austria, France, 
Italy).”788 Georgescu highlighted that as one of the reasons why Romania should join the 
EBU.789  
 
3. Romania – the one remaining NoPS in the region   
That leaves us with a glaring question: why is it that Romania, being the first country to 
express interest in participation, has not followed Bulgaria and Croatia in doing so? Not only 
does it share many characteristics with Bulgaria and Croatia, doubts have also been raised 
about the ability of domestic Romanian mechanisms, resources and instruments to cope on 
their own with the contagion effects of crises.790 There is one major difference. Romania has 
been delaying its accession to the EMU every few years, most recently expressing the 
intention to do so in 2027-2028.791 That allows Romania to weight near term participation in 
the EBU very carefully. The Member State remains concerned with burden sharing in the 
SRM and the SSM decision-making procedures. As Georgescu observed, the ‘policy makers 
v. policy takers’ problem of the Governing Council is a major issue.792 She further noted that 
the EBU’s one size fits all approach does not necessarily account for the specific 
                                                 
787 D Howarth and L Quaglia, The Political Economy of the new Single Supervisory Mechanism: Squaring the 
‘Inconsistent Quartet, EUSA 2015, p.7, 18 
788 Ibid.  
789 OM Georgescu, Romania in the Banking Union: Why the international supervision of cross-border banking 
is necessary, CRPE, 2015, p.7 
790 M Isarescu, Relations between euro and non-euro countries within the Banking Union, Speech before 
UniCredit 15th International Advisory Board, 10/07/2014, p.5 
791 N Banila, Romania aims to adopt euro in 2027-2028, enter Schengen this year – PM, SeeNews, 19/02/2021 
792 Georgescu, 2015, p.6 
 192 
circumstances of the Romanian banking system, providing the example of FX lending, which 
is a major source of vulnerability for Romanian banks.793  
 
4. Incomplete answer  
Generally, the South-Eastern States’ concerns broadly mirrored those of the rest of the 
NoPS or less keen Eurozone states. For each of them the calculus was different, however. 
Bulgaria took the opportunity to spread the blame for future supervisory failures, and 
potentially decrease the likelihood of such failures by making supervision more impartial. 
Croatia seemingly decided to take a leap towards the EMU. For Romania, which struggled to 
make such leap, the scales are not fully tilted towards participation yet. Looking at the bigger 
picture, it is therefore questionable whether Bulgaria and Croatia would participate without 
the incentive and prospect of the EMU membership.  
Such general considerations fail to fully explain the differences in the decisions of these 
States. The legal and political concerns were the same, yet the decisions differed. A more 
complete answer can be provided by examining the banking sector structural characteristics, 
which I will discuss in Chapter 5. Such characteristics explain why Bulgaria and Croatia 
decided not to wait for full EMU membership before joining the EBU, like Lithuania did, and 
partly why Romania remains unconvinced.  
 
C. The Visegrad States  
 
The second region in this discussion, including three NoPS, is known as the Visegrad 4. 
These four States share close ties and much of their history, which has led to a political, 
economic and military alliance originating from the meeting of the leaders of 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland held in the town of Visegrád in 1991. Since joining the 
EU in 2004 the countries have generally demonstrated solidarity on a large number of issues, 
but the EMU and EBU were among the exceptions. Slovakia adopted the Single Currency 
back in 2009, before the EBU legislative proposals. The remaining three NoPS, have opted 
out. This section highlights the most important concerns the Visegrad NoPS have expressed. 
Subsection 1 discusses dissatisfaction with always changing (yet never complete) character of 
the EBU. Subsection 2 addresses why the Visegrad NoPS see the position of the CCA States 
in the EBU as lesser, compared to the Eurozone States. Subsection 3 discusses why EMU 
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membership is currently not a factor that could pull the Visegrad NoPS in. Subsection 4 
summarises the positions.  
 
1. Seemingly permanent incompleteness  
The Visegrad NoPS are particularly concerned about the incremental character of the 
EBU’s development. The Czech Republic criticised the EBU for being delivered in an 
incremental fashion and warned that should the process get stuck at any point, the EU could 
end up with a “half-baked” solution, “worse than the status quo.”794  Poland was adamant that 
supervision and resolution could only be moved to the EU level if responsibilities are moved 
there too.795 The Czech National Bank (CNB),  similarly wanted to see the transfer of 
powers,  financial responsibilities, and burden-sharing undertaken simultaneously.796 In 
addition to also sharing concerns in relation to the EBU’s incompleteness and insufficiency, 
Hungary was particularly unhappy with gradual accumulation of funds for the SRF. The local 
experts estimated that the actual pay-out Hungary could receive is not significantly greater 
than the domestic NRF.797 Furthermore, they saw the decision-making of the SSM as 
cumbersome, and crisis management decision making procedures as “complicated and time-
consuming.”798 Poland has expressed dissatisfaction with the geographical limits of the SRM. 
It advocated full harmonisation of the national solutions on resolution issue, including the 
specific conditions of the each financial market, on the EU-wide level.799 The Visegrad NoPS 
are also concerned with the absence of the EDIS, and insufficient weight being given to 
national authorities in resolution decisions.  
Generally, the Visegrad NoPS fear that the seemingly permanent character of the EBU 
as a constantly changing creature, can result in either ineffectiveness through incompletion, 
or dynamic gradual consolidation of power, which would be hard for participating non-
Eurozone (CCA) States to resist.  
2. ‘Subservient’ position  
Karoly Szasz, head of Hungary’s financial regulator, echoed the concerns about 
unequal participation terms shared by many other NoPS and described the CCA States’ role 
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in the SSM as “subservient.”800 Similarly, CNB’s Hampl is quoted saying that  “participation 
in the banking union for the EU member states outside the Eurozone could mean transferring 
supervisory powers in return for a not entirely equal position within the ECB”, and no access 
to a fiscal backstop.801 The Polish Parliament also emphasised that participation in the EBU 
cannot be asymmetric, giving advantage to the Eurozone States in terms of decision-making 
within the SSM.802 During the EBU negotiations Poland strenuously argued for maintaining a 
balance between the SSM and non-SSM banking systems, and stated that the SSMR gives the 
ECB/SSM “excessive powers over the non-SSM authorities.”803 Poland’s push for more 
equal representation was among the reasons for the changes made moving from the Proposals 
to the final SSMR text, giving the non-Eurozone participating States more of a say in the 
Supervisory Board and access to some liquidity support.804 This, however, did not prove 
enough to satisfy Poland. That is because Poland’s concerns with the EBU stretch beyond the 
SSM arrangements themselves. The head of the main Polish NCA has pointed out that the 
SSM should be analysed jointly with the CRD IV and CRR packages, which (allegedly) 
negatively affect the powers of national supervisory authorities.805 It is broadly recognised 
that the SRM gives home countries even less control over recapitalisation decisions, which 
aggravates Poland’s concerns.806  
The SSM/SRM and CRR/CRD concerns come in as part of the bigger picture, where 
recovery and resolution is still effectively funded by the States, but decisions on triggering 
these procedures are taken at the EU level, partly by the ECB. Also, the need to contribute to 
the SRF would mean redirecting resources from domestic financial markets, thus potentially 
slowing down their development, especially in weaker economies, thus privileging the more 
established pre-2004 EU capitals, Visegrad is keen to compete with. Moreover, “[i]n extreme 
cases, when […] a major European bank is in distress [SRF] contributions [would] have to go 
towards the bailing out of another country’s bank.”807  
These concerns are generally shared by all three Visegrad NoPS. In an interview 
conducted for this research, Mojmir Hampl, vice-governor of the CNB, summarised the 
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situation as follows:  
“Once in the euro zone, the country has got a i) single monetary policy, ii) single lender 
of last resort, iii) single supervision of credit institutions and a iv) single resolution 
mechanism. But for a country outside the EMU, entering the SSM is like sitting at the table 
with just two legs –  the country will still be responsible for monetary policy and for its 
lender of last resort, while having almost no say in supervising their key banks and very little 
say in resolution. Clearly not an equilibrium.”808  
 
3. Eurozone entry as the game-changer  
The Czech position epitomises broader Visegrad NoPS’ consensus that the EBU is 
worth the sacrifices, only if the State in question is a Eurozone State or is planning to become 
one.809 As Hampl further explained:  
“The key issue was keeping the balance between powers and responsibilities of public 
authorities of a non-EMU country within the SSM. And our strong opinion was and still is, 
that this balance could not be reasonably maintained once we join the SSM without 
simultaneously joining the euro zone itself.”810  
 
The examples of Lithuania or Croatia indicate that if the State is determined to adopt 
the Single Currency, the EBU is not an obstacle sensu stricto. However, unlike their Baltic 
and South-Eastern counterparts, the Visegrad NoPS would not necessarily agree to accept the 
EBU with all of its imperfections just to join the EMU. They would seemingly remain 
concerned about power consolidation and the (perceived) neofunctionalist agenda of the 
ECB, discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, even if the seat at the Governing Council was on offer. 
Poland has been the most vocal on this issue. Due to increasing de-internationalisation of its 
banking sector, Poland naturally wishes to increase the powers of its home NCA, whereas the 
SSM, in Poland’s view, is essentially doing the opposite - shifting the power balance to host 
authorities and the ECB.811  
Czechia is also unhappy about the arrangements in the ESM. That is mostly linked to 
the cost, which for this fairly small country could spiral out of control. Such costs would 
                                                 
808 Research interview, 5/5/2018 
809 Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the Government of the Czech Republic, Czech 
National Bank, Impact study of participation or non-participation of the Czech Republic in the Banking Union, 
2015, p.3, see also for Hungarian position Kisgergely and Szombati, 2014 
810 M Hampl, Research interview conducted for this thesis, 5/5/2018 
811 Stanowisko Rz du, (Parliamentary Session) 25/09/2012, cited in T Profant, P Toporowski, Potential for 
cooperation: Polish and Czech standpoints on the Banking Union, PISM, 2014 
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come in addition to the contributions to the SRF and paying for the ECB’s supervision.812 
Notably, the Czech objections delayed the ratification of the amendment of Art.136 TFEU 
authorising the establishment of the ESM by four months in 2013.813 The CNB and the 
ministry of finance also mentioned the costs as a disincentive for joining the ERM II.814 
Poland and Hungary share these concerns, but they are not as pronounced. Poland, due to its 
size, is a much bigger economy with a notably proportionately smaller banking sector. 
Hungary is home to the international OTP banking group and needs to weight the costs 
against potential risks such banking group could pose to the domestic economy.815  
 
4. Current positions   
Despite almost identical concerns, different situations and banking sector structural 
characteristics have resulted in slightly different approaches to EBU participation. The Czech 
Republic is unlikely to participate. Its government decided in 2015 not to join the SSM and 
then reaffirmed its decision again on 2016. Poland has not ruled participation out entirely, but 
being disappointed with non-implementation of its demands, and having adjusted its banking 
sector and supervision system to operate as a NoPS,816 it is likely to join Czechia as one of 
the more determined ‘outs’. Hungary, unlike Poland or Czechia, perhaps surprisingly, 
considers joining the SSM/SRM an option, albeit not a short-term one. This represents a shift 
from the original position in reaction to the Proposals, which was negative.817 Commenting 
on EBU Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said that Hungary was in favour of the overall 
arrangement, bar specific concerns.818 A paper published by the Hungarian Central Bank 
(Magyar Nemzeti Bank or ‘MNB’) highlighted the perks of the Banking Union membership 
associated with “a wider analyst base and ultimately, the ‘ammunition’ of the €55 billion 
available for crisis management.”819 Is it possible that Hungary (or even Poland) could 
choose a different path from their neighbours, like Slovakia did, and, if so, what could 
prompt them to do so? The answers to these questions are not readily apparent from legal and 
                                                 
812 Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the Government of the Czech Republic, Czech 
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814 Ibid.  
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816 See Chapter 5(C) 
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political considerations, and thus require analysis of banking sector characteristics, which I 
will provide in the next Chapter.  
 
D. Nordics and Baltics 
 
The Nordic-Baltic Region (NBR) is connected through cultural, historical, political, 
military and social ties, to an even greater extent than Visegrad.  Its banking sector can 
reasonably be called a single banking market, which is evident from market share 
distributions and supervisory cooperation levels. According to Ferran, the NBR is 
characterised by a high degree of financial market integration and long-standing cross-border 
collaboration in financial supervision.820 Spendzharova and  Bayram described it as “one the 
most densely integrated and effective cross-border banking regions in the EU.”821 
Somewhat paradoxically, the NBR is also extremely diverse in terms of European 
organisational memberships. The three Baltic States and Finland are part of the Eurozone, 
Sweden and Denmark are non-Eurozone EU members, and Norway and Iceland are only 
affiliated through EEA arrangements. To make matters more complex, Denmark and Sweden 
differ in terms of their potential Eurozone membership obligations. Whilst Sweden has a 
choice in the matter and could (in theory) join the EMU, Denmark is in permanent 
derogation.  
                                                 
820 E Ferran, European Banking Union and the EU Single Financial Market: More Differentiated 
Integration, or Disintegration?, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No.29 2014, p.14 
821 A Spendzharova, I Bayram, Banking union through the back door? How European banking union affects 
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Fig.4.1 Nordic-Baltic EU integration levels. Source: Farelius et al822  
 
This contrasts sharply with other areas of deep integration, with either more uniform 
approach to European integration or a smaller number of sovereign states. Due to its unique 
position the NBR can serve as a fertile testing soil for many problems plaguing the EBU. It is 
home to the EU’s largest banking centre outside of Eurozone – Stockholm, as well as the first 
country to join the EMU and the EBU after the launch of the SSM – Lithuania. The 
institutional architectures range from some of the world’s oldest (Norway, Sweden) to fairly 
new (Baltics). The NBR exhibits significant economic discrepancies, as well as radically 
different positions in relation to the EBU and EMU. In many ways it could be described as a 
microcosm of Europe.  
How did these States, exhibiting a number of differences among them, become a de 
facto single banking market? How do the realities of such market affect the EBU positions? 
This section seeks to introduce the Nordic-Baltic market and the positions of its NoPS, before 
using it as an example of the complexity introduced by the existence of fully integrated 




                                                 
822 D Farelius, S Ingves, M Jonsson, Financial integration in the Nordic-Baltic region vis-à-vis the EU: A 
Swedish perspective, SUERF Policy Note 189, 2020  
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1. Ahead of the game: supervisory integration beating the EU curve  
In principle, the NBR’s market integration is attributable to high banking sector 
concentration, with the six largest banks (Danske, DNB, Handelsbanken, Nordea, SEB, and 
Swedbank) holding over 80% of the total bank assets.823 All of these banks also have 
significant presence in several NBR States, which effectively created the phenomenon known 
as the ‘extended home market’ (EHM).824 In order to match market integration, the NBR 
countries developed corresponding supervisory cooperation networks.825 Importantly, the 
NBR authorities embarked on some regulatory and legislative reforms aimed at strengthening 
banking supervision and crisis response, even before the GFC, which, although proven 
insufficient, serves as a testimony to shared interest in regional stability.826 
The efforts obviously intensified following the GFC, setting good precedent for the 
EBU. A prominent example is the Crisis Management Group for Nordea, which ended up 
serving as the resolution college, required under the BRRD. In 2011, the NBR countries 
established the Nordic-Baltic Macroprudential Forum (notably, without any binding powers), 
which shares some features with the ESRB.  The three largest non-Eurozone NBR states, 
Norway, Denmark and Sweden, also have an agreement for utilisation of central bank 
deposits as collateral for intraday lending, called the Scandinavian Cash Pool, which could 
serve as a (partial) substitute for the ESM. Most importantly, the NBR memorandum on 
financial stability, crisis management, and crisis resolution, discussed in Chapter 3,827 also 
led to the creation of a permanent regional body, the Nordic‒Baltic Cross-Border Stability 
Group, which deals with financial stability issues including ex ante burden-sharing 
agreements.828 In some sense the NBR has its own light-touch SRB, SSM, and even an ESM 
substitutes.  
This cooperation and market realities led to cohesion of practices. Given existing 
political ties and institutional cooperation, it is not surprising that the Baltic States sought to 
emulate many of the practices of the Scandinavian authorities. The banks themselves 
                                                 
823 IMF, Nordic Regional Report, IMF Country Report No 13/274, September 2013, p.7, see Chapter 5 of this 
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825 Ibid. p.565 
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indirectly brought the supervisory culture of their home States to the hosts States through 
increasing market integration. For the Nordic banking giants, the newly-capitalist Baltics was 
a new rising market for expansion, whereas for the Baltic States that meant an opportunity to 
stabilise their banking markets, following several domestic bank failures in the 1990’s. These 
failures also prompted the Baltic authorities, especially in Lithuania and Latvia, to look for 
solutions in the practices of other countries. Adopting the practices of the home countries of 
the majority of their market participants was a reasonable choice, justified by the Nordic 
regulators’ track record. They had a long tradition of being the “forerunners at the end of the 
1980s and early 1990s” in terms of regulatory oversight and transparency regimes, in many 
ways – the standard setters.829 Even the establishment of the FSA in the United Kingdom was 
partly inspired by Scandinavian practices.830 Going back even further, the tradition of 
successful central banking is illustrated by the fact that Sweden’s Riksbank is the oldest 
central bank in the world, and the Norwegian Kredittilsynet is one of the oldest integrated 
supervisors. As Wymeersch observed, the Nordic countries were at the forefront of many 
trends in financial regulation and supervision.831 That positioned the Nordic states as the 
standard setters, creating a sense of pride and confidence, strengthened by very successful 
financial management and good record of financial supervision in the last two decades. 
Sweden and Denmark are therefore particularly unhappy with the fact that “the ECB might 
become dominant in setting technical rules,” which challenges their dominance, especially 
when positions on the optimal course of action diverge.832  
 
2.  Interest in European cross-border supervision and the EOFS proposal 
Due to their regional interconnectedness and cooperation, the NBR states became 
increasingly aware of the dangers of a fully integrated banking markets, safeguarded by semi-
integrated supervision, and consequently foresaw some threats arising on the European level. 
Particularly the NBR NoPS (Denmark and Sweden) have been argued to be too small to deal 
with the failure of their massive banking sectors, which also presents an incentive to take part 
in supranational arrangements.833  
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It is therefore unsurprising that the EU NBR countries advocated stronger supervisory 
coordination and deeper prudential cooperation for the entire continent, even before the 
crisis. In 2006, Riksbank governor, Stefan Ingves, proposed the idea to establish the 
European Organisation for Financial Supervision (EOFS). 834 This plan, while imperfect, was 
significantly more suitable for the political, legal, and economic situation than the 
Lamfalussy version. EOFS would have supervised forty biggest cross-border credit groups in 
the EU.  It emphasised cross border-interdependence, impact of NCA decisions on other 
interconnected and exposed states, problematic and artificial distinction between branches 
and subsidiaries, and overlapping jurisdictions in crisis management.835  The report argued 
that the EOFS was the only way “to manage conflicting national interests.”836  The striking 
similarities between the EOFS and De Larosier reforms (and even the SSM) are unlikely to 
be incidental; it is mostly for the constitutional limits discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 and the 
EU’s reluctance to give so much power to private sector actors that the EOFS was not 
created, but its merits were recognised.  
 
3. Nordic preference for national regulatory autonomy 
The feeling of suspicion was mutual, as the Nordic countries, in their own right, were 
suspicious about giving far-reaching supervisory powers to EU institutions, which is one of 
the reasons why Denmark and Sweden opted out of the SSM. Generally speaking, the biggest 
difference between the NBR structures and the EBU is the level of importance assigned to 
national regulatory autonomy. Especially the non-Eurozone NBR states are adamant about 
retaining national autonomy, even in crisis management situations.837 This insistence is 
particularly pronounced in banking rescue and restructuring. That results in a very cautious 
approach to the SRM, and the ECB’s role in early intervention. Such caution extends beyond 
institutional architecture, to legislative frameworks, including the Single Rulebook.838 There 
are multiple reasons for this approach.  
Firstly, the national supervisory and resolution models of Denmark and Sweden (as 
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well as non-EU Norway) require speed and flexibility. Such models were largely designed in 
Sweden after a banking crisis in mid 1990’s, following detailed research and careful 
considerations, and subsequently adopted elsewhere. The maximum harmonisation approach 
of the EBU is perceived by the NBR NoPS as limiting the speed and flexibility of decision-
making.839 During the GFC, as well as other crises, clarity and speed in decision-making 
were crucial, and the Nordic NoPS do not think this has been achieved by the EBU.840 
Secondly, as I will further elaborate in Chapter 5, due to their structural characteristics, 
Danish and (especially) Swedish regulators have little to gain in terms of extra information 
sharing facilitated through the SSM. That is a consequence of limited exposure to non-NBR 
banking markets, which allowed Nordic (home) countries to basically develop a cross-border 
extended ‘domestic’ supervisory network, utilising their influence on the host NCAs, and 
thus mirroring the extended home market itself on the supervisory level.  
Thirdly, much like the Visegrad States, Denmark and Sweden are not keen on taking 
part in rescue, recapitalisation, or deposit guarantee schemes, to save the banks of countries 
their banks have no significant exposures to. According to Spendzharova and Bayram “The 
Swedish authorities were apprehensive about a systematic transfer of resources from Sweden 
to other countries, which would be a liability in the eyes of Swedish taxpayers.”841 This does 
not just apply to the contributions, but also the perceived lack of influence on how the money 
is spent.  The Nordic NoPS were among the harshest critics of the EBU subsidiarity 
settlement, which I discussed in Chapter 2(E). The Swedish parliament’s Finance Committee 
has claimed  that the EBU fundamentally contradicted the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality and even went as far as a ‘yellow card’ procedure attempt, arguing that the 
EU institutions would gain disproportionate influence over the potential allocation of States’ 
taxpayer revenue for bank recapitalisation in other States.842 The SRM and other burden-
sharing arrangements are sensitive issues for Denmark and Sweden, as home countries to 
large banks with international presence.843 Generally, the SRM is said to give home countries 
less control over recapitalisation decisions, compared to the status quo before EBU.844 It is, of 
course, equally problematic for Finland, but its EMU membership did not leave much room 
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for separate EBU considerations.  
 
4. Differences between the Nordic-Baltic state positions  
a) Differences between Denmark and Sweden  
The two Nordic NoPS – Denmark and Sweden – notably differ in terms of how strong 
their unwillingness to participate is. Sweden is considered the least likely participant, since it 
could not opt-into the SSM and SRM, without signing the SRF agreement, which it has 
refused to do. Following the UK’s departure, it remains the only Member State in such 
position. By contrast, Denmark is generally in favour of the EBU as a solution for Europe, 
and would consider participation, if some stumbling blocks were removed. Hougaard Jensen 
and Schoenmaker argued that joining  the EBU would be in the Danish interest due to its 
banking sector characteristics.845 As I will illustrate in Chapter 5, some of these 
characteristics would make Denmark a more likely participant than Sweden.  
However, Denmark is concerned about the operational compatibility of several features 
of its financial system with the EBU, especially the mortgage sector. The National Bank of 
Denmark governor Lars Rohde has insisted that, despite general inclination towards 
participation, he could not imagine Denmark joining the union “at [the] expense of the 
mortgage credit [sector].”846 The disagreement is mostly about Denmark wanting to keep a 
tacit exemption that allows its banks to count mortgage-backed bonds - a market worth about 
3 trillion Danish Krone - as highly liquid assets.847 Denmark wanted to obtain further security 
in the form of an explicit statement in the CCA, in addition to the ECB’s general obligation 
to take different business models into account.848 Obtaining such assurance has been difficult, 
not least since, as I have discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, there is essentially no 
guaranteed negotiation process available to the NoPS.  
 
     b)   The Baltic States – the informal EBU ‘opt-ins’ 
Denmark and Sweden nevertheless stand in stark contrast to their Baltic counterparts. 
While Estonia joined the EMU at the start of 2011, before the publication of the EBU 
proposals, for Latvia and Lithuania the SSM was a very real factor. This was particularly the 
case with Lithuania, which joined the EMU and EBU two months after the launch of the 
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SSM.849  
The three Baltic States epitomise the concept of a host country, with Estonian and 
Lithuanian banking systems being around 90% foreign-owned. This might appear similar to 
most South Eastern and Visegrad States, but there is one major difference: while the Visegrad 
States (and - to a lesser extent - the South-Eastern States) are hosts to mostly Eurozone banks, 
the Baltic States mostly host non-Eurozone Nordic banks. While this market penetration 
process was predominantly based on establishment of subsidiaries, these entities remained 
heavily dependent on parent bank funding.850 Moreover, since the GFC, the Nordic banks 
have turned a number of such subsidiaries into branches, thus increasing their dependency. 
This also puts the Baltic States in stark contrast with neighbouring Finland, which is the only 
predominantly ‘home’ Eurozone state in the region. This position was solidified by the recent 
Nordea’s move to Finland, discussed in Chapter 3.  
Lithuania was the first country to join an already functioning SSM. Latvia was the last 
country to join the EMU before its launch. There are several reasons that made this decision 
more palatable to them than it would be for Denmark and Sweden. Latvia was able to take 
part in the EBU drafting processes as an EMU State. Lithuania, despite being a NoPS for a 
couple of months, joined the EBU via the EMU, not the CCA. It was also able to negotiate 
the exception for its credit unions, as they are listed in Art.2(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU and 
thus excluded from the scope of the tasks conferred on the ECB by Art.1(2) SSMR. The same 
applies for investment firms, as long as they fall within the scope of Directive 2004/39/EC, 
which was very important for the dynamic and tech-driven domestic financial sector, 
comprising mainly of small firms. Moreover, while the Swedish and Danish decision-makers 
were concerned that participating States outside the Eurozone would not fully participate in 
EBU decision-making, this was not the case for EMU Baltic States.851 This is generally in 
line with the path-dependency hypothesis.852 As I have discussed in relation to Bulgaria, 
Croatia and the Visegrad States, Member States that are already determined to join the EMU 
see the EBU as a possible downside, but not one that could fundamentally alter their decision.  
Lastly, the crisis experience and several bank failures showed not just the 
vulnerabilities of the domestic Baltic supervisory systems, thus mirroring the Bulgarian 
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predisposition and the resulting need to spread supervisory blame,853 but also dangerous 
dependence on their Scandinavian partners.854 This, in turn, made the Baltic states more 
willing to participate in alternative stability arrangements. I will explore this further in 
section E, below.  
 
E. The financial crisis in the Nordic-Baltic Region: an example of the dangers of 
a fully integrated market with decentralised supervision 
 
The contrasting positions of the NBR States are firmly rooted in their experiences of 
the GFC, as well as several domestic crises in these countries preceding it. In this section I 
will explore the reasons why different NBR states made different decisions in relation to the 
EBU, specifically concentrating on the interplay between the Baltic States and Sweden 
during the GFC, and the roles each of them played in shaping each other’s position. This 
discussion will further illustrate the dangers that the NoPS can pose to some Eurozone States, 
when they operate in the same integrated regional markets.  
 
1. Sweden: An example of Nordic preparedness  
As the GFC was shaking and shaping the global financial landscape, different NBR 
States (predictably, given the diversity in their ranks) saw the entire spectrum of possible 
crisis experiences. Crisis-stricken Latvia and Lithuania stood in stark contrast with resilient 
Sweden. This contrast is particularly interesting due to their interconnectedness, as the 
Swedish banks were the biggest players in the Baltic markets. When the GFC struck, the 
Swedish banking system demonstrated that it had learned the lessons of a domestic crisis in 
mid 1990’s. Good budgeting and consequently accumulated surpluses, allowed Sweden to 
mitigate the shock. The Swedish subsidiaries in the Baltics obviously suffered, but their 
losses were absorbed by the parent institutions (albeit not without difficulty), avoiding major 
spill-overs to the domestic market, and were essentially the only significant losses of the 
Swedish banking giants, which at the time still included Nordea.855 On top of that, the 
Swedish banking groups contributed to stabilising the NBR banking market by providing 
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their Baltic subsidiaries with sizeable capital injections.856 Such injections effectively 
contributed to stabilisation of inter-bank lending, and thus helped unclog the monetary 
transmission channels. Obviously, as a small economy housing a massive banking sector, 
Sweden needed to be careful with investor confidence, and thus walked a fine line trying to, 
on the one hand, do what it can to stabilise the NBR banking market, and on the other - 
contain the crisis in the private sector. This task was made easier by the limited geographical 
distribution of Swedish banks, with most of their activities being contained in their NBR 
extended home market (EHM). The banks were also in a good state and exhibited good level 
of capitalisation.857  
A number of special measures were also taken during the GFC to protect the domestic 
banking markets.858 Some of these measures were confidence retention tools rather than 
instruments of actual effect. For example, in order to ensure the supply of credit to non-
financial companies, a credit facility where counterparts could use commercial paper with a 
maturity of up to one year as collateral was established in late 2008.859 It was notably closed 
in September 2009 due to lack of demand, but similar measures would have helped many 
other EU countries during the GFC.  
 
 
Fig.4.2 Bank lending to households; Chart from Goodhart and Rochet 2011860 
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As a result of such preparations and swift decisions during the crisis, Sweden’s credit 
market did not experience ‘boom and bust dynamics’ seen in many other places, including 
the Baltic states.861 This is evident from Fig.4.2, provided by Goodhart and Rochet. Such 
reforms were expensive, at times unpopular, and difficult politically. Therefore, as 
Spendzharova and Bayram observed, having built a fairly resilient domestic system, Swedish 
decision-makers were not keen to join a supranational resolution mechanism, possibly 
entailing a transfer of resources to other States, without corresponding say in decision 
making.862 It can be recalled that the economic precautions of the 90’s and early 2000’s were 
sold to the electorate as a means for self-sustainability and regulatory independence, thus 
making joining any supranational structure an inherent electoral risk.  
 
2. The Baltic bubble 
The Baltic States, especially Lithuania and Latvia, found themselves at the opposite end 
of the spectrum in terms of crisis preparedness. The dominance of Nordic banks with 
seemingly limitless liquidity provision, recent EU membership, EMU preparations, entrance 
to ERMII, as well as booming property and construction industries lulled the Eastern side of 
the NBR. Good macroeconomic situation promoted undue satisfaction globally, thus leading 
to underestimation of the rising imbalances and associated risks, and the Baltic States were 
not immune to that.863  Confidence was further boosted by the fact that, much like their 
Nordic partners, they had successful crisis management experience under their belt, having 
bounced back from the 1998–99 Russian crisis.864 These factors inflated private sector 
confidence, thus incentivising risky behaviour of the markets.865 The most important factor 
was, however, continuity of growth. In early 1990s the Baltic States adopted the Washington 
consensus policies: currency boards with fixed pegs, fiscal discipline, liberalisation of prices 
and trade, as well as a wildfire of privatisations.866  The economic environment created as a 
result of these neoliberal policies put the Baltic countries on an impressive growth track.867 
Two socio-cultural factors reinforced the impression of stability: reputation for fiscal and 
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macroeconomic responsibility and a socio-cultural narrative of catching up with ‘the west’, as 
a rectification of historical injustice inflicted by a half-century communist occupation.   
However, the warning signs were – by every objective measure - obvious. Aarma and 
Dubauskas mention “uncontrolled and unsustainable practice of commercial banks' credit 
expansion [in the] Baltic States in years 2003­2008.” Loans to businesses and residential 
portfolio grew from 11 billion litas868 in 2003 to 66 billion in 2008.869  Deposits, in turn, grew 
faster than real GDP.870  The credit expansion fuelled what seemed like (and in some ways 
was) economic growth. Between 2004 and 2007, the Baltic countries led the EU with their 
unprecedented growth rates, with dream-like annual averages of 10.3% in Latvia, 8.5% in 
Estonia and 8.2% in Lithuania.871  Even if these indicators were not clear signs of 
overheating, there were plenty more obvious ones, such as double-digit inflation, a housing 
boom,
 
appreciating real exchange rates, accelerating wage growth exceeding productivity 
growth, fast accumulation of net foreign liabilities, and growing current account deficits.872 
Herzberg provides a detailed discussion on the magnitude of the enormous private sector debt 
levels.873 During the last boom year, 2007, the current account deficits exceeded 20% of 
GDP in Latvia and 15% in Estonia and Lithuania; credit to non-financial corporations and 
households exceeded 75% of GDP in Lithuania and 100% in Latvia and Estonia.874   The 
European Commission warned that the growth rates of mortgage loans were especially high 
in the Baltics – with growth rates “among the highest recorded in emerging economies in 
recent times.”875  
 
3. The role of the Nordic banks in inflating the Baltic bubble  
Aarma and Dubauskas’s analysis of developments in international banking expansion 
revealed that skyrocketing credit growth was only partially financed by local savings, and 
largely fuelled by cross border international credit institutions’ resources.876 What 
encouraged the banks to lend so cheap and so much? In addition to broad global trends 
discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, Nordic foreign parent banks saw this as an opportunity 
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to expand their market share in rapidly growing Baltic markets.877 This was a part of the 
broader tendency for Western European Banks “facing low margins in overbanked Western 
European countries, and looking for a source of profits […embracing] a “second home 
market” strategy focused on Eastern Europe,” which resulted in a surge of capital.878 
Domestically-owned banks thus had to follow, in order to remain competitive, and did not 
face any ‘natural’ difficulties attracting funding through non-resident private deposits and 
wholesale credit market, due to broader economic boom.879 Such conditions encouraged 
excessive risk taking by domestic banks, while simultaneously contributing to further growth 
(or bubble), thus making the markets even more attractive for foreign entrants keen to 
compete, and to that end, offer even cheaper credit. Credit growth and capital inflows (as a 
share of GDP) to the Baltics exceeded those to most other NBR and Visegrad States, which is 
argued to reflect the role of parent-bank funding, as their loan-to-deposit ratios rose 
sharply.880 
Cheap credit drove up domestic demand and was channelled into real estate, 
construction, financial services and private consumption – the sectors that caused or 
aggravated the GFC globally.881 As Purfield and Rosenberg rightly observed, these sectors 
are not tradable as commodities and at the times of economic stagnation tend to turn 
illiquid.882 The obvious question is why the market did not regulate itself. No matter how 
cheap the credit, surely the demand for it should run dry at some point? The short answer is 
that it did. In 2007. What kept inflating the Baltic bubble all the way to the point of meltdown 
was a combination of high permanent income expectations and very low real borrowing 
rates.883 It is argued that increased absorption of EU grants may have had an impact and 
cyclically loose fiscal policy, thus exacerbating the effects of other factors.884 Consequently, 
“all Baltic economies were rapidly losing competitiveness in addition to becoming massively 
indebted.”885    
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Example 1: SEB Group 
SEB, headquartered in Sweden, had penetrated different national markets in different 
ways: in Norway, Denmark and Finland it focused on providing corporate services, in 
Germany it concentrated on the mid-corporate segment and investment, in Sweden, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania it provided all universal banking services. It also had presence in 
Luxembourg, in the form of SEB International.  
Source: SEB 2015886 
On 31 December 2014, the year considered to be the final year of the crisis in the NBR, 
the Group’s total assets amounted to €284.7bn. About 20% of its income was generated by 
activities within the Eurozone, which jumped to 25% following Lithuania’s EMU 
accession.887  
The example of SEB illustrates that foreign activities of Nordic banks are not restricted 
to the Baltics. While, the exposure of, for example, the German economy to this credit 
institution is not significant, multiple troubled foreign institutions could still leave a dent. 
Nevertheless, the Baltics still serve as the most obvious example.  
SEB loan portfolio in the Baltics increased significantly every year 2004-2008, end 
even managed to increase by 1% in 2008.888  These loan volumes of SEB and its main rival – 
Swedbank, discussed below, increased more than fourfold from 2004-2008.889 A huge part of 
the total loan portfolio increase during the economic growth was financed from the 
outsourced capital inflows.890 These tendencies were fairly universal throughout the Baltics 
and most evidently manifested in Lithuania, where SEB was the pre-crises leader in credit 
volume. Its overall loan portfolio volume increased fourfold 2004-2008.891  
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From this example we can see that a credit institution operating across the ‘EBU 
border’ can be both: vulnerable to the market turbulences in the Eurozone, and have a 
significant impact on individual Eurozone States.  
 
Summarising the analysed credit sector indicators of the Baltics, Aarma and Dubauskas 
conclude that the lowest credit deposit ratio was in Estonia followed by Lithuania and Latvia 
during their study period of 2004-2010.892 This correlates with the gravity of GFC in all three 
States, with Estonia surviving it easier, followed by Lithuania, and Latvia experiencing the 
full wrath of the crisis. Their analysis of network and credit expansion activities in the Baltic 
States revealed that in all three countries Swedbank played the leading role.893 With that 
being said, Danske and Nordea banks had the lowest deposits to loan ratios 2004-2010, 
which is an indicator of systematic use of additional funding from their parent banks.894  For 
instance, an accumulated loan portfolio for the five biggest Baltic banks was €17.4 billion 
while the aggregated deposits of the same banks were just €8.2 billion.895  
 
Example 2: Swedbank 
With 8 million private customers and 0.6 million corporate customers, Swedbank 
occupied a leading position in its extended home market of Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania during the GFC, with meaningful presence in Norway, Finland and Denmark.896 It 
also had operations in the USA, China, Luxembourg, and South Africa. It was Europe’s fifth 
largest card payment acquirer and tenth largest issuer.897 As is evident from the table below, 
the overall share of Baltic operations was not very big compared to, for example, Swedish 
operations.  
                                                 
892 Ibid. p.6 
893 Ibid. 
894 Ibid. pp.5-6 
895 Ibid.  
896 Swedbank Annual Report, 2014 
897 Ibid. p.32 
 212 
 
Source: Swedbank898   
Nevertheless, Swedbank’s presence was very significant for the Baltic States, where it 
was the largest bank by the number of customers.899 At the launch of the SSM is was 
designated as one of significant institutions in all three States within the meaning of Art.6 
SSMR. 
Given such established market position, it is not surprising that Swedbank played a 
significant role in the build up of the Baltic bubble. In Estonia its volume of loans almost 
tripled from 2004 to the end of 2008, which was still modest compared to quadruple increase 
in Latvia.900  
 
Source: Swedbank 2014 
These practices continued virtually unchallenged. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
confidence in the Swedbank brand itself in the Baltics was higher than in Sweden even after 
the GFC, despite additional reputation damage that came from a major profit accounting 
scandal.901 Such good reputation is partly attributable to good performance in stress-
testing.902  
The way stress tests were conducted, however, exemplifies one of the core problems 
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revealed in this thesis – the irreducible complexity of supervising cross-border entities 
located in the NoPS. The annual stress tests of major Swedish banks are conducted by the 
Riksbank and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. On the European level, stress 
tests are done by the EBA and the ECB. Therefore, Swedbank as a whole participates in 
national annual stress test and the EBA’s pan-European stress test, while the Baltic 
subsidiaries participate in the ECB’s review of asset quality, and the accompanying stress 
test.903 Such system divides a bank up along the legal lines, which are entirely divorced from 
business reality, thus putting supervisory effectiveness into question.  
 
4. The GFC in the Baltics  
The Baltic ‘franchise’ of the GFC started in the housing market, mostly in Lithuania 
and Latvia, where global real estate markets’ stagnation resulted in failures of construction 
companies, most of which were wildly over-leveraged. This over-leveraging, along with 
indulgence in subprime mortgages, was, as discussed, largely banking sector driven. As 
Aarma and Dubauskas observed, “[R]ealizing the real estate prices had underwent a sharp 
rise, high-value commercial banks created extra money supply, which in certain cases was 
virtually out of control of the central banks.”904 Purfield and Rosenberg also attributed the 
subsequent decline to shrinking exports and the fall in domestic demand, as well as the 
deterioration of the private sector demand, resulting from credit squeeze and plunging 
consumer confidence, further aggravated by reduced public sector spending.905 This 
reduction in public spending, although hailed by some as one of the more successful 
examples of austerity, reduced private spending even further.  
The hit was more painful for the Baltic States because it was delayed and more 
concentrated. In early 2008 the Baltic markets were still holding up, despite the tsunami of 
banking collapses in Western Europe and across the Atlantic. The local press called it 
‘stagnation’ rather than crisis; recession was still believed to be avoidable. The credit system 
seemed relatively safe since the Baltic banks and the majority of their Scandinavian parent 
institutions did not have significant exposures to the likes of Lehman Brothers, Northern 
Rock, RBS or Icesave. Generally, they also steered clear of risky Southern European real 
estate markets.  
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While the early signs of the GFC were ignored, the failures of seemingly not 
interconnected banks still resulted in contagion effects, which eventually reached the Baltics. 
The domestic bubbles started bursting in March 2008, when the credit supply started running 
dry, as the market participants started tightening credit conditions due to domestic processes 
generally “reflecting the freeze-up of global financial flows and concerns about the health of 
parent banks.”906  Unsurprisingly, the ‘stagnation’ was followed by private borrower defaults; 
as construction companies started defaulting on their business loans, buyers also started 
defaulting on their mortgages. The later largely included construction and financial sector 
workers, logistics companies, etc., the services of which were no longer needed. An 
unfortunate exacerbation was the collapses of three domestic Lithuanian and Latvian banks, 
now defunct Snoras, Ukio Bankas, and Parex. Their collapses were mostly attributable to 
reckless management (Parex), and violations of banking rules (Ukio and Snoras). These 
failures had a number of effects that pushed Lithuania and Latvia even further towards 
participation. They put into question the reputation of national supervisors, exposed the flaws 
in national resolution regimes, and strengthened the market positions of the Nordic banks, as 
large Lithuanian and Latvian banks with cross-border presence got wiped out. National 
resolution decisions in particular were highly questionable. During the Parex liquidation, 
Latvian government took an 85% stake and imposed withdrawal restrictions.907 That 
amplified the contagion effects and made the collapses of the two Lithuanian banks even 
more threatening, as other Latvian and Lithuanian banks struggled to attract liquidity due to 
dramatic fall in trust. Lithuanian authorities were involved in multiple scandals during the 
liquidation of Snoras, which further aggravated the problems.  
These events had instant real economy effects. GDP fell by 14.3% in Estonia, 14.8% in 
Lithuania and 17.7% in Latvia.908 However, somewhat surprisingly, the decline in industrial 
production in 2009 was the biggest in Estonia (25.9%), followed by 15.8% in Latvia and 
14.6% in Lithuania.909 
 
5. Baltic NCA performance during the GFC  
It is not surprising that the Baltic NCAs were somewhat scapegoated for these failures 
and the SSM and SRM thus became somewhat desirable to their States, rather than just 
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tolerable.910 Aarma and Dubauskas criticised NCAs in the region for their passive approach 
and not acting as “is suggested by many monetary expansion theories.“911 Cooperation 
between the NCAs, despite the existence of the aforementioned NBR coordination 
infrastructure, was also insufficient. However, blaming them for the Baltic crisis exclusively 
would be unfair. 
Firstly, likelihood and magnitude of a potential financial crisis were underestimated 
globally. Secondly, as Kattel and Raudla observed, high growth rates effectively made the 
political elites oblivious to the warning signals.912 Furthermore, the governments contributed 
to the overheating through “cyclically loose fiscal policies (including the spending of boom-
generated windfall revenues […]) – although more so in Latvia and Lithuania than in 
Estonia.”913 The political positions seeped into the regulatory domain. The national central 
banks were partly forced into the position of observation, due to political pressure to facilitate 
growth, even when it seemed ‘bubbly’. That led to inadequate powers being given to the 
NCAs. The NCAs’ powers in these liberal economies were limited, as the policy was to avoid 
affecting credit institutions complying with existing requirements.914 The NCAs thus lacked 
firepower to address macro-prudential factors through micro-prudential actions, as their early 
intervention powers were restricted to manifest breaches of domestic banking regulations, not 
overall banking health.915 Furthermore, in the rare instances where the overall banking sector 
health was considered as a reason for interference, like in the case of Lithuanian Snoras, the 
actions of the NCAs were met with public and political resistance. The Baltic States’ central 
banks also lacked monetary policy instruments due to currency boards arrangements.916 Even 
when the Baltic governments adopted some steps to deflate the bubble, by increasing reserve 
requirements and tightening the formula for calculating capital adequacy, these measures 
came too late and ended up popping the bubble rather than deflating it.917  
The Baltic bubble was least pronounced in Lithuania, which Purfield and Rosenberg 
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attribute to the absorptive capacity of its larger economy and larger productivity gains.918 
Moreover, as is evident from the examples of Snoras and Ukio Bankas’s liquidations, 
Lithuanian NCAs also were less afraid of taking action, having learned from their Nordic 
counterparts and a series of bank collapses in mid 1990’s. However, the decisive steps of 
Lithuanian authorities could also be seen as aggravations of an already bad situation, as bank 
liquidations and nationalisations during a financial crisis can further destabilise the market.  
 
6. The role of parent banks and home State central banks in untangling 
the crisis  
With a lot of the blame falling on the Baltic States themselves, it becomes apparent that 
undue demonisation of the Nordic (especially Swedish) banks would be unjustified. Despite 
their role in creating the bubble, the Nordic banks and the central banks of their home States 
played an important role in crisis resolution. The Nordic banking groups reportedly delivered 
on their commitments to stabilise the broader Baltic market by providing their subsidiaries 
with capital injections.919 Even before the GFC, there were some notable, albeit partly self-
preservation-driven, attempts on the part of the Nordic banks to stabilise the economic 
development in the Baltics and make it more sustainable. Swedbank and SEB, recognised the 
vulnerabilities associated with rapidly expanding Baltic exposures and sought to engineer a 
controlled deceleration of credit growth from 40–60% per annum in 2005–07 to a more 
sustainable 20-25% level. 920 These efforts obviously came too late, but the behaviour of the 
Nordic banks could still be described as - at worst - somewhat reckless, rather than outright 
cynical.  
The commitment to regional banking stability was also evident in the actions of the 
central banks. During the GFC Latvia found itself in arguably the most uncomfortable 
situation in the entire NBR, rivalled only by Iceland, in terms of the impact of the credit 
market crisis on the real economy. It was the first Baltic State to get the ‘all-inclusive’ crisis 
experience including a run on the currency in 2008 and rapidly diminishing euro holdings, 
which effectively forced it into the EMU. The Latvian government had to ask for 
                                                 
918 C Purfield, CB Rosenberg, Adjustment under a currency peg: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the 
global financial crisis 2008-2009, IMF 2010, p.7 
919 A Spendzharova, I Bayram, Banking union through the back door? How European banking union affects 
Sweden and the Baltic States, West European Politics, 39:3 2016, p.566 
920 C Purfield, CB Rosenberg, Adjustment under a currency peg: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the 
global financial crisis 2008-2009, IMF 2010, p.7 
 217 
international support from the IMF, the EU and other NBR States.921 While Latvia was the 
only NBR country to require a stand-by agreement with the IMF, Lithuania also considered 
this option.922 As part of the rescue effort, the Swedish Riksbank agreed a currency swap 
agreement with the Latvian Central Bank (which at the time was not part of the EMU), worth 
€500 million.923 It further provided bridging loans and liquidity to the Latvian financial 
system, while Latvia awaited the assistance from the IMF and EU, thus making Latvia’s 
otherwise terrible negotiating position a little better.924 In December 2008, Latvia signed an 
agreement with the IMF, the EU, and other NBR countries.  
As I have discussed above and will empirically illustrate in Chapter 5, the NoPS are 
notoriously averse to recapitalising the banks in other States, and generally not keen on 
helping their central banks. However, for Riksbank the situation in the Baltics was effectively 
a ‘domestic’ concern. By assisting the Baltics, Riksbank was also saving the reputation and 
the books of the parent banks. In 2009 60% of Swedbank’s and staggering 75% of SEB’s 
total losses stemmed from their operations in the Baltics.925 If the subsidiaries in the Baltics 
were individual banks, they probably would have failed. Arguably, due to the size of the 
Swedish economy (relative to any individual Baltic State) and stability of the parent banks, 
Riksbank could have allowed the subsidiaries to fail or allow the losses to be absorbed by the 
Swedish parent banks, without assisting troubled host States. However, as Spendzharova and 
Bayram rightly observed, “as a small [by global standards] and highly internationalised open 
economy, Sweden strives to maintain investor confidence.”926 Letting the subsidiaries fail 
would have undermined this confidence and the absorption option could have spooked 
investors and inter-bank lenders, at a time when private liquidity was scarce.  
 
7. Host state autonomy costs  
This rescue effort was not unconditional and came with major autonomy sacrifices for 
the host States. Riksbank demanded that Latvia signs a binding agreement with the IMF in 
order for the currency swap agreement to come into play and even sought to dictate some of 
the conditions of Latvia’s crisis management processes. This conditionality might have been 
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one of the reasons why Latvia and, by extension, Lithuania (which would have faced similar 
conditions, had it opted for the same path as Latvia) started questioning the power that 
Riksbank and the largest Swedish and (to a lesser extent) Danish and Norwegian credit 
institutions had over the Baltic host markets. The Riksbank also offered an agreement to the 
Central Bank of Estonia for short-term currency support.927 In 2009 Sweden offered to 
assume responsibility for 80 per cent of the losses of Swedish-based banks operating in 
Estonia, while Estonia would bear the remaining 20 per cent.928 However, Estonia rejected it 
due to autonomy risks, also considering such agreement a threat to the peg to the Euro, which 
it needed to maintain in preparation for EMU membership.929 Notably, as measured by the 
level of reported non-performing loans, Estonia’s banking system found itself in a 
considerably stronger position than Lithuania or Latvia, so the need for assistance was not 
desperate.930  
This was a pivotal point in what Pistor has described as the ‘host’s dilemma’, where, 
through financial integration, the host State ends up having to accept the regulatory agenda 
dictated by the home State.931  In the NBR the home (Nordic) regulators reportedly hold 
significant decision-making power vis-à-vis host regulators in the Baltic states.932 As I have 
discussed in Chapter 3, this has become even more entrenched in the NBR than it would be in 
some other regions, due to extensive supervisory cooperation and strong supervisory 
colleges. As Pistor argued the host State control over subsidiaries is effectively further 
“undermined by the ease with which transnational financial groups can side-step regulatory 
controls imposed on one vehicle (banks) by channelling capital through other vehicles […] or 
by engaging in direct-lending activities to customers.”933  
Consequently, the Lithuanian and Latvian authorities were presented with an 
uncomfortable fact: much of their regulatory autonomy had already been relinquished. In 
terms of the financial stability trilemma, joining the EBU did not mean major additional 
sacrifices, but it presented an alternative backstop. Unwilling to be at the mercy of their 
Nordic partners, determined to join the EMU and keen to spread the blame for future 
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supervisory failures, they were willing to overlook the remaining shortcomings of the EBU.  
 
8.  Why the Nordic willingness to help the Baltics does not translate to 
the rest of the EU? 
The same events led to the exact opposite conclusion for Denmark and Sweden. Since 
the Baltic markets are a part of their extended home market, over which they have a lot of 
control, effectively, no additional exposures are created by entering into inter-NBR 
agreements, recapitalising branches and subsidiaries in other NBR States, or even structures 
for providing liquidity support to central banks in the region. The Nordic (and particularly 
Swedish) contributions in the Baltics were largely self-interest-driven and linked to pre-
existing exposures. Even the assistance on the State level, was part of the effort to avoid 
devaluation in any given state, which could affect other currency pegs in the region. 
Moreover, further loan losses of Nordic banks could have had additional contagion effects by 
hurting confidence in the parent banks.934  Generally, the Baltic rescue was a limited, 
conditional rescue, within what the major NBR banking groups perceive as their extended 
home market.935 
That is not to say that the NBR NoPS are happy with being obliged to contribute, even 
within the NBR. The bail-in mechanism introduced in the BRRD is therefore particularly 
problematic. Analysing the effects of the BRRD bail-in tool on the Swedish banking system, 
Eliasson et al. raise concerns about potential contagion effects. In their view, indirect 
contagion effects, such as a sharp decline in market confidence, could be particularly severe, 
due to an interconnected banking market and institutions’ reliance on market funding.936 
By contrast to their dominance in the NBR, the Nordic banks do not have significant 
exposures to the banking markets of Southern Europe and France. It could thus be argued that 
the EBU would create that exposure for them. The Baltic market is of very limited size. 
Lithuania and Latvia combined have roughly the same population as Denmark. Moreover, the 
Baltic capitals, while holding some significance in the regional markets and political settings, 
are not major financial centres. In other words, these markets cannot significantly harm the 
Nordic interests, no matter how sour they went. The Baltic rescue was something that the 
Nordic banking groups could afford, without creating dangerous liabilities, but they have no 
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interest in going further. The general Nordic aversion to participation in rescues and 
recapitalisations in other markets remains. 
Furthermore, the Nordic countries are not keen on changing their systems, which reflect 
philosophical considerations and uneasy political compromises. Even the BRRD, in that 
sense, was problematic, as its order of claims in bank liquidation was very different from the 
national regimes.937 Such concerns would be even more pronounced if the institutional 
framework of the EBU, including the SSM and SRM, were adopted.  The SRM entails a 
considerable loss of regulatory discretion in crisis management, as it is thought to give home 
States less control over recapitalisation decisions.938 This comes in stark contrast to the status 
quo. Even after the implementation of the BRRD, the Danish and Swedish NRAs retain 
considerable discretion. They can set minimum requirements governing how much capital 
and eligible debt instruments banks must hold on their balance sheets.939 Furthermore, the 
ultimate resolution trigger decision is still in the hands of the NRAs.940 The SRM is therefore 
a particularly ‘sensitive issue […] due to [Nordic Countries’] structural position as a home 
country to large internationalised banks.“941  
 
9.  Norway and Iceland: non-EU states in an integrated European market  
The discussion of the NBR would not be complete without addressing Norway and 
Iceland. Neither of the countries are members of the EU. However, they are members of the 
EEA. The legal basis for the relationship between the EU and EEA states is Art.217 TFEU, 
under which all rights and obligations are reciprocal. The cooperation with the EEA states is 
detailed by association agreements, which are more intricate instruments than free trade or 
bilateral agreements (such as the ones with Canada or Switzerland respectively), and 
effectively facilitate access to the single market, conditional on compliance with EU law.942 
Their banking oversight arrangements differ from the EBU system in numerous respects, 
including institutional infrastructure and resolution planning.943 Despite these differences, 
having accepted the four freedoms and complying with the relevant legislation, including the 
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EBU legislation, in relation to branches and subsidiaries in the EU, these states form an 
integral part of the single banking market in the NBR and (to a lesser extent) broader EU.  
Their integration in the NBR structures, includes membership in the Nordic Passport 
Union and the Nordic Council, which is linked to the Baltic Assembly. Icelandic and 
Norwegian authorities participate in NBR supervision and resolution systems, which include 
the NBR Memorandum of Understanding, supervisory colleges and the Nordic‒Baltic Cross-
Border Stability Group. The Danish and Swedish banking groups generally consider Norway 
and Iceland part of the extended home market and vice versa. 
However, as far as the SSM and SRM are concerned, these states are barred from 
participating. This is inherently problematic. As Mayes observed, “the discrepancy for non-
euro area members would disappear if they join the euro area, but this would not apply to the 
non-EU EEA members such as Norway.”944  A significant part of my discussion in this 
Chapter concentrated on Denmark and Sweden – countries eligible for CCA. Such choice 
results from the dominance of their banks, especially the Swedish ones, in the EMU Baltics. 
However, the Norwegian banks also hold significant market share. Most prominently, 
Luminor AB (merger of Baltic businesses of Finish/Swedish Nordea and Norwegian DNB), 
is a top five bank by market share and number of customers in the Baltic States and 
supervised by the ECB as significant in Estonia. The DNB group contributed to the Baltic 
credit crises alongside its Swedish competitors, following broadly the same patterns of 
business practices.  
An even more illustrative story of how much havoc an EEA state can wreak on EU 
economies (as well as its own) is one of Iceland. Iceland exemplified a situation where, as 
Mayes put it, a lacuna opens “where a small national central bank cannot provide adequate 







                                                 
944 DG Mayes, Banking union: the disadvantages of opportunism, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Volume 
21 2018, p.133 
945 Ibid. p.140 
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Cautionary Tale: Iceland 
During the GFC Europe 
faced many situations where a 
bank was too large relative to its 
home country to either rescue the 
bank or the pay out all insured 
deposits, and Iceland was a prime 
example of such state.946  
As Sibert947 noted: “When 
the Icelandic bank Icesave went 
down, the court ruled that the 
Icelandic government was not legally obligated to repay UK and Dutch depositors in a timely 
fashion.” 948 [...t]he court accepted Iceland’s argument that the EU directive was never meant 
to deal with the collapse of an entire banking system.”949  
The likelihood of bank failures can obviously be reduced by effective cross-border 
supervision, but this aspect was also sorely lacking. According to Avgouleas, the failures of 
Icelandic banks also exposed the gaps in cross-border supervision of banking groups in the 
EU and the EEA and, in particular, the failure of home country control.950 “Foreign bank 
branches, which proved to be […] a menace to host country’s systemic stability, were, 
nevertheless, supervised by their home regulator. […] identified loopholes in supervision 
were left unattended while the level of harmonization of national prudential regulation 
regimes was getting increasingly dense. […] uncoordinated bank rescues […] highlighted the 
lack of cross-border structures for crisis management and bank resolution.“951 
Have these problems been solved? Mayes argues that the implementation of the BRRD 
has altered the system of deposit insurance and to a large extent removed the problem 
revealed by the Icelandic crisis - that deposit insurance funds in small countries with large 
cross-border banks might be inadequate to meet the claims in the event of failure.952  He 
                                                 
946 DG Mayes, Early intervention and prompt corrective action in Europe, Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers, No.17, 2009 p.8 
947 A Sibert, Deposit insurance after Iceland and Cyprus, VOXEU/CEPR, 2/04/2013  
948 EFTA Court 2013 
949 Ibid. 
950 E Avgouleas, Governance of global financial markets: The law, the economics, the politics, Cambridge 
University Press, 2012, p.264 
951 Ibid. 
952 DG Mayes, Banking union: the disadvantages of opportunism, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Volume 
21 2018, p.138 
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explains that making depositors preferred creditors and the deposit insurers “super-preferred” 
creditors, reduces the chance of their incurring major losses in the failure of a large bank.953  
However, his research also reveals that the deposit insurers might have to contribute to 
resolution when “creditors of the same priority are bailed in and hence they become liable, 
along with uninsured depositors, for the (proportionate) amount that depositors would have 
had to contribute to the resolution had they not been insured.”954  
Moreover, the entire edifice largely stands on the assumption that other creditors will 
be sufficiently large to absorb the loss. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that this would be 
the case and, if it is not, with less liquidity available, the contagion effects might be 
amplified. In the SSM/SRM area the remainder would be handled by the SRF. However, the 
NoPS have no access to the SRF or the ESM. The same problem applies to the EEA states. 
In such situation it would seem that a very robust cross-border supervision system is 
needed, not just between the EBU and the NoPS, but also the EEA states. It is therefore 
unfortunate that cooperation between the ECB and EEA NCA/NRAs is limited to soft law 
measures. 
 
It would seemingly be in the EU’s interest to offer the EEA states a cooperation 
arrangement beyond the current framework of predominantly soft law measures, discussed in 
Chapter 3. Such cooperation would need to take a different form from what is currently on 
offer for the NoPS, since, not only would EEA state involvement in the EBU bodies be 
unconstitutional, they also have somewhat similar structural characteristics to Sweden, and 




In this Chapter I have discussed all NoPS divided into three geopolitical regions, 
exhibiting varying levels of banking sector integration. As far as the SSM is concerned, the 
biggest stumbling block is still fair participation terms.  This issue has been emphasised by 
all of the NoPS and is ‘empirically’ confirmed by the fact that the only NoPS willing to join 
the SSM and SRM are the ones also planning to join the EMU. However, as Ferran expressed 
it, although “fair participation terms are necessary, they are not a sufficient precondition to 
                                                 
953 Ibid.  
954 See also Directive 2014/59/EU Art.109 
955 See Chapter 5 for the discussion of such characteristics.  
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the exercise of the option to participate.”956 Independence, autonomy and burden sharing 
concerns (especially in resolution) are also acute. Furthermore, banking sector structural 
characteristics also play a major role, as I will discuss in the next Chapter.  
It is evident that the relationship between the EBU, the NoPS, and broader Europe is 
symbiotic. While non-participation of NoPS can be dangerous to them as individual states, 
lack of coherent-pan European framework is a threat to the EBU as a whole, and broader 
European financial stability in general. Where integrated markets cross the SSM/SRM 
borders, the level of market integration still exceeds the level of regulatory integration, as the 
home-host system remains in place. That can undermine the intended effects of the EBU in 
some participating States. As the example of the Baltic States illustrates, since the parents of 
most of their banks are outside the SSM’s remit, the ability of the ECB or the Baltic NCAs to 
ensure effective prudential supervision of the region’s banks is conditional upon voluntary 
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As is evident from the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4, all non-Eurozone Member 
States share the same legal concerns about the EBU and the conditions of Close Cooperation. 
Nevertheless, some countries have made a decision to join the SSM and the SRM. It is 
therefore evident that non-legal differentiating factors affect the participation decisions. 
Domestic structural, political and economic incentives can encourage some of these States to 
overlook the legal shortcomings, limitations, and possible sacrifices.  
The aim of this Chapter is to provide a domestic-banking-sector-characteristics-based 
political economy analysis. Through this analysis, I find compelling evidence that several 
structural factors strongly correlate with the NoPS positions. Such factors include, inter alia, 
the percentage of non-performing loans, banking sector profitability, exposure to problematic 
Eurozone banking markets, and the level (as well as type) of banking sector 
internationalisation. It is also evident that politico-economic agendas like banking sector 
nationalism, banking sector socialism, and banking sector regionalism have an impact. Such 
factors also dictate the strategies that the NoPS adopt seeking to mitigate the possible dangers 
of non-participation.  
The Chapter is structured as follows: section A reviews the relevant literature, 
consulted to compile the analytical framework of the analysis and to devise the hypotheses to 
be tested. In section B I test the hypotheses against structural data, in order to determine 
which correlations can be established. In section C I briefly discuss the political and 
economic policies that the most reluctant NoPS adopt in order to find alternatives to the 
EBU, when dealing with structural threats. The final section concludes.   
 
A. Literature and methodology review   
 
The purpose of this section is to find a set of inter-disciplinary methods, in order to 
ascertain the reasoning patterns which led to rejections and acceptances of the Close 
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Cooperation Agreement, discussed in Chapter 3. The need for such research arises as 
previous legal, economic and political research efforts have been unable to fully answer why, 
despite very similar legal, administrative and structural concerns, some non-Eurozone States 
are quite keen to sign the CCA, while the majority remain leery.  
The task of finding a single, domestic-characteristics-based, set of methods for the 
analysis of positions taken by different States is not an easy one. Correlations discovered can 
often have no underlying causal relationships and countries formally stating seemingly 
identical positions can have little in common structurally.  There is an existing body of 
literature exhibiting varyingly successful attempts to develop such methodology, including 
those in the EBU and EMU context.957  The specific gap in existing knowledge that this 
Chapter seeks to fill is the lack of detailed and comprehensive study of all non-participating 
States. Simplistically, previous researches in this field lacked in at least one of the following 
three respects: a) lacked structure in terms of quantifiability and ascertainability of the 
findings b) had limited geographical scope (e.g. focused on a particular region) c) 
concentrated on a small number of selected structural indicators, ignoring or neglecting other 
factors. My goal is thus to comprise, develop and apply a single analytical and 
methodological framework, uncovering correlations which would hold true for all (or most) 
non-Eurozone Member States of the EU. For that purpose, I consulted literature in the fields 
of political economy, economics, and law, since my choice of statistical information used for 
this research requires academic and empirical justifications in all of these fields.  
 
1. Howarth and Quaglia  
Howarth and Quaglia were among the first to use a comprehensive set of structural data 
in the SSM and EBU academic analysis, and I adopt some of the core principles of their 
                                                 
957 JA Frieden, Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary 
Integration, Cambridge University Press, 2003; K M r , D Piroska, Banking Union and Banking Nationalism – 
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Epstein, M Rhodes, International in life, national in death? 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KFG 2014; D Howarth and L Quaglia, The Political Economy of the new Single Supervisory Mechanism: 
Squaring the ‘Inconsistent Quartet, EUSA 2015; D Howarth, L Quaglia, The Political Economy of European 
Banking Union, Oxford University Press 2016, S Donnelly, Power Politics and the Undersupply of Financial 
Stability in Europe, Review of International Political Economy 21:4 2014, S McPhilemy, Integrating rules, 
disintegrating markets: the end of national discretion in European banking?, Journal of European Public Policy, 
21:10, 2014; A Spendzharova, Banking Union under construction: The impact of foreign ownership and 
domestic bank internationalization on European Union member-States: Regulatory preferences in banking 
supervision, Review of International Political Economy, 21:4, 2014; A Spendzharova, I Bayram, Banking union 
through the back door? How European banking union affects Sweden and the Baltic States, West European 
Politics, 39:3 2016; P Hüttle, D Schoenmaker, Should the ‘outs’ join the European Banking Union?, Bruegel 
2016 
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methodology.958  Their work sought to explain national positions on the establishment, 
membership and scope of the SSM, mainly focusing on the preferences of national policy-
makers, predominantly finance ministries.959  They looked at the degree of banking system 
concentration (i.e. market share of the largest credit institutions), the degree of 
internationalisation, degree of foreign bank penetration, funding of different banking systems, 
and selected exposures, ultimately concluding that national banking sector characteristics 
strongly influence States’ positions regarding the EBU. I adopted the use of these variables to 
form part of my research.  
As a basis for their conceptual framework, Howarth and Quaglia adopt a modified 
version of Schoenmaker’s financial stability trilemma, to argue that the Eurozone States 
faced the ‘financial inconsistent quartet’. I have detailed these concepts in Chapter 1(C) of 
this thesis. Generally, the Inconsistent Quartet theory suggests that the Eurozone States 
struggled to manage financial stability, financial integration, national financial policies and 
the single currency simultaneously.960 Howarth and Quaglia use this concept to explain 
national preferences of States towards the SSM, relying upon its nuanced application to 
individual countries and taking into consideration the distinct configuration of national 
banking systems. Crucially, as the authors argue, “the inconsistent quartet […] suggests that, 
ceteris paribus, a […] state less exposed to cross-border banking would be more reluctant to 
lose control over regulation and supervision because this member state is less subject of 
financial instability coming from abroad.”961  Howarth and Quaglia find that willingness to 
participate in the institutional pillars of the EBU tends to correlate with concentration and 
internationalisation of the national banking sector.962 The magnitude of these effects also 
depends on the levels of exposure to the most problematic Eurozone markets, known as ‘Euro 
peripheries’. They use a limited data sample from selected countries to indicate that countries 
opting-out of the EBU or opposing it tend to have lower exposure to Euro periphery debt. In 
my research I updated and expanded this data sample to encompass all NoPS and a broader 
set of exposures. It is discussed in section C(4) of this Chapter.  
Howarth and Quaglia’s argument can be summarised in their two working hypotheses: 
Firstly, that actual or intended “Euro area membership is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for support for the SSM/Banking Union [although it] encourages support especially 
                                                 
958 Howarth and Quaglia, 2015 
959 Ibid. p.2 
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by having eliminated lender of last resort and by having distorted patterns of 
internationalisation.”963 Secondly, the “[h]igher the internationalisation to other euro area 
member states and/or higher the foreign penetration from the euro area, greater the support 
for creating/joining the SSM and widening the scope of direct ECB supervision.” 964  
 
2. Epstein and Rhodes  
Epstein and Rhodes also primarily examined the reasons why Eurozone countries 
decided to move towards the EBU.965 Nevertheless, some of their methods, hypotheses and 
findings apply to my research on the NoPS. Firstly, the authors point out that global 
liberalisation of European economies made banking sector protectionism costlier, as well as 
financially and politically conflictual.966 They argue that one of the major reasons why the 
Eurozone States became inclined to give up banking sector protectionism was the increased 
financial vulnerability of both banks and States.967 Such vulnerability, as I have discussed in 
Chapter 4 and will further demonstrate in my analysis hereinafter, is a major factor in the 
participation decisions. By extension, banking sector strength is a disincentive for 
participation. As my research illustrates, the NoPS that joined the EBU or declared intentions 
to do so, have the lowest GDP per capita, highest levels of non-performing loans and low 
banking sector profitability. By contrast, the three most reluctant NoPS have some of the best 
performing banking sectors and economies, among the non-EMU States.  
Secondly, Epstein and Rhodes discussed the impact of the EMU membership, which in 
the presence of fragmented banking systems and limited adjustment tools, increased the 
vulnerability of the EMU States,968 reduced the effectiveness of monetary policy,969 and 
created pre-conditions for contagion, since troubles in one Eurozone State could easily affect 
other States’ borrowing costs.970 As Howarth and Quaglia rightly observed, in the absence of 
the ‘inconsistent quartet’, namely by not being part of the EMU, the NoPS were shielded 
from this issue,971 and as my research demonstrates, they remain worried about exposing 
themselves to this instability through joint EBU schemes.  
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Epstein and Rhodes’s third hypothesis rests upon the financial crisis experience. They 
claim that international banks became increasingly wary of the conflicts they faced with 
home and host regulators and demanded a common framework of supervision in Europe.972 
The biggest banks have internationalised their operations and now (allegedly) prefer 
centralised European regulation and supervision.973 Nordea’s move to Finland is argued to 
confirm this. This observation prompted me to explore a structural factor, which is often 
overlooked in the literature on his topic - the presence, size and impact of international credit 
institutions headquartered in the State in question, known as ‘outward internationalisation’. 
The absence of large international institutions would reduce the ‘stake’ that the State in 
question has in the banking sector health in other countries, as long as possible deteriorations 
do not amount to outright failures with contagion effects.  
 
3. Spendzharova   
Spendzharova argued that the structure of the domestic financial sector is an important 
determinant of “the extent to which governments are prepared to endorse EU-level 
solutions.”974 She also agreed with Epstein and Rhodes, as well Howarth and Quaglia, that 
the levels of foreign ownership and domestic bank internationalisation are crucial 
determinants of the extent to which governments are prepared to accept EU-level solutions 
and provided in depth analysis of these factors.975  
Most importantly, Spendzharova used a numerical (1-5) index to quantify willingness 
to participate in the EBU, with 5 meaning full and enthusiastic participation and 1 
representing absolute scepticism (e.g. the UK’s position). This is preferable to Howarth and 
Quaglia’s method (1-3), as it leaves more room for nuance. I adopted this methodology for 
my research. An indexed version of this willingness scale is also optimal for comparisons 
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4. Schoenmaker et al.  
I consulted several papers written by Dirk Schoenmaker with other co-authors. The first 
one of these publications is a Bruegel study by Hüttle and Schoenmaker.976 The paper, 
written with a view to advise the non-Euro States on EBU membership, and strongly 
advocating it, builds upon a similar study of the same think tank by Darvas and Wolff.977 
Schoenmaker also participated in a more recent study focusing on Denmark and Sweden in 
particular (with Hougaard Jensen), which retained and refined the methodologies used in the 
above-mentioned papers.978  
Hüttle and Schoenmaker specifically indicated that outward internationalisation (i.e. 
where the country ‘exports’ banking services and in what volumes) is an important factor, 
which was unduly neglected in the publications discussed above.979 As I will elaborate 
further in this Chapter, outward internationalisation can help explain some of the phenomena 
left unexplained by inward internationalisation analysis. The studies also pay attention to the 
impact of differentiation between regional and other international exposure, which I have 
addressed in Chapter 4 and will return to later in this Chapter. Hüttle and Schoenmaker 
specifically point out the substantiality of banking claims of Danish and Swedish banks in the 
Nordic-Baltic Region, as opposed to other countries. This is further explored in 
Schoenmaker’s paper written with Hougaard Jensen. This paper, inter alia, looked at the 
distribution of assets of the largest banks assets and the country’s ability to withstand the 
need to recapitalise all of its banks.980 I adopted the lines of reasoning from these publications 
and took this idea further, analysing the exposure levels of all NoPS, considering total 
exposures to the Euro periphery981 and extended home markets, where such markets exist.  
 
5. M r  and Piroska   
M r  and Piroska criticised Spendzharova’s research on the grounds that selecting only 
two structural data categories is insufficient to illustrate how banking sector conditions 
influence governments’ policy formation. According to them, financial depth, banking sector 
concentration, profitability of banks (RoE), levels of non-performing loans, loans-to-deposit 
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ratios, and other factors also need to be taken into account.982 Crucially, they debunked the 
popular oversimplification that by simply being a predominantly host country the State 
becomes inclined to participate, as the examples of Bulgaria, Croatia and Lithuania would 
indicate. According to M r  and Piroska, countries sharing one or two structural 
characteristics can have differing positions vis-à-vis the EBU and a more holistic assessment 
is necessary.983 Their findings are generally in line with Howarth & Quaglia’s and Epstein & 
Rhodes’s hypotheses that history of difficulties during the GFC increase the likelihood of 
participation.  
However, while they provide a robust technical analysis based on a good set of data, they 
only apply it to Eastern European NoPS. Moreover, M r  and Piroska’s methodology does not 
leave enough room for nuance in participation willingness assessment. Much like Howarth 
and Quaglia, M r  and Piroska simplify participation willingness level to essentially three 
levels: opting-in, opting-out and wait-and-see.984 The ‘wait-and-see’ position, when allocated 
a numerical bracket of the same size as the ones for determined participation and non-
participation, is bound to create false equivalences and distort the findings. It fails to answer 
two fundamental questions: “wait for how long?” and “see what?”. In effect, Poland and 
Czechia’s ‘wait-and-see’ actually meant ‘no’ and Croatia’s ‘wait-and-see’ meant ‘yes’. These 
limitations did not allow M r  and Piroska’s work to reveal the full picture, and arguably 
distorted the conclusions.  
Unlike all of the above-mentioned researchers, M r  and Piroska argued that the 
participation choices cannot be explained by the structural characteristics.985 Instead they 
sought to demonstrate “how banking nationalism dominates policy making in CEE, and that 
this policy choice explains their distance from the BU.”986 I partly disagree with this 
conclusion. I argue that structural characteristics need to be considered alongside government 
policies and political predispositions. With a sufficient sample sizes including all NoPS and 
multiple structural indicators, clear patterns become evident.  
 
6. Schimmelfenning  
Similarly to M r  and Piroska, Schimmelfenning also did not accept the argument that 
participation willingness is impacted by structural characteristics to a material extent, and 
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relied on a different line of reasoning. As discussed in Chapter 1, he argued that the 
“membership in the banking union is congruent with euro area membership.”987 He did not 
deny the existence of predispositions resulting from structural characteristics. His main 
contention is that the effects of prior differentiated integration stemming from the EBU 
override the impact of structural characteristics and other domestic factors.988 
Schimmelfenning further explains that despite the availability of the CCA, EBU 
membership follows the division between EMU States and the NoPS, which is in line with 
the path-dependency hypothesis, detailed in Chapter 1.989 Simplistically, the hypothesis holds 
that the EU has become fundamentally differentially integrated after the EMU and thus the 
divisions on the EBU are merely a consequence of a series of previous schisms.  He bases 
this conclusion on the SSM and SRM legislation, as well as the Treaties, pointing to the fact 
that EBU membership is mandatory for EMU States, but non-mandatory for NoPS, and even 
when the latter opt in, the Union creates fundamentally different rights and obligations for 
both groups of States.990  
Moreover, according to Schimmelfenning, while the original differentiation between 
the EMU States and the rest of the EU has put both groups on different paths of integration, 
different financial crisis experiences and the resulting reforms have forced their respective 
curves to diverge even further, drawing distinctly different trajectories.991 It is argued that the 
EBU “was designed to meet the deficits” of the Eurozone and thus “its institutional setup 
reinforced the original reasons why Non-Eurozone states decided to abstain from the euro 
area.”992 As a result, the banking union “not only reaffirms the original differentiation” but 
also “widens the institutional gap between the euro area and the rest of the EU.”993  
While written as an antithesis to the hypotheses based on structural characteristics, 
Schimmelfenning’s work itself rests on the presence of a national characteristic: the 
willingness to join the EMU. It is arguably the most important structural characteristic, but I 
nevertheless argue that it needs to be considered in conjunction with other characteristics, as 
Howarth and Quaglia’s findings on the EMU States originally suggested.  
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7. Summary of hypotheses  
These publications, in conjunction, paint a broad-stroked picture of a country that 
would be willing to participate in the SSM and SRM. Table 5.1 summarises the structural 
factors highlighted by these publications and the resulting rationales for joining the EBU 
stemming from them. These are simplified and will be elaborated on hereinafter.   
 
      Table 5.1: The ultimate participating state 
Structural Characteristic Rationale for joining the EBU 
Highly internationalised  
domestic banking sector 
Additional financial backing for crisis situations via the SRF. 
Ability to resist the influence of parent banks.  
High foreign bank 
penetration 
Improved supervision of the parent institutions and prevention of 
loss-shifting to/from non-participating states. 
Highly concentrated 
banking sector 
Systemic importance of large banks active in the state to the 
domestic economy.  
High percentage of non-
performing loans 
Financial backing in case of resolution/recapitalisation.  
Loss-making or stagnated 
banking sector during the 
GFC 
The need to move away from a failed approach, public pressure. 
History of banking failures 
or bad NCA performance 
Blame-sharing and financial backing in case of resolution, public 
pressure, need to reform the NCAs. 
Presence of large domestic 
international banks 
Need to spread the blame in case of failure and ensure the 
availability of resources for recapitalisations and resolutions, 
improved supervision of branches and subsidiaries abroad.  
Exposure to Euro 
peripheries  
Dangers posed by interconnectedness with states dealing with 
problematic banking sectors or high non-performing loan levels. 
Short-medium term 
intention to join the EMU 
Unavoidability of eventual membership, full participation rights 
in the SSM and SRM decision-making. Use of the ESM. 
Political impetus towards  
EU market integration 
Macroeconomic interest in pan-European financial stability. 
Avoidance of contagion effects.  
 
Most of these factors can be expressed numerically and compared. However, in order 
assess how they correlate with participation intentions, a participation willingness index 
needs to be devised.  
 
5 4 3 2 1 











decided to opt 
out 
Table 5.2: Numerical Participation Values  
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As mentioned, for that purpose I adopted Spendzharova’s 1-5 scale.994 In my adjusted 
classification, the Czech Republic (1), Hungary (3) and Denmark (3) retained 
Spendzharova’s original scores.  Bulgaria and Croatia, which have joined the EBU, are 
assigned the maximum value of 5. Romania has previously expressed its intention to 
participate but has not moved to do so, which results in the ranking of 4. Sweden has 
formally decided not to participate, and alongside the UK, refused to sign the SRF agreement, 
thus barring itself from participation in the SRM. It is therefore assigned the value of 1. 
Poland has decided not to participate ‘for the time being’, and was assigned the value of 2, 
moving down by one mark from Spendzharova’s original classification. Such classification is 
obviously somewhat simplified, as it does not reflect some nuances like the permanent EMU 
derogation of Denmark, barring it from participating in the Governing Council. Sweden is, 
legally speaking, more ‘non-participating’ than Czechia. The later is still technically able to 
sign the CCA at any point, whereas Sweden would need to sign the SRF intergovernmental 
agreement first. With that being said, such simplistic assessment is the established method in 
the literature on the subject and it is sufficient for the purposes of this thesis. I will now turn 
to comparing this indicator against the hypotheses summarised in Table 5.1.  
 
B. Structural Analysis  
 
Looking at any summary of the NoPS concerns, including the one provided in Chapter 
4 of this thesis, the immediate impression is that many of them are strikingly similar, 
especially if the different weights that States assign to particular concerns are ignored. 
However, the positions and plans of non-Eurozone States differ. This section aims to look at 
the structural characteristics of the NoPS banking systems, in an attempt to find correlations 
between such characteristics and willingness to participate. It then proceeds to analyse these 
correlations, seeking to find possible causal relationships. I use comparative political 
economy analysis of national banking systems, testing the hypotheses discussed in section B. 
This section finds that certain banking sector structural characteristics can present significant 
incentives and disincentives for participation of individual States.  
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1. The internationalisation and concentration hypotheses    
As discussed in section A, Spendzharova, Epstein and Rhodes, as well as Howarth and 
Quaglia, used internationalisation and (to a lesser extent) concentration as indicators in 
determining the ultimate willingness of an EU State to participate in the EBU. In principle the 
hypothesis is that the higher the levels of these two indicators, the more likely the state is to 
participate. M r  and Piroska notably questioned the validity of this hypothesis.995  
 
a) Measuring internationalisation 
The term ‘banking internationalisation’ has been understood in a variety of ways and 
even the very existence of such measurement has been questioned.996 For the purposes of this 
thesis I focus on internationalisation of the banking system of a given non-EMU State. 
However, even this, narrow, aspect is not understood in a uniform way. Distinction has been 
made between inward and outward internationalisation,997 as well as between foreign bank 
ownership and internationalisation of the activities of domestic banks.998 The term inward 
internationalisation is used when foreign institutions settle and operate in a country or 
region.999 Outward internationalisation is defined as the establishment of the banking 
institutions of a given country in other countries.1000 Inward nationalisation is often used 
interchangeably with the terms ‘foreign bank penetration’ and ‘foreign bank ownership’. 
Variance of terms aside, it is the measurement used (or criticised) by all researches cited in 
the literature review in section A, as well as the majority of publications in the field. Aarma 
and Dubauskas proposed several criteria, which can be used to calculate internationalisation: 
the volume of banking claims in foreign countries, the share of banking claims in foreign 
countries as a percentage of total banking claims, structure of an institutions’ balance sheet, 
the quantity of foreign banking institutions, the share of foreign banks’ assets as a percentage 
of total banking market assets, etc.1001 
This list of criteria is as diverse as are the limitations to their informative value. In line 
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with the majority of publications on the subject, for the purposes of this research, I chose the 
percentage of foreign banks’ assets among the total banking market assets, and used 
Hougaard Jensen and Schoenmaker’s data.1002  
 
b) Inward internationalisation 
As mentioned, Spendzharova, Epstein and Rhodes, as well as Howarth and Quaglia, 
consider inward internationalisation to be linked to participation decisions. The general 
correlative tendency with participation willingness is obvious in relation the two CCA States 
(Bulgaria and Croatia), Romania, which has declared an intention to join, as illustrated in 
Fig.5.1 below. Hungary and Poland and Sweden’s positions are also in line with this 




Fig. 5.1: Willingness and internationalisation. Data: Hougaard Jensen and Schoenmaker (2020) 
 
Denmark has very low inward internationalisation. However, since it has not formally 
made the decision, this does not (yet) indicate a discrepancy, and thus does not constitute an 
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outlier sensu stricto. The Czechia could be reasonably argued to be an outlier. In fact, it appears 
to be the ultimate outlier in this analysis, with the highest inward internationalisation among the 
NoPS, and exceptional unwillingness to participate.  
 
c) The Czech Republic: the ultimate outlier or a new rule? 
Czechia’s stance has puzzled many researchers trying to develop a structural-
characteristics-based explanation for the NoPS’ positions. Howarth and Quaglia concluded that 
the “main exception remains the Czech Republic, where foreign ownership by EU banks was 
high, but the country expressed no intention of joining the SSM.”1003  They observed that 
looking at the level of inward internationalisation, Czechia would seem to have more 
incentives to join the SSM than Poland and Hungary. In this respect it is more similar to the 
opt-ins: EMU Latvia and Lithuania, EBU Bulgaria and Croatia, and (potentially) EBU 
Romania. Profant and Toporowski point out that in Czechia there are only two state-owned 
banks, serving specific purposes, and only one universal bank, FIO Bank, is fully owned by 
the domestic capital.1004  
Moreover, as I will explore further in subsection d), the Czech market is also quite 
concentrated with TOP4 banks holding the majority of banking assets, with parents mostly 
headquartered in the Eurozone, and most subsidiaries wholly owned.1005 Darvas and Wolff 
thus provided a detailed account of the incentives for Czechia to join the EBU, presented by 
such market characteristics.1006   
There are several potential explanations for the Czech phenomenon. Firstly, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, Czechia is not ideologically opposed to the EBU, nor is it a 
particularly Eurosceptic country. Its concerns are largely about how the EBU was built, not 
the premise of the Union itself. The Czechs are not oblivious to the incentives, just painfully 
aware of the disincentives.1007  
Secondly, it is possible that a country can reach such levels of inward 
internationalisation that it actually stops being an incentive to participate. Darvas observed 
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that as “over 90% [around 79% from Eurozone] of Czech banks are owned by west European 
banking groups, if they need to be recapitalised [that] will anyway be done by the parent 
group.”1008 As discussed in the previous Chapter, the phenomenon where being a host 
banking market actually works to the advantage of the host state during a systemic shock 
occurred during the GFC in the Baltics. Kattel and Roudla observed that the Baltic states 
gained additional wiggle room provided by the high internationalisation.1009  As a result of 
the Nordic banks refinancing their own subsidiaries, the less troubled Estonia and Lithuania 
could also keep more fiscal space for their domestic bail-outs and other crisis management 
processes.1010 Consequently, especially if the parent institutions are headquartered in the 
Eurozone, the negatives of not having access to the SRF and the ESM are mitigated. This is 
likely to be the case for Czechia.  
Thirdly, it could be argued that in some ways high internationalisation creates pre-
conditions for improved national supervision, or at least eliminates some of the obstacles. 
Internationalised ownership structures can also mean that there is little scope for the national 
champion and home bias issues, especially if disruptive effects stemming from other 
countries’ participation are avoided. Moreover, due to their character as international banking 
conglomerates, most of the parents of the banking groups operating in Czechia are already 
supervised by the ECB, which means that the Czechs are also indirectly benefiting from the 
SSM, without incurring the associated monetary costs and autonomy sacrifices. Just like most 
NoPS, this State does not fundamentally distrust the ECB or SSM NCAs on the operational 
level, and recognises the quality of their parent bank supervision.  
Fourthly, a state where all major market participants are foreign-owned, has (in some 
sense) already lost a lot of control over its banking sector. It might therefore be unwilling to 
weaken the only leverage instrument it still has left – the NCAs. Spendzharova argues that 
being a host jurisdiction to foreign financial institutions constrains states’ ability to steer 
credit flows and tackle perceived threats to national financial stability.1011 As discussed in 
Chapter 3, that can be dangerous, as during systemic crises, home NCAs have strong 
incentives to pursue policies that minimise losses for domestic stakeholders and shift burdens 
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onto foreign ones.1012 This, in turn, raises decision-makers’ sensitivity regarding any transfers 
of regulatory authority away from the NCAs.1013 Obviously, such situation is traditionally 
argued to be an incentive to participate in the SSM, as the host State, like Czechia, would 
then gain some control over the parent entities, but that is only the case if the State believes 
that it is gaining that control. As discussed in Chapter 4, just like many other NoPS, Czechia 
is not convinced that this would be the case.  
Obviously, taking high internationalisation as a disincentive would be very risky for a 
State which has its own international banking powerhouses, sporting significant cross-border 
presence, but this is not the case with Czechia. In this country, inward internationalisation is 
so high that it simply does not leave enough domestic market share for outward 
internationalisation via sprawling domestically-owned banks.  
 
d) Outward internationalisation  
Due to the limitations of the informative value that the characteristic of inward 
internationalisation presents, outward internationalisation can be an important factor, which 
might explain the positions of some States. According to Aarma and Dubauskas, outward 
internationalisation is best understood as “the importance of the domestic banks in foreign 
and international financial markets.”1014  That can mean a lot of things, including the number 
of foreign outlets, banks acting as intermediaries for international payments or attracting 
liabilities in foreign currencies,  provision of international financial services, expanding 
electronic banking activities abroad, etc. In Aarma and Dubauskas’s paper 
internationalisation of banks (as a process) is described as “enlargement of banks’ 
movements into foreign markets by setting up controlled units in foreign countries.”1015 I 
adopt this understanding of outward internationalisation, using the value of the assets held by 
such ‘controlled units’ for comparative purposes. While other measurements also have their 
merits, value of assets is typically used for internationalisation measurement in most of the 
literature cited in this Chapter.   
Simplistically speaking, high outward internationalisation can create the risk of ‘the 
Icelandic problem’, discussed in Chapter 4, when the country’s banking sector becomes 
disproportionately big relative to its GDP, as it expands abroad. Under severe market stress 
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such banking system can face a systemic collapse, as the state cannot afford to recapitalise 
the banks. Schoenmaker and Hougaard Jensen see this factor as a major incentive for 
Denmark and Sweden to join the EBU.1016 The BRRD bail-in tool might not be a sufficient 
bulwark in case of a systemic shock. Arguably, this is the biggest danger of non-participation, 
especially for a State with otherwise solid day-to-day supervision and regulation structures.  
However, such dire scenario would not materialise without the presence of at least one 
highly internationalised domestic behemoth, the likes of which Czechia does not have. The 
Czech position can thus be partly explained by low outward internationalisation, which is 
(depending on chronology) either a natural consequence of high inward internationalisation 
or the reason for high inward internationalisation (or both). This logic could also be used to 
explain the positions of the other two Visegrad NoPS. Poland, also a fairly reluctant NoPS, 
has a few medium-sized internationalised entities. However, Poland is also a large country of 
38 million people. Therefore, its largest bank, PKO BP, and its 296.912 billion zloty (£61 
bln.)  asset portfolio seems manageable, relative to Poland’s (approximately £457 bln.) 
national GDP. Moreover, for Poland the threats posed by inward internationalisation are not 
severe, as the overall internationalisation is below 50%, with the largest foreign entrants 
already supervised by the ECB. Outward internationalisation also does not seem threatening, 
as the combined assets of all Poland’s banks’ international assets barely reach a quarter of its 
GBP. The story is very different for ten million people Hungary, home of the international 
OTP group.  
 
e) Hungary and the OTP group – the impact of outward 
internationalisation  
Hungary not ruling our EBU membership entirely comes across as a bit of a surprise. In 
principle, lower inward internationalisation, compared to the majority of its Eastern European 
counterparts, and one of the most Eurosceptic governments would naturally suggest a stance 
similar to that of the Czech Republic or at least as cautious as Poland’s.  However, Hungary 
was one of the first NoPS to implement the Single Rulebook and mirror the SSM 
arrangements.  
In the literature Hungary is often placed within the same bracket as Poland and the 
Czech Republic, in terms of both: structural characteristics and position. M r  and Piroska 
went as far as to contend that “Hungary’s position is still the same” as that of its Visegrad 
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counterparts and that “this fact in itself disproves Spredzarova’s argument which presupposes 
similar policy formation under similar structural constraints.”1017  This assessment is not 
correct. M r  and Piroska are correct in arguing that the discrepancy between the Czech 
Republic and Hungary cannot be explained by inward internationalisation. However, other 
factors, including outward internationalisation, can contribute to such explanation. The main 
reason for Hungary’s unexpectedly favourable (given its overall level of euroscepticism) 
attitude towards the SSM and SRM, and especially the Single Rulebook is its financial 
behemoth – the OTP group. 
  
Case Example: OTP Group  
The Budapest Headquartered OTP group is the most internationalised Eastern European 
bank in the European Union. The bank offers commercial banking services in Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Croatia, Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Montenegro.  
 
Source: OTP, 20191018 
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Unsurprisingly, it is Hungary’s largest bank. Moreover, it is also the largest bank in 
Bulgaria measured by the ‘banking hat trick’ - assets, loans and deposits. Its asset portfolios 
in the smaller host economies are generally quite large. By assets OTP is also leading in 
Montenegro and occupies the 4th position (close to 3rd) in Croatia.1019 M r  and Piroska 
highlighted OTP as a major difference between Hungary and other CEE countries in their 
research.1020 Its (approx. £38 bln.) asset portfolio is also quite large relative to Hungary’s 
(approx. £145 bln.) GDP. Especially since over 50% of these assets are located abroad. 
Darvas and Wolff saw the international presence and domestic market share of OTP as a 
major incentive for Hungary to join the EBU.1021  
 
OTP aside, the rest of Hungarian banking market is quite diversified. The key players, 
in addition to OTP, are “large and medium-sized foreign banks with a strong corporate and 
retail market presence and an ownership structure largely subject to the Banking Union, 
mixed-activity small banks and […] cooperative bank[s].” 1022 Hungary thus also exhibits a 
healthy degree of inward internationalisation.  
Unlike Czechia, Hungary therefore faces simultaneous pressures as a host and a home 
country in international banking, and is also consequently facing both types of associated 
risks. By contrast, the Czech Republic only faces inward internationalisation. It can be 
concluded, that internationalisation can play a part in the decisions of some NoPS, but the 
assessment of this indicator needs to take into account both inward and outward 
internationalisation. Moreover, internationalisation as a factor carries different weight in 
different states, depending on what other states they do cross-border banking business with, 
the size of the banking sector relative to the overall economy, and the size of the international 
banks relative to the GDP. 
 
f)      Concentration 
The measurement of concentration is quite straightforward: it usually reflects the market 
share of 3-5 largest institutions in the country, either by assets, customers or claims. The most 
common measurement is the value of banking assets, used by the majority of researches I have 
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reviewed.  This characteristic formed part of the hypotheses of Howarth and Quaglia, 
Spendzharova, and Epstein and Rhodes. There seems to be a consensus that high 
concentration correlates with willingness.1023  Establishing causal relationship, however, has 
been more problematic. The causal relationship can be inferred by looking at the (atypically 
direct) legal relevance of this characteristic for the participation decision. Since, pursuant to 
Art.6(4) SSMR, the three biggest institutions in every participating State are to be supervised 
by the ECB directly, the more concentrated the market is, the bigger proportion of it will 
automatically fall within the ECB’s domain. That effectively means that the stakes for a 
highly concentrated States are higher, as the ECB would directly supervise a bigger chunk of 
their markets. This is particularly the case for smaller States, which are home to large or 
medium-sized banking groups.  
This can be illustrated by the example of Sweden. Howarth and Quaglia emphasised 
that high concentration effectively means that by signing the CCA Sweden would effectively 
put its entire banking sector under the ECB’s supervision.1024 As a State in (practically) 
permanent EMU derogation, Sweden does not have an incentive to participate stemming 
from the prospect of eventual Eurozone membership. As discussed in Chapter 4, it has very 
low inward internationalisation and its outward internationalisation has mostly taken place 
within the extended home market, which arguably reduces the likelihood of external shocks. 
Moreover, the Swedish banking sector is largely domestically-owned, with some presence of 
banks from other NBR countries. The percentage of bank assets held by other EU-owned 
subsidiaries or branches is the lowest in the EU.1025 Howarth and Quaglia thus argued that the 
limited EU bank presence in the Swedish market weighed more heavily than the significant 
Euro area presence of Swedish banks in Finland and the Baltic States.1026 They also point to 
limited exposure to the Euro periphery, which I will address later in this section. This can be 
contrasted with Hungary’s OTP, with significant exposures to, as well as presence in, 
southern European States, many of which have high levels of non-performing loans.  
The example of Sweden thus illustrates that the ‘high concentration = participation’ 
hypothesis is an oversimplification. Moreover, Howarth and Quaglia’s assertion that 
concentration correlates grosso modo with participation willingness does not apply to the 
NoPS, as Fig.5.2 below illustrates. In fact, all NoPS have high average concentration of 
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almost 67% and they all are - as the name suggests - not participating.  
 
 
Fig.5.2. Data: Worldbank 2018 
 
Just like the internationalisation hypothesis, the concentration hypothesis needs to be 
applied in a more nuanced way. Purely on the basis of the NoPS banking statistics, it would 
seem that concentration is not in itself a variable in the EBU equation, but rather a 
coefficient; an amplifier of other related factors. High concentration of foreign-owned banks 
seems to be an incentive to participate, as the case was with Latvia, Lithuania and is going to 
be with Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania. However, for countries with high concentration of 
domestically owned banks operating mainly in their home market or extended home market - 
like Denmark and Sweden - concentration can become a disincentive, due to potential loss of 
control over otherwise domestic credit institutions, forming essentially the entirety of the 
domestic market. As an inevitable consequence, of this loss of control, the Swedish and 
Danish authorities would also see their influence on the Baltic regulators weaken.  
Similarly, it could be speculated that a particularly problematic banking market would 
see high concentration as a potential liability and would seek the ECB’s supervision. In such 
states high concentration would amplify the contagion effects in crisis situations. This effect 
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event, it can safely be concluded that concentration is directly linked to the significance 
assessment of Art.6(4) SSMR and plays a role in the NoPS considerations.  
 
2. The financial stability and regulatory performance hypothesis 
One of the most established hypotheses in this discussion is that the less willing NoPS 
had sturdier economies and/or better performing NCAs during the GFC. This hypothesis is 
upheld in all of the sources discussed in section A (even the ones arguing against reliance on 
structural indicators), and is arguably one of the most important factors in the EBU 
considerations. Among the EU policy makers there is a “generally accepted notion [that] the 
entry into the Banking Union tends to be more beneficial for Member States, where the 
domestic banking sector is less stable.”1027 Profant and Toporowski  argued that Non-
Eurozone Visegrad countries drew conclusions from the fact that their regulatory and 
supervisory authorities were successful during the GFC, discouraging unnecessary risks and 
encouraging capital reserves.1028 M r  and Piroska  argued that Bulgaria and Romania are 
keen to join the EBU because of the fragility of their banking systems “coupled with a low 
level of state capacity to maintain financial stability.”1029 In this subsection I will therefore 
assess the validity of these conclusions in the light of banking sector profitability levels in the 
aftermath of the GFC, and supervisory performance, as evaluated by policy makers and 
highly-regarded researchers. I find that the resilience of the banking sector and the track 
record of domestic NCAs can materially alter the NoPS positions.   
 
a) Good performance of the NCAs 
In the most reluctant NoPS, domestic supervisory and regulatory achievements have led 
to the belief that even outside of the EBU “the probability of the emergence of crisis 
situations can be reduced by a sound macro prudential policy” and the “appropriate use of 
supervisory tools, including early intervention.”1030 This stands in contrast with the 
ideological premise of the EBU. By providing for a larger level playing field the EBU, 
further aimed “at reversing the trend for financial institutions to contribute to the 
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disintegration of the EU financial market by making the conditions for cross-border activity 
more effectively equivalent.”1031 This was meant to lessen regulatory arbitrage opportunities 
and weaken the influence of the “national champion” factor, by ensuring consistency in 
supervisory practices.1032  
The crucial difference exhibited by the most reluctant NoPS is that the market 
confidence in them was retained to a greater extent, and therefore the need to cleave 
themselves from the past did not arise. Moreover, Czechia and (to a lesser extent) Poland do 
not have clear national champions, and thus the need to limit their influence did not arise 
either.  Generally, the three most reluctant states - Poland, the Czech Republic and Sweden - 
see their financial authorities as models of best practices for resisting external shocks.1033  
For example, Ji   Rusnok, the Governor of the CNB, highlighted the institution’s 
technical achievements like successful implementation of inflation targeting, valuable 
technical know-how, and position as “one of the top players in this area.”1034 I have discussed 
the remarkable preparedness demonstrated by the Nordic states at some length in Chapter 4. 
Crucially, good performance of the NCAs was often attributed to far-reaching national 
regulatory autonomy. This was often assisted by the ability of domestic banking sectors to 
perform their functions on autonomous basis. I have discussed the Swedish preference for 
autonomy and how it shaped its decision. Similarly, the Polish Financial Supervision 
Authority (UKNF) has stated that the banking sector performed well during the GFC because 
of the high autonomy of the sector, making it resilient to external shocks.1035  They also 
emphasised a high level of prudence and actions of state institutions towards the stability of 
the sector, such as increasing liquidity, recommendation against dividend payments, and 
recapitalisations.1036 Hungarian researchers also concluded that the “potential added value in 
the reinforcement of financial stability [through the EBU] in Hungary is limited.”1037 
Nordic and Visegrad sturdiness stands in stark contrast to many Eurozone States. From 
the NoPS’ perspective most Eurozone States “provided relaxed rules to the banks, which 
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effectively resulted in the need for a common supervisory framework.”1038 This effectively 
created the underlying motivations for the EBU, not all of which are shared by the NoPS.  
 
b) Good banking sector performance  
The trust put in national regulators and the resulting preference for their autonomy is 
linked to the overall economic performance during the GFC. All three of the most reluctant 
countries recovered remarkably well. As quickly as 2015-2016 Poland and the Czech 
Republic saw the CEE region’s fastest growth, ahead of the Eurozone Baltic States and 
Slovakia.1039 Sweden and Denmark also returned to steady growth very quickly, while 
Hungary (notably) took a bit longer.  
Poland’s net banking profit in 2012 (the year the GFC effects weakened and EBU 
Proposals came out) was €2.5 billion, the Core Tier 1 ratio amounted to 12.6% and there 
were no banks with capital adequacy ratio below 8% - the Basel minimum value for a stable 
bank. Profant and Toporowski attributed this to strong and conservative domestic 
supervision, which discouraged banks from loosening their credit policies.1040  
The Czech and Swedish banking sectors were even stronger, which was reflected in the 
public and political sentiment. According to Andrej Babiš, the GFC-time Czech minister of 
finance, and current prime minister, the banks were “very liquid and in very good shape.”1041 
CNB’s Singer has indicated that the Czech financial sector in the EU is extremely specific in 
that it is liquid and well capitalised, and although it is  primarily functioning on a host basis, 
it is a net creditor towards the financial sector of the Eurozone.1042  
The Czech banks were indeed highly capitalised with capital of high quality and 
respectable shock absorption capacity, with CET1 ratio of 17.2% and T1+T2 ratio of 
17.8%.1043 As CNB national stress tests repeatedly also indicate resilience to shocks.1044 The 
capitalisation of the sector as a whole would remain above the regulatory minimum of 8%, 
even in a scenario involving a “sizeable decline in economic activity in the Czech Republic 
and abroad.”1045 The net profit of the Czech banks in 2013 (just before the decision to decline 
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participation was made) was €2.23 billion and the Core Tier 1 ratio reached as high as 
16.77%.1046 With one of the highest GDPs per capita in the Vienna Initiative countries 
Czechia is simply not keen on fixing what (at least from the national perspective) does not 
seem to be broken. 
In line with the hypothesis, Sweden’s banking sector was even sturdier than those of its 
Visegrad counterparts. Tier 1 capital ratios of all of its banks ranged between 11 and 15 
percent.1047 Sweden generally upheld banking sector requirements exceeding those of Basel 
III and the Single Rulebook in most respects. Generally, the banks in all three of the most 
reluctant NoPS outperformed the EU average and the vast majority of Eurozone States in 
terms of bank profitability during the post-GFC recovery period. This is illustrated by Fig.5.4 
below.  
 
Fig.5.4, Data: Trading Economics 
 
In this respect Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania stood in stark contrast. Taking the year 
2010 as an example (the first year after the crisis) Bulgaria and Croatia roughly matched the 
EU average, and Romanian banks were among the very worst performers. Meanwhile, the 
most reluctant NoPS - Czechia, Poland and Sweden - towered over the EU average.  
                                                 
1046 T Profant, P Toporowski, Potential for cooperation: Polish and Czech standpoints on the Banking Union, 
PISM, 2014, p.2 




























Fig.5.4, Data: Trading Economics 
 
The performance of Croatian and Bulgarian banks in this period was far from 
catastrophic, but it was not good either. Moreover, Croatia’s downward trend extended and 
plunged into loss-making territory in 2015-2016. Bulgaria also remained in generally 
downward trend until almost 2018, and, as discussed in Chapter 4, endured a major 
supervisory scandal.  
It can therefore be concluded that the banking sector Return on Equity of banks in the 
three most reluctant NoPS was significantly higher in the post-crisis period than the RoE in 
the NoPS which decided to, or expressed the intention to, participate. A similar tendency 
could be observed in terms of the public perception of NCA performance.  
 
c) Relying on past performance: dangers and indications  
Generally, the most reluctant NoPS survived the GFC easier than their Eurozone 
counterparts or the keenest NoPS and lacked incentives for sovereignty-affecting changes. To 
paraphrase Wolfgang Schäuble, former FM of Germany, reforms are rarely agreed at the 
times of prosperity.1048 It is not easy to persuade countries to tinker with what they consider 
to be an adequately performing system. In the absence of a systemic shock, there is a notable 
and well documented tendency, discussed in Chapter 1A-B, to uphold the existing structures. 
As Moloney aptly summarised:  
 
                                                 




























“National governance frameworks tend to reinforce [the existing] patterns of economic 
co-ordination, and Member States – deriving a comparative advantage from their 
institutional infrastructures and related economy types – can be expected to protect these 
institutions. While particularly acute with respect to financial market regulation, these 
interests have shaped domestic banking regulation and its development and supervision at 
EU level.”1049 
 
Reluctance to reform and overreliance on the GFC experience has notably attracted 
criticism. M r  and Piroska described the GFC-based considerations as “backward-looking” 
and implicitly containing “the unjustified assumption that the future probability of banking 
crises and the related resolution costs will be also lower in [the reluctant NoPS] than in the 
Eurozone countries.”1050 While the Nordic and Visegrad States have a solid track record of 
economic sustainability and resilience in crisis situations, that does not make any state or 
region immune to global financial fluctuations. While track record matters, banking 
profitability and past resilience are not necessarily the optimal predictors of future resilience. 
Even Denmark and Sweden might be taking what has been described as a “large and 
undiversified risk”, since they “cannot provide a credible fiscal backstop to their large banks” 
in “the case of an asymmetric shock to the economy (e.g. a national housing market 
shock).”1051  
As discussed, partly for that reason, Sweden has already endured Nordea’s exodus. The 
Czech and Polish banks might also be more vulnerable than they seem at first glance. Profant 
and Toporowski observed that foreign-owned Polish and Czech banks are often subsidiaries 
of the foreign banks and also generally stand among the most profitable assets of the parent 
groups.1052 This could be attributed to many factors, such as high fees, high interest rates, 
lower staff costs or exemplary asset management, but could also indicate excessive risk 
taking, wherever it is left unaddressed by the Basel guidelines or the Single Rulebook. As 
Nikolopoulos and Tsalas observed, “a vast amount of literature claims that enhanced 
competition may lead to increased credit risk undertaken by credit institutions. That is, 
                                                 
1049 N Moloney, European Banking Union: assessing its risks and resilience, Common Market Law Review, 
Vol.51, Issue 6, 2014, p.1618 
1050 K M r , D Piroska, Banking Union and Banking Nationalism – Explaining Opt-Out Choices of Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic, Policy and Society 35:3, 2016, p.2; for further criticism see Z Darvas, GB Wolff, 
Should non-Euro area countries join the Single Supervisory Mechanism?, Bruegel 2013 
1051 SE Hougaard Jensen, D Schoenmaker, Should Denmark and Sweden Join the Banking Union?, Journal of 
Financial Regulation, 2020, p.7 
1052 T Profant, P Toporowski, Potential for cooperation: Polish and Czech standpoints on the Banking Union, 
PISM, 2014, p.3   
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especially if their quest for market share instigates an undue relaxation of lending 
standards.”1053 This phenomenon, as discussed in Chapter 4, occurred in the Baltics in the 
run-up to the GFC and typically correlates with bubbling prices of a particular type of assets, 
such as a group of stocks or housing. This is particularly concerning in relation to the Czech 
Republic, whose high banking profitability correlated with skyrocketing real estate prices.   
Long term, industry might also pressure the central banks into undue laxity, even if it is 
not doing so now. As Aarma and Dubauskas observed, where central banks are weaker, the 
 
 “dominant commercial banks take over the central bank's role in regulating the money 
supply and demand. In the absence of a serious interest in the country's macroeconomic 
stability, the international banks maximize their profits and increase supply of money by 
widely giving cross-border credit from the funds of the primary banks.”1054   
 
Over-reliance on past regulatory performance can also be questioned, as such 
assessment is vulnerable to confirmation bias.1055 It is natural to speculate that a State which 
is already unwilling to join the SSM/SRM would claim that their national supervision and 
resolution authorities are superior and have performed well. The opposite is also true – a 
State willing to participate would be keener on admitting supervisory failures. 
 
d) Impact on the decisions of undecided States 
However, despite the dangers stemming from overreliance on past experience, such 
considerations undoubtedly impact the participation decision. It is therefore worth addressing 
the two ‘wait-and-see’ states – Denmark and Hungary.  
                                                 
1053 KI Nikolopoulos, AI Tsalas, Non-performing loans: A review of the literature and the international 
experience, in Monokroussos, Platon and Gortsos, Christos (eds.) Non-performing Loans and Resolving Private 
Sector Insolvency, Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp.47-48  
1054 A Aarma, G Dubauskas, Foreign Commercial Banks in the Baltic States: Aspects of the Financial Crisis 
Internationalization, European Journal of Business and Economics 2012, p.1 
1055 In the legal and economic context confirmation bias often manifests as a tendency to interpret past data as a 
predictor for future events.  
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Fig.5.5, Data: Trading Economics 
 
The chart (above), including all NoPS, reveals that in the post-crisis period Hungary 
and Denmark had banking sector RoEs closer to those of the opt-ins than those of the 
determined outs. Hungary broadly followed the pattern of Romania, while Denmark was 
comparable to Croatia, albeit demonstrating an increasing, rather than decreasing trend, 
which eventually reached double-digit profitability in 2017-2018. As discussed, Denmark 
(the only State in permanent EMU derogation and Hungary (one of the most Eurosceptic EU 
States), went against their (seemingly natural) predispositions and did not rule the EBU out 
completely. While both states’ NCAs performed reasonably well during the GFC, banking 
sector profitability might still be a part of the equation. 
 
3. The non-performing loan hypothesis 
As mentioned, banking sector profitability, is not the only (or best) indicator of the 
banking sector health. It only forms part of the puzzle. Another significant structural 
characteristic is the level of non-performing loans as a percentage of all loans. This 
subsection therefore analyses the potential impact of this structural characteristic on 
participation decisions. The tested hypothesis is: the higher the percentage of NPLs - the 






























a) Significance of the NPLs 
Healthy banking sectors require successful performance of maturity transformations – 
well-performing loans. As J.C. Juncker summarised in one of his last State of the Union 
Speeches, non-performing loans 
(NPLs):  
“not only impede banks' 
competitiveness, but they also limit 
their ability to lend to the 
economy. While the responsibility 
for tackling NPLs falls primarily to 
the affected banks or Member 
States, there is nonetheless a 
European dimension.” 1056  
According to Nikolopoulos 
and  Tsalas, “empirical studies 
indicate that problem loans are usually responsible for bank collapses as well as increased 
vulnerability of the banking and broader financial sectors.”1057 One of such studies, 
conducted by Barseghyan, indicates that NPLs can cause a decline in economic activity by 
locking in and crowding out funds that could otherwise be used for performing 
investments.1058 As discussed in Chapter 1, NPLs were among the most important underlying 
reasons for the GFC. It is thus reasonable to assume that a country with a high percentage of 
problematic loans would want to benefit from the reputational advantages of the ECB 
supervision and EU-level liquidity support mechanisms.  
 
b) NPLs and willingness to participate in the SSM and SRM  
M r  and Piroska recognised that there is a positive correlation between non-performing 
loans and participation willingness in Eastern Europe.1059 My findings indicate that this 
correlation broadly extends to all eight NoPS. Moreover, it further extends to the two former 
                                                 
1056 JC Juncker, State of the Union Speech, European Commission, 2017  
1057 KI Nikolopoulos, AI Tsalas, Non-performing loans: A review of the literature and the international 
experience, in Monokroussos, Platon and Gortsos, Christos (eds.) Non-performing Loans and Resolving Private 
Sector Insolvency, Springer International Publishing, 2017, p.48 
1058 L Barseghyan, Non-performing loans, prospective bailouts, and Japan's slowdown, 2010, pp.873-890 
1059 K M r , D Piroska, Banking Union and Banking Nationalism – Explaining Opt-Out Choices of Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic, Policy and Society 35:3, 2016, p.9 
Fig. 5.6 NPLs after the GFC, 
Source: stratfor.com  
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NoPS: Lithuania as the newest member of the EMU, and the UK as the ultimate ‘non-
participator’. 
 
Fig.5.7 Willingness and NPLs, Data: BIS, Worldbank  
 
The methodology for assessing the NPL level in a given state is more uniform and 
straightforward than for internationalisation. According to Nikolopoulos and Tsalas,  the 
most common indicator used for this purpose is the ratio of NPLs to total bank loans.1060 This 
ratio is said to be “related to the quality of bank assets and reflects the risk that the underlying 
cash flows from loans and securities held by financial institutions may not be repaid in 
full.”1061 I compared this to scaled and adjusted willingness index, to illustrate the correlation 
between NPL percentage and willingness to participate in the SSM/SRM.  
Looking specifically at the current and former NoPSs with the highest GFC-time NPL 
percentages, Lithuania has joined the EMU, Bulgaria and Croatia joined the EBU, and 
Romania has expressed the intention to do the same. Alongside other factors, this hypothesis 
could form part of the explanation why the (otherwise Eurosceptic) Hungarian government 
has not ruled out the EBU, and why high inward internationalisation of the Czech Republic 
does not push it to participate.  
Unsurprisingly, as illustrated by Fig.5.7, at the launch of the SSM, the three most 
willing states (Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) had the highest non-performing loan 
percentages. Sweden and the UK had the lowest percentages, followed by Denmark and 
Czechia. Generally, only the NoPS with NPL percentages in the double digits in 2014 have 
expressed intentions to participate.  
                                                 
1060 KI Nikolopoulos, AI Tsalas, Non-performing loans: A review of the literature and the international 
experience, in Monokroussos, Platon and Gortsos, Christos (eds.) Non-performing Loans and Resolving Private 
Sector Insolvency, Springer International Publishing, 2017, p.48  
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The United Kingdom, was also technically a NoPS until 2020, when it left the 
European Union’s legal framework. In 2015 such step still seemed like a somewhat distant 
prospect, but the UK nevertheless made a decision not to participate in the EBU. At that time 
the UK had the lowest NPL percentage among the NoPS. At the other extreme, on the 1st of 
January 2015 Lithuania became the 19th Eurozone State. While this is not ‘opting-in’ or close 
cooperation per se, it was nevertheless a decision to, inter alia, join the SSM.1062 Howarth 
and Quaglia rightly observed that Lithuania, dominated by subsidiaries of Swedish banks, 
would seem to have less interest in joining the EBU.1063 The NPLs might have played a role. 
Lithuania got this measurement under control just in time for its EMU accession, but in 2010 
its NPL percentage reached eye-watering 20.4%; highest in the Nordic-Baltic region.  
 
Fig.5.8. Willingness and NPLs, Data: BIS, Worldbank  
 
c) The most reluctant and the keenest 
At the start of the EBU the distinction between the most reluctant States and the 
keenest candidates was more than obvious, and broadly reflected the same tendencies as the 
participation decisions, banking sector profitability indicators and internationalisation.  
                                                 
1062 V Vasiliauskas, Speech on Lithuania’s Participation in the ECB Governing Council, 2014 
1063 D Howarth and L Quaglia, The Political Economy of the new Single Supervisory Mechanism: Squaring the 
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Fig.5.9 Changes in NPL %, Data: CEIC  
 
Throughout the post crisis period and during the half-decade of the functioning the 
SSM, Sweden stood out among the NoPS with an exceptionally low amount of NPLs. Stable 
Swedish loan market is also credited with helping the stabilisation of the Baltic markets 
during and after the GFC.1064 The Czech Republic had the third lowest NPL level and 
reduced it steadily over the past five years. Good performance of loans is particularly 
important to the Czech domestic economy, as it has a 2:1 loans-to-other instruments ratio, 
which is quite high.1065 As discussed in the previous subsection, the Czech banking 
profitability is also very high, but the maintenance of such profitability is symbiotically 
dependant on the health of loans.  
Generally, most NoPS have lowered their NPL level from their peak significantly, but 
the keenest States are still among the most problematic, NPL-wise. As recently as in 2017 
Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania occupied the unfortunate top 3 positions among the NoPS, 
with double-digit NPL percentages (Fig.5.9). In 2018-2019 Croatia ended up wearing the 
crown of thorns, which might partly explain its decision to join the EBU sooner, not waiting 
for accession to the EMU. Similar reasoning could be applied to Bulgaria. Romania, notably, 
managed to lower its catastrophic NPL percentage to a very respectable 5% level, which also 
coincided with the State decelerating its EBU accession process. Nevertheless, the 
previously-high NPL numbers might have been one of the reasons why it was also the first 
                                                 
1064 C Purfield, CB Rosenberg, Adjustment under a currency peg: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the 
global financial crisis 2008-2009, IMF 2010, p.11 



























NoPS to express the intention to participate.  
 
d) Denmark, Poland, Hungary and their NPLs 
Denmark, Poland and Hungary, have not expressed a formal intention to participate, 
but did not completely rule that out either. They require further analysis in this context. 
Looking at the NPL level at the launch of the SSM, Hungary seemed like a bit of a head-
scratcher. Just like with bank sector profitability and outward internationalisation, purely 
from the perspective of structural characteristics, Hungary seemed like the potential fourth 
opt-in. Yet, while otherwise supportive of the EBU, it did not join. Its wait-and-see position 
meant close monitoring of various indicators. The changes in its NPL curve observed during 
this ‘waiting and seeing’ might have provided a bit of a lulling disincentive. Hungary 
managed to largely solve its NPL issue and in early 2020 nearly tied the Czech Republic. 
Successful NPL management has potential to further inspire trust in the national bodies and, 
in the long run, even boost profitability, thus weakening other incentives to join.  
The most sceptical State among the undecided – Poland – is an unusual specimen in 
respect to NPLs. At the launch of the SSM, it had the fourth-lowest NPL percentage, just 
above Czechia. Moreover, even in the midst of the GFC Poland managed to keep its NPL 
percentage under the glass lid of 8% and – impressively – achieve its record low of 4.4% in 
2008! This can be attributed to its previous NPL management and overall bank resolution 
experience. The State managed to overcome a mountain (22.6%) of NPLs in 2003. The 
peculiar thing about Poland is that, while it retained relatively low levels of NPLs throughout 
the GFC, it did not manage to lower it afterwards. Somewhat surprisingly, for the better part 
of 2020 Poland even had the highest NPL percentage among the NoPS. While the current 
level of around 7% is still manageable and acceptable, a significant increase could revive the 
EBU talks in Warsaw.  
If the non-performing loan hypothesis is correct, Denmark would seem like a 
particularly unlikely opt-in. Its record high NPL level, reached in 2012, was 6%, which many 
other States could envy. However, Denmark has repeatedly claimed that the EBU is still on 
the table. While the State had shelved the plans for a few years, the discussion was 
unexpectedly revived in 2017-2018. Interestingly, that coincided with a spike in NPLs in 
2018 from 2.5% to more than 4%.  
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Fig.5.10 Changes in NPL%: Denmark. Source of Data and visual: CEIC  
 
The spike turned out to be temporary and the level has dropped since, and so has the 
Danish enthusiasm. Temporary 2% NPL spikes are unlikely be enough for the Danish 
decision makers to ignore the lingering issue of the classification of mortgage-backed bonds, 
discussed in the previous Chapter, and the disincentives presented by permanent EMU 
derogation.  
 
e) Assessing the impact of non-performing loans on participation 
NPLs seem to have some pull in participation considerations, but that pulling force is 
proportionate to the overall NPL level. None of the NoPS currently have NPL problems of 
existential proportions, and this factor, on its own, is unlikely to determine participation. It 
seems to be an important factor nonetheless. As a general rule, the NoPS with high NPL 
percentages during and after the crisis tend to opt in. The same conclusion can be made 
looking at a 5 year rolling average, taking any 5 year interval from 2007 until now. 
Moreover, Romania and Croatia declared their intentions to participate while being the NoPS 
with the highest NPL percentage. Bulgaria had the second highest NPL percentage at the time 
of formal expression of interest. By contrast, the five NoPS with the lowest rolling 5-year 
averages have not expressed the intention to participate yet. Generally, the countries with a 
stable NPL percentage tend to reject (or be sceptical about) participation, as the case is with 
Sweden, Czechia, and Poland. Hungary’s NPL fluctuations seem to be in line with its in-
between wait-and-see position. High post-crisis NPL level would explain not ruling out 
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participation, yet clear downward trend would explain why it has not moved to express 
formal interest. Notably, Hungary’s NPL management did not result in an increase in the 
banking sector RoE, as discussed in the previous subsection. That might indicate lingering 
legacy costs of underwritten NPLs.  Denmark would seem to constitute an outlier, but its 
NPL level needs to be considered in context. For the past decade Denmark has had more 
trouble with NPLs than its Nordic counterparts – Sweden, Norway, and Finland. Given the 
country’s dependency on the mortgage sector, its flirtation with the EBU membership does 
not seem entirely out of character, especially in the light of its fairly low banking sector RoE.  
In summary, NPL level generally indicates banking sector health, while declining trend 
tends to correlate with efficient financial regulation. Alongside other indicators, the NPL 
level forms part of the puzzle revealing the full picture of the countries’ banking sectors. 
Notably, this measurement needs to be considered in context, taking into account other 
factors, like loans-to-other-instruments ratios, size of the overall loan portfolios, inter-
linkages between lending and the real economy in a given state and banking sector RoE. 
Nevertheless, statistically, the NPL levels generally correlate with the NoPS positions to a 
great extent.  
 
4. Exposure to Euro peripheries 
As I have discussed in Chapter 4, NoPS with strong banking sectors and a solid 
banking supervision record generally seek to avoid indirect participation in bank 
recapitalisations in the more problematic banking sectors via the SRF, especially those to 
which they are not otherwise exposed to. Therefore, the States with low or decreasing NPL 
percentages might be reluctant to create artificial exposures to those with high NPL levels, or 
finance their bank recapitalisations, especially since these recapitalisation decisions are made 
via the SRM. Slaný summarised the sentiment in a blunt way: “The Czech banking sector is 
one of the most stable ones, so our participation in the banking union would mean little more 
than just guaranteeing foreign debts and risk sharing with the […] countries such as Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and others.”1066  The same sentiment, albeit not expressed so bluntly, echoes 
through all NoPS. This sentiment is not new or NoPS-specific. Schoenmaker even found 
evidence that some national supervisors in the Eurozone encouraged their banks to reduce 
their exposures to troubled sovereigns as well as to banks in these countries during the 
                                                 
1066 Cited by T Zavadilova, Bankovn  unie se pibl  ilam,  esku je t  nehro  , e.15.cz, 2013, Translation is mine 
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GFC.1067 Five European states - Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal - were at the 
epicentre of the GFC. Howarth and Quaglia even argued that the EBU was sought by these 
Euro periphery countries and France (due to its particular exposure to periphery sovereign 
debt) as a way to deal with the banking and sovereign debt crises.1068   
For the purposes of this research I decided to explore whether the levels of exposure to 
this particular group of EMU States, would correlate with the willingness to participate in the 
EBU. Howarth and Quaglia conducted a somewhat similar research, looking into the 
exposure to the sovereign debt of the same five States for their analysis of the Eurozone 
States’ preferences. Although based on the same hypothesis, my approach is slightly 
different. One of the lessons from the GFC is that it is hard to predict which banking 
activities will turn sour. Therefore, for my analysis, I considered the total exposures to the 
periphery States by claims on immediate counterparty basis.1069  
Firstly, I compared the percentage of exposures to the EU peripheries as a percentage 
of all cross-border exposures to the participation willingness index. 
 
Fig.5.11 Periphery exposures as a percentage of all exposures. Data: BIS 
                                                 
1067 D Schoenmaker, Banking Supervision and Resolution: The European Dimension, Law and Financial 
Markets Review Vol.6 2012, p.5 
1068 D Howarth, L Quaglia, The Political Economy of European Banking Union, Oxford University Press 2016, 
p.23 
1069 Data for this analysis has been primarily collected from the World Bank and bis.org statistics, supplemented 
by national bank data and SE Hougaard Jensen, D Schoenmaker, Should Denmark and Sweden Join the Banking 








Croatia Bulgaria Romania Hungary Denmark Poland Czechia Sweden
Willingness (index) to participate
in the SSM




The illustration based on this method generally confirms the hypothesis - the more the 
Member State is exposed to the peripheries, the more likely it is to want to join the EBU.  
The correlation follows the same pattern as with NPLs and banking sector profitability: 
the countries with low direct exposure to peripheries do not want to create that ‘indirect 
exposure’ through participation in the SSM and SRM. The two non-EMU States with the 
highest exposure are also the ones that joined the EBU – Croatia and Bulgaria. 
Unsurprisingly, the two NoPS with the lowest exposure to the peripheries – Czechia and 
Sweden – are also the ones that have formally rejected participation. Poland’s periphery 
exposure levels also seem to be in line with its reluctant-yet-not-fully-ruled-out position. 
Moreover, recent changes in banking ownership have significantly reduced Poland’s reliance 
on Italy. I will return to this in the next subsection.  
Of course, the percentage of such exposures merely illustrates how important such 
exposures are to the national banking system, but not necessarily to the State as a whole. 
Therefore, I also calculated the percentage of national GDP that the periphery exposures 
amount to.  
 
ExEP = Exposure to Euro Peripheries, ExPo = Exposure to Portugal, ExIt = Exposure to Italy, ExGr = 
Exposure to Greece, ExSp = Exposure to Spain. 
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Again, Bulgaria and Croatia had the highest levels, whereas Sweden had the lowest. 
Just like with all other structural characteristics, the positions of the remaining NoPS whose 
decisions are not ‘sealed’, requires more detailed assessment. Romania, the first state to 
express interest in participation, is not particularly exposed to the peripheries. That is partly 
attributable to a significant market share held by Société Générale (France), Erste and 
Raiffeisen (both Austria) groups. The only major ‘peripheral’ entrant is Italian UniCredit. 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, a romance-language-speaking Southern European Romania 
only has 18% exposure to the peripheries, which amounts to less than 9% of its GDP. This is 
a notable drop from the Q3 2014 level (data available at the launch of the SSM), which stood 
at 14.85% of GDP. This drop notably coincided (or correlated) with Romania putting EBU 
participation on the back burner.  
Denmark does not have an incentive to participate arising from this structural 
characteristic. Its geographical position, low overall internationalisation and a comfortable 
position in the Nordic-Baltic EHM has historically shielded the Danish Kingdom from Euro 
periphery exposures. Looking at the total exposures Denmark would seem like a particularly 
unlikely participant and in this respect seems to be aligned with Sweden. Notably, Howarth 
and Quaglia’s research reveals an important difference between these two Nordic States: 
Denmark is significantly more exposed to Euro periphery debt (both, sovereign and 
corporate) than Sweden.1070 This factor might partly explain the differences in the positions 
of the two Nordic NoPS.  
Periphery exposure is yet another structural characteristic which would seem to suggest 
that Hungary should participate. Especially considering that Hungary also has significant 
exposures to NPL-heavy and soon-to-be EMU Croatia and Bulgaria.  
The hypothesis of unwillingness to bail out peripheral States is of course partly 
conditional on the opposite being true: bail-out ‘enthusiasm’ for proximate, already 
integrated and interconnected markets. As I have illustrated in Chapter 4, that is very much 
the case with the Nordic States. Reluctance to bail-out or recapitalise ‘peripheral’ banks 
should not be confused with unwillingness to deliver during subsidiary rescues, or even 
indirectly contributing to the rescues of non-affiliated banks, which pose systemic threat to 
the NoPS in question. Sweden, for example, did not shy away from recapitalising Lithuanian 
subsidiaries, and offered assistance to the Baltic States on the inter-state level. Similarly, the 
UK contributed to Icelandic rescues. The general conclusion would be that most NoPS only 
                                                 
1070 D Howarth and L Quaglia, The Political Economy of the new Single Supervisory Mechanism: Squaring the 
‘Inconsistent Quartet, EUSA 2015, pp.30-31 
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want to participate in bank rescues of the countries that they are already exposed to. In the 
absence of other incentives, they are unwilling to create de facto ‘artificial exposures’ 
through joint European schemes. 
 
5. National origin and business type of foreign credit institutions   
Another important nuance, binding together the concentration, internationalisation and 
periphery exposure hypotheses is the national origin of foreign entrants. Generally, the three 
countries willing to join the SSM exhibit a considerable degree of foreign bank penetration 
from the Eurozone. Among the largest players in Bulgaria we find UniCredit Bulbank (Italy), 
Raiffeisenbank (Austria), Greek Piraeus Bank, and German Allianz. The only exception is 
DSK Bank which is part of the OTP group. Romania is host to many of the same institutions, 
but it notably hosts two major Greek banks - Alpha and Piraeus. In Croatia a significant 
market share is held by Privredna Banka, which is a subsidiary of Intesa Sanpaolo (Italy) and 
Zagrebacka Banka, owned by UniCredit.  
The market penetration of the Greek and Italian banks is an important structural factor. 
As discussed above, the home States of these banks are among the Euro peripheries, banking 
systems of which are still considered weaker, albeit sometimes unduly. That effectively 
creates a pre-existing exposure to the peripheries and thus arguably encourages participation. 
By contrast, the only significant ‘peripheral’ market participant in the Czech Republic is 
Unicredit, which generally has a good reputation and is widely considered too-big-to-fail. 
Moreover, it is directly supervised by the ECB. Due to low inward internationalisation, 
Denmark and Sweden do not have significant market participants headquartered in the 
Eurozone, besides Nordea.  
 
C. Politics, path-dependency, nationalism and banking socialism: how 
the NoPS learned to live without the EBU  
 
My analysis in this thesis primarily focused on legal, economic and structural factors. 
Nevertheless, the decision to participate in the SSM and the SRM is a political step, requiring 
governmental impetus and legislative amendments to national legislation. While legal, 
economic and structural factors can explain the choices made by the most reluctant and the 
keenest NoPS, the ‘undecided’ or ‘wait-and-see’ States exhibit a mixed batch of 
characteristics and can certainly be tilted one way or another, depending on non-structural 
factors. Denmark, with its permanent EMU derogation, low inward internationalisation, few 
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non-performing loans and low exposure to Euro peripheries seems like a particularly unlikely 
participant, but not only has it not ruled out participation, but also seems to be revisiting the 
decision in the light of political developments. By contrast, the structural characteristics of 
Hungary would seem to dictate keener interest in participation, but its politics distances it 
from such step.  
Once a NoPS has reached a decision, political factors and market philosophies also 
shape domestic market and its relationship with the EBU. In this section I will briefly discuss 
three national banking sector philosophies, which could provide additional context for the 
policies of some NoPS, as well as explain how they have adapted to live surrounded by the 
EBU, but not being part of it. The emergence of these alternative policies are a further 
manifestation – or a logical extension - of Schimmelfenning’s path-dependency 
hypothesis.1071As Avgouleas and Arner observed, the geopolitical reality might be that the 
EMU and non-EMU members “are pulling much further apart than ever before.”1072 If that is 
the case, in the near future some NoPS will cross the point of no return, becoming so 
entrenched in their alternative strategies that reeling them back to the SSM and SRM will no 
longer be feasible, regardless of the concessions made to that end.  
 
1. Banking nationalism  
M r  and Piroska argued that banking sector nationalism shaped the reluctance of the 
Visegrad NoPS. 1073 Lupo-Pasini overviews a broader spectrum of manifestations of financial 
nationalism, particularly in cross-border resolution and in crisis situations.1074 In the regulatory 
and supervisory domains, banking nationalism essentially means that the state focuses on 
protecting its domestic economy and banking sector in the event of an international crisis, 
rather than trying to avert or mitigate the crises altogether through international arrangements. 
It is generally linked to a lack of trust in international arrangements or emphasis on structural 
and economic inefficiencies of such arrangements. This thinking could explain why Hungary 
has not joined the EBU yet, as well as add a politico-philosophical reinforcement to Czechia’s 
structural predisposition against participation.  
                                                 
1071 F Schimmelfenning, A Differentiated leap forward: Spill-over, Path-dependency and graded membership in 
European banking regulation, West European Politics 39:3, 2016, p.492 
1072 E Avgouleas, DW Arner, The Eurozone debt crisis and the European Banking Union: A cautionary tale of 
failure and reform, The University of Edinburgh 2013, p.40 
1073 K M r , D Piroska, Banking Union and Banking Nationalism – Explaining Opt-Out Choices of Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic, Policy and Society 35:3, 2016, pp.24-25 
1074 F Lupo-Pasini, The logic of financial nationalism: The challenges of cooperation and the role of 
international law, Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp.I-Ii 
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By contrast, for governments which are less keen on banking nationalism, either by 
political conviction or as dictated by structural characteristics, ever-closer-union aspirations 
provide additional intellectual backing when joining the EBU and getting that decision 
through national parliaments, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 4. M r  and Piroska  pointed out 
the impact of general Europhilic climate in Bulgaria and Romania, which is also notably 
different from all other NoPS, except - of course - Croatia.1075 
In banking nationalism, broader euroscepticism coexists with legitimate concerns 
regarding the political significance of the EBU, discussed in Chapter 1. Czechia sees the 
EBU as ‘yet another’ way to deepen European integration. This position dominates the 
discourse among local experts. Slaný has said that EBU “represents further regulatory 
integration without the genuine political mandate of citizens from the countries of the 
Union.”1076 This is in line with Epstein and Rhodes’s neofunctionalist argument that 
European institutions took advantage of the GFC to “push through reforms that 
fundamentally contradict the perceived interests of many member states.”1077  
In some sense, banking sector (or supervision) nationalism represents a choice in terms 
of the Financial Stability Trilemma. Namely, the choice of regulatory independence and 
financial stability over deeper integration. However, the sustainability of such strategy in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic is questionable, due to high internationalisation of the 
domestic banking sectors. Particularly, it might not deliver on the financial stability promise, 
since it might be too late to limit regulatory integration, when the banking sector is already 
integrated. Unless, the State embarks on the titanic effort of altering the market itself, as the 
case is with Poland, discussed below.  
 
2. Banking socialism 
Poland’s approach is deeper-reaching and represents a slightly different version of 
financial nationalism, which has also been described as  ‘banking sector socialism’.1078 It 
refers to the phenomenon where the state tries to gain and retain a significant (or even 
controlling) share in large banks operating in the country, even when they are not in distress. 
This is rather unconventional, as in the past few decades state-orchestrated takeovers have 
been largely reserved for failing or imprudent entities. A prominent Polish example came in 
                                                 
1075 M r  and Piroska, 2016, p.3 
1076 Cited by T Zavadilova, Bankovn  unie se pibl  ilam,  esku je t  nehro  , e.15.cz, 2013, Translation is mine 
1077 RA Epstein, M Rhodes, International in life, national in death? Banking nationalism on the road to 
banking union, KFG 2014, p.6 
1078 M Miszerak,  D Rohac, Poland’s rush to banking sector socialism, Financial Times, 30/06/2017 
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late 2015, when a state-owned insurance giant, PZU, acquired a substantial stake in highly 
successful Alior Bank. Even more indicatively, in 2016 PZU and the Polish Development 
Fund jointly spent €2.5bn, purchasing the controlling stake in Bank Pekao, Poland’s second-
largest bank from UniCredit (Italy).1079 As a result, four major banks, representing over 50% 
of Polish banking assets are under state control. 
This step significantly reduced Poland’s periphery exposure. If Howarth and Quaglia’s 
hypothesis is correct, this would mean that Poland found an alternative solution to the 
periphery exposure problem, which does not involve the EBU. The ‘banking sector 
socialism’ policy can be traced to concerns raised during the GFC over the ability of 
international owners to provide liquidity to their Polish and other central European 
subsidiaries, during the periods of widespread distress or a systemic shock.1080 Therefore, by 
reducing the dependency on foreign bank groups, especially those headquartered in the 
peripheries and other NPL-heavy states, the Polish government and NCAs might be 
expecting to minimise the effects to the Polish economy in the event of future crises. Not 
having achieved the changes it desired in the EBU negotiations, Poland took a different 
approach to the financial stability trilemma. Instead of sacrificing national control this State 
expanded it, seeking financial stability but arguably at the expense of market integration. 
Poland’s banking socialism is the perfect example of trying to solve the dilemma, by trying to 
‘insert’ a Polish element (ideally - state-owned) into the ownership structures of the banks 
operating in this the country. That way the networks of international cooperation are (partly) 
bypassed, by increasing direct visibility and control over the institution itself.  
Notably, Poland was able to do this due to certain unique pre-conditions. Firstly, its 
own NPL levels were relatively low and, as discussed, were kept flat during the GFC. 
Secondly, although Unicredit’s investment in Pekao was the biggest stake held by a foreign 
bank in any Polish bank,1081 2.5 billion Euros is not that much, as far as the absolute largest 
foreign stakes go. Such semi-nationalisation was something Poland could afford, and many 
other States could not.  Lastly, the Polish banking sector is quite small relative to the overall 




                                                 
1079 M Goclowski, Poland expects more foreign owners to sell banks in 2017, Reuters, 21/12/2016  
1080 M Miszerak,  D Rohac, Poland’s rush to banking sector socialism, Financial Times, 30/06/20 
1081 Ibid.  
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3. Banking sector ‘regionalism’ 
The size of the banking sector is the main reason why Hougaard Jensen and  
Schoenmaker suggested that Sweden and Denmark should join the EBU, particularly seeking 
financial resources for resolution cases through the SRF.1082 They further contended that 
Denmark and Sweden  “have the same cross-border characteristics as the euro area countries, 
which suggests that the rationale for joining the banking union would be similar for Denmark 
and Sweden and for the Euro area countries.”1083 This conclusion, while correct in some 
respects, does not take into account the full spectrum of considerations. As my analysis has 
shown, Denmark and Sweden differ from other states in terms of a number of structural 
characteristics. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4, the creation of the Nordic-Baltic 
Extended Home Market also allowed the States in the region to create an alternative solution 
to the EBU through regional harmonisation and integration, which does not require the 
sacrifices of banking sector socialism and mitigates the risks of banking sector nationalism. 
In line with the thinking behind the host’s dilemma, it is argued that the Nordic NoPS have 
gained  “significant decision-making power vis-à-vis the host regulators in the Baltic states” 
and developed strong regional supervision networks.1084 This has effectively reduced the 
risks the Nordic Banks face abroad. In principle, as long as such ties are maintained and as 
long as ‘extended-domestic’ supervision performs well, the alternative solution to the EBU, 
which could be described as banking sector regionalism, serves its purpose.  
The choice of the banking regionalist framework is notably more sustainable for Nordic 
NoPS than pure nationalism and more lucrative than socialism. As Epstein and Rhodes 
observed: “reduced costs of international economic exchange raise the relative costs of the 
products and services that protectionist states produce, making those states less 
competitive.”1085 As long as regionalist States and their banks do not have further expansion 
ambitions (which has largely been the case since the GFC), they do not face any inherent 
risks. As a result, Sweden, and, to a lesser extent, Denmark lack the incentives to participate. 
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Fig.5.12 Consolidated banking assets as a percentage of national GDP. Data: thebanks.eu  
 
However, no solution is perfect. Banking regionalism rests on the fundamental premise 
that the regional or national supervision and regulation is superior. Learning that this is not 
the case would be very costly. Hougaard Jensen and Schoenmaker are correct in their 
contention that the NBR structures might not be able to provide a sufficient financial backing 
in crisis situations.  The Scandinavian Cash Pool and other regional structures would go part 
of the way, but might not suffice. As is evident from Fig.5.12, Denmark and Sweden’s 
banking exceed the size of their economies to a significantly greater extent than any other 
NoPS.  
The Nordic-Baltic solution is also sui generis, and would be very hard to replicate, so 
this philosophy might be of little use to other NoPS. The same could be said for banking 
socialism. While the size of the NBR extended home market and the national structural 
characteristics of Poland create the capacity to absorb the impact of the negative implications, 
the three NoPS with intentions to participate (and, arguably, Hungary) do not have such 
privilege, and need to take that into account.   
Nevertheless, at least half of the current NoPS have alternatives at their disposal. The 
longer they remain ‘non-participating’, the stronger those alternative solutions get. This is 
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and (to a lesser extent) nationalism, can also take lighter forms, where, as Profant and 
Toporowski predicted, the NoPS would seek to reduce the financial dependence between 
parent banks abroad and their branches and subsidiaries, while simultaneously strengthening 
national supervisory regimes.1086 Such solutions could be available to Czechia and Hungary. 
If these tendencies continue to manifest, the EU’s largest financial centre outside of Eurozone 
– Stockholm, as well as the largest non-Euro state – Poland – will remain outside. That can 
deepen the fractures in the single market.  
 
D. Conclusions   
The aim of this chapter was to complete the discussion on the factors influencing the 
Member States’ decisions regarding the institutional pillars of the European Banking Union, 
by analysing domestic banking sector structural characteristics.  For this purpose, this chapter 
began by examining existing literature on the subject, based in political economy as its 
primary scientific discipline. I discovered several shortcomings of the exiting methodologies, 
including limited sample sizes, failure to account for variation of indicators over multi-year 
timeframes, and lack of nuance in the application of several hypotheses. Having filled the 
gaps in the existing methodology and knowledge on the subject, I compared participation 
willingness to a number of structural indicators, the legal relevance of which became evident 
through legal analysis in Chapters 2-4.  
Following the assessment of the hypotheses linked to banking sector structural 
characteristics, it is clear that many of such characteristics correlate grosso modo with 
willingness to participate in the EBU. By way of conclusion, it is worth briefly summarising 
the main findings. Based purely on structural data, it would seem that the keenest NoPS 
would have high banking concentration, high banking internationalisation, low banking 
sector profitability, high foreign bank ownership, high exposure to peripheries and high 
percentage of NPLs. A predisposition resulting from these considerations would be amplified 
by banking sector concentration and the level of past financial crisis management success. A 
state with a predisposition against participation on the basis of low internationalisation, low 
NPLs and low exposure to Euro peripheries, would become even more unlikely to participate, 
if its banking sector is highly concentrated. A possible explanation would be that such State 
is less vulnerable to cross-border banking problems, and retains a higher level of control of 
                                                 
1086 T Profant, P Toporowski, Potential for cooperation: Polish and Czech standpoints on the Banking Union, 
PISM, 2014, p.1, see also K Kisgergely, A Szombati, Banking union through Hungarian eyes – the MNB’s 
assessment of a possible close cooperation, MNB Occasional Papers No.115, 2014, p.8 
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its banking sector. This logic broadly applies to the two CCA States and one State intending 
to sign it in the future: Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the three States least likely 
to participate: Czechia, Poland and Sweden.  
It can also be argued that a set of factors could potentially override the State’s structural 
predisposition. Eurosceptic or Europhilic political climate, broader macroeconomic strategy, 
and the level of interest in adopting the Single Currency in particular, can shape the decision. 
It should be noted that both NoPS that have joined the EBU intend to join the EMU in the 
near future. Romania has similar, albeit longer-term, intentions.  
It is therefore worth discussing whether structural characteristics could shape the 
decisions of the two ‘undecided’ NoPS – Denmark and Hungary. Both States have been very 
cautious about European integration in the past, and thus even considering the SSM and SRM 
is somewhat surprising. Schimmelfennig and Winzen pointed out that Hungary and Denmark, 
alongside Estonia and Malta have opted for a long-term exemption from the free movement 
of capital.1087 Special domestic reports, highlighting some positives and negatives of 
participation, have been published in both states, but they have not produced conclusive 
answers.1088  
It seems that Denmark has political and organisational reasons to join, but lacks 
incentives, due to low periphery exposure, low NPL level, and low inward 
internationalisation. Howarth and Quaglia also observed that Denmark has very low outward 
internationalisation within the Eurozone, especially if Finland and the Baltic States are not 
counted as Euro exposures, since they form part of the NBR Extended Home Market.1089  
Moreover, there are two, country specific, stumbling blocks, which might prevent Denmark’s 
participation. Firstly, as a State in permanent EMU derogation, Denmark is unlikely to adopt 
the single currency and thus would not be represented in the Governing Council, as discussed 
in Chapter 3. This is something that Croatia could overlook for a few years, but probably not 
something that Denmark could ignore for decades. Secondly, the disagreements about the 
status of the Danish mortgage sector have not been solved.  
With that being said, some structural characteristics are also pulling Denmark into the 
EBU. Firstly, Denmark has an absolutely massive banking sector relative to its GDP. 
Relative to the State’s overall economy, the banking sector is third largest in the EU and the 
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largest among the NoPS.1090 Furthermore, Denmark’s banking sector profitability is among 
the lowest and that provides an extra incentive to shake things up. If my interpretation of the 
concentration hypothesis is correct, high concentration would amplify this pulling force, as 
the internationalised entities form a very large percentage of the domestic market. With that 
being said, high concentration also raises the stakes for Denmark, as it would, in one sweep, 
give up supervision of its entire banking sector to the ECB. In the light of permanent EMU 
derogation, the weight of this decision is probably greater than for other NoPS.  
Hungary’s structural characteristics also seem to indicate a mix of incentives and 
disincentives. High outward and inward internationalisation, historically high levels of NPLs 
and above-average level of periphery exposure would indicate predisposition towards 
participation. Banking sector profitability has also been disappointing, which might dissuade 
the national decision makers from banking nationalism. However, decreasing NPL 
percentage in the recent years has negated the immediate threat stemming from this 
characteristic. Moreover, while periphery exposure amounts to a large proportion of all 
Hungary’s banking exposures, Hungary’s banking sector is smaller than its GDP (Fig.5.12). 
Consequently, periphery exposures only amount to around 10% of Hungarian GDP, which 
leaves room for some risk-taking.  
Hungary might need to recalculate its position now that Croatia and Bulgaria have 
joined the EBU. If Romania follows their example, a very significant percentage of 
Hungary’s largest banking group’s (OTP) business will be carried out in Southern European 
EBU States with problematic NPL histories. That might prompt Hungary to look for financial 
backing in case of a crisis. Another factor to watch is whether Hungary will manage to keep 
its own NPLs down while improving profitability. Ultimately, it is highly likely that, given a 
fairly balanced mix of structural incentives and disincentives, the position will be determined 
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Chapter 6 




As is evident from the discussion in Chapters 4 and 5, persuading the most reluctant 
NoPS to participate in the EBU institutional pillars is an irreducibly complex task. In fact, 
many of them might never be persuaded. This is a problem of significant consequence for the 
EBU as a whole, the unity and integrity of the Single Market, and – arguably – financial 
stability. As Avgouleas and Arner observed, the EU institutions, especially the Commission, 
see the EBU and the Single Market as mutually reinforcing processes.1091 It can therefore be 
argued that non-participation of a significant number of Member States distorts both 
processes. The resulting fractures can be seen as a part of a dynamic disintegration process. 
As Schimmelfenning argued, the EBU thus becomes the highlight of the path-dependency 
hypothesis and a major rift in the EU, not only “reaffirming the original differentiation” but 
also widening “the institutional gap between the euro area and the rest of the EU.”1092  
Should this divergence continue (assuming the path-dependency hypothesis is correct) 
that gap will grow bigger, as the NoPS adjust their legal arrangements and business 
environments to safeguard their banking systems from systemic threats by alternative means, 
while also deriving some advantages from the unevenness of the playing field. Such 
processes, should they become irreversible, will create market pressures to uphold the 
systems, fostering differentiation. Jorg Asmussen, ECB Executive Board member, claimed 
that the EBU “would ensure that all banks in the EU […] benefit from a level playing field, 
as bank funding costs would not be determined by the soundness of their sovereigns, but 
rather the soundness of their balance sheets and business models.”1093 The problem with this 
thinking is that some sovereigns do not have this incentive, and thus also have no inherent 
need for playing field levelling. Especially, if they do not think that the market discrepancies 
pose a threat to the stability of their domestic banking systems, or – alternatively – if they 
find alternative ways to counter such threats.  
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In the light of the risk of deeper fractures and spill-over effects into other areas of EU 
law, it is imperative to enhance pan-European supervisory coordination and rule 
harmonisation. Equally, existing frameworks of international supervisory cooperation need to 
be improved, enhanced and utilised, in order to ensure effective banking supervision, capable 
of crisis prevention or mitigation. While some of the measures taken to that end might not, by 
themselves, close the gap between the NoPS and the participating States, they can decelerate 
further divergence.  
This concluding Chapter is written with the purpose to contribute to the debate on the 
possible solutions to the problems stemming from non-participation of the NoPS. Section A 
briefly summarises the reasons for NoPS unwillingness to participate and highlights the 
connections between legal provisions and structural indicators, shaping the States’ positions. 
Section B summarises the problems stemming from the divergence between the NoPS and 
the participating States. In section C I discuss the possible solutions, suggesting legal changes 
to existing instruments, and proposing new arrangements, which could solve or mitigate 
some of the problems identified in this thesis. The final section concludes.  
 
A. Summary of reasons for non-participation 
 
Shortly after the launch of the SSM, Ferran predicted that “each non-euro Member 
State will make its own wide-ranging […] calculations on whether there are net welfare gains 
from EBU.”1094 The irreducible variety of legal, political and economic factors discussed 
throughout this thesis make such calculations irreducibly complex. Nevertheless, there are 
evident overriding patterns that generally prompt States to opt in, opt out or remain on the 
fence. This section explains how these factors feed into each other or, alternatively, create 
conflicting pressures. Subsection 1 highlights the impact of the relatively safe banking 
environment, that has disincentivised change. Subsection 2 discusses the aspects of the 
NoPS’ situation that are not a direct result of the main EBU legislation itself, but nevertheless 
discourage participation. Subsection 3 briefly revisits inequality of participation terms. 
Subsection 4 highlights certain privileges that the NoPS currently enjoy, and would need to 
part with upon signing the CCA. Subsection 5 discusses the lack of accountability of the 
ECB. Subsection 6 revisits structural characteristics and practical considerations in 
participation decisions.  
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1. Economic climate and banking stability  
It took six years for the first States to join the institutional components of the EBU, bar 
Lithuania’s adoption of the Euro. The majority of non-Eurozone States still do not 
participate. However, only two of them have completely ruled participation out, with Czechia 
taking one and a half years and two major reconsiderations to settle in this position. 
Denmark’s position changes with virtually every significant political event. Practically 
speaking, the fence does not rank high, in terms of comfort, within the hierarchy of seats. The 
financial markets normally hate uncertainty and unnecessary ambivalence. It is therefore 
peculiar that many NoPS do not shy away from leaving the EBU question unresolved. That 
can be attributed to three factors. Firstly, the EBU is evolving and the NoPS often want to see 
how a certain stage of that evolution unfolds. Secondly, the NoPS with EMU plans tend to 
delay the decision, pushing it closer to the adoption of the Single Currency, in order to avoid 
the Governing Council representation issue. Lastly, in the absence of obvious negatives of 
non-participation, due to relatively stable banking climate in the past seven years, the NoPS 
did not experience systemic shocks that could bolt them into participation. The early stages of 
the EBU were marked by apocalyptic rhetoric with the participation decision being described 
as  “decisive for financial stability.”1095 The proponents of the EBU warned of  “devastating 
effects” on domestic banks, as depositors would shift their accounts to banks headquartered 
in EBU States.1096 Since most NoPS did not experience major ‘devastating effects’, they also 
lacked the impetus to make the leap into the EBU, which is otherwise politically difficult, due 
to major autonomy costs, discussed in Chapters 1(C) and 2(E). Steen Bocian, Danske Bank's 
chief economist, has observed that there is “no real cost” in delaying the EBU decision.1097 
This is all the more the case since, the NoPS have avoided the Howard and Quaglia’s 
Inconsistent Quartet,1098 due to retaining their national currencies, and consequently retaining 
more flexibility.  
The situation started changing with Nordea’s move from Sweden to EMU Finland, 
discussed in Chapter 3(B), which has been described as a precursor for future market 
tendencies.1099 Bulgaria moved to join the EBU shortly after, following a domestic 
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supervisory failure.1100 Croatia decided to join the EMU, and joining the EBU made perfect 
sense in the light of its banking sector’s structural characteristics. These events indicate that 
the EBU is capable of attracting at least some States and some banks, when their 
circumstances and needs align with what the SSM/SRM have to offer.  
Moreover, the relative stability of European banking in the past decade is a result of 
unprecedented central bank activity. With seemingly endless streams of liquidity flowing into 
the system, the banking system did not really face a major test, even during the Covid-19 
pandemic. A major liquidity freeze could, however, also encourage participation of one or 
two NoPS.  
 
2. Material differences in the positions the NoPS find themselves in 
The non-Eurozone Member States find themselves in a fundamentally different 
institutional and infrastructural reality. Ferran highlighted concerns on how the SSM and 
SRM would work long term in non-Eurozone States with their own interest rates and no 
access to Eurosystem liquidity provision.1101  In principle, the Eurozone States have access to 
liquidity through ordinary ECB monetary policy, the ELA,1102 and the ESM.1103 The NoPS 
(and even the CCA States) do not generally have access to any of these sources. The banking 
groups headquartered in the NoPS could still have such access through their subsidiaries 
established in the Eurozone, but that is only of practical relevance for Sweden, Hungary and 
Denmark – hosts of big international banking groups. While this situation is not in itself 
unfair or discriminatory (since the NoPS have access to their own central banks’ liquidity 
provision), it is still a concern for the NoPS, because the SRM and the SRF were largely 
designed with Eurozone States in mind, and thus calibrated primarily for a potential crisis in 
the EMU, with ELA and ESM being a part of that equation. On its own, the SRF has been 
argued to be insufficient to fully absorb the shock of a systemic crisis, especially in the 
absence of a fiscal backstop.1104 As discussed in Chapter 1(A-B), the historical developments 
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and the crisis experience have resulted in congruence between the EBU and the EMU. As 
discussed in Chapter 2(C-D), that has shaped the SSM and the SRM. The EBU was built to 
save the Eurozone, and the NoPS are right to worry about being excluded from this 
philosophical conviction. In the eyes of the NoPS, the bulwark of the SRF might not be 
sufficient for holding back the wave of a systemic banking crisis of GFC proportions, yet not 
accessible enough for dealing with smaller flare-ups, especially those occurring in the 
NoPS.1105 
 
3. Unequal participation terms  
As discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3, the CCA States are excluded from the 
Governing Council of the ECB, with numerous far-reaching consequences. The safeguards 
provided to compensate for such discrepancy are in many ways a poisoned chalice, since the 
ultimate remedy in case of a fundamental disagreement between the ECB and an NCA is 
termination of the CCA. Such termination can also be initiated by the ECB, which puts the 
CCA states in a very insecure position. Furthermore, termination of the CCA means 
simultaneous ‘guillotine’ withdrawal from both: the SSM and the SRM. In turn termination 
of the SRM means withdrawal from the SRF, with high corresponding costs and massive 
reputational damage. The Administrative Board (ABR) of Review and the Mediation Panel, 
which could soften these concerns, have not achieved that, partly because of their 
composition, and partly due to direct and individual concern basis for challenges in front of 
the ABR. That is an unnecessarily high standard, which excludes many public bodies. While, 
as I have explained in Chapter 2(C), some of these problems could be argued to be 
constitutionally unavoidable, they have been aggravated by the fact that the ECB’s influence 
has spilled-over into the other pillars of the EBU and continues to grow within the SSM.1106 
That has resulted in a certain degree of push back from the Member States, on the political 
and adjudicative levels.1107 Such fluid and uncertain power dynamic in the EBU is in itself 
undesirable for the NoPS. Not having a say in the highest ranking organ of the ECB, the 
NoPS need to be able to gauge the exact power settlement on offer, and it does not help if it 
keeps changing.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Genuine Economic and Monetary Union and the implications for the UK, 2014, pp.27–28, implicitly 
acknowledged by Ursula von der Leyen, A Union that strives for more: My agenda for Europe, political 
guidelines for the next European Commission, 2019-2024, p.9 
1105 As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, see also House of Lords, EU Committee, Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union and the implications for the UK, 2014, pp.27–28. 
1106 See Chapter 2E 
1107 Ibid. 
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4. Existing benefits that the NoPS would need to part with 
The NoPS also derive several unique advantages from their current status, that they 
would need to relinquish upon signing the CCA. Despite rule harmonisation on the EU level, 
the NoPS retain a lot of operational autonomy and flexibility, particularly in relation to intra-
group liquidity flows, institutional arrangements, and resolution processes, which they seem 
to be keen to preserve.1108 For example, the institutional design flexibility allows the NoPS to 
set the independence, accountability, and transparency balance at the desired level. Some 
countries have given supervisors more independence, while others put greater emphasis on 
political accountability and are therefore leerier of vesting power in unelected bodies, like the 
ECB.1109 Supervisors can also become scapegoats in the aftermath of a crisis, or more 
independence can be given to them in advance, because the government does not want to be 
blamed, if a crisis erupts.1110 The EBU effectively takes such (perhaps manipulative) 
freedoms away from national governments, and puts the independence-accountability–
transparency settlement in more restrictive confines, often different from national 
preferences.  
It is important to note that during the design process of the EBU, an intellectual 
consensus among the Member States on the best supervisory structure was never 
achieved.1111 Individually, the States have reached different conclusions on things like the 
particular institutions that act as supervisors, degree of centralisation, and division of 
authority between supervisory discretion and legal procedures.1112 The settlement we have in 
the EBU was dictated by the majority of Eurozone States, but it is not necessarily optimal for 
all NoPS. This schism became even more evident in the aftermath of the GFC. As discussed 
in Chapter 1 the patterns of post-GFC regulatory reforms were shaped by a natural reaction to 
move away from the approach that had failed, effectively leading to one conclusion - impose 
stricter regulation. Naturally, some aspects of such approach were met with scepticism in 
many NoPS, especially those which demonstrated considerable banking sector resilience 
during the GFC. That is particularly the case for the most reluctant NoPS. As discussed 
                                                 
1108 IMF, Central and Eastern Europe: New Member States Policy Forum, 2014, Country Report No.15/98, 
April 2015 p.38 
1109 D Masciandaro, M Quintyn, M Taylor, Inside and outside of the central banks: Independence and 
accountability in financial supervision - trends and determinants, Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No.2008-
15, 2008, p.17 
1110 Ibid. 
1111 DJ Elliot, Key issues on European banking Union; Trade-offs and some recommendations, Global Economy 
and Development, Brookings, 2012 
p.22 
1112 Ibid.  
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Chapter 4, many NoPS also take pride in their supervisory standards, and give due credit to 
the lessons of the past which allowed them to build sturdy banking oversight systems. The 
participating States obviously retain the discretion to express their banking oversight 
philosophy through national law,1113 but since the ECB can also take part in national law 
application, the NoPS have reasonable concerns about this application process being in line 
with legislative intent. 
Importantly, the NoPS, in their unique status, have also carved out certain concessions 
in the European banking oversight architecture. That includes the double majority voting in 
the EBA’s Board of Supervisors, discussed Chapter 3E, which was recognised as a good deal 
even by the UK.1114 By signing the CCA, a non-EMU State effectively exchanges a vote in a 
smaller pool of NoPS for a vote in a larger pool of participating States. Since Bulgaria and 
Croatia joined the SSM/SRM, and the UK left the EU, the Nordic and Visegrad NoPS now 
wield a lot of power in the EBA. Furthermore, some NoPS also hold significant powers 
through the colleges of supervisors and regional structures. Joining the SSM would often 
mean giving up the role of the consolidating supervisor to the ECB, and thus also much of 
their regional influence.   
 
5. Lack of accountability of the ECB 
Increasing ECB’s influence in the SSM, spill-overs into other pillars of the EBU, and 
exclusion from the Governing Council makes the NoPS particularly concerned about the 
(lack of) constraints imposed on the ECB. As Ferran and Babis explained,  
“weak constraints are unacceptable in the supervisory context because a financial 
supervisor has the power to affect in profound ways the interests of individual financial 
institutions, of financial consumers, and even of nation states; the accountability framework 
must be commensurate with the nature and extent of those powers.” 1115   
 
Clear and effective review procedures are considered imperative for an effective 
accountability regime, which, by reducing the scope for discretionary interventions, can even 
enhance performance.1116 Basel Principle 2 declares that in order to ensure effective 
                                                 
1113 See Chapter 2(C)  
1114 A Barker, P Spiegel, EU sets out framework for Banking Union, Financial Times, 2013, see Art. 44(1), EBA 
Regulation  
1115 E Ferran, VSG Babis, The European Single Supervisory Mechanism, University of Cambridge Faculty of 
Law Research Paper No.10, 2013, p.17 
1116 M Quintyn, EHG Hüpkes, M Taylor, The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors Principles and 
Practice, 2005, p.8  
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supervision, bank supervisors must be accountable for the discharge of their duties and use of 
their resources.1117 Even the Commission stressed the need to strengthen the accountability of 
the ECB as a banking supervisor.1118  
The ECB itself, however, expressed the need to highlight its independence during the 
SSM legislation drafting process.1119 Howarth and Loedel once compared the ECB to 
Hobbes's Leviathan: “a supreme ruler that is nonetheless greatly restrained in its actions.”1120 
The problem is that the NoPS do not want it to be a supreme ruler and sometimes feel that it 
is not sufficiently restrained in its actions, as is evident from the discussion in Chapter 1E. 
Meanwhile, the ECB does not seem to want to be restrained in its actions. That is a 
significant underlying tension in the EBU’s development.  
Such tension resulted in a rather ambiguous accountability regime in the SSM.1121 
Some of the Art.20 SSMR accountability obligations are imposed on the Supervisory Board, 
which can be overruled by the Governing council. As non-Eurozone States are excluded from 
it, this does not sit easily with the principle of subsidiarity. According to the European 
Council, ideally, “accountability takes place at the level at which decisions are taken and 
implemented.”1122 Furthermore, the accountability rules and operational restrictions on 
national supervisors under national law continue to exist in parallel with the SSM rules.1123 
There is no harmonised accountability framework for the NCAs within the SSM, which adds 
to the uncertainty. The NoPS thus have a dual concern of being responsible for decisions they 
have no power over, made by the Governing Council, and not being able to hold this organ to 
account.  
 
6.  Structural Characteristics and practical considerations 
There are many pragmatic considerations that also pull some NoPS away from 
participation. Firstly, Hungary, Czechia, Poland and Sweden have all claimed to be able to 
provide the same level of stability and supervisory standards of their banking sector as the 
                                                 
1117 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, 2012, 
principle 2  
1118 Communication of the Commission of 28 November 2012 on a Blueprint for a deep and genuine economic 
and monetary union 
1119 ECB, Opinion on the SSM proposal, 27 Oct. 2012 (COM (2012) 96), para 1.6  
1120 D Howarth, P Loedel, The European Central Bank: The New European Leviathan?, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003, p.177  
1121 See E Wymeersch, The Single Supervisory Mechanism or 'SSM', Part one of the Banking Union,  National 
Bank of Belgium Working Paper No.255, 2014, p.23 
1122 Pt 15 of the European Council conclusions of 18 October 2012  
1123 E Ferran, VSG Babis, The European Single Supervisory Mechanism, University of Cambridge Faculty of 
Law Research Paper No.10, 2013, p.16 
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ECB, but cheaper.1124 The EBU schemes and instruments are generally considered more 
expensive than the national equivalents.  
Secondly, the reputation argument does not have much pull in the most reluctant NoPS, 
since they themselves performed well during the GFC, whereas the reputation of the ECB 
was rather shaky, and thus there is no real financial cost to non-participation. Ehrmann et al. 
documented a fall in trust in the ECB, reflecting macroeconomic deterioration, broader 
decline in trust in EU bodies, and the severity of the Eurozone’s banking problems, to which 
the ECB was associated in the public opinion.1125 By contrast, some of the NoPS’ NCAs and 
central banks avoided being associated with the crisis.  
Thirdly, banking sector concentration can shape the participation decisions, as the 
SSMR significance criteria designate the three largest entities in each State for direct ECB 
supervision. The more concentrated the market, the bigger chunk of it the ECB will 
supervise. Notably, that can be both an incentive and disincentive, depending on the origin 
and financial health of these three entities. 
Fourthly, the level of non-performing loans on the books of the country’s banks tends 
to correlate with participation willingness, as the State might seek additional security in the 
SRF, as well as to spread the blame in case of a supervisory failure, if the situation gets 
dangerous. As the levels of NPLs declined across the EU, some of the incentives to 
participate were lost.  
Fifthly, the NoPS are concerned about using their taxpayers’ money to bail out other 
States, especially those they have little exposure to. When a CCA State has minimal exposure 
to a troubled Eurozone State, it lacks say in the decision-making regarding the supervision of 
the entities in that EMU State. That is because they do not participate in the relevant colleges 
of supervisors, in addition to potentially having lesser decision-making powers as part of the 
SSM due to their non-participation in the Governing Council. That effectively diminishes 
their level of control over how the money is spent, even if equal participation in the SRM is 
ensured. Lack exposure also means reduced interest in the wellbeing of the institutions active 
in more distant Eurozone States, as contagion effects from their collapse would not be 
immediate. The CCA transfer of power and money is therefore argued to constitute an 
                                                 
1124 See IMF, Central and Eastern Europe: New Member States Policy Forum, 2014, IMF Country Report No. 
15/98, p.38. Also see discussion on Sweden and the Nordic-Baltic market in Chapter 5D-E.  
1125 M Ehrmann , M Soudan, L Stracca, Explaining European Union citi ens’ Trust in the European Central 
Bank in normal and crisis times, ECB, 2013, pp.782, 806-807 
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electoral liability.1126  
Lastly, additional disincentives can also be presented by certain levels and types of 
internationalisation.1127 Importantly, those NoPS which are determined to stay out of the 
SSM/SRM can seek to alter the levels of their internationalisation, as a safeguard against 
some of the dangers of non-participation, which requires political decisions and entails sunk 
costs, making such decisions hard to reverse.  
 
B. Limited scope  
 
As illustrated in Chapter 4, the European banking markets are interconnected across the 
Eurozone - and even EU - borders. I have covered the effects and influence of the NoPS and 
non-EU states. Such states have substantial credit sector impact across the EU, significantly 
influence banking in individual Eurozone States, and can have destabilising impact. 
Therefore, pan-European arrangements need to stretch beyond the EU. As the new reality of 
Brexit dictates – they might even need to stretch beyond the EEA. This section summarises 
the most important problems resulting from limited geographical scope.  
 
1. What the limitations look like in practical terms  
While, given the magnitude of the reform and the associated struggle, the EBU can be 
seen as an enormous harmonisation effort, its geographical scope leaves a lot to be desired. 
All the more so, since the ECB and SRB’s domains do not even cover half of European 
banking assets. Moloney observed that nine of the world’s 29 Global Systemically Important 
Banks, as identified by the FSB are supervised by the ECB and subject to the SSM and 
SRM.1128 A third would be a lot for most other continents, besides North America, but 
Europe’s banking industry is huge and most of it remains outside of the ECB’s remit. At the 
time of writing, the most important European financial centres by the Global Financial 
Centres Index are 1. London 2. Frankfurt 3. Zurich 4. Luxembourg 5. Munich 6. Geneva 7. 
Vienna and 8. Stockholm.1129 The SSM does not cover credit institutions located in four out 
of eight most important hubs, which means that the playing field remains very bumpy. 
Moreover, the three largest non-Eurozone financial centres are located outside of the EU, and 
                                                 
1126 A Spendzharova, I Bayram, Banking union through the back door? How European banking union affects 
Sweden and the Baltic States, West European Politics, 39:3 2016, p.573 
1127 See Chapter 5(B)(1) 
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thus even the application of the Single Rulebook can be problematic in some cases. Even 
assuming that the situation in relation to SSM membership will improve with Romanian and 
possibly Danish and Hungarian memberships, half of Western European1130 bank assets 
would be located in the NoPS, EEA/EFTA states, and the UK. That does not even take into 
consideration interconnectedness with Eastern Europe,1131 the Middle East, Turkey, the 
United States, etc.  
Moreover, 18 of Europe’s 50 largest banks are headquartered outside of the SSM area, 
in the NoPS, the UK, Norway, Switzerland, and Russia. All of them have significant 
exposures to the Eurozone States. Furthermore, 27 of the 32 Eurozone banks on this list have 
branches or subsidiaries in the NoPS, the UK or the EEA/EFTA states. Essentially almost all 
of these banks have presence, interests, or significant exposures crossing the Eurozone 
borders on everyday basis. The banking market can be argued to be fully integrated 
throughout Western Europe, and at least semi-integrated throughout the entire continent.  
Therefore, a reform covering 40-50% of that market only goes a similar percentage of 
the way. Avgouleas and Arner highlighted the “axiom that, although financial markets may 
be established anywhere […] in the absence of restrictions on cross-border flows, their 
stability may only be guaranteed through appropriate institutions and not by reliance on 
market forces’ rationality and co-ordination.” 1132 They assert that the arrangements designed 
“to safeguard the stability of the cross-border market cannot be delayed until formal 
integration efforts reach a peak, whether in the form of establishment of a single currency 
area, or otherwise.”1133  
At this point, cross-Eurozone-border flows are largely governed by harmonised rules, 
but such rules are not underpinned to adequate institutional arrangements, which lag behind 
market realities. Therefore, by virtue of the EBU, the threat to European financial stability 
stemming from the banking market is mitigated, but not eliminated.  
 
2. Consequences of limited scope 
Geographical scope limitations have left plenty of room for further differentiated 
integration in the EU. The dangers stemming from differentiated integration, and the harm 
they can do to the overall outcomes of the EBU, cannot be overstated. Schimmelfenning 
                                                 
1130 For these purposes Western Europe is taken to mean the EU, the UK, Switzerland, Iceland and Norway. 
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1132 E Avgouleas, DW Arner, The Eurozone debt crisis and the European Banking Union: A cautionary tale of 
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warned that:  
“if endogenous interdependencies and supranational institutionalisation among 
insiders grow faster and more strongly than externalities and informal institutions between 
insiders and outsiders, then differentiated integration produces centrifugal effects and causes 
the gap between insiders and outsiders to widen.”1134  
 
As I discussed in Chapter 1, the GFC further merged the narratives of the EBU and the 
EMU, and thus strengthened path-dependency. That has been a catalyst for further 
disintegration. According to Schimmelfennig and Winzen “Euro crisis not only produced 
more integration in the Eurozone, but also more differentiation from the non-Eurozone 
countries. The Eurozone not only strengthened existing institutions (such as the Stability and 
Growth Pact), but also created new institutions, in which non-Eurozone countries do not 
participate.”1135 In addition to Brexit and the EBU, Schimmelfennig and Winzen point out 
other tendencies of disintegration, such as Cyprus joining Ireland as a long-term non-
Schengen Member State, and Estonia, Hungary, Malta and Denmark seeking long-term 
exemptions from the free movement of capital agreements.1136  
The centrifugal effects of differentiated integration are likely to further distance most 
NoPS from the EBU, which also makes the participation offer seem increasingly worse. For 
example, under the SSMR the ECB needs to take into account the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination, as well as the interests of the EU as a whole.1137 However, according to 
Tridimas, as a “consequence of asymmetric integration […] the normative content of non-
discrimination becomes more difficult to pin down.”1138 Some features of the EBU clearly 
favour the EMU States over the non-EMU States. Other features allow for a dynamic power 
fluctuation, the opportunities presented by which can be seized by EU institutions. The 
meaning of normative content can be lost in the crack between the two situations.  
As mentioned, in the light of such imperfections, once determined to decline participation, 
the NoPS often invest in proofing its system against systemic shocks through banking sector 
nationalism or regionalism. I have discussed this phenomenon from the theoretical1139 and 
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empirical1140 perspectives. This dynamic was illustrated by Fig.1.7, which I would like to 




The EBU is certainly a factor, in the pursuance of pan-European banking stability, but 
if it deepens differentiation rather than limits it, the EBU reforms can become 
counterproductive, especially if permanent dividing lines are drawn. “EU2[8] needs a strong 
EU1[9]. But measures to strengthen EU1[9] could undermine the integrity of EU2[8]. This is 
a core conundrum,”1141 as Ferran and Babis concluded. The lack of harmonisation in banking 
oversight is an important issue. The EBU without the UK, Switzerland, Norway, Poland, 
Denmark, Czechia, Hungary and Sweden does not look like a pan-European reform. In the 
light of increasing banking sector nationalism and socialism in Visegrad, regionalism in the 
Nordics and Baltics, and Brexit, the SSM and SRM are themselves at risk of becoming 
regional structures.  
That can undermine the effectiveness of the Single Rulebook and the EBU as a whole. 
The ECB has admitted that “despite the existence of common rules, divergent supervisory 
practices and outcomes pose a potential risk to the effective oversight of cross-border groups 
and the development of a level playing field in financial services.”1142 This is a very old 
problem that will not be solved, as long as unreformed home-host system remains. The 
Lamfalussy report, back in the day, warned about the banking oversight system’s reliance on 
                                                 
1140 Chapter 5(C) 
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national competence and political will.1143 This is still the case in relation to the NoPS.  
Importantly, the financial services markets are not fragmented along the same lines as 
the EBU mechanisms, which introduces further complications. Regional banking markets 
exist across the borders of European organisational memberships. Furthermore, the 
fragmentation in the EBU is deepened by exclusions of particular entities on political and 
constitutional basis, as well as arguably unnecessary flexibility left by the capital 
requirements legislation.1144   
This fragmentation raises fundamental questions about the EBU’s ability to safeguard 
financial stability, which is a very different aspiration from restoring it after a crisis. Tridimas 
stated that as “the fundamental objectives of BU are to safeguard financial stability within the 
EU and promote the internal market […] the underlying rationale of the of the SSM is to 
contribute to the soundness of credit institutions and safeguard financial stability by laying 
down a centralized supervisory system.” 1145  How far does that goal stretch? How much of a 
guardian does the ECB, SRB and EBA, have to be? The answers to these questions depend 
on what we mean by “financial stability.” From the perspective of economics, mere stability 
is not enough – what is required is stable growth. The main public function of the financial 
system is to finance the real economy. Therefore, maintaining and deepening the EU’s 
internal market for banking services is considered “essential in order to foster economic 
growth in the Union and adequate funding of the real economy.”1146 That effectively presents 
three fundamental goals for future EBU development: 1. Contributing to banking sector 
stability throughout the Single Market, not just the EBU 2. Preventing further differentiation, 
and 3. Mitigating the effects of fragmentation.  
 
C. Mending the divide: solutions and recommendations 
 
Simply declaring that the EBU is ‘too small’ to ensure pan-European stability is hardly 
original. Contending that it might be insufficient to achieve the bare minimum of adequately 
protecting the Eurozone might be more contentious, but would still constitute a valid 
argument. Stating the problem is important, yet insufficient. The goal of research is - 
ultimately - to provide answers and solutions. In this section I will therefore explore potential 
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solutions to the SSM/SRM’s geographical scope problem, assessing their merits and 
shortcomings. Before doing so, in Subsection 1, I will assess the likelihood of the NoPS 
considering the (potentially revised and improved) participation offer.  
 
1. Can the NoPS still be persuaded? 
Despite their reluctance to participate, the NoPS are not ideologically averse to the idea 
of the EBU. Even the most reluctant States like the UK, Sweden and the Czech Republic 
welcomed the reform as a whole. None of the current NoPS rejected the SSM/SRM from the 
start and gradually arrived at their conclusions, as they assessed the final form the 
Mechanisms took, and the processes that shaped them. Many of the NoPS, including Sweden 
and Poland, fought to achieve better conditions for the non-Euro States signing the CCA, 
indicating that participation was very much a possibility. The rhetoric coming from the NoPS 
did not indicate hostility. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said that Hungary was 
in favour of the overall arrangement, as far as the essence of it is concerned.1147 At the launch 
of the SSM, the National Bank of Denmark governor Lars Rhode was “firmly convinced” 
that Denmark “should opt-out of the EBU,” but also recognised its merits.1148  Mugur 
Isarescu, the Governor of Romania’s central bank, said that participation could act as a 
mechanism for removing incentives for deleveraging on the part of banks with foreign 
capital, reduce opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, and allow the country to resist crisis 
contagion effects better, while also contributing to market competitiveness.1149 It can be 
recalled that Romania still intends to join the SSM and SRM eventually, even if alongside the 
EMU. Even the former Czech National Bank Governor, Miroslav Singer has said that the 
CNB generally “supports the idea of a banking union in Europe.”1150  
This indicates that some, if not most, NoPS would consider full EBU membership, if 
participation conditions were to their satisfaction or in their interest. Creating such conditions 
will not be easy. Despite the favourable view of the EBU as an idea, as far as the actual 
mechanisms go, the reaction to the EBU proposals indicated “fundamental opposition rather 
than mere technical concerns” among the NoPS, and many of such concerns remain.1151 As I 
have discussed in Chapters 2-3, the Governing Council Representation issue is a major 
stumbling block, resulting in a number of sub-optimal features of the SSM and EBU as a 
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whole. This is confirmed by the fact that only the States that expect to avoid it through 
eventual EMU membership have signed the CCA. Persuading countries with no intention to 
join the EMU will obviously prove more problematic. It is, however, imperative for 
triggering a centripetal reaction. In order to create a pull towards the EBU for more States, 
the EU will first need to find ways to persuade at least one State which does not have plans to 
join the EMU. That is a critical challenge.  
The effort to facilitate that is most certainly worthwhile, as changes in membership 
would affect not just the NoPS joining, but also the interconnected Eurozone markets. For 
example, in the Baltic States fundamental rebalancing between the Eurozone on non-
Eurozone banks would occur, if Denmark or Sweden joined the EBU. If two of the NBR 
giants (SEB, Swedbank, DnB and Danske) were placed within the EBU, the market share of 
non-SSM banks in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia could drop below 50%. Predominantly host 
States could also tip the scales. If the Czech Republic joined, that would reduce the 
percentage of Eurozone groups’ assets located outside of the ECB’s reach. Such 
developments would also affect consolidation mechanics.  
The path to such scenario is not easy. Even Romania’s participation is not guaranteed 
and might require additional incentives. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, improving banking 
sector health and diminishing short-term prospects of the EMU membership have slowed 
down its integration. Denmark and Hungary would probably expect some concessions in 
membership negotiations, which is something the EU has (so far) been unwilling to 
compromise on. Czechia, Poland and Sweden would expect a systemic reform. The most 
reluctant NoPS are unlikely to move in the absence of a major domestic deterioration, or 
significant improvements to membership conditions. Generally speaking, by addressing the 
concerns of the NoPS and having due regard for the underlying structural factors influencing 
their decisions, the EU might be able to encourage participation of some - but probably not 
all - NoPS.  
 
2. Treaty Change   
The possibility (and need) for change is recognised in the EBU legislation itself. The 
SSMR1152 refers to the Communication of the Commission1153 discussing the possibility of 
amending Art.127(6) TFEU to allow a direct and irrevocable opt-in procedure beyond the 
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CCA, granting the non-EMU States participating in the SSM “full equal rights in the ECB’s 
decision-making,” and constitutionalising the separation of decision-making for monetary 
policy and supervision.1154 Back in the Lamfalussy era, it was generally thought that a Treaty 
change would be necessary for “the creation of a single EU regulatory authority for financial 
services.”1155 While a workaround has been found by limiting the ECB’s domain to banking 
and the SSM/SRM scope to the Eurozone and CCA States, such limitations are an 
unfortunate necessity, rather than an optimal arrangement. The possibility of a Treaty change 
might need to be revisited.  
Given the level of centralisation, the magnitude of the reform and the amount of 
liquidity in question, Arts.114 and 127 TFEU seem to be inherently problematic as sources of 
constitutional legitimacy. The former due to its limitations in relation to institution building, 
the later due to its jurisdictional limits and imprecision. That is especially the case since the 
EBU powers of the ECB do not sit easily with the established reading of the principle of 
subsidiarity, as discussed in Chapter 2E. Of course, the biggest issue is that Treaty limitations 
bar the NoPS from representation in the ECB’s Governing Council.1156 This problem is 
further aggravated by the inter-linkages with the SRM, and the ECB’s influence on the 
provisions of the Single Rulebook.  
A Treaty change is of course possible, and the procedure for that is well known. Treaty 
change proposals can be submitted by the Government of any Member State, the European 
Parliament, or the Commission.1157 These proposals may, inter alia, serve to increase the 
competences conferred on the Union, such as the competencies of the ECB. However, Treaty 
changes require political consensus, which is unlikely. The inclusion of the CCA State 
representatives in the Governing Council would dilute the power of Eurozone insiders, and 
give CCA States undue say. In theory, the Governing Council could include the CCA 
representatives, when sitting in its supervisory capacity, and not include them when sitting in 
the monetary capacity, making use of the existing separation. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, such separation itself has been criticised as sub-optimal.  
Moreover, Eurozone States might insist on weighted voting, which already exists for 
some Governing Council decisions. Under Art.10.3 of the ECB Statute, Governing Council 
decisions relating to the ECB’s capital are made through weighted voting, according to the 
national central banks’ shares in the subscribed capital of the ECB. If voting was weighted on 
                                                 
1154 Ibid. 
1155 A Lamfalussy et al, Regulation of European Securities Markets, Final Report 15/2/2001 
1156 See Art.10 ECB Statute  
1157 Art.48(2) TEU  
 289 
the basis of the contributions to the SRF or a similar measure, most CCA States would be at a 
disadvantage, due to the size of their banking sectors.  
Furthermore, the Treaty change would still not make the position of the non-Euro opt-
ins 100% equivalent (or ideal for them), as they would not be able to take part in the ECB’s 
liquidity provision. The communication of the Commission stressed the irrevocability of the 
new (proposed) cooperation agreement, which would remove the threat of being ‘kicked out’, 
but that would also remove one of the safeguards the CCA States now have at their disposal. 
It is unclear whether there as a NoPS’ consensus on the matter. While persuading some 
NoPS, such changes could dissuade some others. 
Most importantly, this Treaty change would, in all likelihood, need to come as part of 
the package of measures further reforming European financial supervision, with all the 
associated costs. In the current political and economic situation, where the financial system is 
flooded with cash and liquid assets, the appetite for such reform will remain minimal for the 
foreseeable future.   
 
3. Giving legal capacity to the supervisory colleges  
Another proposal, discussed at length by Carmassi at al., was turning the supervisory 
colleges into effective supranational supervisory structures, acting under the ECB’s 
instructions, with “full powers to control and inspect all branches and subsidiaries of cross-
border banking groups, thus getting rid of the current artificial task allocation between home 
and host country control while at the same time making full use of existing supervisory 
structures.”1158 According to this proposition,  the colleges would deliver supervisory reports, 
including proposals for remedial action, to the ECB Supervisory Board, which would 
deliberate on the report’s recommendations, and entrust the colleges with the implementation 
of the ultimate decision.1159 
Such reform could in fact contribute to the effectiveness of cross-border supervision 
between the Eurozone, CCA States, and the NoPS. As I have discussed in Chapter 3, the 
main problem with the current EBU-style colleges of supervisors is that they do not have 
legal capacity, nor do they actually have any of the above-mentioned powers. A further 
problem is that supervisory colleges created on non-EBU basis, even if created under the 
EBA’s guidance, are unevenly distributed around Europe and display huge disparities in 
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cooperation intensity and effectiveness. Some level of improvement can be achieved, but 
questions remain as to the extent of that improvement.  
To achieve its full potential, a colleges-based system would need to be able to stretch 
beyond the EU, at least as far as the UK, EFTA, and EEA states. The problem is that the ECB 
could not take part in such colleges, if they had legal capacity or power in their own right. 
That is because the ECB as a supervisor cannot impose obligations on itself in respect to third 
countries. A college-based system would thus need to either continue to ignore the integrated 
regional banking market realities, or operate on the basis of an international Treaty that the 
EU as a whole would accede to. Both solutions are impractical. Moreover, as some degree of 
differentiation between colleges would remain, that would go against the goal of European 
harmonisation and the EU’s neofunctionalist agenda of centralisation. The result could be 
further regionalisation of supervision. That could create duplication of tasks and possibly 
generate conflicts, where the interests of large regional colleges and the ECB would collide. 
A college-based solution could make cross-border supervision even more complicated and –
possibly - costlier.  
That is not to say that the existing college system cannot be improved and utilised 
better. That should involve more recognition for regional colleges, created on the initiative of 
the participating supervisors, and reducing the disproportionate influence of the largest 
members of the college (particularly the consolidating supervisors), redistributing the powers 
more evenly.  
 
4. Stipulating the scope and procedure for negotiations  
The most effective and straightforward way to further integration and harmonisation of 
EU banking oversight is, of course, encouraging more NoPS to participate in adjusted 
existing arrangements. Assuming some NoPS are willing to live with the Governing Council 
issue and its consequences, it might well be that the best way to go about it is to expand the 
scope of negotiations preceding the CCA. The NoPS would potentially want to use Art.1(2) 
SSMR excluding institutions referred to in Art.2(5) CRD. I have criticised such exclusions as 
a threat to level playing field and regulatory harmonisation in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, such 
exclusions, if created through a clear and transparent process, could be successfully used in 
order to remove particular stumbling blocks in negotiations. This would not be 
unprecedented, as changes to this provision have been made by Directive 2019/878, inter alia 
facilitating the exclusions requested by Croatia and Bulgaria. The obvious danger is further 
politicisation of this provision, the evidence of which I have provided in Chapter 2E.  
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If the EU showed willingness to accommodate broader negotiations, Denmark and 
(possibly) Hungary would consider participation, as some of their structural characteristics 
have produced natural incentives, as discussed in Chapter 5. However, it is questionable 
whether the EU would be willing to make such concession, not in small part due to level 
playing field and operational stability concerns. Furthermore, additional exclusions would be 
unlikely to change the positions of predominantly host NoPS.  
 
5. Liability of the ECB and legality of actions 
Moloney mentioned Member State concerns “with respect to the legal protection of 
banks, in particular in relation to the appropriate judicial forum for bank remedies where 
NCA action has been dictated by the ECB.”1160 The ECB itself is almost impossible to sue, 
and there are certainly good reasons for that. According to the Basel Principles, the legal 
framework for banking supervision has to include legal protection for the supervisor.1161  The 
laws need to “provide protection to the supervisor and its staff against lawsuits for actions 
taken and/or omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith.”1162  Academics 
also see outright ECB liability with scepticism, partly due to the limits of the courts’ 
knowledge in this highly technical area.1163 The ECB thus fought tooth and nail to limit its 
liability to ‘qualified unlawfulness’, such as intentional misconduct or gross negligence.1164  
This is generally the established practice in many national jurisdictions, in line with the 
CJEUs jurisprudence.1165 The ECB justified such protections on the basis of an “obligation to 
protect the plurality of interests” in the banking system, and needing to operate, particularly 
in the times of crises, “under tight time constraints.”1166 
The problem is that the SSM liability restrictions, in principle, do not stand in the way 
of the liability of the NCAs in national law.1167 Furthermore, the liability standards differ 
between Member States, with some allowing liability only for wilful misconduct or gross 
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negligence, while others apply the common rules on liability for mere negligence.1168 For 
example, under Art.2 of the Statute of the Bank of Lithuania, the institution is a legal 
person.1169 It does not have exclusive legal protection and can be sued. This stands in stark 
contrast with the German Bundesbank. A hypothetical NCA1 could be doing the exact same 
thing - following the ‘orders’ of the ECB - as NCA2. However, NCA2 is legally protected if 
the measure backfires, whereas the NCA1 might not be, especially if the ECB’s direction is 
limited to guidance, rather than outright instructions. This situation is even more complicated 
for non-EMU States, which are not part of the Eurosystem. A clearer NCA liability 
framework needs to be established as part of the SSM legislation, to alleviate the NoPS 
concerns.  
 
6. Creation of an appeal and review panel  
Given the ambiguity and impracticality of the liability provisions, the creation of a 
more effective and timely review and appeal system is imperative. I have highlighted the 
ineffectiveness of the current dispute resolution system in Chapter 3, including the limitations 
of the SSM Mediation Panel and Administrative Board of Review. As things stand, the NoPS 
are unwilling to accept the Governing Council as the absolute and unquestionable authority 
on all decisions, with the termination of the CCA being the only pushback option. A possible 
solution could be creating an independent appeal panel, including personnel delegated by all 
NCAs involved in the supervision of (and resolution planning for) the credit institution in 
question, as well as the ECB. Such panel could also serve as a first instance of review for 
ECB’s rule-making.  
Alternatively, the SSMR could be amended, giving an opportunity for the States 
concerned (or their NCAs) to address their own objections to the Mediation Panel. The 
downside of such arrangement would obviously be the resulting sacrifices in decision-making 
efficiency, but that could be mitigated by a simplified procedure for such objections and the 
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7. EU-level supervisory standards legislation   
While it is important to note that, quality-wise, standards of supervision do not differ 
much between the Eurozone and the NoPS,1170 as Avgouleas and Arner observed, “[d]ifferent 
supervisory handbooks and supervisory approaches between the Member States participating 
in the [SSM] and the other Member States pose a risk of fragmentation of the single market, 
as banks could exploit the differences to pursue regulatory arbitrage.”1171 
It is clear that the EU supervisory system lacks a common supervisory practices statute, 
which would draw a baseline for all EU supervisors. The EBA standards still lack the 
firepower to achieve cohesion of practices. Moreover, gaps are still evident in somewhat 
unexpected places. For example, the entire body of legislation (TFEU, CRR, CRDIV, SSMR, 
SSMFR, SRMR, PRR, etc.) does not include a precise definition of prudential supervision. 
While the details should continue to be specified by the EBA, a brief and precise EU 
Regulation stipulating the most important commonly agreed definitions and practice 
requirements is both desirable and feasible. Moreover, in the long run, it could phase out the 
ECB’s supervisory handbook, which is deemed to create discrepancies between the 
SSM/SRM and the NoPS.  
 
8. Stricter separation between pillars   
The SRM is fundamentally legally joined to the SSM in terms of its geographical and 
jurisdictional scope and is therefore limited to Eurozone States, and those in close 
cooperation, in accordance with Art.7 SSMR.1172 There are, of course, credible justifications 
for such interconnectedness. Supervision without the Single Rulebook would lead to 
fragmentation and competition distortions.1173  Supervision without the SRM would not break 
the vicious circle, and neither would resolution without burden-sharing.1174 It is believed that 
subjecting the NoPS to the SRM without the SSM would create wrong incentives. The NoPS 
NCAs could be disproportionately and unduly lenient towards banks in their jurisdictions “as 
they would not have to bear the full financial risk of their failures.”1175 This could arguably 
lead to exacerbation of the ‘national champions’ problem, discussed in Chapter 1, rather than 
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reduce it. Baglioni also pointed out BRRD Art.32(4)(d) conditions as a means to “to deter 
early bailouts by national governments” seeking to avoid the resolution procedure.1176 
A fundamental problem for the EBU highlighted in Chapters 2-3 is that the 
interconnectedness between the SSM and SRM has brought all the problems stemming from 
the inequality of representation in the Governing Council into the domains of other pillars of 
the EBU. While participation in the two Mechanisms should not be separated, for the 
aforementioned reasons, a stricter division between functions needs to be established. The 
SRB needs to be strengthened. The ECB now has meaningful say in triggering resolutions 
and can facilitate early interventions.  As long as the Governing Council stands as its most 
powerful organ, such spill-over will remain unacceptable to many NoPS. At the very least, 
the SRB needs to have the ability to meaningfully object to the ECB’s decision to intervene 
early, through a quick and timely procedure. If a dispute arises, it could be handled by the 
above-mentioned appeal and review panel. Furthermore, the Single Rulebook and the 
supervisory technical standards should remain the sole responsibility of the EBA, and the 
ECB should be more restricted in its attempts to influence their content.  
 
9. A convention that the Governing Council interferes less 
Another solution would be to reduce the impact that the Governing Council has on the 
practical level. Currently, the Supervisory Board can only propose decisions which must 
ultimately be adopted by the Governing Council. As Moloney observed, the default scenario 
is silent assent of the Governing Council, but it can nevertheless object in a time-limited 
manner, in which case a Mediation Panel intervention can be requested by the NCAs.1177 This 
convention could be strengthened, ensuring that the Governing Council would only interfere 
under exceptional circumstances. That solution would not go very far, however. The 
Governing Council bares the ultimate responsibility for the actions of the ECB, which creates 
conflicting pressures with respect to accountability. The Governing Council cannot be a 
figurehead or a passive organ in any system involving the ECB. 
 
10. Unwillingness to bail out non-interconnected States 
As my research in Chapter 5 has indicated, important concerns relate to having to bail 
out banks in otherwise not interconnected States, and creation of direct pathways of liquidity 
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into the economies where such need is the most likely to arise through the SRF. Such 
economies tend to have credit institutions with a high percentage of non-performing loans. 
The reluctance to partake in the SRM in turn incentivises banking sector nationalism and 
regionalism, which are - from the perspective of the Single Market - undesirable. There is no 
single solution to this problem, but a set of measures could alter the balance of incentives and 
disincentives.  
Alexander recalls that in 2013, Germany and France proposed an alternative single 
resolution mechanism, established on the basis of existing EU treaties, based around a single 
resolution board consisting entirely of national resolution authorities who would have had 
powers to act expeditiously.1178 With the supranational element weakened and the influence 
of the NRAs increased, some NoPS might be more comfortable with taking part. While it is 
too late to change the SRM structure into this model (and there are important reasons why it 
was not adopted), strengthening the positions of the NRAs individually, (or collectively as 
part of the SRB) would go a long way. A reduction of the ECB’s impact on resolution 
decisions should be a part of this set of measures.  
The second leg of the solution would involve changes to existing legislation, seeking to 
provide incentives for States and banks to create exposures across the EU, including other 
Member States’ sovereign debt. That would eventually result in greater market cohesion, as 
well as deepen the collective interest in the stability of the banking markets in other States 
and regions.  
One of the possible examples of such changes could include alterations to capital 
requirements legislation. In Chapter 2 I discussed a number of provisions in the CRR/CRD 
package allowing a number of questionable exemptions from the large exposures limit, which 
includes intra-group exposures, assets constituting claims on governments, central banks or 
public sector entities.1179 A further exemption is for government bonds and asset items 
constituting claims on regional governments or local authorities. This makes a big difference, 
as otherwise credit institutions are prohibited from creating exposures exceeding 25% of their 
capital to a single counterparty or a group of counterparties.1180 As discussed in Chapter 1, 
the vicious cycle of the GFC was largely linked to disproportionate bank exposures to central 
governments of their own home States. If an exposure limit was imposed on claims on the 
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national governments of the States where the banks have established presence, they would be 
forced to look into government-backed claims in other Member States. As the market would 
become more integrated, the NoPS would also develop a greater interest in the broader EU 
banking sector health, which would make the contributions to the SRF, as well as the costs of 
the SSM, more palatable. This stick should obviously come with a carrot. Although fiscal 
union is not (currently) on the cards, an agreement on tax incentives could still be reached, 
encouraging exposures to claims on governments and public bodies in other Member States, 
including sovereign debt.  
Such exposures would contribute to blurring the distinction between the NoPS and the 
Eurozone States, as well as the ‘peripheries’ and the more ‘resilient’ banking markets. The 
Euro States are already indirectly exposed to other Euro States through shared currency - an 
element of the ‘inconsistent quartet’ that the NoPS lack. Any measure that would deepen the 
interconnectedness between the NoPS and the SSM/SRM States (while presenting notable 
short-term dangers) would also produce participation incentives.  
 
11. Return to integration through law 
Micklitz argued that the EBU is a culmination of a process whereby “integration 
through law was gradually replaced by “integration through governance.” 1181 One of the 
ways to restore the NoPS trust in the EBU agenda would be to return to integration through 
law. This could also help modify the Single Rulebook in a way that would make the 
attainment of the goals of the SSM and SRM easier. Generally, that would mean removing 
some of the flexibility enjoyed by the ECB, the NCAs and the States. However, since all 
three would need to make sacrifices, that (in theory) should not create further power 
imbalances.  
Carmassi et al. proposed what they called an “American-style” system, with capital 
weakness indicators to signal the need for corrective action, based on a set of thresholds 
corresponding to remedial actions of increasing intensity, coupled with a mandatory 
supervisory action when the thresholds are crossed. They point out that the adoption of such 
system was discussed by the Basel Committee but never agreed upon.1182 This idea is 
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generally half-implemented in the EBU, as the thresholds give supervisors the power to act, 
but the legislation falls short of creating an outright obligation.  
Babis  proposed further harmonisation of the rules themselves, taking place on two 
levels: Level 1 comprising of fully harmonised prudential requirements, technical rules and 
methodologies (e.g. calculation of capital, definition of capital instruments, approaches to 
group consolidation, statistical models, reporting requirements and methods), and level 2, 
comprising rules where some margin is left for national adjustments: e.g. waivers, 
adjustments to macroprudential and systemic requirements, or even adjustments to minimum 
prudential requirements as a result of supervisory review.1183  The objective would be not to 
eliminate all divergence, but rather to harmonise supervisory practices.1184   
 Another improvement, this time linked to the SSM itself, would be to recognise 
classifications as credit institutions in national law. While this might disturb the surface of the 
playing field, it could also give the States more say in what they see as concerning and in 
need of the ECB’s attention. On a related note, more attention should also be paid to the track 
record of the institution in question, as the case is in many national jurisdictions, especially 
since one such factor – ESM support – is taken into account. While this suggestion might 
appear to go against the premise of legal certainty - it does not. Recognising the entities’ 
history and national classifications, while an imperfect solution, is preferable to having two 
overlapping regimes. 
Most importantly, the definitions of micro and macro prudential supervision and 
regulation need to be clearly stipulated in primary legislation. While such stipulation has its 
downsides, as discussed in Chapter 2, it would nevertheless mitigate legal uncertainty and 
reduce jurisdictional competition.  
 
12. Demarcating the limits to ECB’s discretion 
In order to return to integration through law, ECB’s discretion in relation to its 
expanding powers should be curbed. The situation regarding the ECB’s ability to draw any 
institution into its domain is unsatisfactory. In principle, the SSM - and consequently the 
SRM - is based on a system of separation by significance, which, as the L-Bank decision 
discussed in Chapter 2(C) shows, can be quite easily overridden by the ECB’s discretion. The 
only counter argument the NCAs have is that there are particular circumstances because of 
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which the “supervision of a significant entity by the national authorities would enable the 
objectives pursued by [SSMR] to be better achieved” by the NCA.1185 This is an 
unrealistically high standard, which only works if the ECB agrees with the NCA on the issue, 
as the NCA would find it very difficult prove that in court. However, the home State can then 
use political influence to exclude a specific entity using Art.1(2) SSMR by amending the 
CRD, which has been done in relation to L-Bank itself. As things stand, the leading judicial 
authority on the demarcation of jurisdictions between the NCAs and the ECB prescribes the 
outcome which is de facto not the outcome of the dispute which gave rise to that litigation. 
That is a mind boggling maze which, albeit not uncommon in the complex and intricate EBU 
legal framework, leads to unjustifiable legal uncertainty. As a consequence, the most 
important exemptions happen on the basis of lobbying and political pressure, likely favouring 
large Eurozone States’ banks.  
Mills has observed that subsidiarity as an EU legal doctrine is subject to periodical 
constitutional renegotiation,1186 where the settlement is achieved “through a legal rule or 
political negotiation,” allocating a competence exclusively to the States or to the 
supranational level, and justifying such allocation.1187 Dynamic elements in such settlement 
make the basis of such justification difficult to pin down. While, through complex 
manoeuvring and legal jargon, it is possible to uphold such arrangement on the legal level, on 
the political level the NoPS retaining temporal flexibility or unwilling to adopt the Euro are 
right to be sceptical. A solution, which will eventually be necessary, is for the EU to stipulate 
clear demarcation between the domains of the NCAs and the ECB, which should take the 
form of an unambiguous statement in the amendment to the SSMR and SSMFR. Such 
legislative statement should take place, even if the ECB’s domain is absolute. In fact, in such 
case it is even more imperative.  
 
13. Bilateral agreements  
The EU has a long history of establishing cooperation with other parties through the so-
called bilateral agreements. That is yet another legal avenue that enhanced cooperation could 
take, but their uses are limited. Bilateral agreements are not something that the EU could 
enter into with its own Member States. They could, however, be used to formalise and 
strengthen the cooperation with EEA States, Switzerland and the UK.  
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It is worth exploring such agreements as an alternative to the memoranda of 
understanding, currently in place for cooperation with the NoPS and third countries. Unlike 
the memoranda, bilateral agreements are legally binding and have the status of an 
international treaty. They would, notably, impose reciprocal obligations on the ECB, EU and 
possibly the Member States, so they would need to be entered into by the EU as a whole. 
While, as mentioned, they cannot be used for the NoPS, bilateral agreements could be an 
option for cooperation with the EEA States. The current EEA Agreement does not establish 
binding provisions in all sectors of the internal market or in other policies under the EU 
Treaties. In particular, its binding provisions do not concern the EMU and some aspects of 
the financial services policy.1188 Bilateral agreements could, in theory, go beyond that.  
Notably, these agreements would need to take a different form from the ones currently 
in use, such as the ones facilitating the cooperation and trade with Switzerland. The Swiss 
agreements are bound by the so-called guillotine clause: terminating any of the agreements 
terminates them all. Such clause would obviously be unacceptable in the banking oversight 
context, and the supervisory cooperation or resolution planning agreements would need to 
stand as separate international treaties. It is questionable whether the political will needed for 
such arrangement can be harnessed.  
 
14. Riding the waves of natural processes 
Some of the problems stemming from non-participation can be solved through more 
nuanced use of ongoing processes in the market, rather than legislative reforms. In some 
sense they are not measures in their own right, but rather utilisation of the effects of existing 
measures. 
Schimmelfennig and Winzen’s analysis suggested that differentiated integration 
becomes self-reinforcing if a shock hitting a differentially integrated area affects the insiders 
more than the outsiders, forcing “the insiders to press ahead with integration.”1189  They 
further reasoned that “if insiders and outsiders were equally affected, we would not see a 
widening gap; if outsiders were more affected than insiders, we might even observe 
convergence.”1190 Notably, if the insiders could efficiently deal with the shock without 
having to integrate further, insiders and outsiders would not diverge.1191  From that it can be 
reasoned even further, that any improvement in European banking supervision and resolution 
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planning, even within the Eurozone, increases the likelihood of convergence, if it ensures 
financial stability, and thus prevents a shock. Therefore, any measure that strengthens 
financial stability is in itself a countermeasure to disintegration. As the findings presented in 
Chapter 5 illustrate, the level of non-performing loans is an important variable in the 
participation decision. Hypothetically, at the moments where the Eurozone State (particularly 
peripheral) NPLs are low and the NoPS’ NPLs are relatively high, strong centripetal forces 
would be created. Notably, that needs to be achieved through sustainable banking practices, 
not artificial processes created by the ECB’s activity.  
The consequent membership of a couple influential NoPS could create a further 
centripetal effect, as being one of – hypothetically – three remaining NoPS might not be 
comfortable. While that would give those remaining NoPS a massive say in the EBA, such 
privileges could turn out to be temporary.  
Furthermore, even if centripetal tendencies do not manifest in signing of the CCA, if 
present, they can lead to a certain degree of convergence through less tangible influences. For 
example, Spendzharova and Bayram have found evidence that despite Sweden’s decision to 
opt-out, the implementation of the EBU structures in the Baltic States “significantly affects 
the decision-making scope of Swedish and other home supervisors.”1192 There is a further 
notable tendency of legislative convergence. For example, Hungary rushed to mirror the 
SRM resolution system as soon as it started becoming clear what it was going to look like.1193 
Even Norway promptly adopted the EBU capital requirements legislation. The Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance subsequently issued a regulation on the identification of systemically 
important financial institutions in Norway, largely mirroring the SSM methodology.1194 DNB 
ASA, Nordea Bank Norge ASA, and Kommunalbanken AS were designated as ‘systemically 
important’. 
Public and private stakeholders also had some influence on the recent convergence (and 
divergence) processes after the launch of the EBU. Nordea’s calculated move into the 
Eurozone indicates that the EBU is attractive to at least some market participants. Such 
moves can also change the financial stability outlook for particular participating States. As a 
consequence of Nordea’s move, neither NoPS nor EEA banks pose a threat to the Finish 
banking sector, since Nordea’s move from Sweden to Finland effectively ‘moved’ ¼ of the 
Finish market share entirely into the EBU. Consequently, 70% of the Finish market is 
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controlled by three largest ECB-supervised domestic entities. It should be noted, however, 
that Nordea’s move to Finland, significant as it was, has not triggered a wave of EBU-bound 
exodus or altered Sweden’s position towards the EBU. While the Eurozone might be slightly 
more attractive to some institutions, the non-EBU States also have their advantages, and so 




This thesis sought to explain why most non-Eurozone Member States of the EU have so 
far chosen not to participate in the European Banking Union. The explanation comprises 
political, economic and legal domains, all firmly intertwined with each other. As this research 
has indicated, there is no single answer. However, through legal and politico-economic 
structural analysis, I have developed a methodology allowing for an informed assessment. 
Before concluding on the findings based on this assessment, it is important to stress that 
the completion and expansion of the European banking Union is of paramount importance to 
the EU long term, if European banking market is to ever become fully self-sustainable and 
shock-absorbent. As Ferran and Babis expressed it “there are hard-nosed pragmatic 
considerations as well as genuine high-minded principles that lie behind the emphasis that 
has been placed on avoiding fragmentation of the internal market following the establishment 
of the SSM.”1195 According to Avgouleas and Arner, the EBU is inseparable from the 
completion of substantive regulatory reforms of the Single Market and the Single 
Rulebook.1196 
If that is the case, the processes leading to disintegration (and amplified by path-
dependency) need to be recognised, halted, or – at the very least - decelerated. The NoPS 
have many reasonable concerns, as well as their own unique sets of banking sector structural 
characteristics, all of which need to be accounted for. All of the analyses provided in this 
thesis lead to one overriding problem: congruence between the EMU and the EBU, which is 
unfavourable to non-EMU States, and has the potential to further distance them from 
participation. That is ultimately the conclusion of the historical analysis in Chapter 1, legal 
analysis of the pillars of the EBU in Chapter 2, analysis of the voluntary participation 
mechanics in Chapter 3, discussion of all individual NoPS in Chapter 4, and structural 
                                                 
1195 E Ferran, VSG Babis, The European Single Supervisory Mechanism, University of Cambridge Faculty of 
Law Research Paper No.10, 2013, p.22 
1196 E Avgouleas, DW Arner, The Eurozone debt crisis and the European Banking Union: A cautionary tale of 
failure and reform, The University of Edinburgh 2013, p.40 
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analysis of statistical data in Chapter 5. Even the (hesitant) memberships of Bulgaria and 
Croatia are not an outlier in this equation, as they only moved to sign the Close Cooperation 
Agreement when the EMU membership became a mid-term option.  
However, while the congruence between the EBU and the EMU is evident, it does not 
in itself determine the behaviour of individual NoPS. My research in Chapter 3 reveals that 
participation terms offered to non-Eurozone States put them at inherent disadvantage, but the 
effects of such disadvantage can be mitigated by altering legal measures. Moreover, my 
findings in Chapter 5 reveal that banking sector structural characteristics can ultimately 
determine how the Member State approaches participation, and how much the legal 
imperfections affect them. Subtle and informed legal changes can thus create a mosaic of 
incentives, which can encourage participation, especially if the economic cycle of the country 
in question presents suitable conditions for close cooperation.  
Decisive and informed action at this junction is very important. If the EBU continues as 
a manifestation of path-dependency, it will condition further differentiation, consequently 
producing spill-over effects, impacting future EU developments. The current levels of 
differentiation would undoubtedly threaten the future capital markets union, which will be 
particularly exposed to the EBU. The relationship between these unions will be an interesting 
strand for further research, for which the findings in this thesis could serve as a starting point.  
This Chapter therefore sought to provide solutions for legal reforms that could bridge 
the gap between the NoPS and the EMU States. A suitable combination of such measures 
could trigger natural processes leading to centripetal dynamic of gradual integration, and 
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